

URBAN SOCIOLOGY

FIFTH EDITION

WILLIAM G. FLANAGAN

IMAGES & STRUCTURE

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Preface

Since our subject matter is the city it is not difficult to find plenty to write about in each new edition of this textbook. Texts are tools of the teacher's trade, easier to do the job with than without. I am always happy to have another chance to update the work and see if the book can be made more useful to faculty and students. Once again, I have not changed the original conceptual framework of *Urban Sociology: Images and Structure*. I still focus on that which is essentially *of the* city, shaped by it, rather than simply listing the things that happen in it—a feature that I found lacking in some other texts and what originally moved me to write this one.

This edition continues the effort to assess the intersection of the forces of globalization and the social importance of local space, as represented by cities and spatial communities. Just as the city provided theorists trying to anticipate the future at the close of the nineteenth century with a major political, economic, and cultural theme, globalization provides the major puzzle today for those who are trying to understand what the new spatial dimensions of society will be as the forces of the twenty-first century reveal themselves. Despite this shift to a wider analytic arena, the broad outlines of issues and debates in urban sociology remain in place. An introduction to the field of urban sociology can no more dispense with the classical themes of Durkheim, Marx, and Weber now than in the past. In the time of Robert Park, the city was the great experimental laboratory; in the present era, the single global network of resources and market opportunities is the great experimental context. In Durkheim's time, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the question was, What does the city portend for the future? Today the question is, What does the economically restructured future hold for the cities of tomorrow? Yet there is a danger in overemphasizing the potential that the current economic and communications revolutions have for obliterating the importance of limited spatial arenas like cities. People still live lives in a particular locality; the consequences of shifting global enterprises are still experienced locally in the creation or loss of opportunities; and the local impact of global change is multiplied according to the number of people who occupy a limited space. The connection between urban conditions and the long waves of worldwide change is

not something new, but there is a new immediacy to their mutual influence that must be addressed by a text treating the topic of urban sociology at the present time. Here I have tried to establish a balance between my respect for the urban tradition in sociology and the urgency of the new agenda presented by an urban future that has already arrived—a balance between old questions of locality and new global concerns. It is my belief that a dynamic urban sociology continues to have a vital role to play within the general field of sociology, as it represents the subdiscipline concerned with many forms of spatial phenomena. Ours is the sociology that talks about what it means to connect the dots on a global field, as well as engaging in the old-fashioned questions of how cities make people think, feel, and treat each other.

Another major theme of this text involves the explicit recognition of the fact that there have been for some time two distinct orientations among urban sociologists; in fact, one could argue that there are two distinct urban sociologies. The heirs of Tönnies and Durkheim, of Weber and Simmel, and of Park and Wirth treat the urban arena as an independent variable, *sui generis*. This is the orientation that has been labeled the "urban tradition" here. Its practitioners are concerned with the phenomena that comprise *urbanism*, a characteristically urban way of thinking, relating, and behaving. They are *culturalists* in that they see the city giving rise to an analytically distinguishable way of life.

Largely independent of this tradition, a vigorous *political economy* of cities has emerged, which argues that urban places are the manifestation of wider patterns of power and wealth. This *structuralist* argument holds that the ultimate causes of the patterns of thought, behavior, and organization that are characteristic of urban places lie beyond the urban environment. The cities themselves are not the cause: they are merely secondary causal factors. Events that take place in the urban arena require a perspective that is international in scope that extends its analysis to worldwide issues of policy and economic trends.

This text then is an effort to bring the field of urban sociology into sharper focus. There is no effort here to oversimplify the issues that are being debated today by urban scientists. In fact, every effort has been made to clearly explain these debates. I have interpreted my job in writing this book to do justice to both the culturalist and the structuralist arguments. It will probably be apparent to the professional reader and the discerning student that I am persuaded by the structuralist point of view. I remain fascinated by life and social action as it is produced within the urban arena, however, and continue to identify myself as an urban sociologist.

I would be happy to hear from readers. Please send comments or suggestions to me at wflanaga@coe.edu

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Introduction

This book has been conceived with two purposes in mind. The first purpose is to provide the student of urban sociology with a text that incorporates certain unifying themes, tying together the various subject matters that are treated by urban sociologists. The second purpose, very much related to the first, is to indicate that there is a distinct area of sociological enquiry having to do with cities and their wider effects. That study calls for a separate, specialized division within the social sciences with its own particular subject matter and perspectives. However, to remain viable, urban sociology must be peculiarly adaptive, because the pattern of human settlement is constantly changing. It is increasingly evident that large and small population centers are interwoven culturally, politically, and economically in a common spatial system. The field of study traditionally known as urban sociology must adapt its analytical schemes to accommodate this new pattern of integrated space and to become more than strictly urban in its focus. It is a fascinating conceptual challenge that now faces the students of urban studies.

The conceptual challenge offered by urban sociology is to identify a discrete subject matter that is different from the subject matter studied by sociologists in other subdisciplines (e.g., political or economic sociology, social stratification, minority and ethnic studies). A reasonable requirement for any science is that it must be able to say more or less precisely what it is it is studying, what it is that sets that particular perspective on the world apart from the work of other similar social sciences with similar or overlapping interests. In the case of urban sociology, this remains something of a challenge.

Consider the subject, *urban*. What is and what is not included? Where do cities and their various influences begin and where do they end? For example, consider the circumstances of a Midwestern farmer in contrast with the situation of a resident of a run-down apartment building in Boston, Massachusetts. The farmer may be regularly counted among the big-city residents of the United States by the Census Bureau if the farmstead happens to fall within one of the bureau's Metropolitan Statistical Areas, as many farmsteads do. The farmer's economic future will be determined in boardrooms and legislatures located in big cities where decisions are made about agricultural commodity prices, international trade, credit availability and interest rates, and other mat-

ters of vital interest to agricultural businesspeople. It may be determined by exurban real estate developers, the World Bank, or decisions on trade arrived at by the European Commission of the European Union meeting in Brussels or Strasbourg. These elements can be seen as important *urban* dimensions of the farmer's circumstances. At the same time, research done in Boston has demonstrated that some urban residents, whose social worlds are encapsulated in intense networks of ethnicity and kinship, may be better understood as villagers than as urbanites (Gans [1962] 1982). The point is that even though we may have a fairly clear image in mind when we think of the "city," its margins or the limits of its influences are difficult to establish, so the urban concept remains problematic. Hence the difficulty of the question: What is (and what isn't) the appropriate subject matter of urban sociology? Some of the difficulty of answering the question stems from the fact that what we are trying to identify is in part a place, the city, and in part a set of social processes, with radiating influences that originate in but carry far beyond these central and densely peopled spaces. Some urban influences are organizational (having to do with social complexity), some are cultural (influences on ways of thinking and behaving), and some political (dealing with spatial aspects of relationships of power and control).

In the following chapters, we will attempt to disentangle the multiple kinds of social phenomena that are associated with the urban form. In the end, we will not have a comprehensive theoretical definition to offer, but we will have a clearer idea of the various dimensions and the complexity of urban influences. Urban sociology overlaps and shares the subject matters of a number of other sociological subfields and traditions. Urban sociologists address themselves to issues in social stratification, small groups, formal organization, the family, modernization and economic development, and political and even rural sociology. Our discussion will review and draw upon the various theoretical traditions in sociology, as well as borrow from scholarship in anthropology, economics, geography, history, political science, and political economy. In working with any of these areas, the questions will always be the same: What aspect of the behavior or relationship in question is the outcome of urban influences? Can an independent urban effect or contributing urban cause be established? The test is this: Apart from behaviors or relationships that take place *within* cities, is there a range of behaviors, processes, or relationships generated or influenced *by* the urban arena? That is, we are not necessarily interested here in things that happen in cities but in things that are of the city, whether or not they take place wholly within cities. This is what is taken to be the legitimate domain of urban sociology in this text. At times we will find it necessary in this urban sociology to speak of farmers as well as urban villagers. Often we will step beyond the urban arena to address the global origins of many urban phenomena. City space is continuous with all aspects of global space: Economic, political, cultural, and environmental concerns draw our attention away from the city to global events and back again as we struggle to identify those aspects of a changing world that belong to the domain of urban science.

THE DIVISION OF URBAN SOCIOLOGY: CULTURALIST AND STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES

One characteristic of urban sociology that will become evident in the following chapters is the variety of approaches taken by its various students. These can,

however, be divided into two major orientations: those that explore the cultural, organizational, and social psychological consequences stemming from urban life and those that are concerned with the wider economic and political context within which cities exist. The first orientation deals with people's experiences in cities, while the second asks how cities figure in the distribution of wealth and power within and between societies. The terms that have been chosen to express the distinction between the two general approaches are reflected in the title of this text: *Urban Sociology: Images and Structure*. Social scientists who are part of the tradition that explores the impact of the urban form on experience are concerned with formulating appropriately complex *images* of the city. These urban sociologists are often referred to as *culturalists* because of their emphasis on the experiential aspect of life in cities. In any society, the urban arena generates values and styles of its own that vary from the values and styles evident in nonurban settings. Culturalists address how urban life feels, how people react to living in the urban arena, and how the city organizes personal lives. In contrast, those who investigate the interplay between political and economic forces and the growth, decline, and changing spatial organization of urban space are concerned primarily with urban *structure*. These sociologists are appropriately referred to as *structuralists*. They see cities as the physical embodiment of political and economic relationships. Their argument is that cities themselves are an effect of more fundamental forces, that they are shaped by social powers that affect all aspects of human existence. In the structuralist view, an accurate assessment of the effects of urban life on people needs to begin with the understanding that the urban environment is a product of a set of broader causal factors. Any comprehensive discussion of urban sociology must address both the images of the cultural emphasis and structural models.

ORGANIZATION OF THE TEXT

The order in which topics are presented in the text reflects the general division between the two approaches. Chapters 1, 3, and 4 deal largely with life in cities and the efforts of social scientists and others to understand that mode of existence. In these chapters, the questions of how people experience urban space, what has become of people's sense of community, and whether cities impoverish or enrich social life are discussed. Chapters 6 through 10 generally focus on the interplay between urban and wider political and economic patterns. Chapter 5, at the center of the text, contrasts the study of ethnicity (a largely cultural expression of group identity) with the study of majority and minority social statuses (a primarily structural matter of group assignment) as these topics relate to the urban environment, and it provides an appropriate transition to the remaining chapters. The final chapter reviews where we have come in urban sociology and examines the relevance of urban sociology in a globalized world.

The emphasis in each of the chapters is as follows. Chapter 1 emphasizes the ways urban space alters experience. Chapter 2 presents a history of the emergence, growth, and transformation of the urban form. It introduces the various dimensions of the process of urbanization and concludes with an introduction to the urban dimensions of the process of globalization. In chapter 3, we explore a rich theoretical tradition in urban sociology that attempts to describe the impact of an increasingly

urbanized world on the quality of social life. Chapter 4 describes processes of social conflict and cohesion as they are influenced by the urban environment. Here we find that the differences that separate us from each other also propel us into organizations and coalitions with those who share similar interests and objectives. As noted, chapter 5 considers the place of ethnic and minority studies within urban sociology. The fact that distinct ethnic identities and minority groups are present and highly visible in cities is not enough to warrant special attention in an urban sociology course or textbook. According to the way we have defined the relevant subject matter, the emergence of ethnic and minority groups must in some way be affected by urban forces—either generated or altered by them—in order for these group processes to gain consideration. Chapter 5 demonstrates this kind of connection.

Chapters 6 through 10 provide an analysis of the economic and political forces associated with urban growth and change. As an economic and political force, the city constitutes a paradox. In chapter 6, it emerges as a dominant agent in the processes of economic underdevelopment and development; as a magnet for wealth and power, too often a greedy giant; and as a center of comfort and privilege for a few in the Third World, where poverty and hunger remain the by-products of uneven patterns of economic growth. By contrast, as chapter 7 progresses, many of the great urban centers of the United States will be seen to wither as they are transformed from the central arenas of the industrial age into deindustrialized and depopulated shadows of their former selves, relics of a bygone era, often only to regenerate, in a modified form, once again. Chapter 8 will then describe the ways in which cities *still* dominate the economic landscape as centers of regional or metropolitan community. The chapter presents the fundamental theoretical division that separates ecological and political economy interpretations of urban growth and change. The issues raised in chapters 7 and 8 lead to the conclusion that the scope of study for understanding the major processes of urban growth, change, and decline needs to be expanded. The increasing rationalization of productive factors over the surface of the globe requires us to cast our spatial analysis at the regional, national, and international levels.

Chapters 9 and 10 survey the attitudes and policies of the state toward its cities. Chapter 9 outlines the dimensions of poverty, political power, and crime as major policy issues. Chapter 10 presents a historical overview of urban policy and planning strategies, from early days when planners thought in terms of visions of the ideal future and the grand scheme through the disillusionment with U.S. programs in the 1960s and 1970s. It concludes with an update of policy in the United States and contrasts it with policy in selected countries outside the United States.

The concluding chapter considers the current state of the field of urban sociology. It reviews what culturalists and structuralists have taught us with their very different questions about the nature and consequences of urban life. And the chapter looks forward to how the urban arena and urban sociology appear still to offer important insights into the spatial dimensions of a world shaped by global forces, including those of cyberspace, transnationalism, and international terrorism.

1

An Invitation to Urban Studies

Cities have a mind-altering quality. They speed you up, they lower inhibitions, space has a different energy, images jump. Not all urban spaces are equally like this, but certain large public arenas in the centers of large metropolises full of people—truly urban spaces—are. The anonymity of public spaces teeming with strangers invites people to play identity games, to pass themselves off as something they are not, to try on altered identities. They offer the opportunity for the adventure of dropping your routine guard against interacting with strangers and to experiment instead with chance encounters. Cities allow you—require you—to make your way among a broad range of others, as they provide the context that offers up the richest array of diversity and freedoms available (Lofland 1985, 163–71). But this is no neutral territory; it may present its own unruly encounter to the unwary wanderer, so you have to be ready for the potential "rough adventure of the street" (Charyn 1987), a tense confrontation, an aggressive intrusion on your personal space: This is a prospect that attracts some modern-day adventurers and repels others who want to keep their urban experience under control and at a distance.

For tens of millions of poor people in wealthy nations, the city is a different kind of adventure: a lifelong struggle to get an adequate diet, shelter, education, and medical attention in overcrowded public clinics and to get by in built-for-profit environments featuring the highest costs of living in the world. For hundreds of millions of people in the poorest countries of the world, cities promise hope and deliver on the promise in every shade of good and ill fortune imaginable, from lavish comfort to a daily bitter struggle for the barest existence. For more than five thousand years, the city is the place where the greatest intensity of human experience, the biggest stories of change, and the most significant events of history have been anchored. This is our subject matter.

CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES IN UNDERSTANDING URBAN SPACE

Sociologists study the structural elements of society. Structural elements include the class system that determines the ways that some people are advantaged while others are disadvantaged, the political system that has to do with who holds power and what they do with it, and ongoing institutional arrangements, such as the form the family takes in a given era. In the field of sociology, we are interested in the ways that these structural elements come into being and change. Ultimately, we are interested in the consequences of structural arrangements for the way people think and behave.

Our study in this volume is *urban* sociology, one of the many subdivisions of the broad field of sociology. In urban sociology, we focus on just one aspect of society, a certain kind of physical environment, how it is produced, and the social consequences that result. The premise of urban sociology is that urban environments have identifiable consequences regarding the ways that people experience themselves and others, the way they interact, and the way their lives are organized. To identify a subfield of sociology as urban sociology, we are thereby proposing a hypothesis: Something called *urban* is a sociological variable that affects people in systematic and identifiable ways. Urban sociology is the field of scientific study that seeks to discover those systematic causes and effects.

The study of cities involves many conceptual challenges, but it is an exciting and worthwhile intellectual enterprise. What we are setting out to discover—the city and its influence—is all around and therefore difficult to see. It is part of who we are, just as we are part of it. We subscribe to urban styles and ideas; we are its models and agents, spreading its influences as we act and speak. It may be difficult to see this at first, but that is because, unlike previous generations, we in Western society have little that is nonurban with which to contrast it.

One of the key features of any science is an almost obsessive attention to terms and definitions, and in urban sociology we immediately run into a problem. It may surprise you to learn that urban sociology has some difficulty defining what is meant by *urban*. In part, the difficulty has to do with the complexity of the structure we are trying to define; in part, it has to do with the emotional response of people to the idea of the city. First, regarding complexity, keep in mind that when we say we are going to study *the city*, we are referring to a matrix of structures and activities that comprise one of the largest and most complex forms of social organization. Unlike other complex structures, the city has no formally defined central organizational structure. We make a distinction here between two kinds of organization in order to make this point. One kind of organization is *enacted*; the other kind comes into being through a *crescive* process (Warren [1963] 1972).

An example of an enacted organization would be a large automobile manufacturing and sales corporation. We say it is enacted because it is planned as a unit from the beginning, and while its organizational structure may expand and become more complex over time, these changes are deliberate and planned out. No matter how large and varied the work of the company becomes, there will be a formal organizational chart and a company handbook that traces the specified relationship between bureaucratic positions from executive board members down through production-line workers. The body of rules and regulations gives overall coherence

to such disparate activities as research and development, marketing and advertising, sales and financing, worldwide manufacturing operations and subcontracting, quality control, and dealing with lawsuits resulting from product failures. Whatever new directions it may take, the company remains a formal organization with clearly defined lines of communication and command.

Now think of how the organization of the city differs from that of the corporation. Is there an organizational chart that identifies the status and set of relationships of every individual involved in some way with a particular city? Such a chart exists for city government with its many agencies and branches, but this is not the unit we are trying to understand. When we say that cities come into being crescively, we are saying that their elements emerge gradually, over time, and that the interrelationships among their many parts are not due to formal deliberation so much as to spontaneous accommodations among the different parts and individuals. That is, if we take the sum total of activities carried out and lives lived in the city, what we have is an arena of action where no one is totally aware and no authorities are totally in charge of how the whole thing operates or even how it holds together. In reaching for a way to express this kind of organization of space and human activity, Long (1958) offered the image of "an ecology of games." Games are the things that people do—for a living, for recreation, for gaining and maintaining shelter, in generally going about their business. *Ecology*, an important concept in urban sociology that we will discuss from time to time in this text, is used here similarly to the way biologists use it. It refers to a natural order that has been worked out over time among various organisms, a process that allows a variety of life-forms to use the same environment in mutually beneficial ways.

This is a useful metaphor in thinking about how people use the urban environment and how that environment is ordered, so long as we remember not to overemphasize harmony and balance to the exclusion of conflict and exploitation. In an ecology, big ones eat little ones, and the powerful grow sleek off the weak (eventually microorganisms gobble up all else, but here we reach the limits of our analogy). Urban environments harbor long-standing conflicts, sudden confrontations, distractions, and discontinuities. The city is an arena, a place in which the balance of elements often involves a standoff among antagonists. Law enforcement and crime, political protest and routine acts of government, fundamentalist religious practices and pornography mills, the industrial production of environmental toxins and community discussions of environmental goals—these are all "games," very serious games, that take place side by side in an arena that makes room for all of them and holds them in tension with one another.

Related to the challenge of understanding the informal structure of cities is the fact that the urban arena lacks physical or spatial closure. The nature of the city is such that it has no natural boundaries or limits; it is peculiarly open-ended. Standing at the center of a large city, an individual can easily see the physical evidence of the city and perceive the life around as characteristically urban in quality. That is not the challenge in establishing the unit of space that makes up the subject of study here. The challenge comes because the sociological consequences of the city reach far beyond the space that we identify as characteristically urban. Although the heights of buildings and density of structures typically diminish as we move away from central cities, through their suburbs and into the open countryside, we have not reached the limits of urban influence when we can no longer see the city skyline on the horizon. Electronic

media, city newspapers, urban lifestyle, and political and economic domination emanate from built-up population centers. Culturally, politically, and economically, the city has no geographic limits in a rapidly urbanizing world.

A further difficulty in conceptualizing the urban form is the fact that cities and the nature of urban life vary among societies. Also, urban places look and operate differently within the same society at different points in history. As we think about how to define the city and urban life, we need to remember to make the definition broad enough to encompass the ancient cities of prehistory, the walled cities of the Renaissance, the cities of the Industrial Revolution, the cities of less-developed countries, and the sprawling modern metropolitan centers of economic activity. Not surprisingly, it has proven difficult to formulate a single definition of the urban form that applies with equal validity cross-culturally and historically to all those places in the world that we would like to recognize as having urban qualities.

There is one final difficulty in defining what we mean by urban, and this has to do with the kinds of effects the city has on people. The public reacts emotionally to cities, and this colors what they think the social consequence of urban life is. Maybe we think that urban life is faster, colder, cooler, socially richer, morally corrupting, spiritually uplifting, and more exciting and therefore either more attractive or more off-putting than life in nonurban places. What we understand as *urban qualities* means different things to different people. People tend to feel strongly, emotionally, about cities, about certain areas of cities, and about their own versus other cities or neighborhoods. The way we feel about cities influences what we "know" about cities, and we may believe so strongly in our emotionally stoked vision that we resist learning other things. This is not the ideal condition under which to conduct science, where differing, strongly held opinions vie with evidence, but it makes for interesting arguments. Is life in the city cold and heartless? Yes. Is it warm and richly human? Yes. Is it a place where people become lost, isolated, or are alone? Yes. Is it a great place to build a wonderful social life? Yes. Is it the dominant pulsating engine of the international economy that gathers in enormous wealth? Yes. Is it subject to unanticipated changes in global arrangements that can destroy the core of its local economy? Yes. The contradictions imbedded in these observations are not resolvable by research-based "facts." The evidence tells us that all of these statements are true. The city is a big place. A unique event occurred on a particular day in 2007 or 2008, when a child was born in one of the world's cities, or perhaps when someone moved to a city from a rural area. At that moment, for the first time in human existence, there were more people in cities worldwide than in rural areas. If the event occurred in mid-2008 that would mean about 3.4 billion people lived in the city on that day. The city is a big enough place to contain many contradictions.

In the remainder of the chapter, we set out to discover in an informal way some examples of how cities influence human experience and shape our thinking and behavior in subtle and not so subtle ways.

EXPERIENCING URBAN SPACE

In 1998 the American Psychological Association devoted most of the June issue of the journal *American Psychologist* to the theme *urban life*. This followed five years of

study by a task force set up by the association to study the effects of living in the city on people's mental health. Although it was recognized that urban life might have some beneficial effects, the impetus for the study was clearly a concern with the negative consequences of living in cities, including "alienation, demoralization, helplessness, hostility, substance abuse, distrust, isolation, apathy, marginalization and powerlessness" (Marsella, Wandersman, and Cantor 1998, 621). An extensive review of the international literature on the mental health consequences of life in urban and nonurban settings led to the conclusion that the beneficial effects of urban living, such as "intellectual and cultural growth and development, tolerance for diversity, and opportunity for social mobility" needed to be appreciated as well as the potential negative effects (Marsella 1998, 632). What interests us here is the operating assumption by professional psychologists that the urban environment produces a real and important impact on experience and the way people define reality. Cities probably affect us in an infinite number of ways. Here we consider a few.

Public Spaces and Human Behavior

When we think about the effects of cities on experience and behavior, we are most likely thinking in terms of the public spaces that characterize urban life. What marks these territories is the fact that, except for the occasional chance meeting of acquaintances, they are peopled by strangers. These are spaces where a certain social tension is inherent and where the successful negotiation of the environment depends on employing knowledge about how to conduct yourself and how to strategically move about in public (Lofland 1998, 28). As a competent participant, you need to be able to reach back into a half-articulated store of knowledge—of public- or street-lore—about how to move through crowds, what seat to choose in a bar or on a bus, how not to draw unwanted attention, the proper way to conduct yourself while standing in line waiting, how to react to someone who appears to need assistance, and how to recognize immediately threats to personal safety and what to do about them. Urban public space affects what we think and do. To the extent thought and behavior reflect who we are—our self-image, how we see ourselves in relationship to others—we are talking about an environment that is arguably of considerable importance for understanding ourselves.

Cities as Culture

If we step back to see what we are saying about cities, it is that cities, in producing their own cues for behavior and their own rules, are altering the cultural world in which we live. The effects of urban ways of life on personal styles, tastes, and attitude are not confined to cities. Given the prominent place of the urban environment in our imagination and the attention it draws to itself as the center of multiple fascinations, we see that the high-profile cultural influences present in the city are quickly communicated to the rest of society. The influences take many shapes and speak in many voices. Zukin (1995) identified some of these. "The cultures of cities certainly include ethnicities, lifestyles, and images—if we take into account the concentration of all kinds of minority groups in urban populations, the availability and variety of consumer goods, the diffusion through the mass media of style. Cities are

the sites of culture industries, where artists, designers, and performers produce and sell their creative work" (264). In fact, cities represent a multifaceted environment where different messages about the basic nature of urban culture—the symbolic significance of The City—compete with one another.

What do cities symbolize? According to Zukin, there is the message of danger, in part a product of the popular media image of the city as a dangerous place, but reinforced in everyday urban experience by such symbols as the presence of armed security guards employed to set aside "safe" spaces. How do we interpret places outside the perimeter set up for the safety of shoppers and strollers, the "other" city? Concerns about security permeate the consciousness and conversations of urban residents and visitors alike. The high visibility of minority and immigrant groups within urban populations has given another symbolic element to the meaning of the city. Cities are the place of beginnings, of cultural transitions, where generations of immigrant cultural others struggle to make peace with the host culture. And cities are places where cultural differences often do not melt down, where assimilation is blocked, where disadvantage becomes in some measure permanent, where prejudice and discrimination against some categories of outsider become chronic, and minority groups settle into pockets of social exclusion. Some of the messages broadcast from the city to the wider society reflect elements of inner-city minority cultures, which grow rich as expressive traditions of art and music with themes that grow out of poverty and economic isolation. The city's mainstream institutes of high culture, such as museums and performance centers, find themselves arguing publicly that *they* represent the true cultural expression of the city, not the life of the streets and alternative cultures that occasionally gain a strong and audible voice, such as that expressed through the popularity of hip hop. At the same time, the rising number of immigrants from new origins—from Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean—transform the neighborhoods and streets of wealthy European and U.S. cities by setting up new market areas evocative of Third World themes. These exotic images compete with other urban themes for a place in shaping the meaning of the city, influencing the self-portrait that the city presents to the world in general, a world that invariably looks to the city to learn what is on the cutting edge of cultural change. Meanwhile, the wealth of the corporation has come to play a more visible role in what we experience as urban culture, making the corporation's presence felt through promotions and advertising in what was formerly public space. Public places—parks, squares, and other gathering places—have symbolically gone private, bear the logos and slogans of corporate sponsors, and at times are renamed in honor of their corporate benefactors (Zukin 1995, 265–67). We are reminded that the privatization of public spaces in city and suburb—as represented by shopping malls, gated communities, designated business improvement districts dominated by local commercial property and business owners, and other forms of privatized areas—has implications for the kinds of behaviors and expression that are permitted there. The interests that design and operate these spaces are intent on bringing the characteristic unpredictability of the urban environment under control, at least in those physical segments of the environment they dominate. Such control inevitably limits the freedom to act, to speak, even to be present if you fall into one of the categories of person deemed undesirable or unsightly (Kohn 2004). Cityspace is an arena that incorporates both

the little anarchies that anonymous crowded environments invite and the impulse to impose control over those tendencies.

The combination of all of these elements and many more play a part in informing our image of what the city means, and images of urban life exert an atmospheric influence on contemporary popular culture in general. Think of the streaming images of action and change that play through the channels of entertainment and information media, that play up the themes of style, of edginess, of sensuous experience, lavish lifestyle, the blurred edge of legitimacy and hustle. Can there be any question as to whether these images are urban in origin? In any world region, for at least the past five thousand years, the cultural future of the next generation was always taking shape in the cities. Cities influence our thinking and behavior in profound ways, whether or not we actually live within the city.

Structuring Personal Experience

For those who do live within the city, we can identify a number of ways that the built environment of urban space itself structures experience and behavior. Lynch's (1960) classic work systematically explained for the first time how cities manage the experience of their residents and visitors. In sum, the significance of Lynch's work is his identification and description of structural elements in the urban environment that channel both perception and movement. He identified five categories of physical elements: paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks. Paths are the channels people travel in moving about: They are important determinants of how individuals experience the city. Long-term residents will know several alternatives in going from place to place, leading through different neighborhoods and districts and opening to different experiences. Newcomers' experiences of the city will be more narrowly channeled, more restricted. Edges are barriers, usually linear, that hem in movement. Bodies of water, including rivers like the Charles in Boston, which can only be crossed at a limited number of points, tend to corral experience, holding it in on one side. Highways cutting through cities with limited over- or underpasses can work the same way. Districts are relatively large areas that have a somewhat cohesive quality, a theme or a characteristic feel. Boston's ethnic North End, with its narrow streets or fashionable Beacon Hill, is experienced as having a unified texture. The Chinatowns in lower Manhattan and San Francisco are particularly well-defined districts. Nodes are smaller public places that may best be thought of in terms of junctions or turning points, such as traffic circles, squares, or major mass transit exchange or transfer points. They may also be points at which people congregate. One might find no better example than the *piazzas* of Italian cities, where people returning home from work or classes in the evening engage in the *passeggiata*, a slow, stylized amble, ideally accompanied by a well-dressed other or at least an engaged cell phone. The plaza, with streets radiating outward from it, is a place of many crossings, a place to linger, to see and be seen, to savor city life. Nodes are distinguished from Lynch's last element of physical structure, the landmark. The landmark is an outstanding feature of the visual cityscape, a marker that helps anchor the individual's mental map of the city. More prominent than the Italian *piazza* is likely to be the dome of the cathedral or public building that stands at the edge of the broad public space, commanding the local scene. Los Angeles has its Civic

Center, Boston the Old North Church and Faneuil Hall, New York the Empire State Building. What distinguishes landmarks is that most people usually pass them by rather than entering them, experiencing them as external markers.

Lynch's approach to understanding urban space has interesting implications. One is that each of us carries a somewhat different image (social construction) of the city around inside of us, even though the broad outlines are shared among many. The newcomer lives in a different city from that of the long-time resident, in this sense, because of the fragmentary experience of the city. It follows that even among long-term residents, different perceptions of the city are bound to exist because people who live in different sections will travel different paths framed by different edges through different nodes past different landmarks and will become familiar with different districts. Thus, they carry a different image of the whole of the city in their heads. Also, Lynch made the point that cities have different degrees of *imageability*, the degree to which they lend themselves to being captured in the mind's eye. He compared three cities—Boston, Jersey City, and Los Angeles—and found that people had the easiest time mentally embracing Boston as a whole, due to its multiple identifiable districts, landmarks, and nodes. The residents of Jersey City emphasized the sameness of their different streets and neighborhoods, while Angelenos tried to hang onto the anchoring influence of the old city center as their city sprawled beyond the capacity of their imagination to contain it.

Placemark 1.1—Portland, Oregon: City with a Personality

The people of Portland love their city. The feeling appears to be irreducible to civic pride or boosterism. There's a kind of pervasive passionate awareness on the part of residents that they live in a special place, a place that has a consciously shared image, a personality that is the project of the people who live it. Portland is a cool place, and this is manifest in the behavior of its citizens, who in greater relative numbers than anywhere else use public transportation, embrace cycling as an effective commuter strategy, walk to shopping, recycle, greet strangers, support the preservation of land and green space, and watch vigilantly lest their special place be altered by less scrupulous agents of change. The city is perennially cited as the most cycling friendly in the United States, with laws designed to protect cyclists from motorists and 266 miles of designated bike routes. Estimates place the number of commuters who use bikes to get to and from work at between 16 percent and 25 percent. Portland may not be the only town to hold an annual naked bike ride on city streets (there are scores of cities worldwide that do) but their naked midnight ride is the largest. And for Portlanders recycling is not restricted to setting out paper, cardboard, plastic, and metal cans for curbside pickup: The first stop for do-it-yourself home improvement projects and contractors alike is the *neighborhood* construction materials reclamation warehouse, selling everything from recycled lumber to bathtubs. The personality of the city is reflected in the annual recycled materials fashion show where a remarkable array of discarded

materials are transformed into items of fashion runway "clothing" (www.junktofunk.org). Portland's personality is also present in the norm that urges wireless Internet subscribers to allow passwordless access to their neighbors. But it's not easy being green or staying green and funky. A city planner told the author that there is constant pressure by business interests and owners of commercial properties to relax restrictions on building and land use, and she said that planners and citizens alike worry about "how long the city will continue to be what it's been." There are strains in maintaining the ultraprogressive self-image. Large numbers of bikes and cars sharing city streets has led to conflict, reflecting militant right-to-the-road attitudes on the part of both classes of operators: Occasionally, serious clashes between motorists and cyclists occur (*Newsweek* Web exclusive July 28, 2008). The city has attracted a large number of homeless people, especially young people. Yet even here a unique urban personality is manifest in Dignity Village, an area set aside for homeless self-sheltering. The planning emphasis on preventing sprawl and increasing residential density through the construction of apartments and multiunit condominiums in predominantly single-family-home neighborhoods has not always been welcomed by long-term neighborhood residents. But even here the policy has had the effect of revitalizing old commercial pocket centers in these neighborhoods, putting services within walking distance of attractively restored shops, locally owned coffeehouses, and restaurants. These little centers are many and contribute to the personality of the city. For the most part, the usual urban chain-outlet retail establishments, which are characteristic of the generic urban environment of U.S. cities, are not found here. The "alternative" Portland is just Portland.

The Micro Order

Cities by their nature are large and complex structures. But some sociologists have oriented their study to smaller units of space within the urban environment. William H. Whyte is prominent among them. Whyte (1988) was an observer of incidental public behaviors, and so he became familiar with the kinds of public space that people were comfortable in and the kinds of spaces that thwarted sociable mingling. His careful and systematic observations of behavior yielded surprising results. Although people who work and live in the city might talk about longing for a break from the crowds, about getting away from it all, Whyte observed that people on their lunch hours and other breaks appeared to be drawn to other people, to crowded spaces. His work reveals that for people who are a part of them every day, crowds are stimulating in the sense that they are a desirable and congenial medium in which to pass time. When acquaintances meet on crowded sidewalks, contrary to what we might expect, they stop in their tracks and carry on extended conversations in the streams of highest pedestrian traffic. And, also contrary to expectations, obstructed pedestrians squeezing past knots of conversation are polite and unruffled for the most part (10).



The work of William H. Whyte reminded us of the importance of inviting spaces that allow people to move out of the flow of urban life. © Rhonda Pyatt Photography.

Whyte's work led him to consider what types of spaces, besides crowded ones, people found most congenial for passing leisure time and for accommodating *schmoozing*, a Yiddish term that translates roughly as "nothing talk," gossip, small talk (11). The crowded sidewalk is the schmoozer's natural habitat in the large metropolis, but Whyte found that the engineering of microenvironments was very important in determining whether a particular space was welcoming or off-putting as a site for spending little snatches of leisure. Setting aside space in the city is not enough to ensure people will use it. Whyte observed that many set-aside spaces were nearly empty, while others were jammed. A number of factors appeared to determine which spaces would be most well used. Pedestrians will not go far to relax, and when they get there, they want to sit down. Whyte was surprised and dismayed by the number of instances where low ledges along buildings and walls adjacent to walkways actually seemed to be designed to discourage sitting, being too narrow or fitted with hostile pointed surfaces, apparently intended to keep people moving, to prevent them from becoming knots of obstruction. Food will draw people, the sound of falling water and rustling leaves overhead will soothe them, low ledges and alcoved seating will get them to linger, shade in summer and sunlight in winter will comfort them. Long blank walls, enclosed and elevated walkways, the nearby rush of traffic will keep them moving, reduce chance street-corner meetings, discourage lingering, and all but eliminate the natural tendency of urbanites to schmooze. For our interest, Whyte's work is a reminder that even the most incidental aspects of the structuring of the urban environment have real consequences for the quality of experience and patterns of behavior. Urban environments shape social life.

Personal Management of the Public Experience

While Whyte was interested in engineering social space to make it more accommodating to human needs, Lyn Lofland (1985) is interested in the ways that private individuals and small groups take matters into their own hands by taking over public spaces and making them their own. She observed that through the regular and routine use of a particular restaurant, plaza, or section of park, individuals and small groups of individuals may gain a sense of priority over the space, a kind of informal ownership or stewardship. Through regular use, the individual passes from the status of regular "customer" (who has the general lay of things clearly in mind) to that of "patron" (who has some familiarity with other regulars and whatever official staff or attendants may be present) to that of "resident," the culmination of cultivating a sense of place. "The resident, who, by dint of not only using the locale regularly but using it on most occasions for long period of time, acquires . . . an intimate knowledge of all that there is to know and a set of privileges that goes with such mastery" (122). This person, connected to this public space as a matter of choice, having dedicated weeks and months to establishing a familiar presence in that place, having become a recognized fixture in the minds of other users, has effectively *colonized* the territory. It becomes a home away from home, a semi-privatized realm in the resident's mind. The resident may be surrounded by strangers, but these simply become part of a moving backdrop, just another familiar element of the local scene. As a part of the moving curtain of strangers yourself, you can identify the residents by their body language and their demeanor: They are relaxed, informal, sprawling, presiding over their domain. They are at home in a world of strangers who are temporarily moving through their space.

By contrast, Lars Frers (2007) draws our attention to the public condition of those who are simply part of that moving curtain of strangers, how those who are navigating territories in which they are truly anonymous attempt to manage their experience of such places. In his view the stranger creates an *envelope*, a layer (or layers) consisting of attitude, demeanor, and details of performance that allow the public actor to manage the degree of personal involvement (and disinvolvement) with their physical and social surroundings. At the same time, the individual is passing through an environment where other envelopes, created by other public actors in whose midst the individual is operating, or even envelopes created by the physical environment (the intensity of a bakery's smells, the noise of demolition or construction), tug at and threaten to penetrate one's calculated intent, that is, threaten to envelope one's envelope. Seen in these terms, urban public space is rich in situated energies. Confident actors may adjust their envelope to be open to the richness of encounter. More timid souls may tighten their personal envelope, disengaging with their surroundings at the cost of missing much of the potential richness the city has to offer. And it may be the case that at different times the same individual may be more open or more closed to engagement, depending on, for instance, whether they are late for an appointment or taking a leisurely stroll.

All of these writers, from the American Psychological Association through those like Lofland who take a microview, show us many ways to think about how cities shape experience. The urban environment is more than a backdrop; it actively intervenes in the social process. It is created by our collective attitudes and actions, and in turn it impacts who we are by becoming part of our consciousness and influencing

our behavior. You may love what the city is, you may hate it, but whether or not you live in one, the city is here. Its influence is all around you, you are a part of it and it is part of you—and not just because you have been assigned to read this textbook, but that, too.

OUR LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CITY

In chapter 3, we will see how important historically attitudes of Western culture toward cities have been in shaping urban theory in sociology. Here we look briefly at how people feel about cities today.

There is a long history of city bashing in the United States; it is somewhat less pronounced in Europe. Moralists and anxious politicians have been concerned with the effects of teeming urban centers on the human soul and on the political future of the state, respectively. Each succeeding era finds something new about the city to be put off by. In the United States, this has meant shifting concern away from Eastern European immigrants and Catholics at the beginning of the twentieth century to Third World immigrants and racial purity at the beginning of the twenty-first, away from infectious epidemics of influenza and tuberculosis to HIV, from gangsters to gangsta. Lofland (1998) said that when she asks her students on the first day of her urban sociology class for impressions that come to mind when she says the word "city," she gets back "frenetic, crowded, loud, smelly, dangerous, indifferent, anonymous, dirty, filled with hostile strangers, and littered with the unsightly homeless and the unsightly poor" (113). Others who find themselves living in cities by choice or default have made peace with it and find it downright appealing. We are divided in our society between *cityphobes* and *cityphiles*—those who hate and those who love the city. Many may respond to this distinction by recognizing a little or a lot of both within themselves.

Cityphiles have learned to use the city to suit their needs and their tastes. They are at home in cities in general or in love with their own city in particular. If they are not living in a city, or a large enough, exciting enough, or varied enough city, they will let everyone around them know of the shortcomings of their compromised life situation. Once one is used to the smorgasbord of elective diversions that prevail in the pace of life, the politics, art, and culinary variety of the world city, it is hard to be happy anywhere else. Placemark 1.2 invades a chat room hosted by the official Austin, Texas, Web site. Within Texas and the Southwest region, Austin generally has a reputation as an appealing and highly livable university town. However, the first speaker is disappointed that Austin falls short of expectations acquired from living in other cities. Note that the argument is about the virtues of particular cities of different sizes and characteristics: These speakers are emotionally tied to their favorite city, not necessarily the city in which they live or the city in general.

Placemark 1.2—My City Can Beat Your City

One of the things we have learned about the Internet is that people tend to speak plainly about what is on their minds, dispensing with normal rules of

civil interaction, their true identities buffered by their online alter egos. In this e-mail exchange, the first speaker derides Austin, Texas, in a chat room peopled largely by other Austin residents. "Austin is way overrated . . . following the hype of Austin, I moved from San Jose. . . . The tech industry is not what I thought. Little pay $$ and the Austin base economy is very small. . . . It's still very much a college town, which is ok if you are going to school. However, the pay sucks and the traffic is worse than S.J. Stay in New York with a real job with real pay. I plan to move to Dallas, where the pay is 5 times better and the industry is highly diverse. . . . It's no wonder . . . high tech industries always choose a city like Dallas (a real city with real money and a real Airport!, not a college town) over Austin. Move to Dallas!!!"

The response from Austin defenders is equally direct: "Spoken like a true Californian—GO HOME THEN. We don't really want people here who don't get what Austin is about anyway. Austin is NOT Dallas and I can only pray to God that IT NEVER WILL BE!!! Dallas is filled with plastic attitudes polluting the quality of life (just like California)—Austinites have always taken great pride in the fact that we ARE NOT Dallas or Houston. . . . You should go—hurry—and a take a few of your buddies with you because 150 people move here every day due to the fact that it is such a desirable place to live. . . . BYE BYE—we really don't need you congesting our roads, polluting our air, depleting our springs, destroying our parks, or infecting our children with such shallow, superficial principles." Others agree, including this resident of San Francisco: "If you don't get it . . . leave. Austin is heaven. San Jose has F—'ed their city up by letting the techs do as they want. I live in SF and work in 'the valley of death' (AKA silicon valley) and I spend as little time there under that cloud of brown 'prosperity' as possible." And a third defender steps out of the my city–your city box. "As for Dallas, it has its pluses I'm sure, but my impression is it's a big flat sprawled out city. It matters what you are wanting out of a city and if where you are doesn't fulfill it, then everyone has the option of moving elsewhere. It doesn't mean that where you left isn't the perfect place for someone else, now does it?"

The last speaker really does seem to "get it."

There is a lot at stake in the argument in placemark 1.2. People need to feel good about their city: Place of residence represents one of the most important life choices. The ease of electronic data gathering and communication has allowed people to compare the quality of life among different cities using more or less objective criteria. The trick in putting the data to good use is to select the criteria most relevant to you. Then you can shop around for the city that suits you, aided by such reference works as *America's Top Rated Cities* (1999), *The Places Rated Almanac* (2007), the *Gale City and Metro Rankings Reporter* (1997), *Inc. Magazine*'s "Boomtowns '07" for entrepreneurs, *CNN/Money Magazine*'s "Best Big Cities" list, *Best Life Magazine*'s "The Best 100 Places to Raise a Family" (2008), or *The 100 Best Art Towns in America* (2005). These sources are probably not going to resolve arguments about whether one town is better than another, but they do supply data that

may help the geographically mobile make informed choices about where to live. Such lists inevitably generate their own heated disagreements in the quality-of-life rivalry when some cities are left out, demoted from year to year, or placed lower on a list than rival cities. Some ranking instruments include do-it-yourself rankings where you can plug in the criteria most important to you: the *Best Places Almanac* provides users with paper and pencil score sheets, while *CNN/Money* features a similar online interactive device.

In their ranking of city qualities *America's Top Rated Cities* considers information on state and municipal finances, population, employment and earnings, taxes, transportation and commercial real estate prices, as well as cost of living, housing, education, health care, public safety, climate, and water quality. In selecting the one hundred best places to raise a family, the editors of *Best Life Magazine* considered the safety of children, favorable student-teacher ratios, above-average test scores, numbers of museums, plentiful parks and pediatricians, and good earning to cost of living ratios. Negative measures included multihour commutes, high housing costs, and higher divorce rates. The *Places Rated Almanac* presents data on crime rates, climate, price of a starter home, traffic congestion, medical services, and a number of other criteria (seventy-four in all), including the availability of classical music radio stations. The *100 Best Art Towns* list is addressed to people who are attracted to art museums, galleries, theater performances, music festivals, and art fairs. It is not surprising that their top-rated five places (Santa Fe, Loveland (Colorado), Sarasota, Hot Springs (Arkansas), and Asheville (North Carolina) are not matched by *Inc. Magazine*'s top five: St. George (Utah), Yuma (Arizona), Prescott (Arizona), Fort Myers (Florida), and McAllen (Texas). The *Places Rated Almanac* demonstrates best just how volatile a place's rank can be when criteria are shifted: According to the *Almanac*, New York ranks number 1 in terms of "ambiance," but if you're looking for "normal people" it ranks number 150 on a list of 150 places. Alternatively, when attention shifts to a global scale considering the "livability" of cities, a new set of criteria is called for that includes such factors as political stability, currency exchange regulations, and degree of media censorship, along with more familiar quality of life measures (Mercer 2008). In the resulting ranking of 215 large cities, only two North American cities made the top fifteen: Vancouver (number 4) and Toronto (number 15). The two top cities were Zurich and Vienna. The United States enters the list at number 28 with Honolulu, while New York ranks number 49. The least "livable" of the world's major cities in 2008 was Baghdad according to the Mercer listing.

How do the opinions of the fans of Austin, Texas, square with these formal rankings? They probably would not be pleased to learn that Mercer did not consider their city at all for its list of 215 significant world places. It made the *America's Top Rated Cities* list. It was ranked favorably at number 14 on best family-rearing places to live (2008). Dallas didn't make that list, nor did San Jose. But those of us who have lived in a number of different cities are bound to feel that there is something suspect in any attempt to sum up any city's qualities in a set of standardized comparisons. Indeed, we can assume that the compilers of these city comparisons offer them only as the roughest guides to the would-be intercity migrant. Different people are going to be emotionally caught up in their love or hate reactions to the San Francisco Bay area, San Jose, Dallas, and Austin. Even where we employ handy

standardized criteria, we end up allowing the last speaker in placemark 1.2 to have the final word.

The True Cityphile and the Idealization of Urban Space

Some of us are tied emotionally to the city in general, the very idea of the city, a specific kind of city that embodies what we feel to be the fulfillment of the true urban promise of enriched living. Oldenberg (1989) wrote about the array of "great good places" harbored by the great cities—the pubs, cafés, and coffeehouses that are welcoming to the stranger. Oldenberg agreed that much about cities is potentially off-putting and believed that the city has the capacity to divide human beings and isolate them (48). But that is the beauty of the welcoming public place, which provides a haven. The German or transplanted German American beer garden is a place of festivity waiting to happen, the English "pub" combines the contradiction of the public place (from which its name is contracted) with the private familiarity of long and intimate associations among neighbors, and the French café or bistro is a democratizing force where all classes rub shoulders during prolonged and very regular visits. Oldenberg took Lyn Lofland's observation, that regulars colonize space and make it their own, a step further. He suggested that even strangers are welcomed by certain urban public spaces.

Oldenberg wrote about spaces more characteristic of the old-fashioned convivial urban environments of the city center, and we may wonder whether the changing North American metropolis, with its sprawling suburbs, will continue to provide such convivial public environments. He warned that "where urban growth proceeds with no indigenous version of a public gathering place proliferated along the way and integral in the lives of the people, the promise of the city is denied" (Oldenberg 1989, xv). In this vein, Janusz Mucha (1993, 22), a sociologist visiting the United States from Poland in the 1990s, found that outside of three American cities—New Orleans, New York, and San Francisco—"The idea of the 'city' as I conceive it, hardly exists in America." He means that there is a dearth of public squares where people safely meet, talk, or buy flowers. It is hard to find a decent coffee shop or cafe. There is no theater culture in the downtown; everyone has gone to the "movies" at the sprawling suburban mall. Mucha is passionate about cities, particularly familiar cities, cities that are the cultural heart and life blood of a society, *his* cities. Those of us who love the city are apt to be passionate, to have allegiance to a certain form of urban environment, and to feel robbed by its absence. Oldenberg and Mucha wanted cities that gather people in their leisure to the center and gently hold them there through the lure of welcoming public space.

But are these writers talking about a real or a romanticized city? How do the spaces they are speaking of square with the prevailing image of the inner city in the United States? The city is not for everyone, not for the cityphobic. In his book, *Urban Nightmares* (2006), Steve Macek explains in a chapter titled "Inventing the Savage Urban Other" how conservative forces in government and the popular media have amplified the fears of the middle class by demonizing poor and minority residents of cities. Suburbs are testimony to the way many Americans who find themselves tied by work to the large metropolis feel about the city. Suburbanites are willing to commute long hours from home to work each week so they do not

have to sleep where they work. As we see in chapter 7, many corporate headquarters, other offices, and even manufacturing complexes have followed the commuter out of the city. And people employed in the suburbs respond by pushing the edge of the metropolis still further into surrounding plains, hillsides, and deserts, creating the *exurbs* from which they commute back to jobs in the suburbs created a decade or so earlier. Former Arizona governor and Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt is acutely aware of the issue of sustainability of expanding urban encroachments on natural areas in his own state and elsewhere in North America. He comments in his book *Cities in the Wilderness* (2005, 18–19) on the environmental impact of exurban sprawl: "As open spaces have disappeared, as development has accelerated and the patterns of sprawl have spread across the nation, it has become clear that in many areas development has already undermined the integrity of the surrounding natural systems . . . It is time to weigh the benefits of marginal developments." Some urban exiles have pushed beyond the edge of the metropolitan region, opting out of the large cities in favor of small-town life. The Midwest has become home in the past decade to a number of metropolitan refugees fleeing the East and West coastal regions. William E. Pike (2000) tells his story in textbox 1.1.

Textbox 1.1. Choosing Pierre, South Dakota, over Washington, D.C.

William Pike (2000) made a choice. He moved from the nation's capital to the capital of South Dakota, population 13,800. He wrote, "After four years at Harvard and another year and a half in Washington, urban life was wearing me down. I was not meant to tread along exhaust-choked streets, ride on subways, and stand in lines for everything. Nor was I willing to put up with a cynical culture, continuous late nights at work, a constant striving for material gain, and an empty view of life as a chore, not a privilege. I had seen one too many jaundiced, suit-clad, vacant-eyed paper pushers riding the metro, 30 years older than me and not a day wiser. I knew I must escape before I too fell into this trap called The City and suffered under its slow death sentence." Pike visited Pierre and found a job with the state legislature and an apartment, loaded the rent-a-truck, and never looked back. He reversed the logic of the old German saying, "City air makes men free," and enjoys new freedoms in Pierre, like not having to lock the car doors, being able to walk anywhere at any hour of the night, eating lunch at home if he wants to, and leaving the office at five o'clock each evening. These are freedoms that many residents of the coastal metropolises may long for. But his description of the open prairie surrounding Pierre, the lack of neighboring towns, and the peace of the countryside is not going to appeal to the cityphile. Phrases that would leap to their lips might include "boondocks" and "the middle of nowhere." Pike acknowledged that where he lives is not paradise, but when locals ask him why he moved there, he asks back, "Have you ever lived in D.C?" In response, they smile and nod knowingly. It is interesting to think about vacationers from one of these places, Pierre or D.C, visiting the other, and what they would miss, if anything, when they returned home.

People *are* leaving the city. Not only Washington, D.C., but also North American cities in general have lost population in the past few decades. Most of those leaving the city aren't going far, not as far as Pierre. As we will see in chapter 7, there is something of a contradiction in the general pattern of urban population

loss. While Washington's population appeared to have slipped by about 20,000 people, down to a total population of about 520,000 between 2000 and 2005, the greater Washington metropolitan area, extending into western Maryland and northern Virginia, increased by about 7 percent to a total of just under 6 million in roughly the same period (*Washington Post* April 17 and December 22, 2005). People leave the city proper, but most remain within the sprawling urban regions, and newcomers arrive daily. Also, while many of the older urban cores are losing population, they are taking on new functions and a new character. Washington, of course, retains its old federal architectural quality and government function as the national capital: Much of the region's growth is attributed to the creation of new national security jobs in northern Virginia, which received a disproportionate amount of homeland security spending after 2001 (*Washington Post* April 17, 2005). But another important economic feature of the capital is tourism: Washington, D.C., is host to millions of tourists each year, 20 million in 1997 alone. In city after city, governments and promoters of local economic growth are going after tourism and convention business more competitively. The downtown area of the capital city in the middle to late 1990s acquired a new look, with new retail development, a new convention center, and a $100 million sports arena (*America's Top-Rated Cities* 1999, 332–33).

As metropolitan regions sprawl around them, older urban cores are threatened with losing their old importance, even symbolically, as the heart of their region. The most dynamic growth takes place on the region's periphery, where the affluent middle class resides. If the welcoming public spaces that attract Oldenberg and Mucha are to survive, they must learn to live here in the suburb. Suburbanites and inner-city residents have many issues that divide them, in terms of economics, culture, and politics. Under what circumstances can we still talk about urban regions as representing a meaningful sociocultural unit generating among all the elements of the population a common sense of identity—an identity attached to the broad physical space they share? Of the little we have said about the District of Columbia, the new sports arena may provide the most valuable hint.

We're Number 1

As we have seen, place of residence generates a sense of allegiance for many people. This is especially so in the case of hometowns, the place of birth. For people who were born in large cities, the "hometown" may be the whole city, or a neighborhood, or named area within it (the South End, the West Side, and so forth). For those born in metropolitan regions, the question of what is "local" is problematic. People in the Boston metro region—a large, but by no means the largest, example we might have chosen—may live in and identify themselves as being from Brookline, Dedham, Quincy, Newton, Chelsea, or a dozen other possibilities. Is Greater Boston a "real" place to its residents? The following observations are not based so much on careful scientific data gathering as they are on a set of truths that become immediately recognizable as facts once they are expressed. Here we enter the dangerous realm of common observation.

To highlight the dimension of the urban experience having to do with the way people identify the spatial unit in which they live, we turn our attention to a particular

aspect of popular culture that has very wide appeal. When this cultural force comes into play, geographic allegiance comes to extend to the city as a whole, to cut across all demographic categories, to unite all social classes, to extend even through the suburban metropolitan region joining all in a single solidarity based on shared space and glory. This powerful force is not warfare or mortal threat, at least not in the literal sense. This force exists, by advancing degrees, where there is a local professional team competing in a major sport, when that team is having a winning season, when that team makes the playoffs, when that team is champion. This is the one force to unite the cityphile and cityphobe in celebration or mutual despair. It is a phenomenon similar to the patriotic experience that attends the playing of the gold medal winner's national anthem at the Olympics. In the case of professional sports in North America, the rivalry is not as often international as it is intercity.

Red Sox and Yankee fans root not for a team representing the Northeast, but for a team from their metro region, and when the two teams play each other, the rivalry is at its height. The pitch of local identification and rivalry is repeated in city after city. The *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, during the 1999 National Football League season, sponsored a Web site where Cleveland Browns fans could trade insults with Pittsburgh Steelers fans, soon provoking a similar site sponsored by a Pittsburgh-region newspaper. The sponsors of both sites had some trouble keeping the exchanges limited to "good clean fun" (Williams, 1999).

Anthropologically, team rivalry is thought to represent a new form of tribalism. Psychologists talk about the degree to which fans identify with their teams, experiencing a surging sense of well-being when the home team wins and a deflated sense of self with each loss. On-site studies show that male fans, during important games, undergo a physiological transformation expressed in substantial increases in testosterone levels, which only lasts beyond the duration of the game if their team is victorious. When teams win an important championship, hometown fans are apt to rampage through the streets, as in 2008 in Montreal when the Canadiens bested the Boston Bruins in the first-round payoffs for professional hockey's Stanley Cup (*International Herald Tribune* April 22, 2008) repeating the disturbances that had occurred in Boston months earlier when the Red Sox won the World Series in 2007 (*Telegraph* October 30, 2007).

One disreputable element among the ranks of European soccer fans is notorious for inflicting damage and injury. The phenomenon, known as *football hooliganism*, is especially associated with international matches, but opposing fans and the city hosting a domestic intercity contest often come in for rough treatment as well. English sportswriter and fan Hunter Davies (1999) once attended an international soccer match between his own country's badly outmatched Arsenal team and Spain's Barcelona at Wembley Stadium. At halftime, with their team behind by two goals, disgruntled Arsenal fans roughed him up because they suspected he was a Tottenham (another English team) fan, even though, as far as he could tell, he showed no outward sign of that secret allegiance. There simply were no Barcelona fans available, and a fan of an urban rival was a worthy substitute.

The phenomenon of sport interests us here because of its unifying power. This power is tied to location, and at least while the winning streak, championship game, or playoff series is underway, we have a glimpse of the power of place, of

allegiance to a particular city, to transcend the important sociological differences that otherwise separate local populations on a daily basis. Professional sports is one of the most powerful forces for getting people to use the term "we" inclusively, with reference to all of the people in an urban region, and mean it. Of course, the "we" don't all have to be living in the city of the home team, but to be sure the most ardent body of fans are there—the highest per capita ratio of fan to inhabitant. In years where the Yankees and the Red Sox are battling each other for the American League title, it is possible to find Yankee fans from Boston and Red Sox fans from New York in the stadium, but there won't be many, and they may not admit it.

It would be highly desirable to harness the unifying power of sport, to generalize and apply it to the cause of social unity on a routine basis, and to preserve the spirit of fellowship that it generates among metropolitan populations. So far no one has thought of a way to do it (short of actually going to war with neighboring city-states), and any lingering sense of solidarity and common cause probably does not extend beyond the stadium parking lot. Still, it gives us another glimpse of the sociological importance of space.

THE URBAN ARENA: PLAYGROUND AND POLITICS

The ancient city of Athens, in 400 BC, provides insight into one very important feature of all cities: Cities are arenas or stages that naturally lend themselves to spectacle. The daily business of Athens took place in the open, in the central marketplace where goods from all over the known world were sold, all trades plied, and all services provided. This was also the site in the early years for entertainments, athletic games, and equestrian displays (Hall 1998, 38). Although the population of Athens was modest by current urban standards (at its peak, having no more than 300,000 inhabitants), by the standards of the age Athens provided a spectacular pageant even as it went about its daily business. One of the ways that cities are different today is that most businesses and entertainments are somewhat less likely to be carried out in the open. But there is still much activity that spills out into the streets and plazas, and cities remain natural arenas for festival and dramatization because of the sheer numbers of people they contain.

People find cities attractive playgrounds, and local authorities and organizers, aware of this fact, sponsor festivals to remind residents and visitors to have a good time—and spend some money. The International Festival and Events Association estimates that there are 32,000 urban festivals each year in the United States (Ward 2000b). One New York City street festival source listed 291 festivals for the 2007 season, most of them clustered from April through October (May is the big month with fifty-three). These included *La Gran Parada Dominicana*, Feast of Our Lady of Mount Carmel (two, one in Manhattan and another in the Bronx), the Romania Day Festival, the Old Saint Patrick's Street Fair, the Bronx Puerto Rican Festival, the Dance Parade Festival in Washington Square Park, the Livable West Side Street Fair, and the Young Republicans Club and PrideFEST celebrations both held on the same day in June. Organizers in smaller cities may make do with just

one street festival a year in an effort to put their city on the map: Gilroy, California's Garlic Festival each July and Moriarity, New Mexico's Pinto Bean Fiesta in October.

One of the most popular festival themes combines ethnic celebration and food. Some cities host multiethnic food fairs, like St. Petersburg's Ethnic Food Festival or, with more emphasis on food than ethnicity, Chicago's Taste of Chicago. Mexicans, Germans, Greeks, Chinese—many traditions know how to party in the streets, but none seem so dedicated or naturally adept at it as Italians in the United States. There are no fewer than thirty-three major Italian American street festivals in the United States each year, from Sacramento's *Festa Italiano* to Saint Anthony's Feast in Boston. Probably none of them is larger or better known than New York's San Gennaro Festival held each September in the Little Italy neighborhood. Like many Italian American festivals, it combines a good time with observation and celebration of a saint's feast day, in this case San Gennaro, patron saint of Naples. The continuation of the festival is important to many of the long-time residents of Manhattan's Little Italy, which is today roughly a six-block area on the Lower East Side, bounded by Mulberry, Canal, and Prince streets. Formerly, the area known as Little Italy was much larger, but it has shrunk from generation to generation, and the third- and fourth-generation Italian community is being succeeded by Chinese, Vietnamese, Spanish, and other ethnic groups. The languages in which Mass is now said in formerly Italian Catholic churches are those of more recently arrived ethnics. The street festival gives the remaining few thousand people of Italian immigrant descent a few days each September when they symbolically reclaim the streets, although most of the locals who watch the parade and other festivities are of Asian birth or descent (Leyden 1999).

Another symbolically important feature of the festival lies in its organization and sponsorship. An annual event since its beginning in 1927, there is ample evidence that for much of its existence it was run by sponsors with ties to organized crime, and that the proceeds, which were raised for charity, were skimmed by major New York crime figures. In 1996, after a two-year investigation, the City of New York barred the former sponsors from organizing the festival, and neighborhood interests immediately founded a nonprofit organization to take over the festival's operation (Leyden 1999). The potentially damaging publicity, made-to-order to fit negative stereotypes attached to successful Italian American enterprise, was for a time defused. While rumors of mob influence persist (*New York Sun* September 17, 2004), and although some neighborhood residents claim that the annual event is a nuisance and should be banned (*New York Daily News* March 26, 2007), the symbolic importance of the festival for New Yorkers of Italian descent remains strong. In 1999, the president of the organization committee said, "It all started here for our families, the roots are here. Why should we end this? The neighborhood is smaller, but the tradition, the heritage—it's a big thing. People come back. . . . The point is Little Italy is a very big part of people's lives" (Leyden 1999, A3). Between 1 million and 3 million people, according to various estimates, are attracted to the food and games every year, lending weight to the Italian American claim that they still own a couple of blocks on Mulberry Street for several days each September.

Cities for Fun and Profit

Urban street festivals are a public expression of the identity and solidarity of a community. A particular festival may express the ethnic identity of an urban subculture, like the San Gennaro festival; it may support a particular neighborhood cause, like New York's Livable West Side Street Fair; or it may celebrate something about the city as a whole, like Moriarity, New Mexico's annual Pinto Bean Fiesta. Whatever their theme, festivals reframe public space for a time, maximize its potential to be experienced as warm and welcoming, and invite visitors to join with locals in a time and place that's "just for fun."

But a lot of work by neighbors, volunteers, or members of religious organizations is required to bring off a successful public event, and because at least a share of the proceeds is typically marked for charity or for community improvement, an important measure of success is the bottom line—how well the event worked as a money raiser. The increasing popularity of the street fair or citywide festival has created a growth industry for private consulting companies that specialize in engineering financially successful festivals. Behind the expressions of solidarity, tradition, and people having a good time is a set of promoters doing business.

The urban festival's potential to generate profit has not been lost on the entertainment industry and other promotional entrepreneurs. If a neighborhood can generate substantial profits in a few days of organized nostalgia each year, why not create year-round festival zones in the heart of large urban centers featuring proven crowd-pleasing, money-making attractions—minus the for-charity motive? The festival theming of contemporary urban spaces did not simply occur spontaneously. The historical context was provided by the decline of the industrial economic



The Little Italy street festival in Lower Manhattan is perhaps the best-known of all the ethnic street fests in the United States. © KLPJ Photography, photographersdirect.com

urban base, especially in older northern and eastern cities of the United States, cities that had originally developed as part of the era of industrial expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the face of industrial decline, city leaders opted to promote tourism because tourism paid off. "By the 1990s tourism had become one of the most dynamic sectors in the world economy, growing faster than any other sector; by 1990 it ranked third [behind automobile and petroleum production] in value-added trade-related activities" (Judd 2003, 50). In 2006, international tourism alone (people traveling between countries) was valued at $733 billion, and U.S. urban Chambers of Commerce and other civic leadership groups were eager to increase the 12 percent or $86 billion share of that worldwide tourist market that was spent in the United States (Oskar Garcia, Associated Press July 4, 2008).

In fact, individual cities have "entered into a vigorous international competition for tourists, and the terms of this competition require cities not only to market themselves, but also to provide a constantly improving level of facilities, amenities, and services." Clever promotional themes, like the well-worn "I Love New York" slogan introduced in 1977, are not enough to keep tourists coming in. Cities are devoting a major share of their budgets to underwrite the costs of sports stadiums, festival-themed malls, convention centers, family-friendly pedestrian malls packed with shops and free of motor traffic, redeveloped waterfronts, themed museums, outdoor concert venues, casinos, and other enhanced public spaces, in order to attract visitors and their dollars to tourist-magnetic entertainment zones (Judd 2003, 3–7).

Hannigan (1998) used the term *Fantasy City* to describe the "urban entertainment destination" (UED) projects that were being contemplated or constructed by nearly every major entertainment company and several large real estate developers by the end of the twentieth century. The phenomenon being described here combines elements of old-fashioned entertainment districts that have developed *crescively*, with the *enacted* form of environment characteristic of the theme park (these terms were introduced at the beginning of this chapter). Some districts may be wholly designed and managed by a single corporation. Others involve many developers, designing their projects independently, but all united in the recognition that a particular urban area is taking shape as a UED; entrepreneurs scramble to position their restaurant, theme bar, multiscreen theater, or retail complex strategically within it. The idea is to create a public space that appeals to the tourist and consumer mass market, a secure environment that has something for everyone, and where the attraction is fun. It is typically a day-and-night operation in the spirit of the Las Vegas casino, and visitors carry away with them prestige logo-embossed souvenirs—maybe the best example is the Hard Rock Cafe T-shirt—bearing the imprint of the UED, one of its many attractions, or the logo of such an area's corporate sponsor, attesting to the fact that they had been to the site.

> Fantasy City . . . is constructed around technologies of simulation, virtual reality, and the thrill of the spectacle. Without a doubt, a major inspiration has been the Disney model, not only because it has been widely imitated but also because a number of the Disney "imagineers" (designers) have migrated to other entertainment and real estate companies and projects where they bring their "Magic Kingdom" sensibility. Increasingly, as motion picture and amusement park technologies merge to produce a new

generation of attractions, the space between authenticity and illusion recedes, creating the condition of "hyperreality." (Hannigan 1998, 4)

Hannigan's examples include as many actual theme parks as sanitized and revised downtown sites, but some of the prominent illustrations of the concept include the desexualized revision of Times Square, the South Street Seaport (also in Manhattan), Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston, Harbor Place in Baltimore, Madchester and Gay City in the old industrial city of Manchester, England, and several urban or urban-adjacent entertainment complexes in Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. The text provided by a visitor's guide to San Francisco's waterfront attractions profiles the way cities and their agents promote their locations as urban entertainment destinations.

> Hop on the ferry to Alcatraz (be sure to reserve ahead as tours often sell out) also known as "The Rock" and take an audio tour. . . . Now every kid has an inner pirate, but how many have sung sea chanteys on a real ship? San Francisco Maritime National Historical Park hosts Chantey Sing at Hyde Park Pier . . . truly a once-in-a-lifetime kind of thing. . . . A stroll along the Marina Green will lead you to Fort Mason Center, a collection of buildings jutting out into the bay, transformed from an Army post into an arts/events/performance /restaurant/non-profit space. . . . Up a slight incline to Upper Fort Mason is a small park [that] offers hands-on exhibits, ranger led tours of historic sailing ships, workshops, and programs designed especially for kids.
>
> Continue southeast for the perfect mid morning (or afternoon or evening) snack: a hot fudge sundae at the Ghirardelli Ice Cream and Chocolate Shop in Ghirardelli Square, which houses shops and restaurants with great views of the water. . . . If you do get caught without a sweatshirt when the fog brings in its damp coolness, there is no shortage of merchants along the wharf waiting to sell you a warm piece of clothing that says, "I Escaped from Alcatraz," or "I Left My Heart in San Francisco." . . . pass under the Bay Bridge to reach our final near-the-water destination. AT&T Park is home to the San Francisco Giants. . . . If attention wanes walk over to the Coca-Cola Fan Lot, an interactive play area above the left-field bleachers. Slide inside the 80-foot wooden Coca-Cola bottle, see the world's largest baseball glove, or run the bases inside "Little Giants Park" . . . AT&T Park tours leave every day from the Giants Dugout Store at 10:30 am and 12:30 pm on non-day-game days. (*Where Magazine*, San Francisco July 2008. Morris Visitor Publications. Augusta, Georgia)

The San Francisco waterfront provides a familiar urban experience offered by many cities to the contemporary visitor. But we do need to recognize that as a calculated and marketed environment it represents a transformation of the nature of urban space as it has existed and been experienced until recent times. It is more orderly, safe, and deliberate. Cities have always been places where people could find "fun," but fun has not historically been the city's reason for being. Critics of urban fun zones make this and other points in considering the transformation of urban space that we are describing here. These fantasy spaces do not simulate authentic urban arenas so much as they do a theme park experience. One may spend several days in the managed entertainment environments and never come to know the city that exists beneath this sanitized facade. Second, critics point out that these themed environments are created solely for the purpose of separating visitors from their cash in arenas of inflated prices. Ehrenhalt (1999) comments on Chicago's premiere

shopping UED, Michigan Avenue. It does not belong in any particular way to Chicago. The stores drawing the crowds are the same upscale chains that are found in other cities, selling hypermarketed image items in such super outlet operations as Niketown, Disney Quest, and the American Girl Place. Minorities are dramatically underrepresented among the shopping crowds, and the poor have no reason to be there. However, Ehrenhalt concludes that, although these are serious criticisms of the Michigan Avenue district, the slick and segregated environment is succeeding on its own terms and that is worth something in an era when many downtowns continue to struggle economically. His response to critics of the new *shoppertainment* environment is summed up, "No matter how much you might wish to deny it, most of the people strolling down Michigan Avenue on a Saturday night are enjoying themselves. If they're suckers, they're happy suckers. It's a little presumptuous to second-guess their contentment" (7).

Finally, the quest to reinvent urban space in order to attract visitors comes with a huge price tag. Any public resources devoted to underwriting urban attractions means that those resources will not be available for the provision of other municipal infrastructure and services: education, security, safe bridges, and so forth. Critics argue that subsidies that enhance a city's attractiveness for visitors and affluent residents are misspent, since they do not return benefits to the city's poor. Reviewing the impact of just one of these sites, Baltimore's often celebrated success in turning its dilapidated Inner Harbor into an attractive tourist and convention destination, Norris (2003) concludes that the matter of who receives the net benefits of such projects is difficult to determine. When the project was initiated, Baltimore had long been in a state of decline, as affluent citizens and businesses fled to the suburbs. But, if the city had opted to invest public funds more directly to enhance the lives of the city's poor rather than trying to make the city center more attractive to entrepreneurs and affluent classes, the question remains as to what the consequences would have been for *all* citizens if the exodus of capital and retail dollars had continued unabated. This, of course, is part of a familiar perennial public debate about whether policies that focus on economic growth serve all interests or best serve the affluent and economic elite.

Political and economic questions about which classes of citizens benefit most from particular policies abound in urban sociology, and they will absorb our attention in much of this text. For now what interests us about the various elements of urban fun zones is the assumption that the engineering of spaces modifies thought and behavior. Here, we are trying to see how urban space and different kinds of urban space impact the perceptions, the mood, and the behavior of people who occupy them. The developers of urban fun zones—the Fantasy Cities—realize that urban space can be engineered to produce a particular kind of experience. In effect, the agents of development are doing urban sociology, a kind of applied sociology or human engineering—deliberately attempting to modify urban environments to produce particular perceptions and behaviors that are compatible with the profit motive. They are providing cues that are widely recognizable to people who have absorbed and been absorbed by a particular kind of urban stimulus to induce the "here's where we begin to have fun and spend some money" reaction. We may define this neutrally as facilitating recreational behavior or more critically as shaking down the suckers, but whatever our interpretation, we are operating within the

assumption that urban space alters behavior and that by altering the space itself, a particular behavioral tendency can be created.

One final and especially curious form of the imagineered urban experience is the re-creation of historic, exotic, or even current urban environments somewhere else—in a theme park or a foreign UED. A small but perhaps familiar example is the transplanted-brick-by-brick Irish pub, with its permanently stashed bicycle, thatch, hearth, and Guinness on tap. On a somewhat larger scale, you can experience New York in Las Vegas in the New York–New York casino, which reproduces New York environments for Las Vegas tourists—many of whom are visiting from New York. In the 1990s the casino's operators lifted a selection of Manhattan's street performers to put on a ninety-minute "authentic" expression of New York street culture, "MAD-hattan," backdropped on stage by a graffitied street scene (Hannigan 1998, 74): By 2008 this production had been replaced by Cirque du Soleil's more risqué *Zumanity* stage creation. Universal Studios took the quest for authenticity to a new level in its re-creation of New York City, combining the resources of the two fantasy capitals, Hollywood (the movie capital) and Orlando (the Disney capital). The Universal Orlando theme park featured a New York experience richer than the experience of New York itself, affording visitors a walk through the "real" South Street waterfront of the 1920s, the Little Italy and Fifth Avenue of the Great Depression, and the more upscale contemporary New York. Authenticity of experience was enhanced by attention to detail—from rust stains on pipes to cobwebs to sidewalk bubble gum. Fantasy and reality have been run together as the streets of the theme park New York now provide the big city backdrop for thrills aboard the Revenge of the Mummy and Twister rides and performances by Jake and Elwood, the Blues Brothers (www.uescape.com), not the "real" Jake and Elwood, of course. A Universal Theme Park opened in Osaka, Japan, in 2001. It re-created authentic urban experiences from cities in the United States. These included an Irish pub, not from Dublin but from Brooklyn, a Chinese fast food restaurant from San Francisco, and yes, a re-created authentic Japanese restaurant—from Manhattan's SoHo district.

The line between what is real and what is fantasy is blurred by the near-miraculous capacity of rapidly advancing technology to create illusion. In Fantasy City, it has been combined with unprecedented levels of modern corporate wealth to build physical environments that mimic Hollywood's capacity to create two-dimensional illusions on the movie screen. It seems both ironic and natural that it is the movie set that has taken fantasized urban environments to their logical extreme: fantasy in the round. But there is the possibility of a further step here, that the fantasy cityscape will escape from the theme park and reenter the everyday, lived-in urban environment and transform it to conform with the fantasized, re-created, sanitized, and perfected theme park city scenes. Zukin (1995, 65–69) believes that is just what has happened. The Disney formula for simplifying and stylistically co-ordinating the appearance of spaces that people use, so that their themed message can be easily understood and digested—what has been called the sanitization of experience—is at work in such diverse projects as the wholly planned community of Seaside, Florida, and the cleanup and redesign of New York City's Times Square. The Disney Company, during the 1980s, was commissioned to redesign Seattle Center by that city, but concerns over whether the center would be turned into a theme park where those needing access would be charged an admission fee, the company's

reported unwillingness to incorporate input from the city or its citizens, and cost overruns caused the city to look elsewhere for design ideas. In order to apply theme park criteria to actual urban space, "Its charming surface and smooth-running infrastructure would only be achieved through planning practices that are unacceptably authoritarian in the real world" (Warren 1994). To the extent the imagineer's sense of visual and social order prevails in reshaping the public environments of future cities, making them safe and predictable, the urban features that draw many of us to the study and the experience of the city will have been lost. Toontown may be safe, it may be fun, but it lacks intrigue, chance events, surprises. It lacks many of the features that delight the urban sociologist and the cityphile alike.

Cities and Political Expression

Just as cities provide an arena for festivals, they also offer a natural setting for dramatic political expression. For one thing, they provide large numbers of people that can be mobilized by those in power for political rallies in support of government and its policies and for mass expressions of solidarity on national political holidays. But they also provide the critical mass of like-minded dissenters who can take to the streets to express dissatisfaction, mistrust, and opposition to a government or its unpopular policies. Historically, the city provided a natural arena where political demonstrations were communicated effectively and immediately to the largest audience possible simply by the noise and spectacle of mass gatherings themselves. In recent centuries, communication of urban demonstrations has been insured by the concentration in cities of the news-gathering resources of print and electronic news media. The objective of most political demonstrations is expressive, designed to communicate a message of dissent and a call for change. Major cities provide a showcase, a setting that lends weight to the cause, a setting where large numbers of people in the streets are optimally disruptive, where the consequences of massed opposition have the greatest effect. Cities also draw political demonstrations because the targets of the demonstrators reside there: congresses and parliaments, presidents and prime ministers, corporate headquarters and other influential institutions. Cities have also been the natural setting for demonstrations because they contain the most substantial numbers of the poor and minorities. As people in the United States know from the experience of recent decades, confrontations between agents of law and order and members of minority communities regularly invite the perception of injustice and the use of excessive force. These can quickly generate massive rioting.

Cities appear to continue to be a necessary component in political causes that employ public demonstrations as a means to gain the attention of policymakers. Whether the mode of operation is a candlelight prayer vigil or an act of terrorism, if it takes place in the heart of a world city or capital, it will be a more effective means of communicating the cause. Farmers seeking a change in policies that affect their livelihood bring their tractors to the capital; they don't demonstrate in rural areas. Revolutionaries, anarchists, and other activists may come together on the Internet to refine their positions and strategize activities, but if they live only in cyberspace, few of us will take note of their activity unless we deliberately take the trouble to look for them. Cities are a different type of communication medium. Here the world is

forced to take note. When the world remembers the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2001, the World Trade Center in Manhattan is the first image that comes to mind, then the Pentagon. The tragedy of the hijacked airliner that crashed in a remote field in Pennsylvania that day does not have the same symbolic impact: it lacks an urban context.

For those who feel pushed aside by economic globalization itself, where better to address the remote and faceless process than the streets of Seattle, London, and Washington, D.C., as the executives of the World Trade Organization (WTO) come together to meet? Symbolizing both the shrunken globe and the continued relevance of local space, 50,000 demonstrators who had gathered from throughout the world blocked the streets in Seattle in 1999 and prevented the United Nations Secretary General from addressing the assembled WTO delegates in person. The tens of thousands of protesters who gathered there to shout their defiance at the remote and faceless engines of global economic change may not be a sufficient force to reverse the process. They may accomplish little more than to inconvenience the executive agents of the organization convened to set the terms of global change. But the people in the streets are a highly visible force that effectively draws the attention of the watching world to what the demonstrators see as the dark side of the most recent economic revolution. The streets and public squares of the city are more than a backdrop to the drama: They provide the setting for the massing of human energies, the infectious excitement of being a part of a huge crowd that shares what they see as a set of noble goals. Each protester's voice is amplified into a thunder of collected voices and together the protesters enjoy the empowering experience of standing against lines of police, the coverage of hundreds of television cameras and news reporters from around the world, and the validating sense of the crowd that they are up to something worthy of note on the broadest possible scale.

In many ways the political use of the street is the ultimate expression of people taking control of public space, making it their own, and feeling fellowship and at home there, at least while the demonstration lasts. At the same time, they are in the company of thousands of strangers. At this moment, the city, by virtue of providing the conditions that invite collective political expression, is having a profound impact on each of the people gathered there, on their sense of who they are, on the way they perceive others, on the way they perceive the world, and on the way they organize their lives. This is a decidedly urban phenomenon.

We conclude this chapter in textbox 1.2 with an examination of events that are both festivals and episodes of collective political expression: the urban tradition known as the gay rights march.

Textbox 1.2—From Stonewall to Rome

On June 8, 1969, the patrons of a Manhattan bar, the Stonewall Inn, took to the streets in defiance of public homophobia and in direct response to a police raid on the drinking establishment where they had carved out a safe place—an establishment that catered primarily to gays—in a hostile environment. "Stonewall" became a rallying symbol of defiance against the suppressed right to a gay sexual identity, and a powerful

political movement emerged. During the following decades the gay pride march became a familiar fixture in many cities. Chicago, London, San Francisco, Boston, New York, and many other cities regularly host celebrations of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered identities. The marches, which in the beginning were political demonstrations of solidarity akin to those of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, had by the 1990s become parades surrounded by a festival atmosphere. While the marchers are still subject to counterdemonstrations, threats of violence, and hecklers, they are now regularly joined by family members, community leaders, celebrities, and political figures.

The annual New York City Gay Games, a gay Olympics, draws thousands of athletes and estimated hundreds of thousands of spectators. The May 2000 gay pride celebration at the National Mall in Washington, D.C., included a six-block street fair and featured such prominent corporate sponsors as United Airlines, America OnLine, and the Miller Brewing Company. Comedian Ellen DeGeneres wore a Mickey Mouse T-shirt and publicly thanked the ABC television network, owned by the Disney Company, for airing her weekly sitcom *Ellen* (the show ran from 1994 to 1998). Martina Navratilova, former tennis champion, appeared as spokesperson for both Subaru and the VISA Rainbow Card. The event demonstrated how far the gay rights movement had come from the days of the Stonewall march. Members of the movement had found a broad base of public support, and many enjoyed a level of economic success that made them an important market that could not be ignored (Wildman 2000, 14).

In Rome, Italy, 2000 was also the year of the World Pride celebration. Rights demonstrators had organized parades and rallies in many countries in recent years, from Ireland to Mexico to Australia, and it was time to bring the cause to the world's attention in a focused and highly publicized event in the Eternal City. The weeklong event in early July drew between 200,000 and 300,000 participants. It occurred during the summer of the Vatican's Jubilee Year, a year that combined celebration and solemn purpose, and attracted hundreds of thousands of pilgrims from around the world. The juxtaposition of these celebrations generated the expected controversies, which highlighted the political purpose of the World Pride event. Some organizers had favored the more gay-friendly cities of Amsterdam or London for the international celebration, but Rome was chosen due to the Church's opposition to homosexuality. In the weeks leading up to July, the Vatican openly criticized the movement's plans, the mayor of Rome withdrew the city's welcome, Catholics held public vigils in opposition to the World Pride gathering, and neofascist organizations marched through the streets and threatened violence.

In the end, the World Pride celebration took place peacefully, as scheduled, with conferences, fashion shows, a parade, theater events, and concerts. The parade was broadcast live on Italian television. The atmosphere was festive, but the undercurrent of hostility was a reminder that gay rights is still fundamentally a political cause with far to go toward the goal of universal acceptance. As one of the organizers said of Rome, "This is turning into another Stonewall" (*New York Times*, July 9, 2000).

The celebration and the controversy surrounding it highlight the fact that the city is an arena, a showcase for the culture and politics of the times. Social movements must still come to the city to achieve their political and social ends. International social movements select spectacular arenas of expression, and Rome, the ancient and Eternal City, the former seat of empire, is hard to beat as a stage from which to address the world.

2

From Ancient Cities to an Urban World

In order to appreciate the way cities shape social life it is necessary to begin by tracing the advent and development of the urban form—to study the origins of cities and how they have changed over time. In this chapter, we begin with what we think were the first cities—located in the Middle East—and also look at the earliest cities in other regions of the world—China and Mesoamerica. We then turn to the urbanization of Europe and assess the impact of the Industrial Revolution. In both the ancient period and the period of rapid industrialization, there are three distinguishable categories of social change: the increase in the scale of human settlements and its consequences for social organization, specifically social stratification; the impact of the city on culture and experience; and the process of political and economic centralization. In both the ancient and industrial eras, the magnitude of the change associated with new urban centers was truly revolutionary in terms of the conditions under which people would live their lives and experience the world. These eras laid the groundwork for the urbanization of the world, a process that continues today. The chapter concludes with a discussion of current patterns of urbanization. Today the most rapid urban growth takes place in the largely poorer countries in the Southern Hemisphere, and in the emerging global giants, China and India. At the same time, the significance of cities, as important units of spatial analysis, is challenged by the conceptual framework, *globalization*. The study of the impact of globalization leads us to ask whether we have reached an era in human history where limited physical space, like the space defined by a city, has become a significantly less important framework for containing or influencing social action.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE URBAN FORM

The city as a type of human organization and settlement, measured against the record of human existence and settlement, is a relatively recent innovation. It is generally agreed that early modern *Homo sapiens* emerged about 200,000 years ago. The last ice age ended 10,000 years ago. Permanent settlement is commonly thought

to have begun shortly thereafter, as scattered human populations could turn from hunting to agriculture and the domestication of livestock. The earliest of the human settlements that would seem to qualify as a city, Hamoukar in current-day Syria, didn't come into the archeological picture until sometime a little more than 6,000 years ago (Ur 2002).

Although the city has emerged only relatively recently as an artifact of human existence, its emergence still came some time before there was a written language to record its history. This means that whatever we learn of the origins of urban life must be pieced together by archeologists from the physical remains of these places. As Mumford (1961, 55) wrote in *The City in History*, "This inquiry into the origin of the city would read more clearly were it not for the fact that perhaps most of the critical changes took place before the historical era opens. By the time the city comes clearly into view it is already old."

In Search of the First City: The Middle East

The first cities probably were built in an area ranging between what is today northeastern Syria and southern Iraq, and these were followed within a few hundred years by the development of cities in the Indus River Valley in contemporary Pakistan. The emergence of cities in these regions came only after a long pre-urban period of permanent human settlement and technological advancement, the development of a dependable agriculture, and an increase in population. Gradually, the nature of the settlements in question underwent a qualitative change, a transition from a locally focused, isolated, economically and socially self-contained, and basically agricultural community to a form of settlement that demanded recognition as distinctly urban. Even if we had a perfectly clear account of the entire era of transition from preurban to urban society, it would still be impossible to establish at what point the transition took place. We can imagine that the change came about by degrees. The nature of that difference is reflected in the following passage from Childe:

> By 3000 BC the archeologist's picture of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the Indus Valley no longer focuses attention on communities of simple farmers, but on States embracing various professions and classes. The foreground is occupied by priests, princes, scribes, and officials, and an army of specialized craftsmen, professional soldiers, and miscellaneous laborers, all withdrawn from the primary task of food-production. The most striking objects now unearthed are no longer the tools of agriculture and the chase, and other products of domestic industry, but temple furniture, weapons, wheel-made pots, jewelry, and other manufactures turned-out on a large scale by skilled artisans. As monuments we have instead of huts and farmhouses monumental tombs, temples, palaces and workshops. And in these we find all manner of exotic substances, not as rarities, but regularly imported and used in everyday life. (Childe 1951, 115–16)

At the ancient site of Erech, an early Mesopotamian city, excavation revealed a mound of debris (a *tell*) fifty feet high. It consisted mostly of the ruins of mud and reed huts, layer upon layer, the result of centuries of continuous occupation. Over time the village grew in size and wealth, but it remained a village. Above the older ruins, however, was evidence of a monumental structure, an artificial mountain of



What is known of ancient cities and their societies must be pieced together from their ruins. These are what is left of Mohenjo-Daro, dating from 2600 BCE, in current-day Pakistan. © J.M. Kenoyer, Courtesy Department of Archaeology and Museums, Government of Pakistan

clay, carefully modeled and decorated, 35 feet high and 1,000 yards square at the top. Its religious purpose was revealed by a small shrine built atop the structure, raised closer to heaven by the mound. Larger temples were built at the base of the sloping sides of the earthwork (Childe 1951, 117).

The decorated mound of clay at Erech reveals something about the transition from preurban to urban society. It symbolizes the three dimensions of social change that mark the rise of the urban form: the increase in the scale of social organization, the transformation of culture and experience, and the rise of empire or the state found in the growing political-economic power of city-based leaders to command and control.

Change in the Scale of Social Organization

The earliest cities were not very large, either in terms of population or in the area of land that they covered. Sjoberg (1960, 36–37), upon viewing the evidence, put the population of the larger Mesopotamian centers at between 5,000 and 10,000 late in the fourth millennium. After 3000 BC the estimates for specific sites are somewhat higher, ranging from 12,000 (Khafaje) to 24,000 (Ur), but Sjoberg suspected that these figures were inflated. The relatively small population size of early cities raises the question of how big a population center has to be before it can be recognized as a city or a truly "urban" place.

There are perhaps three ways of handling this question. The first is to avoid the issue as unresolvable. A second is to attempt to establish an acceptable base figure, such as 2,500, 5,000, 10,000, or 20,000—all of which are currently employed by various census bureaus or worldwide data-gathering agencies. The problem is that these figures are arbitrary. The third approach is to admit that we have no numerical answer to the questions, How big is a city? or What is the scale of urban life? and to establish the question of size in a different way. Instead of attempting to posit a critical number of inhabitants, we look for the effects of increasing population size on the number and nature of different roles and relationships that occur among densely concentrated populations. A concentration of population leads to specialization within the workforce (Durkheim [1893] 1993). At some point, the density of sizable populations generates the demand for specialists who are thus freed partially or altogether from agricultural production—assuming that the remaining agriculturalists can be induced to produce sufficient surplus food to support those withdrawn from production.

This is the specialization referred to by Childe in the emergence of "the army of specialized craftsmen, scribes, soldiers and miscellaneous laborers." But in the same passage, Childe notes that the archeological record discloses something else about the changes in social organization that were taking place. Where specialization created interdependence among the population, it also produced scarcity, in that access to the most highly valued goods and services was restricted to the few. Wealth was required for their acquisition, and some mechanism of distribution was needed to decide who would have access. The emerging urban social differentiation produced a more elaborate system of social stratification than had previously existed. Consequently, that hierarchical division of society into groups having greater and lesser access to wealth and life chances became more complex and the differences more extreme in the new urban society.

Although we can understand the systemic relationship between the size and density of populations, and how these give rise to diversity and stratification, it is more difficult to reconstruct the reasons that these populations were drawn together in the first place. Childe (1951, 88–90) offered the hypothesis that in the case of the very oldest Mesopotamian cities massive drainage and irrigation works were required to turn swampland into productive agricultural lands, which in turn required the coordination of very large workforces. The logic here is that the cooperation and coordination demanded by the environment led to the permanent settlement of relatively large populations of individuals who were mutually dependent on their collective efforts. While Childe's reasoning is interesting, the reasons that urban settlements came about in other places varied widely. Some cities are thought to have emerged gradually from the growth of early protective agricultural communities. Hamoukar, near today's Syrian-Iraqi border, seems to have been a specialized obsidian tool manufacturing and trading center from very early in its existence (Ur 2002). In other cases, urban settlement may have resulted from the continuous occupation of permanent military encampments or have been related to the requirements of religious practice—as in the building of monuments requiring large-scale coordination.

To summarize, when we speak of the emergence of an urban form of *social organization*, we have the following transition in mind: As society became more urbanized,

it became more socially differentiated, more specialized. This specialization, in turn, created an interdependence among the various members of society who were no longer individually capable of providing for all of their own material needs. At the same time, the variety of fine works, luxuries, and comforts magnified and defined what it meant to be rich or poor.

These emerging cities were clearly different from the large agrarian centers that preceded them. It is important, however, not to equate the relative richness and variety that these cities contained with that of cities familiar to today's urbanite. The level of comfort enjoyed by the very few 5,000 or 6,000 years ago would seem modest by current standards of affluence. Famine and invasion were recurrent threats. Luxury, restricted to the elite, was purchased at the price of the slavery or poverty of the many, whose labor supported the standards of the rich and powerful. For most of the city's existence, most urbanites lived in huts of mud or clay.

The Urban Form as Culture and the Transformation of Experience

As the dimensions of the social order became enlarged and as the division of labor produced skilled specialists and a more stratified and heterogeneous society, more elaborate and sophisticated cultures evolved that mirrored these social complexities. Early records show that trade routes covering considerable distances brought diverse cultures face to face in orderly exchange. The intermingling of societies was also generated by war and conquest. Although the average urbanite might live in a hut as a laborer or slave, the experience of the soldiers and the stories of traders and other travelers would filter to all quarters of the city. The order of the universe and the relation of heaven and earth were now interpreted by high priests, and the margins of the known world were pushed beyond the horizons that had limited experience in the long stages of prehistory. Life took place on a new scale and with a new variety. As Mumford's colorful vision states:

> In the city, godlike kings, winged bulls, hawk headed men, lionlike women, hugely magnified, erupted in clay, stone, brass, and gold. It is not merely in the theater that the spectator feels that the actors are larger than their actual life size. This is a characteristic illusion produced by the city, because the urban center is in fact a theater. . . . Thus the old active participant in the village ritual became the passive chorus, the spectators and commentators in the new urban drama. Once upon a time in the old village these lookers-on had a full share in what went on, and could perform successfully all the roles, by turn actor and spectator. Now, in the city they were diminished to supernumeraries. Perhaps not the least mission of urban monumental art was the reduction of the common man. (1961, 70)

Although the individual's influence in shaping the new order may have diminished proportionately to the growth of social scale, Mumford (1961, 66–67) suggested further that a sense of participation and identification with a particular city may have compensated at the same time. "If the inhabitant of the city exulted in his powerful gods, he was no less proudly conscious of the circling and all containing wall: to contemporaries it seemed the great gods had fashioned the city and its temple—'the house descending from heaven'—and above all its great wall touching the clouds."

Life meanings were transformed, mystified, and raised up in the emerging urban culture, so that at its highest point heaven and earth seemed to be touching; the city provided the vehicle that brought these two planes together. Ultimately, death carried the worthy citizen across to the other side. In ancient Sumer, the wealth, and position of one's temporal existence was not left behind. Wenke (1980, 415–16) noted that through 3800 BC, at even the largest settlements, grave sites evidenced little social differentiation. By 3000 BC, however, there was a striking difference in mortuary practice. At Ur, excavators working in the 1920s uncovered a burial pit that eventually revealed tombs of three distinct social strata: simple graves that presumably contained the remains of the common people, the more elaborate graves of the well-to-do, and a total of sixteen royal tombs. In one of these tombs were the remains of a queen, found partially hidden under a mass of gold beads and precious stones. She was surrounded by sacrificial attendants and guards whose duty it apparently was to assist her in her journey, for which the party was equipped with a jeweled chariot and similarly decorated wagons. Lying nearby was a gold- and jewel-encrusted harp, across which were strewn the bones of a gold-crowned harpist.

Even though it may not be possible to pinpoint the dates at which the first urban cultures emerged, we are still able to sense something of the differences embodied in the change. At some stage, people were clearly living in a different, wider, richer world, where specialists could devote more time to contemplating the metaphysical mysteries and debating their answers. The city transformed the human experience for those living within and around its walls. But its influence did not end there.

The Rise of the State and the Growth of Political-Economic Power

Any discussion of the advent and growth of cities would be incomplete if it focused exclusively on events that occurred within and around the walls of the early city. As the urban form took shape and grew in size, the territory that came under its influence grew as well. Whatever the other requirements of urban existence, the one condition that must be met is that of a sufficiently productive agricultural base. To the extent that all early urbanites were not self-sustaining peasants or farmers, and we have observed that many were not food producers, farmers had to be induced to produce a surplus of staple food crops. As Sjoberg (1960, 68) observed, "Peasant farmers . . . rarely produce and relinquish a surplus willingly in feudal societies; thus tribute, taxation and the like must be exacted if cities are going to gain the wherewithal to support their populations." As the city emerges, therefore, we witness simultaneously the creation of a hinterland, an area containing a population that is not urbanite but subject to urban rule. They are a people whose lives have been transformed by the city, an example of the expanding dimensions of the power associated with the new form of organization. Whether it is through the teachings of the priest or the swords of soldiers, they learn that they owe their allegiance and the first share of their productive efforts to the city.

If the territories under the control of the early population centers of Mesopotamia were limited to a radius of a few miles in 3500 BCE (Hawley (1981, 22), it is not

likely that this remained the case for long. Shortages of the best agricultural land are likely to have made the maintenance of territorial borders a source of constant concern and conflict (Adams 1966, 157). A growing population with the need to secure additional supplies of food, or a stable population given the uncertainties of nature, would have provided sufficient motive for territorial expansion. Sjoberg (1960, 69) observed the general rule for cities of this type: The cities that prosper must have ever-widening hinterlands. These cities must command territories that are characterized by strength, stability, and open trade routes, in addition to a dependable tributary population of agriculturalists. This is a principle that these early societies had centuries to observe and came to understand well. The city had come to represent the seat of *imperial power*.

There is evidence that the rulers of the early Mesopotamian cities were eager to extend their control beyond the area necessary for subsistence and to develop agricultural surpluses useful in military campaigns. A common feature of the early dynastic period of Sumer was the attempt by the rulers of some cities to establish hegemony over others. Regarding one of the entombments at the burial pit at Ur, Hammond (1972, 42–43) concluded that the magnitude of the riches displayed indicates that the ruler must have had military might sufficient to acquire such great wealth: "Presumably a monarch interred so elaborately ruled not only Ur but other cities as well." Adams (1966, 162) suggested that rivalry between cities periodically generated the need for military leadership and that the rise of this kind of secular ruler led to predatory expansionism among the fledgling states. In any event, written records indicate that by the latter part of this era a distinction emerged in the title of address between the rulers of dominant cities and the governors of dependent cities.

The ancient cities of the Indus River Valley, in what is today Pakistan, were in many ways typical of cities in other ancient regions of the Middle East, but in at least one important way, they were different. Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro were two of the major population centers in the region. Harappa probably got its start as a farming village in 3300 BCE and by 2200 BCE had grown to a population of 80,000, about the same size as the city of Ur in Mesopotamia. Like other ancient cities, it commanded long-distance trade. Merchants came from what today are Baluchistan and northern Afghanistan to supply copper, tin, and lapis lazuli. Sea shells, which provided a medium for local carvers, were brought from the southern seacoast. The lower slopes of the Himalayas supplied timber; semiprecious stones came from Gujarat; silver and gold arrived from as far away as Central Asia. Just as the city was influenced by distant cultures, its own culture influenced other settlements in the Indus Valley, and it exported its products to Mesopotamia, Iran, and Central Asia. Goods entering and leaving the city passed through a narrow gate in the wall that completely surrounded the settlement, and the city raised revenue from taxes on goods going in and out.

The nature of this wall and other archeological evidence has led to speculation that Harappa and the other cities of the Indus Valley may have had a different kind of history than that of other Middle Eastern cities. The straight wall, without strategic angles that would have made it a more effective device if the city were under siege, was apparently not built for military defense, but to prevent the smuggling

of goods and the evasion of tax collectors. The archeological remains of Harappa and the other major population centers in the Indus Valley bear no evidence of warfare. While Indus Valley society was clearly an economically powerful force in the ancient world—covering a territory twice the size of Mesopotamia—it was apparently not a battleground in which city-states fought to dominate one another. Current speculation is that after 700 years of stability, the end of this social order came as a result of ecological and climatic changes, not conquest (Kenoyer 1998; Menon 1998).

Once the urban form emerged in the ancient world, it exerted a central organizing influence on surrounding territories—with or without military force—developing a set of territorial relationships in which the major urban center, as political and economic nucleus, played the dominant role. Today, the emerging evidence allows us to conclude that ancient centers like Harappa were indeed agents of lasting changes in human society as they began the process of knitting distant resources into a single network of markets. These metropolitan economies were taking the first steps in organizing the exchange of the resources of the known world, what we refer to today as *globalization*.

The Development of Early Cities in China and Mesoamerica

Although the Middle East apparently produced the earliest cities, other regions evolved ancient urban-based societies; two of the most notable of these regions are China and Mesoamerica. The parallels between the cities that arose there and early Middle Eastern societies suggest that the broad principles of urban-related social, cultural, and political changes we have described for the Middle East are generalizable. In fact, there has been some controversy, historically, about whether cities evolved independently in China or whether the urban form was somehow transported from the Middle East in the period before written history. Today the weight of evidence supports the argument that China's historical urban traditions are rooted in a long prehistory of evolving local settlements and indigenous traditions (Huang 1988, 5).

There had long been speculation that China's first dynasty, the Xia dynasty, had generated the earliest urban settlements in China, but researchers were not able to produce a clear record of the nature of early Chinese population centers until relatively recently. In 1990, Chinese archeologists announced that a site that had been under excavation for several decades in coastal Shandong Province did indeed comprise an ancient city, dating from 1900 BCE. At the same time, the group announced that an even older settlement had been discovered in the area, dating to 2600 BCE, predating the first or Xia dynasty (2100–1600 BCE). The older site is associated with the Longshan Culture. The site's thick walls enclose a rectangular area about one-fourth of a mile in width by a third in length. The substantial area covered within its walls and the probability that its population included a number of specialized artisans favor the classification of the earliest site as a true city. The later, Xia dynasty city is more than eight times as large as the earlier site and fills the prehistorical gap between the Longshan Culture and the more clearly documented Shang dynasty, which lasted from the sixteenth to the eleventh century BCE (*Beijing Review*, October 1, 1990, 45–16).

Rich archeological evidence is associated with the 500-year history of the Shang dynasty, where rule was passed from brother to brother or father to son. Unlike the earliest Middle Eastern cities, the record of the dynasty has been preserved in writing on tens of thousands of bone fragments, called "oracle bones" (Huang 1988, 6–7). The record reveals, for example, that the last Shang king sent a military expedition to subdue an enemy, that the expedition took a total of 260 days, and that 2,656 enemy soldiers were killed. These are small historical details viewed from the present era, but it was important news at the time and was duly recorded in seventy-eight entries in the oracle records (Cheng 1982, 18–19). The account reveals the kind of detail that a written history can provide, how much clearer the record of urban-based cultures can be where written records survive.

Between 1600 BCE and 1100 BCE, the Shang dynasty moved its capital at least a half-dozen times. One of the capital sites, the city of Ao (in Henan Province today), comprised an area of just under four square kilometers within the wall, and the large number of house and workshop foundations located outside the wall indicate that the city had outgrown its original boundaries. By contrast, the Great City Shang, further to the north, covered an area of between 30 and 40 square kilometers and was apparently laid out according to a preconceived plan. Not far away is a royal cemetery where the graves of the kings are lavishly furnished and include human sacrificial remains (Cheng 1982, 19–20). The famous terracotta army of thousands of life-sized soldiers, found buried at Xi'an in association with the tomb of a later emperor, date from much more recent times, around 200 BCE.

The date of the establishment of China's very first cities is obscured by the imperfect light that can be shed by archeology. The precursors of urban civilization now appear to have been established in China as long ago as 5000 BCE. The Yi people of present-day Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou Provinces had by then devised a solar calendar. They built three-story, pyramid-shaped tombs that were systematically oriented with respect to solar movements and stellar formations and served as observatories as well as grave sites. The culture of the builders bears a few striking resemblances to the Mayan culture of the New World. The Maya also had a solar calendar, and like the Yi people they adopted the tiger as their totem; they also developed similar hieroglyphic conventions and built three-tiered pyramidal platforms surprisingly similar to those of the Yi culture (*Beijing Review*, March 20, 1989, 46). There has been at least some speculation that Mesoamerican city building may have had some unknown link in the prehistoric period to these proto-urban Chinese cultures (Meggers 1975).

Mesoamerican cities developed much later than cities in Mesopotamia or China. Settled, agricultural life in Mexico apparently dates only from about 4000 BCE: the first evidence of any human habitation goes back to roughly 10,000 BCE. The first long-distance traders and the earliest culture to leave monumental architectural and stone-sculptured remains were the Olmecs, whose oldest monumental artifacts appeared on the southern coast of Mexico about 1200 BCE.

The Olmecs are important because they unified a large area of southern Mexico with territories as far south as Costa Rica. Their trade items, including objects made by artists and artisans, evolved into important symbols of prestige in many areas and were available from no other source. As the artifacts produced by the Olmecs became incorporated into many of the cultures in the region, the trade provided an

overall connectivity among societies there. Olmec trading activity fostered a series of market sites and manufacturing sites or "towns," and it laid the commercial groundwork for the development of a succession of regional empires based in large population centers (Litvak-King 1985, 16–36). The unifying force of long-distance trade integrated much of modern-day Mexico with Guatemala, Belize, and parts of Honduras and Ecuador, creating a form of cultural integration referred to by anthropologists as a *culture area*, providing one basis for the unifying concept *Mesoamerica* (Sabloff 1989, 19). The period from 1200 BCE through the period following the European invasion and conquest in the sixteenth century is seen most appropriately as a single complex era of cultural and political development, with exceptional periods of achievement, such as those characterized by Maya and Aztec hegemony.

There has been vigorous academic argument over whether the early New World population centers of ancient Mesoamerica qualify as "true" cities. Two main features distinguish early Mesoamerican population centers from ancient centers elsewhere in the world: First, they have traditionally been interpreted primarily as ceremonial rather than commercial centers. Their main architectural features are religious monuments that are positioned to address one another in a highly formalized, almost sculpted overall plan. Second, while these ancient sites served as the foci for large regional populations, these populations were not housed within city walls. Instead, populations were spread out over large areas. For example, Tikal, located in modern-day Guatemala, grew into a major Mayan city between 800 BCE and 300 BCE. At its peak, it had between 30,000 and 40,000 people, but this population was scattered over about 120 square kilometers (Sabloff 1989, 83). This amounts to an average of about 290 people per square kilometer, or a little more than one person per acre. Are we prepared to see this as an urban site? Some scholarship emphasizes the differences between different Mesoamerican sites, observing that some of the larger centers fit the Western concept of "urban" places better than others (Sanders and Webster 1988). Webster (2002, 150–57) favors the recognition of places such as Teotihuacan in the early Mayan era and Tenochtitlan later as true cities, but argues that all Mayan centers be recognized for their distinctive purpose as the home of kings, expressions of the great traditions, and "obtrusive expressions of the cosmic order that kings professed to deliver to their kingdoms and subjects" (154). Others hold that these less densely populated places served similar functions to other ancient cities and therefore deserve to be recognized as such (Smith 1989).

Keeping this debate in mind, it appears that most regional scholars are of the opinion that the first Mesoamerican cities appeared in about 500 BCE. In quick succession, large religious and administrative centers arose in the Valley of Oaxaca; at Teotihuacan in Central Mexico (300 BCE); and at various Mayan sites in Belize, Guatemala, and Yucatan (300 BCE). The first of these, today called Monte Alban, grew to a population of 15,000 by the third century BCE. A century later the population of a rival city, Teotihuacan, was probably 40,000; it continued to grow during the next six centuries to between 120,000 and 200,000 people.

The Classic Period of Mayan civilization, dating from 300 BCE to 800 CE, featured familiar patterns associated with the growth of ancient cities elsewhere. These included increasing populations, increasing nucleation of the population,

craft specialization, the growth of wealth and power of the urban elite, expanding bureaucracy, increased social stratification, and an increase in the competition between cities. The Mayan age lasted long enough that it was characterized by many fluctuations in political and economic fortunes and many regional shifts, as some urban sites declined and others rose to prominence. The archeological record offers a variety of reasons for why particular sites declined when they did. In an authoritative summary Webster (2002) believes the causes were, in declining order of significance, a decline in agricultural and other resources, warfare, the decline in authority of kings, increasing impact of severe drought, unrest of the general population, and disease.

The Aztecs came to dominate the other people of Mexico late in the period leading up to the Spanish invasion in 1521. Beginning in 1325, they built up the site of the old city of Tenochtitlan from swampy islands at the edge of Lake Texcoco. Over the course of the fifteenth century, the Aztecs came to rule a large empire in central Mexico from their capital city. They collected tribute from subject peoples throughout the region. At its height, early in the sixteenth century, it is estimated that the population of Tenochtitlan was between 200,000 and 300,000 people. The Spaniards wrote that they were amazed, could not believe their eyes, at the scale of the conquered city. But the conquest and European diseases brought complete destruction. "The complex, civilized world of ancient Mexico, which had produced such marvels as . . . Tenochtitlan over a 3,000-year-long period, came to an abrupt, catastrophic end" (Sabloff 1989, 130). Archeologists continue to explore the ancient settlement, hampered by the fact that today one of the largest cities in the world, Mexico City, grows on the site.

The Significance of Early Urbanization

Changes in the scale of social organization, the transformation of culture, and the rise of the state led V. Gordon Childe to designate the ancient era as an era in which the world underwent an "Urban Revolution" (1951, chapter 7). Among the revolutionary achievements of the time he included the growth of technology, especially in architecture and the smelting of metals, and the long-distance trade among urbanizing cultures that led to the diffusion of ideas and skills, in addition to goods. Once the city had emerged as a social invention, it proliferated and persisted. Although particular urban societies came and went, the city remained the heart of empire, technology, and civilization. The ancient city reached its fullest development in Greek and Roman cultures. Athens may have had 120,000 to 180,000 inhabitants at its peak in the fifth century BCE (Davis 1955, 432). Estimates of the population of the city of Rome range from half a million to a million. Mumford's (1961, 231, 236) sources indicate that in Rome as many as 200,000 poor received regular rations of bread issued from public storehouses. An inventory dating from early in the fourth century CE indicates that there were 46,602 "lodging houses" in the city. In addition to the great city itself, the Roman Empire fostered a number of provincial capitals. Although the decline of Rome may have ushered in a dark age for much of Europe, as the empire's urban outposts withered until they contained mere fractions of their former populations, other urban cultures were flourishing.

The seventh century marked the beginning of the rapid expansion of Islamic cities that would continue throughout the medieval period. Udovitch (1977, 143) observed that "urbanism is a characteristic feature of the entire [medieval Islamic] period and all its parts. . . . The spiritual, material, and political culture of medieval Islam was an almost exclusively urban creation."

By the medieval era, China, where the city had come into existence by 2000 BCE, had become a network of administrative cities organized in a hierarchy, each one typically planned to symbolically reflect the relationship between humanity and nature by its spatial arrangement (Williams 1983, 413–17). Between CE 900 and 1200, it is possible that four or five of the largest Chinese cities were not far short of a million inhabitants (Elvin 1978, 79).

From their earliest beginnings, the number of people who lived within the cities of the great societies, or whose lives were subject to urban-based rule, was gradually increasing. From its inception as a massive technical device for concentrating and organizing human energy and liberating the power of human imagination, the city was here to stay. And while early cities were much different from those of today, it is possible to discern continuities in the ways in which the city organizes space and life in every era (Smith 2003).

Yet Kingsley Davis (1955, 429–32) believed that the influence of urbanization in any era before the late eighteenth century was too limited to qualify as an "urban revolution." While he conceded that the advent of the urban form represents a fundamental change in the pattern of social life, he argued that this change touched the lives of relatively few people living in earlier times. Observing that it must have taken the work of fifty to ninety farmers to support a single urbanite, he concluded that the urban proportion of a given population must have been limited to 1 or 2 percent. Furthermore, he was critical of elevating some of the earlier and smaller places that we have discussed to the status of "city," noting what he felt is the inclination of researchers to call any unearthed settlement a city if it had "a few streets and a public building or two." Although Davis allowed that by 3000 BCE "true" cities had emerged, he reserved the designation of "true urban revolution" for the era of explosive growth that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. Not until this point in history were large proportions of the population of a major world region gathered into cities.

THE URBANIZATION OF EUROPE

When the Roman Empire disintegrated, it left its urban outposts isolated, and in Europe they fell prey to the formerly conquered and subjected societies of the region. Many of these cities disappeared, while others shrank into towns and villages. The achievements of urban culture, such as those in medicine and astronomy, were maintained in these smaller centers or kept alive in monasteries or other cloisters. However, by the tenth century, Venice and other independent Italian cities had been called to new life by Mediterranean trade with the cities of the Eastern Roman Empire, which had continued under Byzantine rule (Sjoberg [1965] 1973, 25–26).

Elsewhere in Europe, towns gradually grew again in response to trade, the opportunity for which was created by the stirrings and movements of the repeated

crusades to the Holy Land. The medieval cities that profited and grew were in some ways similar to and in other ways different from the ancient cities. The cities were still walled for protection, and their growing numbers of inhabitants were squeezed within these walls, making them vulnerable to repeated epidemics of disease, including the plague. As was the case in ancient times, staple grains were stockpiled against years when crops failed or warfare threatened (Rorig [1955] 1967, 113–14). Power slipped away from religious leaders and the nobility, and by the thirteenth century merchants and traders emerged as a new powerful class whose influence was based on the increasing importance of the marketplace. German traders set out deliberately to found a string of urban "colonies" in Europe, a trading network promoting regional trade, thereby unifying northern Europe into an important economic entity. Although these towns were modest in size, seldom exceeding 20,000 in population, these compact settlements would have "fulfilled a political, economic, and cultural function [of] which many a present-day town of several hundred thousand would be envious." According to Rorig's classic account, "The medieval town [was] one of the most important impulses in world history" (Rorig [1955] 1967, 111, 113).

By 1300, urban growth on a larger scale was once again occurring in Europe. London had grown on the site of the old Roman outpost to a population of 45,000; Paris was much larger, perhaps containing 228,000 people by that date (Chandler 1987). In Italy, several of the urban centers that lent their names to the city-states they ruled had grown through three centuries of sustained economic and population expansion. But before the Renaissance would regenerate urban growth in the fifteenth century, the Black Plague of 1348 and subsequent years of epidemic diseases reduced the population of Italian cities, as they did the populations of other European centers, by 35 to 65 percent. Milan had 150,000 inhabitants in 1300, but a century after the plaque had rebounded to fewer than 90,000. The populations of other cities—Venice, Florence, Genoa, Bologna, Siena, Pisa, Padua—smaller than Milan before the epidemics, were similarly reduced. This makes the achievements of the Renaissance era that were sponsored by these centers all the more remarkable. Placemark 2.1 briefly describes Florence, where the population was at least halved (from 95,000 to perhaps 40,000) between 1300 and the early 1400s (Martines 1979,168).

Placemark 2.1—Renaissance Florence

We associate the Renaissance, the rebirth of artistic and other high cultural achievement in Europe, with the great Italian city-states of the 1400s. Among the most prominent of the Italian Renaissance cities was Florence. Within the space of a few decades, Brunelleschi created the dome of the great cathedral, Ghiberti sculpted the astonishing North Doors of the Baptistery, Fra Angelico executed the frescoes of the convent San Marco, Masaccio painted his *Trinity* for the cathedral Santa Maria Novella, Donatello sculpted *The Maddelena*, and others, including Fra Filippo Lippi, Domenico Veneziano, Andrea del Castagno, and Uccello, were at work adding to the storm of creative energy that brought every public space, facade, and interior to life. Peter Hall (1998, 69–70) made two observations that help us appreciate the extraordinary nature

of Florentine accomplishment. First, Hall noted that Renaissance Florence had at most 95,000 people (probably far fewer), roughly equivalent to the present-day population of a "smallish English country town," or Bakersfield, California. The Florence that produced the great volume of art in the fifteenth century was by no means a large city by today's standards. Second, the creative burst of energies was no accident or coincidence: Civic leaders consciously promoted the ascendancy of Florence over other Renaissance cities in accordance with what they believed was the city's destiny. As Hall put it, "These works were the conscious creations of the entire collectivity, they were not simply expressions of individual creativity or genius, but the result of long deliberations in committees and rigorous, indeed contentious and bitter, competition among artists of huge talent—and frequently—egos to match" (65). Florence was a self-contained state that waged wars with similar states, where the Medici, Pitti, and Rucellai families created empires of wealth and, along with the Church, became patrons of architecture, sculpture, and painting. It was a place where the populace believed that "by its ugliness an old building may be a disgrace to the town, while a new one should redound to its honor and ornament" (Burkhardt 1985, 4). The wealth of achievements in art and architecture that has survived the ages and draws us to Florence today was created within an atmosphere of inspiration that was not simply artistic but also combined a particular mix of political and economic factors and local civic loyalties. Taking nothing away from the talents or genius of the individuals who produced the works themselves, we may ask to what extent it is appropriate to argue that the city, rather than its artists, produced Florence's contribution to the Renaissance. Or, if we stand before the great Florentine works that are included in the city's Uffizi Gallery, what are we seeing? What are we missing by not knowing at least a little of the history of the city that provided a time and place for their creation?

In the next three or four centuries, European exploration and colonization fueled the growth of the continental capitals and other cities. Lisbon had a population of more than 100,000 by 1600 and grew to more than 200,000 by the mid-1700s. The population of Madrid is estimated to have reached 80,000 in 1600 and 110,000 in 1750. By 1700, the populations of London and Paris surpassed the half-million mark (Chandler 1987, 474–84). By then the landscape of Europe had become increasingly dotted with an assortment of manufacturing and market towns, provincial centers, and cities of various sizes, in addition to the growing metropolises. The world was about to enter a period of revolutionary change in which the city once more would play an important role.

The Industrial Revolution

For some time historians have been refocusing the image of the Industrial Revolution until it is no longer viewed as a relatively sudden transformation, but as the culmination of a gradual economic process that took place over several centuries.

By the early sixteenth century, there was already some evidence of local industrial specialization in England. Coventry specialized in textiles and metals, Northampton and Leicester in leather trades, and Birmingham in metals (Musson 1978, 17).

Although the populations of industrial cities would grow explosively from the 1760s through the mid-1800s—the period generally considered as the Industrial Revolution—the population of Liverpool had already multiplied by ten times from 1680 to 1760, and the population of Manchester by five times from 1717 to 1773. Moreover, a full-fledged textile factory had been in operation at Derby since 1719 (George 1931, 144–47).

> There was no sharp division between the medieval and early modern economy and society. Towns had been growing, trade and industry had been expanding, a monetary economy and a system of mercantile credit had been developing over earlier centuries and as markets expanded . . . industrial specialization and the division of labor had been increasing, tending to produce distinctions between agriculture and industry, between town and country. (Musson 1978, 21)

Therefore, it is important to recognize that the roots of the Industrial Revolution began deep in the medieval period, and that it is more accurately viewed as a gradual process rather than an abrupt change occurring at some point around the date of 1760. However, the cumulation of changes that occurred after this approximate date is dramatic.

The Industrial Revolution is considered to be comprised of improvements in industrial machinery, especially textiles, of improvements in the steam engine and its utilization as a source of power in manufacturing, and of the use of coal in iron smelting. However, a number of other changes, having no direct relationship to industrial or manufacturing technology, were occurring at the same time, each seemingly amplifying the effect of the others. Between 1750 and 1800, the European population grew as death rates declined. This decline in death rates is attributed to improvements in agricultural productivity, which included the introduction of artificial manures, new methods of crop rotation, and the development of heavier, more efficient livestock through planned breeding techniques. Fluctuations in yearly harvests were reduced, and except for Ireland (1845–1850), famine had largely disappeared from western Europe. Medical practice and the understanding of disease improved, although plague, typhus, smallpox, cholera, malaria, and tuberculosis still took a terrible toll (Armengaud [1970] 1976, 38–43).

England, which led the way in industrialization, was in the process of establishing a colonial empire and took measures to control or eliminate competition in trade; thus the city retained the imperial function it had acquired in ancient times. This trade, which provided the basis for a large shipbuilding industry, was carried on in part with Africa, India, and the Americas, giving rise to industries that processed tropical raw materials and providing markets for the export of textiles, metals, and other manufactures. Trade was necessary to maintain the rapid growth of industry and, thereby, the growth of European cities. It was the dimensions of this growth that led Davis (1955, 433) to conclude that "the transformation thus achieved in the nineteenth century was the true urban revolution, for it meant not only the rise of a few scattered towns and cities, but the appearance of genuine urbanization in the sense that a substantial proportion of the population lived in towns and cities."

At this stage in the history of urban growth it became more possible to speak in terms of *urbanization*. As Davis pointed out, urbanization refers to the growth of the *proportion* of a given (for example, national) population living in urban areas. In the early nineteenth century, reliable comparative data became available from national census records, and we can compare rates of urbanization country by country, at least for Europe. This makes it possible to begin to evaluate Davis's claim that the nineteenth century marked a truly revolutionary era measured in terms of urbanization rates.

The urbanization of the populations of selected European nations is reflected in Table 2.1. That portion of the British Isles that includes England, Scotland, and Wales most clearly embodies the revolutionary change referred to by Davis. The British island was transformed from a predominantly rural society to a predominantly urban society within the span of the nineteenth century. However, other European nations, as well as Russia and the United States, fall into one of two contrasting patterns. For the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, the urbanization curve is rather flat. In these countries, urban growth was sponsored in an earlier era by imperial trade rather than by industrial growth. And the pattern differs again for another group of countries that includes Belgium, Prussia, the United States, France, Switzerland, Austria, and Russia. In the most urbanized of these countries, only about one-fourth of the population was living in cities of 20,000 or more by the end of the nineteenth century. The impact of the Industrial Revolution came more gradually and later to these countries. So when referring to the Industrial Revolution in Europe, we need to keep these variations in mind. Finally, Ireland has been included as a special case: The population of this country was rapidly urbanizing during the nineteenth century, although the trend is not apparent from the data presented in the table. This is because the "urbanization" of the Irish population was taking place through immigration in England, the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Table 2.1. The Urbanizing World in the Nineteenth Century: Percentage of Populations Living in Cities of 20,000 or More

	1800	*1850*	*1890*
England and Wales	16.9 (1801)	35.0 (1851)	53.6 (1891)
Scotland	13.9 (1801)	27.7 (1851)	42.4 (1891)
Belgium	8.7 (1800-1810)	16.6 (1846)	26.1 (1890)
Netherlands	24.5 (1795)	21.7(1849)	31.3 (1889)
Prussia	6.0 (1816)	7.8 (1849)	23.0 (1890)
United States	3.8 (1800)	9.8 (1850)	23.8 (1890)
France	6.7 (1801)	10.6 (1851)	21.1 (1891)
Spain	9.8 (ca. 1820)	9.6 (1857)	18.0 (1887)
Ireland	6.6 (ca. 1800)	8.7 (1851)	15.3 (1891)
Switzerland	1.3 (1822)	5.2 (1850)	13.2 (1888)
Austria	3.6 (ca. 1800)	4.2 (1843)	12.0 (1890)
Portugal	10.3 (1801)	10.7 (1857)	9.2 (1890)
Russia	2.4 (1820)	3.5 (1856)	7.2 (1885)

Source: Adna F. Weber. [1899] 1965. *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Statistics.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 144–45.
Note: Figures have been rounded to nearest tenth.

Also hidden in the growth rates, and adding to their significance, is the fact that the overall population of Europe, rural as well as urban, was growing. Due to mortality rates that remained high throughout the century, urban population growth stemming from *natural increase* (i.e., an increase caused by having a birthrate higher than the prevailing death rate) was retarded. The rapid urban growth that did occur is attributable to the fact that the cities continued to replenish and increase their labor force through migration from rural areas. Even so, the growth of the rural population kept pace with the growth of the urban population through the late 1700s (Armengaud [1970] 1976, 32). During the 1800s, as the *proportion* of rural population began to decrease in relation to the growing urban population, the *absolute number* of people employed in the agricultural labor force remained steady, supported by the increasing food demand of the growing urban population (Bergier [1971] 1976, 423–24).

The increase in urban population reflects both the growth in the number of urban places and the growth in the size of individual cities. For example, in 1800 six cities within the states of Italy were above 100,000 in population; just over a century later (1910), thirteen cities were above this figure in population. In 1800 only St. Petersburg and Moscow in Russia could count more than 100,000 inhabitants, but by 1910 twelve Russian cities were in this category, with Moscow having 1.5 million inhabitants and St. Petersburg nearly 2 million (Armengaud [1970] 1976, 34–35). Table 2.2 traces the growth of individual capitals during the nineteenth century. By 1891 London, with over 4 million people, had grown to nearly five times its size in 1801. And in ninety years, Paris, with almost 2.5 million, had grown to four and one-half times its former size. The most rapid urban growth, however, was taking place not in these old centers but in a new urban form, the industrial city. Although London continued to grow at the remarkable rate of 16 to 20 percent per decade throughout the century, much greater rates of growth were being recorded in rapidly industrializing Liverpool, Birmingham, Leeds, Sheffield, and Manchester, each of which had grown by more than 40 percent in just ten years between 1821 and 1831. In addition, Bradford had grown by 65 percent (Sheppard 1971, xv–xviii).


These cities presented an alteration of the urban form, a new city whose reason for being sprang from the practical technology and economics of factory production, from the efficiency of gathering large numbers of industrial workers in proximity to the power source—the great steam engine. That the new urban form marked a departure with the image of the monumental cities of the past is made clear by the emerging travelogue literature of the early nineteenth century and the reactions of disappointed tourists. Travelers journeyed to the romantic centers of the past and were offended to find in Florence and Rome that the majesty of historical sites was obscured by streets teeming with the kinds of proletariat they thought they had left behind in their cities of origin (Buzard 1993). Many of the old established centers were deeply changed by the process of industrialization. Despite the rapid growth of the industrial countries of Lancashire and Yorkshire, London became and remained the leading manufacturing center of the country (Sheppard 1971, 158). During the 1800s,

> The view from Westminster Bridge (and from many other places in London too) had changed greatly. The air had become laden with smoke of steam vessels, gasworks, and the furnaces of a host of industrial establishments, and the snort and hiss of rail-

Table 2.2. The Growth of Major Cities during the Nineteenth Century

	1800	*1820*	*1840*	*1860*	*1880*	*1890*
London	864,845 (1801)	1,224,694 (1821)	1,873,676 (1841)	2,803,989 (1861)	2,823,354 (1881)	4,232,118 (1891)
Paris	547,756 (1801)	713,966 (1821)	935,261 (1841)	1,696,741 (1861)	2,269,023 (1881)	2,447,957 (1891)
Berlin	—	201,138 (1819)	283,727 (1837)	547,571 (1861)	1,122,330 (1880)	1,578,794 (1890)
Vienna	232,000 (1800)	260,224 (1821)	356,869 (1840)	476,222 (1857)	705,402 (1880)	798,719 (1890)
Glasgow	81,048 (1801)	147,043 (1821)	274,533 (1841)	436,432 (1861)	674,095 (1881)	782,445 (1891)
Budapest	61,000 (1800)	85,000 (1820)	156,506 (1850)	186,945 (1857)	360,551 (1880)	491,938 (1890)
Madrid	156,670 (ca. 1805)	167,607 (ca. 1820)	—	281,170 (1857)	—	470,283 (1887)
Lisbon	350,000 (1801)	—	—	275,286 (1857)	246,343 (1878)	370,661 (1890)

Source: Adna F. Weber. [1899] 1965. *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century: A Study in Statistics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 46, 60, 73, 84, 95, 101,119, 120.



The streets of the cities of the Industrial Revolution were full of people attempting to earn a living through street trades. Here Gustave Doré's drawing of London's Bishopsgate Street in the 1870s preserves a glimpse of that street life. Victorian London Bishopsgate Street. East of London. Engraving by Gustave Doré, from London , a Pilgrimage*, by Gustave Doré and Blanchard Jerrold, 1872 . © Lebrecht Music & Arts Photo Library, photographersdirect.com*

> way locomotives at the new terminus at Waterloo Station could constantly be heard. Downstream, the noble prospect towards the City and the dome of St. Paul's had been ruthlessly sundered by the brick and iron of Charing Cross Railway Bridge. Beneath Westminster Bridge itself still flowed the perennial river, no longer gliding "at its own sweet will," but controlled and restricted by the great granite wall of Victoria Embankment, along which clattered an endless procession of carriages, buses, cabs and carts, and beneath which there now extended an underground railway and two giant tunnels, one for gas and water pipes and telegraph wires, and the other for sewage. Upstream, too, the change was as great—to the left a vast new hospital, to the right a new palace of Westminster, more embankments, more bridges. Nothing within sight "lay open to the fields," and even the sooty parapet of Westminster Bridge itself was new—iron in place of stone. London had been transformed. (Sheppard 1971, xv–xvi)

The Dimensions of Urbanization in the Industrial Revolution

The industrialization of cities meant much more than their rapid growth and change in appearance. The discussion of the earliest cities explored three major dimensions of their existence: a change in social organization, an enriched human experience, and the advent of the urban form creating the territorial city/hinterland relationship. The Industrial Revolution held its own powerful consequence for the ways in which the city influenced society and affected experience. In the following discussion, these three dimensions, which denote the consequences of urbanization, are considered for the industrial era.

Social Organization

As Marx observed, one of the most profound transformations of human existence under industrial capitalism was the *proletarianization* of labor as society is divided into two distinct social classes, one gaining its living from profit, the other (the proletariat) from wages. As with other slow-paced social transitions that accompanied the Industrial Revolution, the supplanting of earlier kin-based organization of peasant labor is likely to have taken place gradually in some industries (Langton 2000), but the new definition of the condition of labor soon crystallized. With the rise of industrial urbanization in England, for example, a reformist criticism of the ways in which common people spent their leisure time emerged among the elite guardians of the social conscience. In the recent past, popular pastimes had included football, cricket, and other team sports, bearbaiting and bullbaiting, cockfighting, wrestling, cudgel playing (dueling with poles), and parish feasts and fairs. Those concerned with public order did not see these pastimes as compatible with the requirements of industrial production and factory discipline. *Gentleman's Magazine* warned that "the Diversion of Cricket might be proper in Holiday-Time in the Country, but upon Days when men might be busy, and in the Neighbourhood of a great City, it is not only improper but mischievous in a high Degree" (Malcolmson 1973, 161). By the end of the eighteenth century, opposition to traditional recreations was the ascendant voice, and by the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the very limited supply of alternative, attractive sources of recreation was marked by the overwhelming importance of the public house (Malcolmson 1973, 171). Urban life, to the

extent that it had now become industrial life, demanded a new level of discipline, or at least the docile compliance of its workforce.

The largest proportion of the growing urban population was made up of industrial workers, most of whom had no real property and owned no share in the productive machinery at which they worked. Understanding the conditions of this proletariat is essential to understanding life in the cities of this era. However, the changes in organization that occurred in this period went beyond the expansion of a great laboring class. The requirements of industrial technology called forth an increasing number of specialists to design, finance, build, sell, provide services for, and administer this complex apparatus and its products. Within the manufacturing process itself, each worker's function was broken down into simple repetitive tasks, leading to a concern that the experience of work itself might become meaningless (Durkheim [1893] 1933). This was the era of the rise and formalization of bureaucracy, again a rational system of social organization devoted to the accomplishment of complex tasks, such as the construction of a steamship or the administration of the city itself. Bureaucracy mimicked the efficient machinery of the industrial age within the realm of social organization.

The industrial city contained a large number of statuses and occupations. In early nineteenth-century Germany, differentiation within the ranks of industrial workers themselves is reflected in the fact that some male workers received eight to twelve times as much as the lowest paid child, and four to five times as much as the lowest paid adult male worker (Sagarra 1977, 363). Of course, the most significant inequalities existed between the laboring and other classes. In late nineteenth-century London, labor made up three-fourths (73.3 percent) of all occupations. The remainder of the economically engaged population consisted of shopkeepers (large and small), the capitalist or ownership class, some professions, and the domestic servants of these social strata (Sheppard 1971, 389). Those outside of the labor force accounted for nearly half the population of the city. This segment of the population can be divided into those who could afford not to work and those who could not find work. Many of the latter were forced to turn to the streets for their livelihood. In Placemark 2.2, Sheppard provides a reconstruction of street life in London, which shows both its color and the desperation of some of those who had to make their living from it.

Placemark 2.2—Petty Trades and Street Life in Nineteenth Century London

Besides those who worked for a wage there were thousands of others who worked in equally various ways on their own account. For such people the public streets were the cheapest places to work in, for there were no rents or rates to pay, nor heating or lighting, and in many trades the equipment required could be bought for a shilling or two. The streets of mid-nineteenth-century London bustled and rang with a quasi-nomadic economic life, which has now

> almost completely disappeared. There were some 30,000 costermongers alone, dealing in fruit, vegetables, or fish, either going their rounds with their barrows, or congregating at the street markets, particularly on Saturday nights and Sunday mornings when the poor did their shopping. But almost any article of food could be bought in the streets, delicacies such as hot eels, pickled whelks, and sheep's trotters being included in the daily menu alongside such more commonplace items as bread, milk, cat's meat, and even water. Many small manufactured articles were always on offer from itinerant salesmen—fusees, flypapers, cutlery, old clothes, rat poison, toys, and spectacles, for instance; there were dog sellers, bird sellers, goldfish sellers, blind sellers of matches or needles, and in the poorer districts a living could be made (or at any rate attempted) by the writing of begging letters to individual customer's requirements. But the street was more than a place of business; the acrobats, jugglers, conjurers, singers, pavement artists, strongmen, hurdy-gurdy men, and Punch-and-Judy men made it a place of entertainment as well. Shoe blacking or cross sweeping often provided children with a cheap mode of entry into the great world of street trade, and if all else failed, the destitute could resort to the collection of the very ordure of the streets—cigar ends, the droppings of horses and even dogs, the last being sold by the pail full to the tanneries. . . . Destitution, in fact, led many women to prostitution and many children to crime. (Sheppard 1971, 365–67)

The enormous congregation of population in the cities of the nineteenth century was a huge, spontaneous experiment. It caused many to wonder whether society could continue, what form it would take, and how the massing populations would be controlled. What would be the consequences of the urbanization of the world? We will postpone consideration of the speculation that was offered in response to these kinds of questions until chapter 3.

The Urban Experience in the Industrialized City

For most of the inhabitants of the new city, the conditions of life were dominated by the conditions of work. These have become more or less well-known. It is necessary to understand, however, that a workday comprised of long, hard hours was not something new in itself: Artisans and farmers had always worked similarly long hours. What was new was the monotony of industrial work and the strict and constant supervision under which it was carried out. It may have been because the repetitive work was so dulling and dehumanizing—in addition to the fact that through the practice of child labor, adults had become socialized to accept their condition—that workers had neither the energy nor the will to successfully resist the imposition (Bergier [1971] 1976, 43).

In Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, the average number of hours worked per day was fifteen or sixteen, often without a break for meals. Work could begin at four or five in the morning and finish at eight or nine at night. Child labor reforms, prohibiting the employment of children under nine and limiting the workday to

ten hours for children fourteen or younger, were not effectively enforced until the 1860s in Prussia, Bavaria, and Baden (Sagarra 1977, 364). Still, this made cities there among the earliest examples of effective child labor laws in the industrializing nations.

Although industrial wages were low for most workers, in many cases they were higher than those received by agricultural workers. However, industrial work could be intermittent, as a result of fluctuations in the demand for manufactured products or the increasing ability of industrial-production technology to outstrip existing levels of demand. In contrast with those living and working in rural areas, or in the towns of an earlier era, "in the crowded industrial towns, the urban worker had no garden in which to grow his vegetables, or common on which to keep his pig or poultry, no wood from which to gather kindling or game to trap or poach" (Minchinton [1973] 1976, 112). The urbanite had become a hybrid, wholly dependent upon external conditions of supply and demand over which the individual had no control.

The Industrial Revolution that called the people of Europe to its cities did not automatically foster enlightened and effective government planning and housing policies. The lessons of how to accommodate and care for the health and welfare of the huge and rapidly growing populations of the urban poor were learned slowly, through trial and error, and not in time to benefit those who took part in the earlier phases of the revolution. At first, industrialization led to desperate conditions of crowding throughout Europe. Every available inch of residential space was exploited, and new housing was built within the shadows of factories, as in the case of the back-to-back row houses of English cities that allowed no air or light into the back rooms where families crowded. Although the conditions of housing were bad by any standard, it is necessary to recall, for the purpose of drawing appropriate comparisons, the conditions of the housing that was being left behind by migrants from rural areas. Typically their housing consisted of rough huts of timber, sod, or stone, with earth floors and small holes for windows (not always glazed); the huts were often smoke filled and chimneyless, overcrowded and cold (Minchinton [1973] 1976, 144–45). Nevertheless, the concentration of the poor in cities led to conditions difficult to imagine. We have vivid descriptions of those conditions from the fiction of Charles Dickens and the accounts of Alexis de Tocqueville, but none are more grim than the passage in Textbox 2.1 from Friedrich Engels, who conducts us on a stroll through certain sections of Manchester, England, in 1844. The city had grown from 70,000 in 1801 to 240,000 in 1841. At the end of the passage, Engels tells us that his description is not an exaggeration.

Textbox 2.1. Friedrich Engels's Manchester, 1844

Going from Old Church to Long Millgate, the stroller has at once a row of old-fashioned houses to the right, of which not one has kept its original level; these are remnants of the old pre-manufacturing Manchester. . . . But all this is nothing compared to the courts and lanes which lie behind, to which passage can be gained only through covered passages, in which no two human beings can pass at the same time.

> Of the irregular cramming together of dwellings in ways which defy all rational plan, of the tangle in which they are crowded literally one upon the other, it is impossible to convey an idea. . . .
>
> The south bank of the [River] Irk here is very steep and between fifteen and thirty feet high. On this declivitous hillside there are planted three rows of houses, of which the lowest rises directly out of the river . . . a narrow coal black foul-smelling stream, full of debris and refuse, which it deposits on the shallower right bank. In dry weather, a long string of the most disgusting, blackish-green slime pools are left standing on the bank, from the depths of which bubbles of miasmatic gas constantly arise and give forth a stench unendurable even on the bridge forty or fifty feet above the surface of the stream. But besides this, the stream is checked every few paces by high weirs, behind which slime and refuse accumulate and rot in thick masses.
>
> Above the bridge are tanneries, bone-mills, and gas-works, from which all drains and refuse find their way into the Irk, which receives further the contents of all the neighbouring sewers and privies. It may be easily imagined, therefore, what sort of residue the stream deposits. Below the bridge you look upon the piles of debris, the refuse, filth, and offal from the courts on the steep left bank; here each house is packed close behind its neighbour and a piece of each is visible, all black, smoky, crumbling, ancient, with broken panes and window frames. The background is furnished by old barrack-like factory buildings. . . .
>
> Such is the old town of Manchester, and on rereading my description, I am forced to admit that instead of being exaggerated, it is far from black enough to convey a true impression of the filth, ruin, and uninhabitableness, the defiance of all considerations of cleanliness, ventilation, and health which characterise the construction of this single district, containing at least twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants. . . . True, this is the Old Town . . . but what does that prove? Everything which here rouses horror and indignation is of recent origin, belongs to the industrial epoch (Engels [1936] 1970, 27–32).

The conditions of crowding and poverty were, of course, not only restricted to rapidly growing English cities but also existed elsewhere in Europe and the United States. In Germany the conditions may have been made more serious by the fact that, until the second half of the nineteenth century, many cities, including Frankfurt and Hamburg, were walled and their gates closed at night. In Barmen in 1847, an inspector on an inspection tour for that city's rehousing commission found "in a room like a broken down stable some twelve feet long, seven feet wide, and six feet high were ten people of both sexes in one bed covered with rags; in another, right under the roof, six feet long, seven feet wide, and five feet high were four people; in a cellar ten feet long, eight feet wide, and six feet high were six more" (Sagarra 1977, 393). In the United States, industrial growth spread out from the cities' centers into residential areas, where the existing housing was modified to accommodate the families of the working poor into single rooms and makeshift dwellings erected in backyards. Some of these were multistoried. Alternatively, existing structures would be demolished, and more efficient, but equally overcrowded, tenements erected in their place. Breweries, outhouses, and warehouses were also converted for rental to the poor. A final alternative, chosen by many, was to become an illegal squatter on vacant land. As many as three-fifths of the recipients of private and public charity

in New York City in 1860 were shack-dwelling squatters (Klebanow, Jonas, and Leonard 1977, 82–83).

As these descriptions suggest, cities remained unhealthy places in which to live and work. Besides the desperate residential and work conditions suffered by urban residents, the general environment of the city was filthy. There was, in many places, a chronic difficulty in keeping sewage out of the water supply, and everywhere the practice was to dispose of all forms of garbage and waste in the street. Here the waste would await the rummaging of dogs or swine or, when the public roads became truly impassable, the irregular removal efforts sponsored by the city governments. Despite the advances in nutrition and medicine, mortality rates in urban areas remained higher and life expectancy lower than regional or national norms. Crude statistics gathered in the late 1800s revealed that the average person in Massachusetts could expect to live 41.5 years, while the average native Bostonian could anticipate only 34.9 years. Comparable figures for France and for Paris are 42.2 and 28.1 years, respectively; and 38.1 and 30.3 years, respectively, for the Netherlands and its urban population (Weber [1899] 1965, 346). Urban mortality rates were correlated further with the density of population in particular districts. In the London district of St. Giles in the Fields, where densities remained at around 220 per acre for the period in question, annual mortality rose from 26 per thousand in the 1840s to 28 per thousand in the 1850s and 29 per thousand in the 1860s. Conditions were especially harsh in England for the large numbers of immigrant Irish, who took the lowest-paying jobs and were thereby accused of effectively lowering the wages of all laborers (Busteed and Hodgson 1996). In Church Lane, in an area referred to as the "Irish rookery," 310 of each 1,000 children born in the 1840s died before reaching age one; of the remainder, 457 of each 1,000 died before age two (Sheppard 1971, 17).

The conditions of employment were dangerous for early industrial and other workers, and an injury such as a broken leg could mean permanent disability to a wage earner and pauperism to a family. Women and children worked in the new industries of early nineteenth-century America and Europe. Women earned lower wages than men and were segregated into a few types of manufacturing, which added to the competition for positions and thus drove down their wages. In New York, the labor market was oversupplied with female job seekers, which often caused wages to fall below subsistence: A woman could expect to be unemployed periodically and overworked when she found a job. Before 1850 a system of "outwork" prevailed in which women were badly exploited in their homes for piecework wages. The growth of the factory system after 1850 actually brought an improvement in work conditions and wages, though we remember this today as the advent of the sweatshop. The gathering of women (as also with men) into factories did provide for a growth of camaraderie that in turn provided the basis for the development of labor organizations (Stansell 1986).

Crime posed another danger for the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century urbanite. The lack of employment and opportunity left many with no legal alternative to pauperism. In the United States and Europe, gangs controlled particular streets and neighborhoods and remained outside the control of police. In London, where police protection was loosely organized and inadequate, gangs of up to several hundred in number periodically terrorized shopkeepers and other citizens. One of their

modes of operation involved stampeding stolen cattle through the streets of the city in order to create mayhem, then preying on their victims in the ensuing confusion (Sheppard 1971, 32).

It is difficult for the present-day urbanite to imagine the life experience of the typical resident of a large nineteenth-century city. Most of the day was consumed by the long hours of hard work under unhealthy and often dangerous conditions. Home was not a comfortable retreat but a cramped refuge for meals and sleep; the streets and other public places were a source of entertainment but also of danger, and, for some, livelihood. Childhood was shorter than we have made it today; it was a risky stage of life punctuated and threatened by illness. There was but a brief time to learn the rules of city life and to prepare for a career of work. This is not all there was to life, and certainly not the fate of the affluent, but it is the big story of the urban experience for most of its participants.

City and Hinterland

One final consideration of urbanization in the industrializing era is that of how the city related to the wider world. Was it the engine of conquest and empire that the early city had been? The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were clearly a period of European expansion, colonialism, and struggle to maintain or expand domination or control of far-flung territories, culminating at the end of the nineteenth century in the partitioning of Africa by European nations. The question of the role of the *city* in this era of conquest and competition is a difficult one. It would be difficult to argue that European, or American, expansion took place due to some inherent requirement of the growing cities alone. True, part of the reason for the rapid industrialization and, therefore, of urban growth had to do with the flood of cheaply obtainable raw materials that fed the growth of manufacturing centers. It seems more accurate, however, to conclude that rapid urbanization was in part a by-product of the complementary processes of colonialism and industrialization, rather than to conclude that cities exerted some independent, causal influence on the process as a whole.

Instead of attributing an independent role to the city as an agent of empire in this era, we need to distinguish between what the cities did and what actors and agents (governments, industrialists, banks, trading companies, speculators) located within the cities did. In some abstract sense, cities such as London, Paris, New York, Boston, and Madrid may be said to have dominated world trade or have been the seat of empire during all or part of this era. It is also appropriate to recognize vast and distant areas of the world as their hinterlands. But the city itself did not require these territories in the same way that the early city needed to expand and dominate its suppliers of necessities in order to survive. It can be argued at least hypothetically that large urban populations can be sustained through amiable and balanced trading arrangements rather than through world conquest or the domination of the terms of trade by the stronger nations. The true agents of expansion were the business interests and policymakers seeking to serve not the city but either profitability or the "national interest" or both. Nevertheless, the dramatic growth cities did undergo in this era was a direct offshoot of conquest, empire, and, in the case of the United States, the economic consolidation of territorial expansion.

Urbanization did exert a more direct territorial influence locally and nationally. It demanded the development of transportation technology to carry more and more passengers and goods cheaply and quickly. First in Europe and later in the United States, the need was met by the omnibus, the tramway, and, of course, the development of the intermetropolitan railway system.

Large urban centers came to dominate smaller ones politically and economically. Fashion and style typically radiated from the city and came to shape national and international trends and tastes; where this influence stopped marked the boundary that set ruralites and small-town types apart as objects of ridicule by sophisticated society. The influence of the cities became that much stronger through the changes in transportation and communication that had their inception during the Industrial Revolution.

As difficult as it is to mark the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and the urban growth associated with it, there is no question that a revolutionary upheaval was in full swing by the middle of the nineteenth century. The pattern of glacial advance, retreat, and advance of urbanization characteristic of earlier ages was over as the city erupted everywhere, eventually absorbing the majority of the population in one industrializing nation after another—although in most cases this would not be accomplished until well into the twentieth century. In its early stages, the conditions urbanization produced for the vast majority of urbanites were dreary and harsh. But these conditions improved gradually as the masses of the poor demanded and eventually received the attention of reformers and, finally, government.

URBAN CHANGE IN THE PRESENT ERA

The era that is comprised of the past hundred years or so has brought about enormous social, cultural, and political transformations, changes comparable in scope to those that have in retrospect come to be labeled "revolutionary." It is a difficult task to identify discrete periods of change that deserve that designation, and it is especially dangerous to promote such recognition for the period in which we happen to be living: We are too close to judge the enduring significance of the way we are changing the world. The work of identifying truly significant periods of change is best left to historians. Nevertheless, for anyone with a special interest in the evolution of cities, it is difficult to escape the sense that the changes occurring today rival earlier upheavals in their potential for affecting people's lives and in their impact on patterns of human settlement.

In some parts of the globe, urbanization may be approaching its practical limits. In places where cities grew most rapidly during the Industrial Revolution, current economic and technological changes bring with them less need for populations to be concentrated in cities. In an article titled "The Post-city Age," Melvin Webber wrote, "We are passing through a revolution that is unhitching the social processes of urbanization from the locationally fixed city and region. Reflecting the current explosion in science and technology [the] increasing ease of transportation and communication is dissolving the spatial barriers to social intercourse" (1968, 1091). What is remarkable about these observations is that Webber made them in 1968,

before the widespread distribution of the cell phone, personal computer, e-mail, and the World Wide Web. Yet, three decades later, when further technological innovation had more nearly dissolved the barrier of distance, Webber was forced by the evidence to recognize what he termed the "persisting power of propinquity." Cities persisted and metropolitan regions continued to grow. This was "because the cost of overcoming space had not yet reached zero. . . . If time and dollar costs were zero, there'd be little reason for urban settlements to exist. People and firms would be in immediate contact with friends and associates even if they were in distant places. . . . But costs—especially travel costs—are not yet anywhere near zero . . . we still lack a magic wand that can bring us face-to-face in a flash" (1996, 2). As we are all well aware, communication continues to shrink the globe. Yet, as global commercial interests were reminded during the sharp increase in world energy and transportation prices in 2008, distance (as between markets and manufacturing sites) still counts (*New York Times* August 3, 2008).

So, at the same time that the real consequences of distance persist, its meaning has been changed, and this has had serious implications for patterns of urbanization in different parts of the world. On the one hand, we find urban populations growing at historically unprecedented rates, particularly in the former colonial territories, in the poorer and less developed nations. On the other hand, the forces of industrialization that gave rise to population concentration in the nineteenth century are now largely obsolete, as the economies of nations that were part of the Industrial Revolution deindustrialize. And while the transfer of industrial operations to poorer Third World nations may account for some of the growth today, explosive urbanization often takes place in areas where little industrial development is occurring. Meanwhile, in the more developed nations, a form of decentralization of urban populations is occurring, as urban core populations decline or stagnate, while growth continues at the edge of metropolitan margins. In both regions, in richer and poorer countries, the urban form is changing. Urban trends today include the growth of megacities, cities of well over 10 million people, especially in less developed regions of the world.

The Shifting Center of Urban Growth in the Present Era

By the latter half of the twentieth century the most dynamic urbanization shifted to less-developed countries. In richer, more industrialized nations the increase in the proportion of people living in cities slowed, as the level of urbanization for these nations taken together approached 75 percent (table 2.3). No one knows the urban saturation point for a given population. At the end of the century, the population of Hong Kong was 94 percent urbanized, that of Kuwait 96 percent. The question of urban saturation can no longer be answered in terms of the proportion of agriculturalists it would take to sustain the nonfarming population. While the formula may have helped us to think about limits on the urbanization of local populations in ancient times, in today's global marketplace food flows across national borders and around the world to reach those with the income to pay for it. Theoretically, a nation's population may be 100 percent urbanized and include not so much as a single rooftop vegetable garden.

Table 2.3. Urban Distribution of Population in More and Less Developed World Regions, 1975–2025

		Population Living in Cities of That Size (millions)			*As Percentage of Total Urban Population*			*Net Increase in Urban Population*	
Economic Region	*Settlement Size*	*1975*	*2007*	*2025*	*1975*	*2007*	*2025*	*1975–2007*	*2007–2025*
More Developed	10+ million	42	89	103	6.1	9.8	10.3	Percent	Percent
	5-10 million	50	49	69	7.1	5.4	6.9	8%	4%
	1-5 million	137	202	203	19.6	22.2	20.4	Number	Number
	<1 million	472	570	621	67.3	62.6	62.4	(millions)	(millions)
	*(Total urban)	(700)	(910)	(990)	(100)	(100)	(100)	210	60
	*Rural	350	310	260	—	—	—		
	*Total Population	1,050	1,220	1,260	—	—	—		
Less Developed	10+ million	11	197	344	1.3	8.3	9.6	Percent	Percent
	5-10 million	68	165	268	8.3	6.9	7.5	17	9.0
	1-5 million	180	558	855	22.1	23.4	23.8	Number	Number
	<1million	559	1,464	2,122	68.3	61.4	59.2	(millions)	(millions)
	*(Total Urban)	(820)	(2,380)	(3,590)	(100)	(100)	(100)	1560	1210
	*Rural	2,210	3,060	3,160	—	—	—		
	*Total Population	3,030	5,450	6,750	—	—	—		
World	*(Total Urban)	(1,520)	(3,290)	(4,580)	—	—	—	Percent	Percent
	*Total Population	4,080	6,670	8,010	—	—	—	12	8
								Number	Number
								(millions)	(millions)
								1770	1290

Source: Adapted from *United Nations Population Division* (2008, 9), table 1.5 and table 1.1 (3).
*Data from table 1.1 are rounded to nearest million; percentages are as presented by UNPD and may not compute precisely here.

Table 2.3 presents the record of urban growth for the last quarter of the twentieth century and projected urban growth estimates through the first quarter of the twenty-first, with the year 2007 providing the most recently available measures. The table is divided to show the differences in trends between the more developed and less developed regions, and it arranges urban population according to cities of different size. The two right-hand columns present a summary of just how much the urban populations of each region and of the world as a whole have increased in each quarter century. Note that both the number and the percentage of each population category are given. It is important to consider both the level of urbanization (proportional increase) and the size of the increase (number of people involved) in order to get a complete picture of the relative magnitude of recent urban population changes in the more- and less-developed world regions. Rapid overall population growth in less-developed regions and slow population growth in more-developed regions mean that measures of urbanization, taken alone, fail to convey an adequate picture of differences that exist in urban growth patterns. Consider the hypothetical case of a nation where the total population doubles in size over the course of forty years (at present the estimated doubling time of some populations in less-developed regions is only thirty-three years). If 50 percent of the people were living in cities at both the beginning and end of this forty-year period, we would say that the rate of urbanization was zero. Yet its urban population—the number of people living in cities—would have doubled in size (just as the rural population would). Two real-world examples help to make the point of the importance of considering *both* urbanization and urban population growth figures. Between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s the urban population of the East African nation of Tanzania increased *six times*, giving the country 4.5 million more people living in cities and a dizzying rate of urbanization. During the same period, India, the second most populous nation in the world after China, experienced an increase of only *six percentage points* in its urban population, as the proportion of people living in cities grew from 20 percent to 26 percent. But with its much larger population base, this meant that India, in just two decades, added *118 million* more people to its urban population. The importance of regarding size as well as proportion in thinking about just how dramatically the urban population of the world is growing at present is made quite forcefully by the figures in Table 2.3. The table is derived from data organized by the United Nations Population Division (2008).

During the last quarter of the twentieth century and the first seven years of the twenty-first, the urban population of the world increased from 37.3 percent to 49.4 percent, a change of nine percentage points (as noted elsewhere, by 2008 the urban proportion of the world population had reached 50 percent). In that period, the world added well over half again as many people to its total population as there were in 1975, growing from just over 4 billion to over 6.5 billion people. Most of those 2.5 billion new people, nearly 1.8 billion of them, were living in cities in 2007. So a change of 12 percentage points in the level of urbanization, in a world with a rapidly growing population, means that roughly 1.8 billion more people lived in cities in the year 2007 than in 1975. The vast majority of these new additions to the world's urban population, more than 1.5 billion of them, lived in the less developed nations. Table 2.3 also projects population trends into the future, to the year 2025. In these projections, the most notable trends of the past twentieth century continue, with

the vast majority of population increase occurring in cities—and in cities of the less developed nations. Some further points to note with regard to Table 2.3:

- The most rapidly growing segment of the world's urban population is not the largest cities, but cities under a million in population. This holds true for both the more-developed and less-developed regions.
- The population of cities with more than 10 million people has grown and will continue to grow rapidly, but this is especially the case in poorer countries, where by 2007 there were eighteen times more people living in cities larger than 10 million than in 1975; in these poorer nations in the year 2025, there will be thirty-one times more people in cities with populations above 10 million than there were in 1975. There will be a half billion, or more than seven and a half times more people living in cities of 5 million or more in these poorer regions than in 1975.
- The population of rural areas in the more-developed countries continues to shrink in number and proportion, while the rural population of poorer nations will continue to grow or stabilize, representing a reservoir of potential urban migrants that promises to swell the number of people living in cities for decades beyond the year 2025.
- The two right-hand columns of the table reveal just how much more rapidly the urban population of the less-developed category is growing in comparison to the urban population of more developed nations. In the years between 1975 and 2007, more than 1.5 billion people were added to the population of cities in the poorer nations, and by 2025, 1.2 billion more will be added. In contrast, the net urban population growth of more-developed nations is slowing appreciably, adding only 80 million in the latter period, which equals a mere 7 percent of the growth in less-developed regions.

Thus, there are a number of ways to state the changing focus of urban growth from North to South. One of the more dramatic is to trace the development of megacities, the world's largest, with populations above 10 million inhabitants. In 1975, there were five cities worldwide with 10 million or more people: Tokyo, New York, Shanghai, Mexico City, and São Paulo. By 2005, there were eighteen, and eleven were in the less-developed regions. The projected number for 2025 is twenty-three, with seventeen in the less-developed nations (United Nations Population Division 2008, 165–67). While the proportion of the world population living in such large cities is relatively small (9 percent in 2007), these cities mark an important new phase in the urbanization of the world. They draw our attention because they are concentrated in regions of the world where more than 80 percent of the world's population lives, where total populations are growing more rapidly, and where in 2007 there were 3 billion people living in rural areas, some unknown number of them poised to migrate to the cities.

A revealing exercise is to consider the kind of urban growth taking place today in the light of Kingsley Davis's (1955) argument (reviewed earlier) that the true urban revolution coincided with the Industrial Revolution. If we employ his criteria—dramatic change in the size and proportion of populations living in cities in the nineteenth century—we may decide that the current era may well be a candidate

for recognition as an urban revolution. In the nineteenth century, an outstanding example of urban growth was Birmingham, England. The city grew in just six decades from a population of 72,000 (1800) to 400,000, and then to 1.25 million in the next four decades (1900). With comparable growth taking place in other English cities, as well as elsewhere in northern Europe and at a couple of points in the United States (New York and Philadelphia), we can appreciate the revolutionary impact of these changes on human experience and social organization. But compare the dimensions of nineteenth-century urban growth to what is happening to cities in the present era. In 1975, Mexico City already had 11 million people. Twenty-five years later, it had at least 18 million—no one knows for sure: Such measures are difficult in the poorer nations. Between 1975 and 2007, the population of Mumbai (note: the terms Mumbai and Bombay are used interchangeably in the text) grew from 7 million to 19 million, São Paulo from 10 million to 19 million, and Lagos, Nigeria, from a mere 2 million to 9 million. These cities are projected to reach from 21 million (Mexico City) to 26 million people (Mumbai) within the first twenty-five years of the twenty-first century.

Placemark 2.3—Mumbai (Bombay): Suketu Mehta's Maximum City

What is it like to be immersed in one of the enormous megacities of the Third World? While his account is surely not representative of all his fellow inhabitants, Suketu Mehta, a fiction writer and journalist, tells us of his experience of Bombay, a city he loves. Mehta is well traveled, but wherever he is living, "home" is Bombay, in a way that only people with a love of home-place can understand: "When I moved to New York, I missed Bombay like an organ of my body. . . . I existed in New York, but I lived in India" (8–9).

Mehta recognizes that Bombay is not representative of India, that it thinks of itself as a cultural entity apart, affluent, independent, all about business. Describing it as the biggest, fastest, richest city in India, he quotes the Bhagavad-Gita, saying today's Bombay might represent the kind of force that Krishna referred to in the lines "I am all destroying death, I am the origin of things yet to come, I am the gambling of rogues; the splendor of the splendid." In his own words Mehta simply calls it the "maximum city" (17). Bombay is many cities: Closely and repeatedly juxtaposed are its main features, a series of amassed poor villages abutting the more solid and globally familiar high-rise structures of the urban-built environment. Within the more modern structures things often don't work and repairs tend to be makeshift. Of his own residential building he writes, "If you were to follow the progression of drain water from the twentieth floor to the first it would make as many zigs and zags and diversions as a crazy mountain road. . . . Sewer water is constantly threatening to rise up into my bathroom, as it has in other flats in the building. The arteries of the building are clogged, sclerotic. Its skin is peeling. It is a sick building. Meanwhile, I am paying rent every month to my landlord for the privilege of fixing his flat" (23). He finds that the school to which he sends his son has eight families living in it, there since before the school bought the building and

protected under the law from eviction. There is no alternate land for building schools in the district (33).

Using personal stories and broader accounts Mehta pieces together painful events that shape the maximum city: riots and bombings, the segregation of Hindus and Muslims, gang wars, murder and prostitution, people's lives torn between conservative tradition and the piling on of temptations brought by rapid change. And there are the endless slums: 73 percent of the families in Bombay live in a single room; that averages 4.2 people per room. In one small, one-room, tin-roofed house he asks his friend Girish where the seven adults sleep at night. Two brothers on the cot, two on the floor, mother and father in the kitchen section of the room, and sister under the table. But crowding is a relative concept in Bombay: Girish explains that on commuter trains there is such a crush that if he puts his arms down at his sides he won't be able to raise them again until he gets off at his stop.

Mehta has a very personal sense of what Bombay means, and he thinks that each of the millions who live there has a personal construct of the city that allows them to live there. They are all individuals, and yet he sees them as interdependent cells of the one giant organism that is his city. "I have learnt to see beyond the wreck of the physical city to the incandescent life force of its inhabitants. People associate Bombay with death too easily" (537). As Mehta struggles personally to make sense of the maximum city, to come to terms with the meaning of Bombay, it becomes clear in what sense the city is a part of his being, shapes his experience of the world.

In 1900, at the end of the century of the Industrial Revolution, there were between 1 billion and 2 billion people in the world and less than a tenth of them lived in cities. Sometime in 2008 it is believed that the proportion of the world's population living in cities exceeded 50 percent. Between 2007 and 2050 the world is expected to have added 3 billion people, and virtually all of that growth will be in the cities of less-developed regions (United Nations Population Division 2008, 3). If we are going to recognize an urban revolution based on urbanization and urban population growth in any period of history, we cannot omit consideration of the present era.

Globalization and the Place of the City

If we consider the earlier phases of city-hinterland development that have been reviewed in this chapter, the world may be seen as evolving through a series of stages, with each involving an increasing degree of economic rationalization or management of the far-flung economic resources of the globe. Ancient cities were relatively modest in size, but they began the process of organizing distant resources into a common network of trade by providing populous markets, a degree of private wealth, and points of exchange. The cities of the Industrial Revolution were built upon still larger empires that included distant colonies and a diverse international trade, setting in place the framework for the development of a single world economy.

The present era represents yet another step in the consolidation and rational management of that economy, in the organization of the productive capacity of the globe into a single marketplace. In this latter phase, cities remain at the center of change, and yet their function as engines of global change needs to be qualified. The requirements of the Industrial Revolution were served by the large-scale gathering of workers into industrial cities. The spatial implications of today's sweeping changes are different. As the globalization of the economy and changes in communication and transportation technology begin to approach their logical extreme, city and hinterland will become one: the globe.

In our discussions of the ancient and industrial urban revolutions, we considered three dimensions of change: changes in the scale of social organization, in culture and experience, and in the political organization of society. We return to these criteria here to gain a sense of some of the present implications of change.

Social Organization

In the global era, there are notable changes in organization. During earlier urban revolutions, new statuses were created, as individuals were thrust into the roles of priest or industrialist. In the new economic order, there is a new mover, the global manager, who feels little attachment or allegiance to anything but the best interests of his or her business, lenders, and stockholders. Reich described how these managers coordinate investment and technological services from around the globe, targeting international markets with the same natural ease that creative managers of earlier eras coordinated such resources within a particular city or subnational region. Global enterprise represents a new form of capitalism that is more purely economically rational "having shed the old affiliations with people and place. Today corporate decisions about production and location are driven by the dictates of global competition, not by national allegiance" (Reich 1995, 161).

Another dimension of organization we have considered in connection with past periods of revolutionary change had to do with social stratification. In the past, social stratification was measured with reference to the degrees of inequality that existed within a society, between priest and peasant, industrialist and laborer, householder and servant. In a world economy, stratification must be reckoned according to the inequalities that exist within this single, international economic system. It becomes more clearly relevant to talk about the standard of living enjoyed by affluent populations in Europe and the United States in contrast to that of rural laborers in Latin America or Asia who toil at the margins of existence in the production of cheap agricultural exports consumed at bargain prices in affluent nations. Similarly, it is relevant to examine the living conditions of children and adults who labor for meager wages manufacturing products sold in the markets of wealthy nations. The scale of comparison of the conditions of the rich and poor in a global economy has reached its maximum dimension.

Culture

Human experience in a globalized culture represents converging styles and tastes, for better or worse. At its furthest reaches, globalization touches the most remote

peoples. Wireless electronic communication reaches every part of the globe; corporations learn that billions of poor people with little disposable income, when taken as a whole, still constitute an enormous mass market; and we are amused by tales of salespeople in canoes peddling expensive cosmetics "door to door" in the most isolated territories of the Amazon or of equally inaccessible indigenous peoples being organized to supply natural rainforest products to upscale ice cream and cosmetics manufacturers in Europe and the United States. These more extreme examples serve to illustrate that cultural homogenization is taking place on a global scale and that the people who are less remote are more influenced, but no one is immune. We can still argue that the global culture is an urban culture, because what are popularly considered to be the attractive products and ideas that are disseminated through the global web still emanate for the most part from urban-based enterprises, styles, and art forms.

West African filmmaker Gaston Kabore complained some time ago that West African audiences, especially young audiences, preferred films made in the United States, films that deal with a fantasy world conjured up to fill theater seats. These audiences will not support the development of films made by African filmmakers dealing with African topics that speak with an African voice. Does it make more sense to say he is describing an essentially urban cultural influence or a Western influence? When we speak of the globalization of culture, we are speaking primarily of its Westernization, and it is difficult to extract exactly what the urban content of that is, in abstract terms, especially when what is being communicated through film, as well as through advertising, is a fantasy world that exists nowhere.

Political Order

The political dimension of global reorganization is well-known. It is expressed in the many regional trade agreements that have emerged within the past decade. These agreements are designed to facilitate trade by lowering or eliminating tariffs and creating free trade zones for manufacturing. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Treaty on the European Union—creating the European Union (EU), which presently integrates the economies of the twenty-seven member states—and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are all examples of such agreements. In every area such agreements create controversy because they are seen by labor leaders and others as eliminating the trade protections that support domestic employment, especially in manufacturing. Yet there is by now a widespread, if guarded, commitment on the part of governments to facilitate open trade across borders—the belief being that a failure to do so would in the near future hamper businesses that operate partly within their borders and damage national economic interests that are thought to be served by full participation in the growing global economy.

In a sense it can be argued that globalization is merely the name applied to the dictates of profit-taking on a worldwide economic playing field, that this rational order demands that successful entrepreneurs follow the strict demands of the global market to minimize costs for labor and materials. If they don't they will lose their stockholders and their companies. Seen in this way the global economic order is everywhere, an entity that exists independent of place, except for the globe itself. But

it is equally true to say that the economic and political actors that strategize, manage, make the rules for, take the profit from the global economy do occupy specific spaces. Their corporate headquarters are *somewhere*. Cities continue to anchor the network of global activity. The concept "world city" has evolved to address the fact that some urban centers of finance and commerce must be understood in terms of their global influences. Cohen (1981) called for a recognition of the fact that certain cities were "vastly more important" than others in their share of international business and corporate services. Friedman and Wolff (1982) referred to these cities as "basing points" for global capital, for organizing and strategizing its global deployment. As well, global cities attract large numbers of migrants and immigrants, amplify inequalities between social classes who live in them, and place disproportionate strains on local and national government to deal with the social fallout of their disruptive presence. The world-city concept is most easily understood within the framework we have referred to as the city-hinterland relationship. The hinterland of the world city, its sphere of influence, is the world itself. This represents "the globalization of urbanization" (Brenner and Keil 2006, 5) that in recent decades has caused urban sociology to move beyond the assumption that prominent cities could be understood in terms of their place in a national urban hierarchy. The influences of cities like London, New York, Tokyo, and other centers of capital within the core economic sphere of wealthy countries extend around the world. An emerging second tier of economically important world cities in largely less-developed regions needs to be recognized as well (Gugler 2004). Certainly, as we now witness the rapid reshuffling of the world economic order, with the economic giants China and India assuming their ascendant positions, Beijing, Mumbai, and other centers in these nations demand due consideration as cities of far-reaching influence.

There is a role to be played by local municipal governments of cities of all sizes in the new world order. Increasingly, local governments engage in promoting the assets of their cities internationally as mayors and other local officials make periodic visits abroad (Fry 1995, 25). At times, common regional interests overlap international borders, such as in Seattle, Washington, and Vancouver, British Columbia, in the Pacific Northwest. In the case of this important region on the northern edge of the international trade-oriented Pacific Rim, city and regional governments have undertaken joint efforts aimed at promotion and preservation (Artibise 1995; Cohn and Smith 1995). In Europe the development of transnational urban systems is even more pronounced, as the proximity of multiple nations offers more opportunities for cross-border linkages and cooperation (Sassen 2006, 65–76).

What is left to say about the sociological significance of the city? In a physical sense, the process of spatial decentralization that we have described is still in its infancy. Decentralization is such a big story for urban sociology because it represents a break with the long historical pattern of the centralization of populations. By and large, world population continues the long-term trend described in this chapter toward concentrating in cities and metropolitan regions.

We still look to major metropolitan regions to discover new trends in how technology is changing work. We still find manufacturing and industrial processing plants, old and new, in the centers and on the edges of cities of all sizes and in all world regions. Cities remain the laboratories where experiments of living and working together are worked out by the most culturally diversified elements of the

population. The drama of urban life, excitement, opportunity, and risk still draw the popular imagination and the ambitious, the talented, and the daring among us. Sassen (1996) reminds us that there is still much for the sociologist to study and understand about urban places where work is changing, about the ways that changes are affecting people's lives, especially those lives made more difficult as the result of change. In addition to changes in wage and salaried employment patterns, small neighborhood entrepreneurs increasingly face competition from international chains that open franchised retail outlets on their blocks, selling mass-marketed goods that may have been manufactured by people working at subsistence wages in sweatshops in distant large and small Third World cities. The global and the local are not opposites but are intimately interrelated. All sorts of firms that enjoy high profits derived from the global economy can have the effect of superheating local urban economies as they, their high-wage employees, and upscale services and other businesses that cater to them drive up the cost for space, affecting the ability of other businesses and residents to afford urban rents. At the same time, the extreme level of inequality that exists between international urban centers drives immigration from poorer nations to the cities of more-developed nations, where the new immigrants, used to less, compete for jobs and customers. In a fairly common pattern, recent immigrants pool the modest material resources of family members, along with their combined labor, to open businesses that survive on the margins of local economies, adding a further dimension to the localized manifestation of the global marketplace and enriching the cultural diversity of the urban experience. Immigrants revitalize old residential neighborhoods, introduce new forms of economic activity, and change the appearance, language, and urban cultural style where they settle. Cities of a globalizing world contain many of the economically and politically displaced: In addition to immigrants and refugees, we count here minority populations of wealthy nations and the masses of poor people crowding into the cities of the less-developed regions of the world. Cities, therefore, continue to demand our attention as sociologists, just as they have done since the emergence of the discipline.

Sassen (1996) has speculated that in rich nations some of the urban tensions and violence evidenced by young people may relate to a feeling of frustration and anger at the remoteness of the global change that is affecting their lives. She suggests that aggressive behavior is in some manner an unarticulated political statement. More clearly articulated political resistance to the remote forces of profit-led globalization comes in the form of the increasingly visible mass political movements that took to the streets of Seattle; London; Washington, D.C.; and Philadelphia in 1999 and 2000. Demonstrators sought to challenge the legitimacy of the World Trade Organization and to challenge the position of political candidates suspected of placing the interests of global corporations above the interests of people in rich and poor economic regions. The city affords demonstrators a dramatic stage for the presentation of their grievances and insures coverage and broadcast of their message. And of course, as Peter Marcuse (2004, 264) points out, "Al-Qaeda saw the commercial towers of the World Trade Center and the military bastion of the Pentagon as the symbols of American power." He is concerned that the fundamental nature of cities may be jeopardized as a result, in part through the deliberate removal of strategic targets to decentralized locations and the restrictions placed on accustomed freedom

of access in urban locations. Both the targeting and defensive strategies reflect the continued importance of the city, the centrality of place.

Although we stand on the threshold of new decentralizing tendencies that are sure to profoundly alter cities and patterns of human settlement in the future, we stand within a society and a history that remain the product of a thoroughly urbanized past and a present in which the city continues to be a stubbornly persistent magnet for migration, human imagination, and major change. The city is still a very big story of human history and a useful focus for understanding the world.

3

The Urban Tradition in Sociology

The same physical environment can be experienced in a number of different ways. That is, reality has a subjective side; we attach our own personal meaning to our experience of the world. The city has a different symbolic and emotional impact on different people. For example, people who have spent all of their years in the modern cities of London or New York will experience large cities in a different way from people from a small town or village. As cities grew rapidly in the nineteenth century and continued their unprecedented expansion in the next century, both the average person and the professional social observer struggled to make sense of the new environment—this new experiment in living that gathered millions onto a single patch of land. Because urban growth of this sort was new and seemed to have infinite potential for continued expansion, many observers were awed and even fearful of the city's capacity for social disruption.

Urban sociology was produced by a sense of urgency, the recognition that cities were changing social life, and the desire to understand or predict the nature of those changes. Most early theoretical interpretations reflected that popular sense of urgency and tended to focus on the negative or disorganizing aspects of city living. In this chapter, we will examine the cumulation of a particular image of the city, a subjective interpretation that continued to dominate urban sociology for the first half or more of the twentieth century. This image has now come to be widely criticized for emphasizing the negative socially alienating features of urban life, for being too one-sided, too "anti-urban." However, criticisms notwithstanding, the body of theory that we refer to here as the "urban tradition" has something important to tell us about the burgeoning urban form and its impact on social organization and experience. The following passage from Louis Wirth, the most influential of the urban tradition theorists, is representative of that point of view.

> The close living together and working together of individuals who have no sentimental ties fosters a spirit of competition, aggrandizement, and mutual exploitation. Formal controls are instituted to counteract irresponsibility and potential disorder. Without rigid adherence to predictable routines a large compact society would scarcely be able

> to maintain itself. The clock and the traffic signal are symbolic of the basis of our social order in the urban world. Frequent close physical contact, coupled with great social distance, accentuates the reserve of unattached individuals toward one another and, unless compensated for by other opportunities for response, gives rise to loneliness. The necessary frequent movement of great numbers of individuals in a congested habitat causes friction and irritation. Nervous tensions that derive from such personal frustrations are increased by the rapid tempo and the complicated technology under which life in dense areas must be lived. (Wirth 1938, 15–16)

This passage is remarkable for several reasons. The first is the vivid imagery it presents. We can see and feel the alienation experienced in the bustling crowds of anonymous and diverse strangers rushing past one another in their hectic yet routine quest to meet the demands of punctuality. This portrait of the city appeals to intuition. It is almost a caricature in that it draws out and emphasizes certain prominent characteristics, making the urban experience immediately recognizable to members of a wide audience who share these impressions of city life. Wirth's passage is also remarkable because he has managed, in so few words, to capture so many of the themes developed by earlier sociologists and other prominent students of the city. The essay from which the quotation is taken, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," is an eclectic work, drawing broadly from within the mainstream of sociological thought. In it Wirth managed to integrate almost every major sociological observation that had been made about the city up until the time that he wrote. His work also reflects the fact that although many of these early theorists were ambivalent about the conditions of urban life, most were distrustful of the urban future, and many brooded over its prospect. It was no accident that Wirth's work reflected the considerable sense of foreboding that attended the urban tradition in sociology, and he was bound by this tradition to end up composing a bleak portrait of urbanism. In the following sections, we will consider the evolution of ideas that Wirth eventually combined into his image of the city. Figure 3.1 provides a brief summary of the people and ideas contributing to Wirth's understanding.

THE CHANGING SCALE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

The rapid urbanization of Western societies raised interesting questions for those who found themselves caught up in it. Aside from the fact that people would increasingly become concentrated in cities, what would be the other social consequences of the great transformation? How would life be organized in an urban society? How would social order be maintained? How would it differ in principle from the preurban order?

These questions were first squarely addressed by three writers, Ferdinand Tönnies, Henry Maine, and Emile Durkheim, each considering a somewhat different feature of social organization but all three intent on saying how the old and new ways of living were different from each other. Each of them saw the old social order and the new in terms of opposites, that is, the old and new orders could not be more different from one another. And although these contrasts were meant to apply to societies in general, the old order always described life in small villages and rural settings, and we therefore take the descriptions of the new social order to apply in particular

Three Proto-urban Contrasts

Ferdinand Tönnies	*Gemeinschaft* Communal plight	*Gesellschaft* Commercial individualism
Henry Maine	Status Family honor	Contract Formalized individual Responsibility
Émile Durkheim	Mechanical solidarity Common experience and collective consciousness	Organic solidarity Division of labor and functional interdependence

Three German Perspectives

Max Weber	The ideal type, city as marketplace, fortress, at least limited political autonomy, and related forms of association
Georg Simmel	The mental life of the metropolis is conditioned by overstimulation and the exchange of cash
Oswald Spengler	The city has a soul, which means that its human subjects feel superior to rural types The denial of nature ultimately contributes to urban demise

The Urban Tradition in the United States

Robert Park	The city as an ecology of natural areas, each of which generates its own moral code
Louis Wirth	"Urbanism as a Way of Life" essay integrates the major elements of all previous writers in the urban tradition as Wirth examines the combined effects of size, density, and heterogeneity

Figure 3.1. Keeping Track of Who's Who in the "Urban Tradition."

to life in cities. These are *proto-urban sociologies*; they provided the groundwork for the urban tradition.

Ferdinand Tönnies adapted the terms *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* from his native German language to express the distinction between life in small-scale rural societies and life in the growing urban order. By *Gemeinschaft*, Tönnies ([1887] 1940, 37–39) was referring to "any arrangements that involved intimate, private and exclusive living together" in a single community. The term was intended to convey a particular intensity of social integration. In a *Gemeinschaft*, the individual is socially immersed as a segment of a social unity, a component of the whole—with that whole being the group. "In *Gemeinschaft* . . . with one's family, one lives from birth on, bound to it in weal and woe" (Tönnies [1887] 1940). If forced to choose a single word in the English language to express the idea, translators invariably choose "community," although it is clear that in doing so the more intense connotations are lost. The term *Gesellschaft* can be translated (also inadequately) as "society," the wider social world without intimate ties. "One goes into *Gesellschaft* . . . as one goes into a strange country. . . . A young man is warned about bad *Gesellschaft*, but the expression bad *Gemeinschaft* violates the meaning of the word" (Tönnies [1887] 1940, 37–39).

Tönnies observed a direct tension between *Gemeinschaft* and the city. The rural village was compatible with the feeling of unity; it was stable, and small scale, and the web of relationships within it was seasoned with age. But the city introduced division by social class, created tensions between the interests of capital and labor, was characterized by hostility, and had no natural need or place for family.

> The city is typical of *Gesellschaft* in general. It is essentially a commercial town and, in so far as commerce dominates its productive labor, a factory town. Its wealth is capital wealth which, in the form of trade, usury, or industrial capital, is used and multiplies. Capital is the means for the appropriation of products of labor or for the exploitation of workers. The city is also the center of science and culture, which always go hand in hand with commerce and industry. Here the arts must make a living; they are exploited in a capitalistic way. Thoughts spread and change with astonishing rapidity. (Tönnies [1887] 1940, 266)

In the city, actions are coordinated simply by their calculated exchange values. The *Gesellschaft* gives the appearance of many living together peacefully, but in fact "everybody is by himself and isolated, and there exists a condition of tension against all others" (Tönnies [1887] 1940, 74).

Tönnies thought that the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* had been accompanied by a change in the relationship between the individual and the state. Here his thinking was influenced heavily by Henry Maine's influential work, *Ancient Law* (Tönnies [1887] 1940, 211ff.). In it, Maine traced the replacement of a system of laws based on what he referred to as *status* with an ever-emerging legal arrangement that he called *contract* ([1861] 1917, 98–100). Under the older system, the state and its laws addressed only the head of the household, the parent, who was responsible for and essentially ruled over the family and servants. Their behavior was governed by a sense of family honor. Tönnies viewed this arrangement as characteristic of the collective nature and the unity of *Gemeinschaft*. Increasingly this arrangement was being undermined by the growing legal apparatus of the state and its government. The idea of *individual* obligations and liability was laid down in *contract* terms or the common rules (laws) of the state. In Maine's words:

> The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of Family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which the civil laws take account. . . . Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It is Contract. Starting as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have moved steadily towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals. . . . We may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from *Status to Contract*. (Maine [1861] 1917, 99)

There was no specific reference in Maine's account to the corresponding urbanization of society with the transition from status to contract. It was Tönnies who formally associated status relations with *Gemeinschaft* and contract relations with *Gesellschaft*. In the former, social control of individual behavior is stipulated by

the nature of the individual's attachment to the group. In *Gesellschaft*, where the individual is cut free from group constraints, social control must be ensured by an external factor—a code of laws and punishments, a contract that demands predictable behavior.

Tönnies's work emphasized the fragility and, in his view, the "artificiality" of the emerging urban society. He had found in Maine's account some basis for regulating the tensions aroused by the self-interest on which relations in urban society were founded. On the other hand, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim believed that the basis for understanding the more complex order of an urban society was to be found in the principles of natural ecology. Durkheim ([1893] 1933) contrasted the type of society governed by what he called *mechanical solidarity* with that characterized by *organic solidarity*. Mechanical solidarity was the principal mechanism of social integration in small-scale, agrarian societies, where the division of labor or specialization was negligible and especially where a strong, common religious belief persisted. In such societies social cohesion was provided by the homogeneous experience of all of the society's members, and "religion pervade[d] the whole of social life, . . . because social life [was] made up almost exclusively of common beliefs and common practices which derive[d] from unanimous adhesion to a very particular intensity" (Durkheim [1893] 1933, 178). Common, mutually reinforcing experience and religious themes in small-scale, socially homogeneous societies resulted in a *collective consciousness*, a common way of seeing and a common identity that held the society together. Here Durkheim pointed out what costs are involved in the closely circumscribed worlds of *Gemeinschaft*:

> Solidarity that comes from likenesses is at its maximum when the collective conscience completely envelopes the whole conscience and coincides in all points with it. But at that moment our individuality is nil. It can be born only if the community takes a smaller toll of us. (Durkheim [1893] 1933, 130)

It is clear that the basis of this mechanical solidarity is being undermined wherever differences in experience and ideas can be found among a given population. However, these differences are the natural product of the growth and concentration of populations, conditions that lead in turn to a division of labor. It is here that Durkheim turned to natural ecology and the observations of Charles Darwin to explain what he saw as the natural progression of society toward more complex forms.

> Darwin justly observed that the struggle between two organisms is as active as they are analogous. Having the same needs and pursuing the same objects, they are in rivalry everywhere. As long as they have more resources than they need, they can live side by side, but if their number increases to such proportions that all appetites can no longer be sufficiently satisfied, war breaks out. . . . It is quite different if the coexisting individuals are of different species or varieties. As they do not feed in the same manner, and do not lead the same kind of life, they do not disturb each other. . . . Men submit to the same law. In the same city different occupations can coexist without being obliged mutually to destroy one another, for they pursue different objects. . . . The oculist does not struggle with the psychiatrist, nor the shoemaker with the hatter. . . . Since they perform different services, they can perform them parallely. (Durkheim [1893] 1933, 265–66)

Durkheim emphasized that he did not mean to say that the growth and condensation of the population *permitted* a greater division of labor, but that these conditions *demanded* it and that the city was a prime arena in which to observe this process ([1893] 1933, 258, 262). He termed the resultant form of solidarity *organic*, because under an elaborated division of labor, each of the specialized divisions of society was *interdependent*, which was analogous to the interdependence of the various organs of the human body. This interdependence of each part upon the whole, or *organic solidarity*, replaced the unity of conscience, or *mechanical solidarity*, as the major unifying social force. As societies evolved, the division of labor became more complex and the interdependence of the parts, the organic nature of social integration, became more complete.

Durkheim was sure that the overall result of evolving specialization and interdependence was social progress, although he remained concerned that the division of labor also brought with it certain liabilities. Among these were the results of unregulated competition, class conflict, and the feeling of meaninglessness (*anomie*) generated by routinized industrial work—this last liability being a direct result of the division of labor. But he felt that these social and psychological consequences were abnormal and temporary by-products of the rapid rate at which industrialization had taken place and that appropriate economic controls and norms of industrial relations would emerge in time to remedy them (Lukes 1972, 174). Likewise, Durkheim believed that tendencies toward moral confusion or anomie were largely the result of the rapid and incomplete transition from the old moral order to a society governed by organic solidarity that, when mature, would be characterized by a just distribution of rewards among the various occupations.

Taken together, the impressions of urbanizing society compiled by Tönnies, Maine, and Durkheim include the following elements: the erosion of an intimate community and the rise of conflictual relations in the city, the decline of family authority and the rise of contractual relations, and the replacement of solidarity based upon common experience and identity with solidarity based upon the differentiation of individuals and their consequent functional interdependence. One more important contribution is offered by this trio of social observers: They present a common methodology for considering social change—the construction of polar opposites. This use of opposite constructs has been a favorite device for dealing with the difficult problem of characterizing urban society. The strategy consists of establishing the characteristics of urban society in contrast to what we suppose are the characteristics of nonurban or preurban society. Max Weber, a contemporary of Tönnies and Durkheim, took a different approach. He developed the methodology of *ideal type* by constructing his model of the city from the observable historical characteristics of the cities themselves.

The Urban Sociology of Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Oswald Spengler

Urban social theory has been heavily influenced by a few German writers whose work followed that of Tönnies and built upon his major themes. Most prominent among these theorists is Max Weber whose wide-ranging works include an attempt to formally define the city. His objective was to devise a comprehensive and concise

model, an ideal type that would identify the essential elements that make up the city. After considering a variety of characteristics that he found associated with cities historically, he arrived at the following formula:

> To constitute a full urban community a settlement must display a relative predominance of trade-commercial relations with the settlement as a whole displaying the following features: 1. a fortification; 2. a market; 3. a court of its own and at least partially autonomous law; 4. a related form of association; 5. at least partial autonomy and autocephally, thus also an administration by authorities in the election of which the burghers participated. (Weber [1905] 1958, 80–81)

While some of these criteria, such as the existence of a market and of municipal regulation, seem perfectly appropriate in the construction of a general model, the criterion of fortification seems anachronistic. When Weber's work appeared in 1905, the walled city was, for the most part, a thing of the past; industrialization had taken and reshaped the city, as Weber himself pointed out in the same essay ([1905] 1958, 75). But this did not affect the model that he constructed.

Weber was not interested in describing cities but in modeling *The City*. Each of his core criteria had to qualify as a necessary component of the model. The predominance of trade-commercial relations was the most basic of these criteria. "The 'city' is a marketplace," he wrote; but of course he did not intend to elevate every marketplace to the status of "city." He continued, "We wish to speak of a city only in cases where the local inhabitants satisfy an economically substantial part of their daily wants in the local market. It is only in this sense that the city is a 'market settlement.'" (Weber [1905] 1958, 66–67)

In his model, Weber made the city a fusion of fortress and marketplace, systematically interwoven components of the full urban community. The *full* urban citizen was bound to perform certain military duties—to build or maintain the fortification and to guard or to defend the settlement—as an expression of membership in and allegiance to the community. It was in accordance with this reasoning and in this sense that Weber incorporated the idea of a fortification in his model. The town center could serve alternately as marketplace or drill field. In Weber's own words, "The politically oriented castle and economically oriented market . . . often stand in plastic dualism beside one another" ([1905] 1958, 78).

It follows that a settlement so constituted be self-aware, and that it, to some extent, determine and regulate its own policies and laws. It is because of this connection that Weber included the third criterion ("a court of its own and at least partially autonomous law") and the fifth criterion (at least partial political self-direction) in his list. In the area of setting policy or managing receipts and expenditures, as well as the regulation of conditions under which production and exchange in the market are carried out, the agents of the city constitute the commonly recognized "urban authority," of which any concept of the city must take account. Weber made a simple but critically important point for establishing a clear understanding of the nature of the city here: "The economic concept previously discussed must be entirely separated from the political administrative concept of the city. Only in the latter sense may a special *area* belong to a city" ([1905] 1958, 74). That is, by distinguishing the city's economic features from its political features, it is possible to

see that the city consists of a finite, formally orchestrated political arena, which exists within the economic field; the influence of the economic field extends outward indefinitely.

The remaining criterion to be considered, that of "a related form of association," is connected to the other components of Weber's definition. What he was looking for here were elements of social organization peculiar to the city. He believed that the emergence of a large *burgher* class or "estate," a politically powerful and privileged citizen-merchant-soldier strata of the population that was able to perceive its interests and take action, was an earmark of the true urban community. The formation of traders and artisans into "urban corporations," such as guilds, is one example of this characteristically urban form of association (Weber [1905] 1958, 81–89).

In sum, the model that Weber constructed is of a diversified market economy upon which the largest number of inhabitants are regularly and primarily dependent. Furthermore, it is a self-aware and somewhat autonomous unit within which special forms of social unity arise, which are responsible in part for the settlement's defense. This is *The City*. It is intended as a model against which any city from any time period may be measured. That is, ancient cities, contemporary cities, and all of the variations between may be held up to this single model to see how well they would fit as "full urban communities." While any city will reflect certain qualities of this model, the medieval town most closely approximates it. As the translator of Weber's essay comments, this suggests an interesting conclusion regarding the present urban era (Martindale 1958, 62). Although we can continue to observe the increase in the size of urban populations, we should not "confuse physical aggregation with the growth of the city in the sociological sense." The city no longer defends itself militarily, its legal and political autonomy was subordinated long ago to the authority of the state; in addition, individual interests and loyalties are fragmented and drawn in many directions beyond those of a local, civic nature. Martindale concluded, "The modern city is losing its external and formal structure. Internally it is in a state of decay while the new community represented by the nation everywhere grows at its expense. The age of the city seems to be at an end" (1958, 67). It is only in the context of Weber's model, and what he intended by it, that we can understand such a conclusion. For Weber, the urban age had reached a peak. The city at the beginning of the twentieth century was becoming reorganized. New relationships based on models of efficiency, namely, bureaucracy, had come to characterize the new age: The city no longer held out the promise that *The City* had once offered.

The work of examining the *experience* of urban life in the new age was undertaken by Weber's colleague, Georg Simmel. Whereas Weber was interested in identifying the broadest features of the urban question, Simmel, in his essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life" ([1905] 1950, 409–24), sought to understand what the urban experience did to the way people thought and behaved. He believed that there were two important features of urban life that conditioned how urbanites thought and acted: the intensity of nervous stimuli or sensation in the city, and the pervasiveness of the market's effect on urban relations. Simmel observed that urbanites had no choice but to become insensitive to the events and people around them. He reasoned:

> the rapid crowding of changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance, and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions. These are the psychologi-

> cal conditions which the metropolis creates. With each crossing of the street, with the tempo and multiplicity of economic, occupational, and social life, the city sets up a deep contrast with small town and rural life with reference to the sensory foundations of psychic life. (Simmel [1905] 1950, 410)

True urbanites must develop a special capacity to avoid emotional involvement in all that takes place around them. This capacity resides in the "intellect" and its careful cultivation and development and displays itself in the "blasé" attitude, "so unconditionally reserved for the metropolis." In contrast to those who reside in small towns and villages, who have the capacity to embrace each other in more deeply felt and emotional relationships, metropolitan beings must hold themselves apart. Of his "metropolitan type of man," Simmel said, "he reacts with his head instead of his heart" ([1905] 1950, 410, 412–13).

The tendency toward reserve, brought about by the intensity of experience, is reinforced by the economic basis of life in the city. Where Weber observed the city as a marketplace, Simmel asked what life in a marketplace would do to social relations. His answer was that it drew people into relationships characterized by tension and calculation.

> The metropolis has always been the seat of the money economy. . . . Money economy and the dominance of the intellect are intrinsically connected. They share a matter of fact attitude in dealing with men and things; and in this attitude a formal justice is often coupled with an inconsiderate hardness. The intellectually sophisticated person is indifferent to all genuine individuality. . . . Money is concerned only with what is common to all: it asks for the exchange value, it reduces all quality and individuality to the question: How much? All intimate emotional relations between persons are founded in this individuality, whereas in rational relations man is reckoned with like a number, like an element which is in itself indifferent. (Simmel [1905] 1950, 411)

In the metropolitan milieu, the modern mind with its predominant qualities of punctuality and exactness becomes ever more calculating. Simmel suspected that if we dared to examine more closely the reserve characteristic of urbanites, we would find that it merely cloaks the aversion, even mutual repulsion, with which people regard one another in the city. This stems from the sheer impossibility of becoming socially involved with everyone in the metropolis and also from "the right to distrust . . . in the face of the touch and go elements of metropolitan life" (Simmel [1905] 1950, 415).

Having alienated and isolated metropolitans from one another in this manner, one might expect that Simmel would have despaired at the urban condition. That was not the case, however. If individuals were socially isolated in the metropolis, this meant that they were also set free from one another. Simmel ([1905] 1950, 416–417) observed that the small, tightly knit social circles that characterized nonmetropolitan social conditions bound individuals to a narrow set of expectations and allowed little individualism or autonomy. In the metropolis, the division of labor provided the opportunity for the development of differences among individuals. And, as the size of any "group" grew, its inner unity loosened and individual freedom increased. "The smaller the circle which forms our milieu . . . the more anxiously the circle guards the achievements, the conduct of life, and the outlook of the

individual, and the more readily . . . specialization would break up the framework of the whole little circle" (Simmel [1905] 1950, 417). In this view, the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* was a liberation.

One further reference to German influence, which comes from outside the field of sociology, must be made before turning to the urban sociological tradition in the United States. Oswald Spengler believed that history revealed that the city was a central actor in the story of every great civilization. His greatest impact was realized through his work *The Decline of the West* ([1922] 1928), which was widely read by both popular and scholarly audiences. Readers were drawn by the power and elegance of his writing, while they were compelled by his apocalyptic vision. Spengler ([1922] 1928, 90–95) hinged his thesis on the observation that all great cultures had been urban cultures and that the city was the engine of "civilization" (a term he used broadly with reference to the industrialized West). The quality that set the city apart was the emergence of a "soul"—an embodiment of the urban culture as the city (its population) became aware of itself as a special entity. The city was regarded, or in this sense regarded itself, as apart from and superior to its environs, its hinterland. The soul of the city spoke a new language; urban architecture denied any relationship to organic or natural forms; and urban art, religion, and science became progressively alien to the land and were beyond the understanding of the peasant.

> It is the Late City that first defies the land, contradicts Nature in the lines of its silhouette, denies all nature. It wants to be something different from and higher than Nature. These high-pitched gables, these Baroque cupolas, spires and pinnacles, neither are, nor desire to be, related with anything in Nature. And then begins the gigantic megalopolis, the city-as-world, which suffers nothing beside itself and sets about annihilating the country picture—In the village the thatched roof is still hill-like and the street is of the same nature as the baulk of earth between the fields. But here the picture is of deep, long gorges between high, stony houses filled with colored dust and strange uproar, and men dwell in these houses, the like of which no nature being has ever conceived. Costumes, even faces, are adjusted to a background of stone. By day there is a street traffic of strange colors and tones, and by night a new light that outshines the moon. And the yokel stands helpless on the pavement, understanding nothing and understood by nobody, tolerated as a useful type in farce and provider of this world's daily bread. (Spengler 1922] 1928, 93)

Echoing Simmel's concerns over the leveling effects of the preoccupation with money and the rise of intellect on the quality of human relationships, Spengler projected no such compensatory consequences as a gain in individual freedoms. According to Spengler, the growth of the city, for all of its promise, was a terminal condition for society. In the end, "the giant city sucks the country dry, insatiably and incessantly demanding and devouring fresh streams of men, till it wearies and dies in the midst of an almost uninhabited waste of country" (Spengler [1922] 1928, 102). In the end, no one would want to live in the country. In the end, the city, which was the product of human thought and effort, would turn and seize its makers; each of us would be "made its creature, its executive organ, and finally its victim. This stony mass [was] the *absolute* city" (Spengler [1922] 1928, 99).

Spengler held out no hope that the process could be reversed. The history of civilization, given the emergence of the city, was an inevitable rise and fall. As he put it

elsewhere, "Only dreamers believe that there is a way out. Optimism is cowardice" (Spengler 1932, 103). Today this rigid interpretation of history and projection of social change is without adherents or followers. It is easy to see, however, the shadows of Spengler's gloomy musings cast across the pages of early urban sociology in the United States.

THE URBAN TRADITION COMES TO THE UNITED STATES

The foundation of urban sociology in the United States is credited to Robert Park. Park was a newspaper reporter who came to sociology late in his career, after becoming convinced that a more scientific approach was required in order to write the "big story" of the city. In 1899 he went to Berlin, where he studied with Georg Simmel. After returning to the United States, he spent several years serving as a secretary and assistant to Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee, where he met the sociologist W. I. Thomas. Thomas encouraged him to accept a teaching position at the University of Chicago (Faris 1967, 28–29). Chicago became both a laboratory and a classroom for Park and his students and, to a considerable degree, the city upon which concepts in urban sociology in the United States were modeled.

Besides echoing in his sociology many of the earlier themes that have been examined here, Park developed his own ideas about the ways in which spatial features of the environment influence organization and experience. There are two nested themes in Park's work and, because of his pivotal position as a founder of urban sociology in the United States, each of these themes has had an enormous influence on the developing field. First, Park was interested in the evolving structure of the city itself, the physical form of the city and the way different land uses and neighborhoods became oriented toward one another. This interest laid the foundations for the school of urban sociology that came to be known as *urban ecology*. Second, Park was fascinated by the different patterns of human adjustment in the city, the "ways of life" of urbanites. He urged his students to get into the streets and investigate firsthand the ways that modern city dwellers acted, thought, and felt. This emphasis gave rise to the study of urban culture, or *urbanism*. He saw both of these elements, ecology and urbanism, as naturally intertwined and combined them in his own work. The ecological order was the dominant factor: The urban arena was a self-contained universe upon which a science could be based. The physical arena provided a natural order, an urban ecology, that gave rise to distinctive behaviors. In this thinking, he borrowed from Durkheim's division of labor thesis and combined elements of field biology, producing a very distinctive realm of study for urban sociology.

The Ecology of Urban Life

The major elements of the urban arena, the different kinds of land use, and the varied urban populations that occupied the city were sorted or sorted themselves into distinguishable areas. These "neighborhoods" (Park 1915, 580) or "natural areas" (Park [1929] 1952, 196) had particular affinities or aversions to one another, resulting overall in an urban ecology—a spatial division of the city that corresponds

to the functional division of labor occurring within it. Some common examples of such specialized areas include the central business district, exclusive residential areas, areas of heavy or light industry, slums, ghettos, immigrant communities, bohemias, and "hobohemias." These are *natural* areas, Park believed, because they are the products of ecological forces that work to distribute the city's populations and functions in an orderly fashion, with respect to one another. Those who can afford to do so sort themselves away from functions or elements of the population that they regard as distasteful or dirty. Those without the economic means are relegated to the residual areas, perhaps those neighborhoods popularly regarded as containing criminal or "abnormal" types (Park 1915, 612). Each area, whatever its qualities, is characterized by its own "moral code," which corresponds to the interests and tastes of those who use it and what they use it for—residential or recreational purposes, for example. Each district is its own moral region, and in this sense each is segregated from the others. "The processes of segregation make the city a mosaic of little worlds that touch, but do not interpenetrate." Park saw the modern urbanite of his time passing quickly among these worlds, from one moral milieu to the next, "a fascinating but dangerous experiment in living at the same time in several different contiguous, perhaps, but widely separated worlds." In his view, it is this segmentation and transience that generates the superficial quality of urban life (Park 1915, 608). Although the city provides its inhabitants with these little localized, more manageable social orders (the city is, in fact, carved up into these social worlds *by* its inhabitants), the areas do not provide *stability* because urbanites don't live in any one of them. Instead, every individual lives among many



Open market stalls in cities everywhere remind us that at its heart the city is a marketplace. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

of them, playing roles that are only partial to one's entire self. For Park, neighborhood or community offered little in the way of refuge from the impersonality of the city, and urbanites remained loosely integrated and even emotionally unstable in the urban environment.

Robert Park's influence on sociology in the United States has been broad and enduring. He presided over the work of what has been described as "an army of students of cities and city life" (Hughes 1952, 6). His students, working in the great open laboratory of Chicago, produced doctoral dissertations with titles such as "The Hobo," "The Gang," "The Gold Coast and the Slum," and "The Ghetto." The last of these was completed in 1927 by Louis Wirth, who a decade later published an essay that became one of the most influential documents in modern sociology, certainly in the field of urban sociology. This is the essay, "Urbanism as a Way of Life" (Wirth 1938), which was quoted at the opening of this chapter.

Urbanism as a Way of Life

Although Wirth's essay has drawn its share of criticism, it remains important today because his observations represent the capstone of the classical urban tradition. In his essay, the major themes of that tradition have been woven into a single, conceptual cloth. His essay was intended as nothing less than a comprehensive, theoretical definition of the city and urban life. In this endeavor, Wirth acknowledged the efforts of Max Weber and Robert Park but argued that prior to his attempt, these approximations to a systematic theory of the city fell short of providing a complete framework. In his construction, Wirth linked the definition of the urban form to its consequences for social organization and the nature of individual experience. He identified the quality that he was attempting to capture as "urbanism." It was a quality that characterized life at one end of a continuum, while life at the opposite end of the continuum was occupied by rural or "folk" society. Wirth identified three key criteria that directly determined the degree of urbanism found in a given society: size, density, and heterogeneity of the population. He was unwilling to recognize any quantitative threshold that might be attached to these criteria in order to distinguish urban society from rural society. For example, Wirth demonstrated that any attempts to establish an absolute criteria of urban size would produce an arbitrary and, therefore, useless set of numbers. Wirth was not prepared to answer the question, How large is an urban population? The question he was prepared to deal with, however, was How urban is this place? because the answer had to do with the size, density, and heterogeneity of that population. Consistent with his continuum approach, the answer was expressed in terms of more or less.

The following paragraphs describe Wirth's observations with respect to the effect of each of his key variables—size, density, and heterogeneity—on social life in the city. Note the numerous points of continuity with earlier concepts.

Size

The greater the size of a given population the greater the likelihood that it is made up of different kinds (races, statuses) of people. This, in turn, tends to give

rise to spatial segregation within the population. Without a common tradition or experience, there can be no common identity, and "competition and formal control mechanisms furnish the substitute for the bonds of solidarity that are relied upon to hold a folk society together" (Wirth 1938, 11). Wirth referred directly to Weber's and Simmel's observations that typical social relations must be more shallow in the city due to the sheer numbers involved. Human relationships are highly segmented or specialized, and contact as full personalities is impossible. The city is thus characterized by secondary rather than primary relationships. Many of these relationships remain face-to-face, but they are impersonal, superficial, and transitory. According to Wirth (1938, 12), the reserve, indifference, and blasé outlook that he believed typify the urban type are really the urbanites' "devices for immunizing themselves against the personal claims and expectations of others." The relationships in the city that we do take the trouble to maintain are instrumental in nature, and we regard them merely as a means for the achievement of our own ends, not for the value of the relationship itself.

Wirth allowed that individuals in urban life gain some element of freedom from the control of the intimate group, but they also lose the reassurance that comes from life in a more emotionally integrated society. Along with freedom comes a social void and sense of anomie. Although the division of labor and the growth of specialization (even among cities themselves) lead to the social solidarity of interdependence, the pure market motives that bring us together, the "pecuniary nexus," lead to relationships of a predominantly predatory nature. Finally, in the vast numbers of the city, the individual counts for little politically.

Density

When numbers increase and area is held constant, specialization must occur among the population of organisms occupying the space. With this, Wirth indicated his basic agreement with both Darwin and Durkheim. The general effect of density is to reinforce that of size; thus it would appear that many of Wirth's observations regarding density also could have been made under the heading of size.

One consequence of having numerous but superficial and anonymous contacts is that people come to look for cues or symbols of who the other is and how they may be expected to act. Wirth cited Simmel's reference to the importance of the "uniform" that identifies the role of the particular functionary, while the personality remains hidden behind it. Wirth believed that as urbanites we have become attuned to the world of artifacts and are "progressively further removed from the world of nature" (14).

The effect of density is also evident in the spatial configuration of the city. Its surface is divided into different uses, and the urban population is distributed into more or less distinct settlements, which become segregated to the degree that their requirements and mode of life are incompatible with one another. The inhabitants of the city travel among these settlements, "a mosaic of social worlds in which the transition from one to the other is abrupt" (15) and where the result is that the participant traveler develops a relativistic perspective and a greater tolerance of differences. But the dominant spirit that emerges from the close aggregation of divergent

types is that of competition and mutual exploitation in an urban world where the clock and the traffic signal are the symbolic basis of the social order.

Heterogeneity

By the time Wirth came to this third criterion, he had already discussed its effects in relation to both size (in that the city draws to it a diverse population) and density (which creates a division of labor and, thus, a diverse population). The particular consequence of this variable is that every individual in the city is in regular contact with a wide diversity of other individuals, which presents the opportunity for the development of a variety of interests, orientations, memberships, and allegiances for each individual. What sets apart the urbanite is that she or he has no undivided allegiances to any particular group. It is in this consideration of the significance of urban heterogeneity that Wirth's concern for the massing of human society emerges. Instead of enriching individual's lives, socially or culturally, these multiple memberships become transitory and relatively unimportant. Rather than anchoring individuals in a stable social life, these multiple and shifting memberships pull them in conflicting and changing directions. Instead of providing modes of individual expression, "cultural institutions, such as the schools, the movies, the radio, and the newspapers by virtue of their mass clientele, . . . operate as leveling influences . . . If the individual would participate at all in the social, political, and economic life of the city, he must subordinate some of his individuality to the demands of the larger community, and in that measure immerse himself in mass movements" (Wirth 1938, 16–18).

In the end, the image of the urban condition that Wirth leaves with us is one where individuals are alienated, alone, and adrift in a sea of competing norms and values. Increasing size, density, and heterogeneity leave people socially uprooted and politically powerless, conditions that are lessened only to the extent that urbanites are willing to submerge their identity in mass movements. Community is obliterated and in its place rises the "mass society"—a society of undifferentiated humanity, in which individuals are reduced to a common condition. The leveling of individuality in urban society is completed by the mass messages and faceless ministrations of its massive bureaucratic institutions.

The Image of the City in the Urban Tradition and in American Culture

Wirth's conclusions are clearly a product of the sociological tradition within which he worked. Some of the themes of this urban sociology, especially as they were expressed by Simmel, Park, and Wirth, also mirrored certain Western European and North American cultural attitudes toward the growing and spreading cities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Popular attitudes, supported by contemporary religious writers and literary themes, were characterized largely by a mistrust of the city. White and White (1962) made a strong case that there has been an antiurban intellectual tradition in the United States, from the time of Thomas Jefferson through Frank Lloyd Wright. Glaab and Brown (1983, 52) took issue with

this interpretation, arguing that it would be a mistake to characterize either intellectual themes or popular thought as single-mindedly antiurban. North Americans have not wholeheartedly loved their cities, they argue, but they have been fascinated by them, especially as symbols of progress. Those nineteenth-century critics, like Henry David Thoreau, who questioned the proposition that material growth meant social progress, were in the minority:

> The rationale that developed in defense and explanation of American capitalist expansion had the city as one of its principal elements. We read Thoreau today and are moved by his prophetic remonstration against American materialism, against the city, the machine and the factory. Yet in his own time people were more likely to read the poetic tributes to the telegraph, the iron horse, or the country's magnificent thriving cities to be found in their commercial magazines or local newspapers. Although the anti-urban philosophers and novelists of the nineteenth century intrigue the contemporary mind, the defenders and prophets of the material city perhaps reflect more exactly the early popular view of the city. (Glaab and Brown 1983, 66–67)

Nevertheless, a strong current of popular criticism directed at the city did exist in the late nineteenth century and persisted into the twentieth century. In its simplest form, this criticism was inspired by the fear of unpredictable urban masses, which was supported in turn by the xenophobic reaction in the United States to large-scale European immigration. In its more sophisticated form, the popular view of the city shared the concern so common among urban sociologists—of life reduced to its most commercial and calculating dimensions.

In 1872 Charles Loring Brace, a clergyman who worked among the destitute of New York City, published *The Dangerous Classes of New York*. In his book, he urged the keepers of the law to watch closely over the homeless and hungry, or someday they may find that city suddenly reduced "to ashes and blood" (Glaab and Brown 1983, 231). Similarly, the Reverend Josiah Strong ([1885] 1968, 128) wrote of his concern over the growing concentration of European immigrants in the cities of the United States, where the juxtaposition of poverty and wealth in their most extreme forms chafed on the public conscience. He warned that socialism bred in the city: "Here is heaped the social dynamite; her roughs, gamblers, thieves, robbers, desperate men of all sorts congregate; men who are ready on any pretext to raise riots for the purpose of destruction and plunder; here gather foreigners and wage workers; here skepticism and irreligion abound" (Strong [1885] 1968, 128).

Lincoln Steffens (1904), in *The Shame of the Cities*, focused America's attention on the corruption of urban governments. He criticized the common tendency of the times to blame the "foreign element" for the moral failure of urban government as "one of the hypocritical lies that save us from the clear sight of ourselves." Instead, what was wrong with politics, he argued, was the same thing that was wrong with "everything"—art, literature, religion, journalism, law, medicine—they were all *businesses*. The motives of urban politicians were based upon commercial principles. "The commercial spirit is the spirit of profit, not patriotism; of credit, not honor; or individual gain, not national prosperity; of trade and dickering, not principle." Self-interest and personal gain were not motives peculiar to politicians, however; these people were simply in a position to make bigger deals and turn a larger profit than

the average citizen (Steffens 1904, 5–7). In the popular mind, the typical urbanite was thoroughly distracted by concern with money and profit. In this vein, Rudyard Kipling was inspired by a post-turn-of-the-century visit to Chicago to write:

> I spent ten hours in that huge wilderness, wandering through scores of miles of these terrible streets, and jostling some few hundred thousand of these terrible people who talked money through their noses. The cabman [his guide] left me: but after a while I picked up another man who was full of figures, and into my ears he poured them as occasion required or the big blank factories suggested. Here they turned out so many hundred thousand dollars worth of such and such an article; there so many million other things; this house is worth so many million dollars; that one so many million more or less. It was like listening to a child babbling of its hoard of shells. It was like watching a fool play with buttons. But I was expected to do more than listen or watch. He demanded that I should admire. (Kipling [1913] 1968, 42)

It is a familiar story. We cannot know what proportion of Kipling's audience was sympathetic to his view, willing or perhaps even eager to accept his caricature of the typical urbanite. We can, however, observe that social science had produced little in its formulations of the nature of urban life that would contradict Kipling's image.

Many early twentieth-century American writers were drawn to the urban milieu in their work. In addition to the concern for materialism in modern urban life, their popular writings contained a number of familiar sociological themes, which included isolation and alienation, the collapse of community and the breakdown of tradition, and the weakening of ties of affection and religion. As Gelfant (1954, 21–22) wrote mid-twentieth-century, "The comprehensive theme of city fiction is personal dissociation: the prototype for the hero is the self-divided man . . . the community has failed to provide a cohesive tradition that can guide the individual in his choice of goals and moral alternatives."

American novelist Theodore Dreiser was one of the throng of small-town migrants to the big city. By his own account, he was transformed by his urban experience: His small-town idealism was soon undone. He is another who was struck by the extremes of wealth and poverty that stood side by side in the city, and eventually he came to adopt the view of his hardened newspaper-reporting colleagues: Life is a fierce, grim struggle where one expects others to lie, cheat, and lay traps in order to achieve their ends (Gelfant 1954, 50). As a seasoned urbanite, he wrote, "For myself, I accept now no creeds. I do not know what the truth is, what beauty is, what love is, what hope is. I do not believe anyone absolutely and I do not doubt anyone absolutely" (Dreiser 1913, 4). In effect, this was a self-portrait of the figure evoked by the classical tradition of urban sociology. It echoed, in the first person, the theme of the anomic individual, alone in a sea of changing and conflicting ideas and values. There were other, more positive, popular reflections of the city that dated from the same era, as well as evidence that there was some resistance to the unremitting criticisms of contemporary life like those found in Dreiser (Glaab and Brown 1983, 248–50; Doctorow 1982, vii–ix). It is evident, however, that early in the century sociologists were not alone in their suspicions and criticisms of the city. Many of the critical themes of the Chicago sociologists were part of the popular vocabulary.

Evaluating the Urban Tradition in Sociology

Just as it would be inaccurate to regard the popular attitudes of the times as uniformly antiurban, so it would be to fail to recognize the ambivalent feelings of classical urban sociologists in this regard. However, each of the theorists reviewed in this chapter dwelt to a greater or lesser extent upon the loss of solidarity, security, and confidence in life lived in a world of primary ties. With the exception of the work of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, it is the negative qualities of urbanism that become the most important features in identifying the urban condition. Finally, in Wirth's "Urbanism as a Way of Life," we have urban life stripped of all virtue. Does the emphasis on predatory relationships and human isolation in the crowd accurately describe the experience of the city dweller? Critics have argued that it is instead a poor, biased account.

It is important to recall what Wirth's purpose and method were and not misinterpret his effort to model the urban experience. First, he was not trying to describe the experience of the average urbanite or life in the average city; instead he was constructing an ideal. Second, his method involved positing characteristics of one extreme (urban) in contrast to its assumed opposite (rural or folk society). The product of such reasoning, the ultimate model, may be expected to describe only the most extreme or "pure" elements of urban experience. The way to employ such a model is not to hold it up to experience in order to evaluate it, but rather the other way around. That is, by taking a given situation, identifying its basic features, and comparing these features to the characteristics of Wirth's concept ("urbanism"), one may determine the degree to which that situation (experience) can be characterized by his ideal quality. In assessing the usefulness of the model, it is necessary to bear in mind that the nature of Wirth's method caused him to emphasize the most extreme attributes of urban life in contrast to what he felt were the most characteristic features of rural society. In this way his formulation remains useful.

There is no question that Wirth's emphasis on aversion and suspicion exaggerates the experience of most urbanites most of the time; but *situationally*, from time to time, we may recall having seen these factors at work or having felt them shape our own behavior. For example, consider the norms for interaction among strangers, even for looking at other people, on a crowded city bus or subway car, or even the driver of the car in the next lane in traffic. Do we engage or avoid each other? How should one react to a friendly approach by a perfect stranger on a crowded street in a large city? on an empty street?

All knowledge, all experience, can be understood as situated, that is, based on the perspective of a certain person with particular characteristics. If we raise the question of whether the city can be a hostile and alienating environment, whether public places have the capacity to provoke anxiety—we need to think about the answer from the point of view of the variety of individuals and the full range of situations that we find in cities. How might the answer depend on such factors as the race, social class, gender, or age of the person answering the question? How might the factors of race, class, gender, or age be combined to produce a greater or lesser potential for unease in the way that various urban public spaces are experienced? Klinenberg (2002) provides us with a portrait of particular urbanites, elderly people of limited means, who would find little to argue with in Wirth's emphasis on the

effects of social isolation (placemark 3.1). And then the following section of this chapter considers the city as gendered space.

Placemark 3.1—Chicago: The Heat Wave of 1995

The idea that some people can experience loneliness while they are surrounded by millions of people in the great cities of the world may tax the imagination. Yet for many elderly who live in the city, social isolation is a real condition. When such people face a crisis, living an isolated life with a minimum of informal social contact may very well be life threatening. Eric Klinenberg's (2002) account of the Chicago heat wave of July 1995 shows just how real isolation in the city can be, and how dire the consequences.

Day after day in mid-July temperatures climbed near or above 100 degrees. The city morgue overflowed with the bodies of elderly people who died from heat-related causes. The official count for the month was 521 deaths caused by heat. According to Klinenberg, this was not strictly speaking a natural disaster. "The 1995 heat wave was a social drama that played out and made visible a series of conditions that are always present but difficult to perceive . . . We have collectively created the conditions that made it possible for so many Chicago residents to die in the summer of 1995, as well as the conditions that make these deaths so easy to overlook" (11). The pattern of metropolitan decentralization had left older people who had limited means behind in the inner city, and the out-migration of socially mobile friends and relatives created increasing distance between the elderly and their potential support networks. Meanwhile, a lack of access to safe public spaces gave them little opportunity to socialize and look after each other. When they died, there were few who noticed, and it was not unusual for no one to claim the body. What the vast majority of people who succumbed to the heat that month had in common was that they were poor, socially isolated, elderly, and afraid of the world that lay beyond their bolted doors. They "died alone behind locked doors and sealed windows that entombed them in suffocating private spaces" (15).

Data reveal that increasing numbers of elderly and frail people are living alone throughout the United States. While the pattern reflects a determination to remain independent as long as possible, there is another side to going it alone. Klinenberg found a culture of fear among the elderly, a fear that is fanned by the kind of news stories that are featured in the local reporting media: Older people perceive that they are particularly defenseless in the face of muggings or burglary.

Klinenberg offers the case of an elderly white woman, Pauline, a long-term resident of a neighborhood where most former residents looked and sounded like her, but now her neighbors are predominantly Latino. "They are good people," she told Klinenberg, "but I just don't know them" (51). Pauline has "aged in place," while her surroundings have changed. She has a number of age-related health problems that make it difficult to get around, and she is afraid to go out due to her fear of crime. Outside of a couple of people with

whom she remains in phone contact, she has very few active social relationships and prefers to remain within the confines of her third-story apartment. Climbing the stairs to her apartment has become very difficult. Her old air conditioner was inadequate during the heat wave, but might have been all that stood between her and death.

Chicago has been the site of a number of remarkable heat waves over the past several decades. In the waves of the 1950s and 1960s, and perhaps in Wirth's time, residents escaped to the relative comfort of the parks and streets at night. No more. Regardless of whether or not the perception of danger in the streets is exaggerated among the people Klinenberg studied, the contemporary urban milieu is not the same as that described by Wirth. For some of today's urban inhabitants, the casual aversion to strangers described by Wirth and Simmel might sound quaintly old fashioned and understated.

GENDER AND PUBLIC SPACE

We began this chapter with the observation that reality is to some extent subjective, that people with different backgrounds experience the world differently. As Wirth pointed out, urban populations are heterogeneous, and part of what this means is that they represent many perspectives. One of the features of heterogeneous populations is that the individuals who make them up have different amounts of power. Differences in power are present in all social contexts, whether we are talking about families, classrooms, workplaces, or international organizations. It is also true of cities, and here we will pay particular attention to public space, where the actors involved are mostly strangers. The existence of differing amounts of power in such places will have consequences for the way individuals experience those places, as Klinenberg makes clear with regard to Chicago's isolated elderly.

A dimension of the diversity of urban populations that was particularly neglected by early theorists was gender. Today we acknowledge that men and women "strategize" public arenas differently (Gardner 1995, 200), which means that experience has conditioned them to move through anonymous territories full of strangers with different kinds of awareness, deliberation, and intent.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century cities emerged as the seats of manufacturing and commerce, and public spaces within them emerged as the arteries and retreats that serviced the business and leisure needs of the men who conducted the world's important businesses. The observation is trite but true nevertheless that the modern city emerged at a time when the ordinary arena of activity for the gentlewoman was her father's or husband's home. As Ryan (1990, 4–6) put it, "To search for women in public is to subvert a longstanding tenet of the modern Western gender system, the presumption that social space is divided between the public and the private, and that men claim the former while women are confined to the latter." She asserted that the role of the male planner, in creating order, is in part to exclude (genteel and domesticated) women along with other out-of-place and disruptive elements who threaten to spoil the male domain. Certainly poor women—as hawkers, labor-

ers, ragged scavengers, and prostitutes—were fixtures of the street life of cities. But their presence, off-putting to the sensibilities of comfortable business folk, was no evidence that urban public space was a proper domain for women (Stansell 1986).

Sennett (1977) offers insights into the degree to which women faced barriers to entering the public realm in the nineteenth century. He remarks on the desire on the part of both sexes to be inconspicuous in public. Men looked to minute details of conformity in attire, while a woman could do little to avoid the possibility of "being read wrong or maliciously" when in public. There was both an expert and popular belief that it was possible to "read" a person's inner state from unconscious or unintended outward signs available to the properly trained eye. Sennett asked, "Is it any wonder that women would be afraid of showing themselves in public?" (1977, 173).

Cone (1996) explored fictional accounts in nineteenth-century French novels of what became of young women who defied the prohibition on exploring urban public spaces on their own. Affluent women did have a recognized role in public as mass transportation and the renovation of Paris provided reasonably safe corridors of access to the center and as retail merchandising came to rival the purely industrial nature of the urban economy. But a respectable woman's place in public was restricted to only the obvious extension of her domestic role, such as shopping in the new department stores. She had no license to wander the city alone, certainly not at night.

Pollock (1988) drew attention to the effects of restricted urban access on the work of painters who were women. Domestic interiors and private gardens—rather than public spaces—are disproportionately represented in their work. When wider urban vistas are portrayed, the foreground is typically framed by a doorway or window. Marie Bashkirtseff, a nineteenth-century painter, wrote: "What I long for is the freedom of going out alone, of coming and going . . . Of stopping and looking at the artistic shops, of entering churches and museums, of walking about old streets at night; that's what I long for, and that's the freedom without which one cannot become a real artist" (Pollock 1988, 70).

Women continued to occupy the status of something of an *urban other* through the middle of the twentieth century, a status that was an odd mixture of domestic forager, guest worker, and involuntary public performer under male scrutiny. The condition is brought into sharp focus in the following consideration of crowding on public transportation in Canadian cities during World War II (Davis and Lorenzowski 1998). As a result of gasoline rationing during the war the public bus and trolley systems were quite crowded, especially at morning and evening rush hours. The vehicles themselves appear to have been designed for use primarily by men: This was symbolized by high boarding steps that were clearly not suitable for women wearing skirts or dresses, and by special smoking sections that were de facto restricted to male riders whom, it was assumed, were on their way to and from work. During wartime male workers acquired an enhanced patriotic legitimacy. Women workers also had legitimate claim to a space to ride. Women shoppers, set apart by the bags and packages that made up their public uniform, were a different matter. If they were caught traveling during hours of peak worker demand, they were considered to be in the way: In widely voiced (primarily male) public complaints they were labeled *tardy shoppers*. Their claim to a space in the public arena was an extension of their domestic

role—and as such was perceived as having a lower order of legitimacy. Wartime did not create the distinction, it only accentuated it.

Today, as the urban arena and other male domains have become contested ground in the battle for social equality, it is still possible to argue that men are more at home and in control in anonymous public space, and there are ways that members of this more powerful social majority remind others that they are out of place and at risk. Gardner (1995) has provided useful insights into the processes of male public domination and control in her monograph, *Passing By: Gender and Public Harassment*. Her observations reflect the fact that women's public behavior is controlled by widely understood norms that apply specifically to them. These rules of public "etiquette" are evidence that a woman alone in public may be objectified as an "incomplete participation unit," as Goffman (1971) termed the condition. Old-fashioned norms that imposed limits on women's freedom of movement in public may seem laughably archaic in many (not all) societies today, yet for women everywhere, being street-smart involves considerations based on gender.

In particular, women in public are still advised not to draw attention to themselves, either by manner or dress. They should take care to conceal their tracks, to keep separate their anonymous public presence and the locus of their personal life to avoid being followed home. Women have to take special care when interacting with strangers, so as not to transmit the wrong idea by appearing overly pleasant. And, in the event that public harassment occurs, the traditional advice to women is to avoid direct confrontation with their assailant in order to avert further assault. These extraordinary precautions that women are advised to observe, precautions that make them a passive and wary presence in public, clearly identify urban space as not only a gendered but also an "eroticized" environment (Young 1990), carrying sexualized overtones of threat for women who negotiate these spaces.

Seen in this light, the ideas advanced by Wirth and his predecessors, that there is a calculated and predatory aspect to city life, take on a new dimension. While people in general may express a concern for their safety on city streets, the concern of women is heightened by frequent reminders that they are at risk. These reminders take the form of what may be referred to generically as *public harassment*—whistles, comments, calls, solicitations, lewd looks, and physical contacts that create, overall, a distracting tension (Gardner 1995, Madriz 1997). Anonymity emboldens and provides cover for would-be casual assailants to engage in what *they* may consider minimal or playful behavior—a comment or suggestive look. Women are likely to assign different meanings to such encounters in the context of power differentials based on gender. That power differential "associates femininity with vulnerability and masculinity with dangerousness . . . Men's perceived greater strength and women's perceived sexual vulnerability are . . . taken for granted in everyday conversation" (Hollander 2001, 84–85). Cumulative experiences of breaches of civility in urban public spaces reinforce the gender hierarchy, making women wary and defensive. As one woman expressed the condition: "I think I'm definitely impacted by violence, or the implied threat of violence, just in the atmosphere. I mean, as a woman, I'm conscious of the possibility of being assaulted whenever I go out. I always am thinking about my safety and whether this is a safe area or not" (reported by Hollander 2001, 83).

When women present accounts of harassment, the normative structures that surround feminine public behavior reemerge as criteria for evaluating such complaints.

The rules are so clear that "everybody knows them," according to Madriz (1997, 152). "The underlying message is that women who do not follow this code expose themselves to 'unnecessary' risk . . . The implication is that "the responsibility for preventing and controlling crime against women is squarely on the shoulders of women." Any claim by a woman that an act of gross public incivility has occurred raises questions about the victim's behavior. As Hollander (2002, 490) puts it, "There are very real social rewards for 'doing gender' conservatively, and very real social punishments for flouting gender expectations."

Official crime rates in the United States indicate that men are more frequently the target of violent street crime. The locus of violence against women is much more frequently the home, not the street, carried out by intimate males, rather than strangers. Yet it is not surprising that women who are conditioned by daily reminders of risk in public are especially concerned about crime. A summary of research on the topic (Ferraro 1996) shows that women's fear of sexual assault is generalized to all categories of assaultive crimes. This is called the "shadow effect," the fear that any form of criminal confrontation might include sexual assault (Ferraro 1996).

A serious consequence of the anxiety women experience in public is that they curtail their activities, meaning that their access to the full range of public amenities is limited. The consequence can be as specific as a reluctance to walk or jog in urban green spaces set aside for that purpose (Wesely and Gaarder 2004) or more generally a fear of going out into the city. A study of one British city (Bradford) discovered that 68 percent of women did not go out alone after dark, and in another (Nottingham) a small percentage of women were afraid to venture into urban space in daylight, especially on weekends (Trench and Jones 1995).

Much thought has been devoted to the question of what to do about ensuring that all categories of people, including women, have more equal access to urban public space. Responses to the question generally agree that it would be a mistake to engage in a kind of "victim feminism" that advocates for women's interests in terms of their perceived helplessness. The very observation that cities are particularly hostile environments for women involves a potential political liability: It could invite the conclusion that since the great commercial centers are a naturally more threatening environment for women, women are naturally and permanently disadvantaged in their prospect for becoming full and equal participants in political and economic life. Yet, if nothing is done about it, and individual women continue to be burdened with employing tactics to stay safe, society evades its responsibility for ensuring equal access for all to public goods, including the streets of its cities. Madriz (1997, 156) warns that public rituals of avoidance that women are urged to adopt in order to protect themselves can subtly reinforce the gender hierarchy, noting that "many of the rituals of protection infantilize women by presenting them as defenseless." An infantilized class of citizens will continue to be perceived, implicitly, as less than equal participants.

In addressing the question of what's to be done, Elizabeth Wilson (1991) attempts to take the argument that women are less fit to survive in the urban jungle and stand it on its head. Her analysis builds on the notion that the city is an especially sexual arena. At the same time, the arena offers a paradox. Because of its carnivalesque atmosphere, the city offers women a kind of freedom, in contrast to the rural and suburban domestic isolation that is their other option. "We must cease to perceive

the city as a dangerous and disorderly zone from which women and others must be excluded for their own protection." In her view it is especially a mistake for feminists to focus on women's safety, welfare, and protection when discussing the urban environment because this plays into the hands of paternalistic planners and protectors who believe they know what is best for women. Safety is an issue, but it is necessary also "to insist on women's right to the carnival, intensity, and even the risks of the city." It must be possible to be both pro-women and pro-city, recognizing that urban life, "however fraught with difficulty, has emancipated women more than rural life or suburban domesticity" (Wilson 1991, 8–10).

Madriz (1997, 153) offers a caution here: She says that those who advocate acts of defiance need to remain mindful of the overall structure of power that has produced the gendered urban environment. The choice to break restrictive norms takes place within a broader "context of unequal power relations in which women know that men control the streets and many feel they can harass a woman without any consequences." Wilson is aware of that context, but she argues that in the end these facts "should not blind us to the pernicious effect of the ideology that has sought to banish *all* women from urban space, and to lock them into an often stifling domestic privacy" (1991, 119).

Within this framework of masculine domination and feminist defiance, the battle between the genders for urban public space has long been joined, especially in higher income countries in the West and in more socially liberal urban cultures elsewhere. There is an easily observed disjuncture between the warnings expressed in the preceding analysis and the behavior of urban women determined to express themselves on their own terms. Madriz (1997, 156) quotes a peculiarly authoritative "text" that exemplifies this determination: A t-shirt associated with the *Taller Salud* feminist women's health collective in San Juan, Puerto Rico declares "*Las niñas buenas van al cielo. Las demás vamos a todas partes*." (Good girls go to heaven. The rest of us go everywhere.) Going everywhere has its hazards and its rewards. In making the video "War Zone," Maggie Hadleigh-West (1993) took a seven-and-a-half-hour stroll through New York City. She was accosted a total of 112 times by male strangers who taunted and verbally sexually assaulted her. But in each case she turned a video camera on her assailant and relentlessly taped his confounded response. The male proprietors of the territory sometimes retreated sheepishly, but they appeared to react as often with outrage, that a woman was challenging their right to behave in the accustomed manner in the male urban domain.

So, despite the thrust of the analysis of public behavior that has been rehearsed here, contemporary women have hardly succumbed altogether to the warnings that they restrict their movement and presentation of self. In some public places they demonstrate a growing confidence. In that regard, Hollander (2002, 493) hears the beginnings of change in the conversations that define gender, changes that are small but not insignificant. "Traditional discourse on gender and violence—which casts women as pervasively vulnerable and men as alternatively overwhelmingly dangerous and necessary for women's safety—facilitates a vision of the world in which women's choices are constrained because of their helplessness . . . Those moments in which alternative conceptions of gender are offered allow listeners to envision an alternative reality, one in which women have the right and the ability to be free from assault." People who are at a power disadvantage *can* subjectively redefine

their position, and in so doing can take the moral high ground. What is more important is that they find ways to make their account count in practical terms.

Women and others have been organizing along these lines for decades. During any week of the year in cities of any size, one will find meetings where women are organizing to "take back the night," issuing mace and police whistles, attending self-defense classes, and training in the peer counseling of rape victims. Gay and lesbian organizations are also gathering to discuss and work to reduce victimization.

These are not the only concerned groups who struggle to make a place for themselves in public. Other categories include the elderly, racial and ethnic minorities (who are often fearful of the enforcers of law and order themselves), and people with special physical needs. It is encouraging that worldwide there are now hundreds of community safety programs at some stage of development. The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime and the World Health Organization have moved toward a holistic conceptualization of the promotion of public safety, focusing more broadly on creating comprehensive community safety and security programs, less on the detection and pursuit of criminals. The evolving "community safety" perspective advocates an holistic perspective for establishing a common platform of full rights of citizenship for all social categories, that would include "'the right to the city': the right not only to feel comfortable and welcome in public space, but to influence its physical form and the social relations that take place in public space" (Whitzman 2008, 11, 41).

The urban environment resists efforts to transform it into a more secure and convivial space. Yet the nature of threat in urban space as it is viewed by its critics is produced by deliberate actions of those who live there. As diverse categories of social actors become more central participants in the shaping of that space, demand more of it, and require it to serve equally the needs of a pluralistic population, the conviviality of the urban arena may be enhanced.

UPDATING THE URBAN TRADITION

Certainly the city is a somewhat different place than was described by those who struggled to define urban life in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And yet certain features of the city remain the same as when they wrote. We still talk about how cities impact the way we experience the world and organize our lives. But the social impact of sheer urban *growth* is no longer the major theme of change in Western culture, although it will remain a major story for decades to come in the poorer regions of the world.

Today the emphasis in the dramatic tale of city life has shifted from the issue of growth to that of social division: divisions between gendered identities, center and suburb, poverty and affluence, ethnic and racial classifications, renegade youth and solid citizen. It is heterogeneity itself that attracts and excites the popular imagination. Themes having to do with morality and the city still appear, applied mostly to political corruption and questions about poor people's behavior, such as their dependence on public assistance and their childbearing and marriage patterns. Social critics on the right and associated moralists still decry the ungovernable North American city, still fear the poor and marginalized masses, and raise the specter

that the "new barbarians" of the postindustrial city "weren't simply a danger to themselves and other inhabitants of the big city but threatened to drag the entire nation down into a new Dark Ages" (Macek 2006, 39). Issues from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centures still haunt the popular imagination.

There may have been a period decades ago, at mid-twentieth-century, when the city had become a mere dramatic backdrop in popular fiction, not the kind of social force that it had been for early reformers and sociologists. By midcentury, writers and readers were less awed by the city than earlier generations. People had simply got used to it; they themselves were products of the urban environment. In the post-modern era, the meaning of *city* merges with themes related to the influence of the mass media and the operation of international capital, with some concern over the rapidly growing "overpopulated" cities of poor nations. The image of the city "becomes more abstract and 'unreal,' as power operates from hidden sources" (Weimer 1966, 144–45). Those familiar with the perspective will immediately realize the consequence of the postmodern interpretation of the city: The city can only be known from within, an interpretation that takes on a meaning that is created and interpreted by each individual (Lehan 1998, 287–88). However, although it may be more difficult to tell stories about cities independent from themes of the global market and mass culture today than it was a hundred years ago, cities continue to emanate their own excitement, to magnify the scale of human action, and to showcase action.

Cities focus the racism that erupts into violence, headquarter the machinations of power brokers who orchestrate world resources, provide mass markets for large and petty drug dealers, represent the territorial frameworks that provide the incentive for gang fighters, and showcase the efforts of terrorists to attract the attention of the world. Not the least element in the drama of the city is the overwhelming spectacle of a billion poor people living in slums and facing the threat of permanent economic obsolescence (Davis 2006; Okpala et al. 2006).

The wild city in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the lived-in city and the city of the imagination, is the setting for shadowy intrigues of young gun-slinging desperados, places where inhabitants, male and female, of all races and classes, don't need to have the term *street-smart* defined for them. Here the working-class and service populations hustle between formal and informal economic strategies to make ends meet. The working poor live on the margins of makeshift and decaying housing supplies. Many of the poor—including millions with regular jobs—find themselves living on the streets. In some ways these are not the cities that Louis Wirth wrote about in the 1930s, and in some ways they are. Certainly in the 1930s there was poverty, crime, racism, and disorder. We are missing something obvious and important if we conclude that today's city does not provoke alienation, suspicion, and outright fear, perhaps to an even greater extent than in Wirth's time.

If we consider the city from all the perspectives that reflect the diversity of the people who live there, we can still sense some of the awe and dread that drew the attention and concern of early sociologists. It would be a mistake, however, to focus exclusively on the more sensational aspects of urban life. The city is simultaneously the place where many people live reasonably predictable and mundane lives, are at home, choose this above all other settings, and value the differences, the carnival, the excitement. We turn to the perspective of those who are at home with the city in the next chapter.

4

City and Community

In the preceding chapter, we reviewed the classical tradition of sociological reasoning, which, in the end, nearly despaired at the human condition in the modern world. Since the publication of Wirth's "Urbanism as a Way of Life" (1938), urban sociology has been preoccupied with reconciling this negative image with research that has revealed a very different picture of the quality of urban social life. In classical urban theory, mass society and utilitarian relationships dominate social experience: Individuals are largely powerless, alienated, and alone. This is the model of thoroughly urban existence, but this is not what research has revealed about life in the city. Instead, researchers have discovered repeatedly a strong sense of local community and involvement among neighbors, friends, kin, and others who share common interests. Preurban forms of sociability survive in the city, and the urban arena also makes possible new forms of community and solidarity, which is most important in an *urban* sociology because it addresses *the* urban question. While the survival of the forms of community usually associated with smaller types of settlements is interesting, the question for the urban sociologist is, How does the city modify this survival? And most important, What unique forms of community are caused by urban life?

In this chapter, we will consider a number of different forms of social cohesion in the city. We begin with an examination of the ways in which the concept of community has been used with reference to urban spaces and social groupings, and how that concept has been modified to make it more useful. For example, the concept of "community" in urban sociology has shifted from the designation of a physical space to that of a social grouping or "social network." The forms of social organization discussed in this chapter portray the city as a rich social mosaic of interpenetrating worlds, giving individuals a sense of social attachment. While certain structural features of the urban environment create a tendency toward aversion among individuals, there are also multiple opportunities for the development of sustained and enriched social ties. Just as Wirth was able to make a case for the atomizing effects of the urban arena, we can make a case for the reinforcement of social ties in the urban arena. Indeed, the city may possess a peculiar capacity for fostering novel groupings of individuals with mutual interests.

URBAN COMMUNITY STUDIES

The orientation of classical theorists in urban sociology was to emphasize the difference between life in the city and life as it had existed before, to treat these spheres of existence as opposites. Thereby, their work emphasized the socially alienating and isolating effects of the city on social life. On the other hand, sociologists who went out into the cities to research how people lived tended to focus on local residential areas, to engage in a methodology know as *community study*. This method involves the close observation of a relatively small segment of the wider urban arena, and these studies tended to focus on working-class, ethnic, and minority populations. Perhaps it should not be surprising that urban theorists and urban researchers developed quite different interpretations of life in the city.

An orientation among researchers toward a community approach predisposed them to uncover bonds of friendship, kinship, and neighborliness in urban life. This evidence of community in the city led, at least initially, to the belief that Wirth's interpretation of urbanism, as well as the theoretical tradition upon which his conclusions were based, had been proved wrong. However, since early in his career, Wirth had been fully aware of communities of close ties and supportive relations in the city. In fact, he had carefully documented these ties in his own research in Chicago's Jewish ghetto (Wirth 1928). These features of social life simply had found no place in his effort to construct an ideal model of urbanism. The accumulation of community-oriented research, however, clearly indicated that Wirth's classical model did not address the common experience of large categories of urbanites.

One of the earliest studies to challenge the theme of the undifferentiated mass and individual anomie was conducted in the North End of Boston. William Foote Whyte's *Street Corner Society* (1943) examined the nature of social organization in a poor, working-class district of the city. The study showed fundamental differences in what insiders and outsiders saw when they looked at the same area. Whyte managed to gain the perspective of the "Cornerville" insiders. He did not romanticize the area and its residents; he carefully focused on the members of street-corner gangs and the operation of racketeers and their payoffs to local police. He did not, however, see any of these elements as symptomatic of community breakdown or social disorganization.

What might have appeared as elements of disorganization or moral decay from the outside were interpreted as integrative and stabilizing influences within the community. For example, the notoriety enjoyed by a leader of street-corner boys could provide useful visibility if he later chose to run for local political office. His leadership qualities could be put to good use by outside agents, such as social workers, to gain the cooperation of young people in the area for a city-sponsored recreation program that might otherwise be ignored by area youth. Or the abundance of illegal activities in a neighborhood could provide an alternative structure of opportunities whereby bright young people with few other options would work their way up social and economic ladders. That all members of the community did not suffer a sense of indignation because there were artful lawbreakers in their midst was not due to any breakdown of moral order. Instead, the area studied by Whyte may be better understood in terms of Robert Park's "moral worlds," an urban area that embodies its own particular sense of right and order. For example, it was simply

natural for a mother who sent her young daughter to the grocer for a bottle of milk to tell her to "put the change on a number" (i.e., play the illegal rackets-run lottery with the few cents left over). Whyte's study reflected that the residents of the area had a clear sense of what constituted order and honorable behavior; they paid close attention to community political affairs as well as kept an eye on what was going on in the street.

Since Whyte's study appeared in the 1940s, close on the heels of the publication of Wirth's essay, "hordes of scholars" have carefully researched and published studies that show "that urbanites still neighbor, still have a sense of local community, and still use neighborhood ties for sociability and support" (Wellman and Leighton 1979, 373). By the 1960s the survival of community in the city was a commonly recognized sociological fact. Among the most outstanding examples of this research was that done by Young and Willmott (1957), which focused in part on a poor working-class borough in London. They documented the central importance of kinship in the daily round of life and in times of need. The social worlds of the subjects in this study, especially the women, were intensely localized.

In Washington, D.C., Elliot Liebow (1967) studied the failed nuclear-family lives of black street-corner men. Their families had been direct victims of racism and economic discrimination. Urban conditions, independent of the economic consequences of racial discrimination, were not responsible for the disintegration of family life. The street corner simply offered these men a refuge, a place to be with others who understood their frustration and a place where they could maintain their self-esteem. Although they had failed to achieve the kind of success that was most important to them—success as heads of their families and as dependable providers—they still had the sociability of the street. The street corner provided an alternate set of goals and opportunities. The wider society neither understood nor approved of these alternate goals, but it was society that had first set the conditions of failure.

Ulf Hannerz (1969), who studied the same city and strata of society during the same era (the mid-1960s), placed street life in the context of the wider community, and he concurred with Liebow's interpretation. He emphasized that men who hung around street corners were often seen as troublesome from the perspective of other members of their community, but not all their neighbors were willing to judge the behavior of those who sought the camaraderie of their street-corner peers or to see personal failure on the part of others down on their luck. This is because unemployment and the difficulties of maintaining a stable family life that go with it were familiar to the many presently able to maintain those standards. The inability to maintain standards had to do with economic factors external to the ghetto. Hannerz warned that it is a mistake to think about similar communities of that era as divided between respectable and unrespectable residents, between family-oriented and street-oriented people. All understood the ideals of family and the vacillation of individual fortunes. They were all too familiar with the difficulty of approaching and maintaining the ideal. As did Liebow, Hannerz pointed to the fact that the struggle to maintain family life in the absence of economic stability was carried on by women heads of household (Hannerz 1969, 36–37, 96–99).

Gerald Suttles (1968) produced a remarkable study of a poor multiethnic area of Chicago, where he found an intricately organized social order based upon strong

territorial identification. In what Suttles called the "Addams Area," Italian residents were slowly being replaced by growing numbers of African Americans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans. Within the area, each ethnic segment remained socially independent and kept largely to itself. However, a sense of identification with the physical community that contained their residences and livelihoods was shared among all the ethnic groups. There was also a certain level of intergroup apprehension, but confrontation and conflict were avoided since the groups were tied to the same limited space. Suttles reported that open conflicts were limited to confrontations with groups from outside their local community. These conflicts usually began as fights between adolescents of the same ethnic origin. These disputes could linger and escalate into serious antagonisms—for example, between local and outside Italians—eventually involving older boys as well as adults. At this stage, according to Suttles, the lines of adversity could come to encircle all Addams Area residents on the one side and a similar community of outsiders on the other. Suttles (1968, 32–33) argued that territorial identity was sufficiently strong to supersede ethnic and racial differences and created a solidarity based upon common residence. The tendency toward territorial coalition was reinforced by the mutual suspicion among potential adversaries that opponents could be expected to unite in the same way, leaving them no choice but to bury their local differences. Suttles (1972, 21–35) called this type of community the "defended neighborhood" and wrote that "like the family, the neighborhood is largely an ascribed grouping and its members are joined in a common plight whether or not they like it."

Such a sense of community could arise in response to a wide variety of perceived threats and manifest itself in different forms. These might include locally organized vigilante citizens' groups, restrictive housing covenants designed to prevent certain groups from moving into an area, or groups of citizens organized to protest certain demolition and/or construction projects targeted for their area. The idea is that the community is called into existence and becomes a recognized entity and source of group identification through the common perception of an outside threat. The defended neighborhood may or may not be a formally named community or one with official recognition. It may vary greatly in size, but it is typically large enough to include the full complement of establishments (businesses, playgrounds, places of religious assembly, etc.) whose goods and services are required by its members in their normal round of activities (Hunter and Suttles 1972, 58). Accordingly, this type of community may be defined as a spatial unit that serves the day-to-day living requirements of its members, who have developed some degree of collective self-awareness in response to a threatening outside force. The defended neighborhood provides us with one example of how conflict and cohesion occur as simultaneous outcomes of the same social process.

The defended neighborhood is just one of many forms of social unity found in cities. Hunter and Suttles (1972) offered in contrast to the defended neighborhood the "face block," the "community of limited liability," and the "expanding community of limited liability." The *face block* refers to people connected by mutual recognition, the familiar faces encountered in the routine of activities occurring close to home. As the name suggests, often this familiarity is limited to a single city block where, for example, parents may confine their children's play. In some instances the face block could be a defended neighborhood, but usually it is not large enough



Classical urban theory focused on the alienating and isolating aspects of urban life. Close observation of the places people live in reveal that cities harbor the full range of human social ties. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

to supply all the routine needs of its members. Whereas the face block depends on the perceptions of its individual members for its existence, the *community of limited liability* is an area designated as a community by outsiders who have some political or commercial interest in its existence. Hallman (1984, 56) pointed out that many outside interests tend to see city spaces in this way. For example, realtors and mortgage lenders group properties of similar type and sales value, municipal administrators see service areas, school officials perceive school districts, politicians count voting precincts, and sociologists seek class or ethnic homogeneity. Politicians may encourage the development of a community identity among residents who potentially represent a constituency. Others perceive a consumer market whose loyalty to local merchants can be courted in advertising campaigns.

Given the fact that there are likely to be competing, overlapping appeals to a population's sense of belonging, especially in large cities, Hunter and Suttles noted that individuals may come to feel more or less a part of many such "communities"—hence the designation, community of limited liability. The *expanding community of limited liability* once again involves the designation of community status by some outside agent; for example, the reference in news reporting (or in urban sociology) to entire areas of a city as the "West Side" or the "South End." Hunter and Suttles

believed that this enlargement of community corresponded to the increasing scale of government and business, as larger and larger units of jurisdiction and administration have been carved out. The designation of these larger units as communities can, in turn, call forth community self-perception and community organization on this larger scale. While these large-scale organizations, which may claim to speak for tens of thousands of residents, may be more effective in getting the attention of city hall, the expanding community of limited liability is far removed from such units of sociability as the face block or the defended neighborhood.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the term *community* may refer to any of these territorially based forms of social organization. Additional nonterritorial facets of community remain to be explored.

Case Studies

Neighborhood and community studies are case studies. The method involves the immersion of the researcher into the life of a particular neighborhood, an attempt to become part of the locality, and in the process bring it to life for the reader. The goal is to become a participant observer, to approximate the authentic experience of the insider. Usually the period of research lasts a year or more, enough time to allow the fascination of the tourist to wear off, to allow the day-to-day rhythms of the place to set in, and to let the locals get used to the researcher's presence, enough so that they let down their guard and act in something approximating a normal manner. This is not an easy research strategy to accomplish. One never knows just what one is supposed to be looking for, especially at first. And once you have found something to write about, you can't be sure how representative either your particular field setting (neighborhood, in this case) or your particular interpretation is of places like this. The value of the case study is that we get to know a particular setting more intimately, that we get a feel for it.

Herbert Gans ([1962] 1982) produced what is perhaps the most widely referred to of all North American urban community studies, *The Urban Villagers*. Gans conducted his research in the late 1950s in the West End of Boston. During the period that he lived there, the residents' sense of the area as a community was reinforced and expanded by the threat of demolition, as the area became slated for urban renewal. The West End became, in effect, a defended neighborhood, but its defense was unsuccessful. Before the residents' efforts to fight city hall and to "Save the West End" had failed, Gans was able to chronicle a form of life in the city that led him to refer to the subjects of his study as "urban villagers."

Gans's subjects were largely working-class, second-generation Italian Americans, whose neighborhood was considered a slum by many outsiders. The West Enders found the low rents compatible with their economic priorities and their limited incomes. Their social relationships consisted mainly of intense involvements with kin, mostly adult brothers and sisters and their families, and friends, all of whom lived close to one another. Sociability took the form of routine gatherings several times a week by these members of what Gans called a "peer group society." Gans placed great emphasis on these gatherings, noting that they were the ends for which other everyday activities were the means (Gans [1962] 1982, 74). The gatherings provided the chance to express oneself, exchange gossip, offer advice, and entertain

and be entertained. The West Enders were truly themselves and fully alive only as members of this group.

This peer-group society was based on a strong sense of equality. Although much of the group interaction was based on a competition among members, as in behavior calculated to draw the group members' attention and approval, there were strict limits to the amount of attention that one could demand. One could only expect a fair share. There was a general distaste for, and suspicion of, anyone who seemed to covet a leadership position. This is important to understand because it affected social involvement at a different level in the West End.

Whereas the peer-group society was characterized by strong loyalties, people outside this group—even neighbors—were regarded with suspicion. This fact, coupled with the egalitarian norms of the peer-group society, prevented the effective political mobilization of the West End. When it came time to defend the area against demolition by the city government under an urban renewal plan, the peer-group orientation translated poorly into community-wide action. The group was an end in itself and could not be used as a means to an end. Gans wrote,

> The members are less interested in activities that require working together than in impressing each other. Moreover, if group tasks, especially those of a novel nature, are suggested, people become fearful that they will be used as pawns by an individual who will gain most by an activity. Consequently, the inability to participate in joint activities does inhibit community organization, even when it concerns the very survival of the group, as did the clearance of the West End. ([1962] 1982, 89)

In other words, that which made the West Enders ideal peers made them poor defenders. The community to which they were tied individually, the one they identified with and cared about, was their narrow urban village, which consisted of only a few people, their own street, the stores they used, their church and parochial school, and, in some cases, a few organizational ties. It was only the impending destruction of the whole area that caused them to perceive the area as a whole (Gans [1962] 1982, 104); but by then it was too late, and they were unable to effectively act together to save it. With the destruction of the West End, the West Enders were displaced to other parts of the city and the suburbs. A survey conducted two years after their relocation found many of them still grieving for their lost neighborhood and the close social relationships that had been lost with it (Fried 1963).

Case studies can be compared in order to offer insight into how communities differ as well as share certain characteristics. Placemarks 4.1 and 4.2 present brief accounts of community studies, one located a few miles from the West End and the other half a world away.

Placemark 4.1—Boston's Dorchester, Roxbury, and Mattapan Communities: The Next Generation Moves Up and Out

An interesting comparison with Gans's study is offered by the work of Levine and Harmon (1992) in the analysis of the decline of the Jewish American

community located in the Dorchester-Roxbury-Mattapan area of Boston. It is an account covering the history (1950–1970) of an ethnic-based community in which many of the members had become socially mobile, resulting in an increasing division along the lines of social class. During this period, in which the United States was trading its working-class identity for a middle-class identity, many of this community's members had middle-class and suburban aspirations. The urban areas in which Jews were concentrated in Boston, as in many other U.S. cities, were part of the crumbling urban American landscape. Yet many members of Dorchester and the related areas had strong ties to these places, to the familiar spaces over which they felt a sense of collective ownership and a strong sense of belonging. Levine and Harmon (13) offered openly nostalgic accounts of Blue Hill Avenue and the G&G Delicatessen where crowds of regulars gathered in an atmosphere of sociability.

But the surrounding dilapidated areas did not suit the younger, university-educated generation who did not have the same strong sense of place as did the older generation. During the 1950s, after prolonged debate and division, a centrally important synagogue was moved to the suburbs. This removed an important community landmark. It also removed the most active and vocal spokespersons. In this case, the death of the community came not from city hall and not from a lack of effective leadership. The leaders led the way to the suburbs, and they created a momentum that caused an enormous reduction in the number of Jews in the old communities.

Their place was taken by African Americans. This case study is important because it details a widespread process of ethnic and racial transformation, whereby African American or Latino minorities succeed exiting European ethnic groups in inner-city neighborhoods (Alba, Logan, and Crowder 1997). The fact that the abandonment of the community was voluntary, at least for the socially mobile out-movers, may have helped to cushion the experience of displacement, in contrast to the forced exodus of the West End that Gans wrote about. Nevertheless, it is clear that the abandonment of the familiar home place caused a sharp sense of loss that resulted in decades of grieving for a time when living in Boston meant a clearer and richer pattern of association for Jews.

Placemark 4.2—A Tokyo Community: The Meaning of Belonging in Miyamoto-cho

Bestor (1989) studied the neighborhood of Miyamoto-cho in Tokyo during the 1980s. The population of Tokyo and the surrounding urbanized area reached 12 million by the end of that decade. The small area studied by Bestor is fully incorporated by the city, and the neighborhood conforms to the gray and dingy appearance for which Japanese urban places have acquired a reputation. Buildings are low, seldom above two stories. The more recent architecture is

utilitarian and plain; the older buildings dating from the 1920s are dilapidated. This is an extremely crowded space. Shops are interspersed with residences, and the area is very busy during peak shopping hours (between four and six) when women, who must shop for the family meal every day, buy fresh meat, fish, and vegetables. On business streets, the parts of the neighborhood that contain bars, sushi counters, noodle stalls, restaurants, and karaoke establishments remain lively until late at night. Men go on a regular basis to the same bars and shops where they can expect to find their friends late in the evenings.

There is a deliberate effort by residents to support a neighborly and harmonious community life. Miyamoto-cho's residents are linked by ties of friendship, mutual aid, and social control, and they appear to enjoy knowing and being known by other members of their community. The usual web of connections that one would assume to be part of a closely integrated neighborhood is found here. People gossip, help each other, attempt to chase away unsavory influences. Beyond friendship, members of each household are linked to the community through the neighborhood association to which they pay monthly dues, through an active women's auxiliary association that coordinates community-wide activities, and through the old-people's association. The neighborhood unit generates strong norms of universal participation, reciprocity, and mutual obligation. People do not seem to suffer from an overload of pressures for local sociability. Rather they seem quite happy to indulge in locally based friendships far beyond the call of loyalty.

The neighborhood is a main source of friendship, and people spend a great deal of their leisure with their neighborhood friends. In fact, when a family plans an excursion outside of the neighborhood, they very often take their friends with them. Bestor said that he was reasonably confident that the Tokyo neighborhood he chose to study is not unusual in this regard.

THE RECONCILIATION OF URBANISM AND COMMUNITY

The findings of the various studies reviewed so far reflect a variety of forms of social unity in the city; for example, Liebow's study focused on the solidarity of the street corner, Young and Willmott on urban kinship, and Gans on the peer group. These studies have one common feature: Their findings do not bear much resemblance to the model of urbanism that was developed in chapter 3. On the basis of his research and the research of others, Gans developed a formal criticism of Wirth's thesis (1962). He argued that Wirth's model of life in the city must be questioned on at least three counts. First, it seemed to have been constructed only with reference to the inner city, the conditions of which cannot be generalized to all sections of the city—particularly the outer city and the suburbs. Second, evidence was lacking that ways of life, even in the inner city, resembled those described as urbanism: There was reason to doubt whether size, density, and heterogeneity produced the conditions attributed to urbanism. Third, even if it could be shown that the city produced such conditions, it had also been demonstrated that sizable proportions

of the urban population were insulated from the negative consequences of urbanism (Gans 1962, 628–29, 639).

In summary, Gans was not convinced by the evidence available that Wirth's urbanism thesis could be supported, and if it could, it surely did not apply very widely to all segments of the urban population. Instead, Gans saw five major categories of adaptation to urban life (1962, 629–30):

1. The cosmopolites, who included students, artists, writers, musicians, entertainers and other intellectuals, and professionals choosing to live in the city to be close to its cultural amenities.
2. The unmarried or childless, who remained in the inner city to be close to work and entertainment.
3. The ethnic villagers, whom we have already met in Boston's West End. Their social life was rich in primary group ties; they were insulated from life outside of their immediate surroundings; and they were suspicious of anyone and anything outside of their neighborhood.
4. The deprived, who were the poor, emotionally disturbed, or otherwise seriously handicapped members of broken families, and people of color. They were relegated to the poorest housing.
5. The trapped and downwardly mobile, who were the people caught in transition; for example, when the area in which they were living had deteriorated but they could not afford to escape, or when, as in the case of many elderly people, their standard of living had declined with the purchasing power of their small, fixed income.

Gans's general point was that there is not one style of urbanism in the inner city, but at least five, each sufficiently distinctive. It is hard to see how size, density, and heterogeneity could exert a common influence on their existence. Urban or ethnic villagers are insulated by their culture and social ties. The cosmopolites and the unmarried or childless have chosen the city for its convenience and cultural amenities. The remaining groups—the deprived and the trapped and downwardly mobile—*are* affected by the conditions of transience and heterogeneity that generate the kind of segmental roles and superficial interaction that Wirth described: Anonymity, impersonality, and superficiality characterize many of their relationships. However, Gans (1962, 632) concluded that these conditions were most directly functions of poverty and discrimination, and they were not generated by the nature of the city itself. He then asked the broader question of whether city–noncity differences (termed *settlement* or *ecological variables*) were useful for explaining ways of life. To this, he answered that his own suburban research led him to conclude that his subjects' move from city to suburb involved no significant behavior changes. Gans concluded that assumptions about urbanism and suburbanism as modes of life were misguided and that other factors, such as social class and stage of life, were more basic in explaining important, observable differences in behavior. In this view, the structural factors of size, density, and heterogeneity are simply not very interesting because they are not very consequential.

If this conclusion is correct, then it could be argued that urban sociology would be largely without an object of study. It is possible, however, to move beyond both

Wirth's argument that urbanism had a disintegrative effect on social life and Gans's argument that the existence of a variety of lifestyles meant that the urban arena exerted no influence. Claude Fischer (1975; 1984) proposed that the question of the effect of the urban arena be cast in terms of what are the forces at work in the urban environment that contribute to characteristically urban forms of association. He believed that both Wirth's and Gans's approaches to this question were worthwhile, but he differed sharply in his conclusions about how the urban arena altered social life.

Fischer (1984, 28–29) found Wirth useful as the leading proponent of what he called the *determinist* school of urban thought—"determinist" because Wirth and those who took a similar view believed that the urban environment itself directly influenced or determined the way people thought and acted. Likewise, Fischer (1984, 32–33) found it necessary to retain Gans as the most representative statement from the *compositional* school—"compositional" because it viewed the city population as being made up of a diversity of conditions and styles that were not reduced to a common condition by their urban experience.

Fischer developed his own synthesis of the determinist and compositional schools of thought, which he labeled a "subcultural" theory of urbanism. In this view the urban arena provides a supportive environment for the growth, differentiation, and interaction among groups of people who share common interests and orientations. Examples would include members of ethnic groups, people with particular cultural interests (e.g., music, theater, dance), and political movements: The more narrow the appeal of a particular interest or movement, the more vital is the size of the urban population to its success. The individuals involved would be unable or less able to find support for and express their interest in nonurban settings. For Fischer, population size was the central factor in determining urbanism. The urban area must be able to provide the *critical mass* necessary to permit people of the same interests to become a vital, active subculture. Critical mass sustains interaction among like-minded individuals, allowing them to reaffirm their mutual identity and strengthen their subcultural identification.

The size of an urban area ensures the existence of a diversity of subcultures in two ways. First, there is the determinist explanation that the concentration of an urban population produces specialization or the structural differentiation of inhabitants into different occupations and interests. Alternately, there is the compositional explanation that the larger the city, the wider will be the territories from which it draws its migrants, creating a more diverse population (Fischer 1984, 36–38). According to Fischer, these are complementary, not rival explanations of urban diversity. The heterogeneity produced by the processes of differentiation and migration is seen as a source of richness in the urban experience, as it increases the potential for the development of social ties by providing potential companions for a diversity of interests.

Although Fischer's subcultural view may be a synthesis owing to the traditions of both Wirth and Gans, it is important to recognize just how different his conclusions were from the earlier views:

> Urbanism does shape social life—not, however, by destroying social groups as determinism suggests, but instead by strengthening them. The most significant social effect

> of community size is to promote diverse subcultures. . . . Like compositional theory, subcultural theory maintains that intimate social circles persist. (Fischer 1984, 35–36)

Unlike the determinists of the urban tradition, Fischer no longer interpreted urbanism as the leveling influence of mass society. And, opposite to the compositionalists who found little of interest in the urban variable, Fischer believed it had the power to enrich social experience by directly providing the conditions for a multiplication of diverse social worlds or, to use his term, subcultures. The more urban a place, the greater its subcultural variety. The larger the population, the more intense the subcultural experience. This is due to the capacity of a larger population to provide more complete support for cultural expression and activities, and the tendencies in certain cases for intergroup conflict to deepen loyalties within a group. At the same time, large cities provide opportunities for forms of contact among subcultures that allow for the diffusion of cultural elements or traits among the various groups. Thus, while a subculture is intensifying, it may be changing at the same time through the incorporation of traits borrowed from other groups. The theory also proposes that the more urban a place is (the greater its size), the higher will be the rates of deviance among its population. This proposition is based on the same principle of critical mass, which observes that larger cities provide unconventional subpopulations—thieves, counterculture experimenters, avant-garde intellectuals—with a community of like-minded individuals to support their particular values, beliefs, and practices (Fischer 1975, 1324–29; Fischer 1984, 37–38).

The emphasis in subcultural theory is on the integrative quality of urbanism. It is the antithesis of the avoidance and anomic view. However, Fischer (1982, 233–35) pointed out that although some may feel that the negative determinist or Wirthian view had become outmoded, there was still considerable evidence to support it. Psychological research has suggested that city dwellers are less forthcoming to strangers and more estranged from and aggressive toward one another than people who live in smaller social arenas. Fischer proposed avoiding the sweeping psychological theories of chronic social withdrawal in order to explain the characteristic urban styles of disengagement and aversion. These styles may be accounted for instead through subcultural theory. The subcultural heterogeneity of the city regularly leads to contact among people who are not only strangers to each other but also are culturally strange, perhaps even threatening, to one another. It is natural, therefore, as a consequence of urban life, for people to recoil from one another in public places. The more public the place, the more visible the strain. Cities generate a variety of cultural communities: In public encounters their members experience a mutual aversion. Urban sociologists have been mistaken in misinterpreting this public (and therefore highly visible) behavior as a central characteristic of the urban personality, or as reflective of the quality of private life (Fischer 1984, 214–15). This is an important point.

Fischer contributed to a clearer understanding of urban social processes. The subcultural theory of urbanism recognizes the energies generated by the urban environment to create both cohesive social units and conflicts among dissimilar social groupings. At the same time that Fischer's work is a departure from earlier theories, it stands within the tradition of urban sociology and does not reject altogether the

older perspectives. Rather, it is a reinterpretation. The urban arena remains a mosaic of social worlds, as it was for Robert Park and Louis Wirth, but living among these is no longer a hazardous social experiment. Instead, in subcultural theory, urbanism has become a rich and promising way of life.

Distinguishing between Social Spaces and Social Relationships

In this chapter, we have discussed a wide range of social relationships. Although these relationships have varied from friendships on the street corner to the expanding community of limited liability, each has come to be recognized as evidence of "community." The meaning of this term has become increasingly broad and inclusive. Claude Fischer, on the other hand, invites us to see a different kind of community, subcultural communities, based on common interests rather than physical spaces.

Urban sociology, a sociology of physical space, was of course traditionally preoccupied with divisions of space in the city and was, therefore, prepared to consider group life only in the context of residential neighborhoods. Discussion of community was limited largely to the question of what had become of neighborly ties. Early theorists, like Simmel and Wirth, who emphasized the breakdown of social ties in the city, are represented by what Wellman and Leighton (1979) called the "community lost" school of thought. Urban community studies, on the other hand, overwhelmingly supported a "community saved" interpretation, exhaustively documenting the survival of neighborhood ties and support. One of the outcomes of community studies was the tendency to see community and neighborhood as one in the same. Wellman and Leighton (1979, 366) believed that this a priori emphasis on the organizing power of residential space caused social science to ignore other major spheres of daily action and sociability. They pointed out, with reference to neighborhoods, that "residents tend to disappear from view in the morning and mysteriously reappear at dusk." What do we miss by ignoring their social affiliations beyond their area of residence?

Wellman and Leighton proposed to break this emphasis on neighborhood—and on any physical reference point—by rethinking the community concept. They offer the concept, "community liberated": By this they mean community "liberated from constraints of space." This recognizes the fact that people form all sorts of relationships beyond the confines of the neighborhoods they live in (Wellman and Leighton 1979, 376–79). These liberated communities are comparable to Fischer's subcultural groupings. Like Fischer, they emphasized that individuals are free to engage simultaneously in a number of social relationships. An individual's social relationships *might* be contained almost entirely within a neighborhood area, but most people had social ties to a number of different sets of relationships outside their area of residence. Wellman and Leighton (1979, 381–83) speculated that people whose social ties were concentrated within the neighborhood—in other words, those with ties corresponding most closely to the community-saved school—were likely to be people of limited economic and social resources, with limited ability to make contacts outside their residential area. By contrast, Wellman and Leighton

proposed that the community-liberated pattern—where individuals formed ties to a number of friendship and resource pools not restricted to their residential area—was likely characteristic of more affluent segments of the urban population. Research conducted by Claude Fischer (1982, 251–52) supports this. A survey of northern California communities indicated that higher levels of education and income are associated with geographically more broadly based relationships.

If it is inappropriate to see the community within which most urbanites live their lives as a neighborhood, then how are we to visualize it? The answer is that people's lives are contained in social networks. To describe the social worlds of individuals in this way presents a challenging set of conceptual and research issues.

Social Networks

The social network approach provides a useful framework for picturing the sets of interlocking relationships that make up the complex and diffuse organizational fields like those found in cities. The social network perspective stresses that people live their daily lives among a number of groups, organizations, and sets of friendship and family relations. Each one of these social contexts contains only a fragment of the total of a person's roles and relationships; therefore, each can be expected to yield only a fragmentary understanding of the social basis of an individual's experience and behavior. Social network analysis traces social relationships across group boundaries. The following passage depicts the social network image as it was first described by J. A. Barnes.

> Each person is, as it were, in touch with a number of other people, some of whom are directly in touch with each other, and some of whom are not. Similarly, each person has a number of friends, and these friends have their own friends; some of any one person's friends know each other, others do not. I find it convenient to talk of a social field of this kind as a network. The image I have is of a set of points, some of which are joined by lines. The points of the image are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other . . . A network of this kind has no external boundary, nor has it any clear cut internal divisions, for each person sees himself at the centre of a collection of friends. (Barnes 1954, 43–44)

Barnes makes a number of points in this definition of social networks that are worth emphasizing. First, the social-network concept describes a web of relationships within which interaction is channeled. Second, not all of the members of any individual's contacts are in contact or direct communication with each other. Social networks not only consist of a person's contacts but also contacts of contacts (e.g., friends of friends), and so on. So, it follows that there is no boundary of the network because relationships continue to radiate outward from every included member. Finally, social networks are *egocentric*; that is, every network must be traced from the position of a particular member and can be mapped and described only from that point of person's perspective.

Networks have been interpreted, in part, as systems of interpersonal exchanges. In one view, the viability of a set of relationships is "governed by the principle that value gained from the interaction must be equal to or greater than the cost" (Boissevain 1974, 25). Seen in this way, a social network contains a pool of "so-

cial capital" (Blokland and Savage 2008). Research has revealed, for example, that people's networks play a critical role in determining how successfully they cope with stressful events or personal crises (Curley 2008; Gottlieb 1981; Hirsch 1981). However, if an individual's network contains every important relationship of that person, then the network is not comprised entirely of mutually beneficial relationships. A link that provides social capital for one member may very well be experienced as a drain on personal resources by another (Fischer 1982, 3). In addition to binding people together in mutual benefit or obligation, networks also consist of negative or antagonistic relationships that influence behavior. As Laumann (1973, 3–4) put it, "One individual may love another who reciprocates with hatred, but in any case they are mutually oriented to each other and take each other into account in their own behavior." Thereby, each remains part of the other's social network.

The network approach has been applied widely in urban studies. It provides a lens for seeing a difference between the structure of urban and rural social relationships. This difference is diagrammed in a highly simplified fashion in figure 4.1. Less urban settings tend to be characterized by a higher proportion of mutual acquaintances and face-to-face interaction among all the members of a network. In the urban arena, it is less common for all of a person's friends and other significant contacts to know one another. Within smaller populations, networks are denser, closely knit, and highly connected, while the urban network is open, loosely knit, and dispersed.

Frankenberg (1966) employed network density in this way to determine the degree to which a particular population could be characterized as rural or urban. In his review of community studies, which ranged from a small, relatively isolated Irish farming village (Arensberg 1939; Arensberg and Kimball 1940) to large urban housing developments (Young and Willmott 1957), he observed that greater network connectedness translates as greater social "transparency," while the loosely knit network associated with more urban settings "insulates" social actors. In the city, the individual is insulated because the many roles he or she plays are visible only to a portion of that individual's total network; therefore, only a segment of the individual's behavior is visible to each part of his or her network. In the densely knit




Figure 4.1. Comparison of Rural and Urban Network Structures. Both network fragments contain the same number of individuals, but they stand at opposite extremes with regard to the degree of connectedness among network members.

network of a rural village, where each individual tends to know and communicate with all others, the scrutiny of the individual's behavior by the entire network is unrelenting due to the transparency among the various roles a person plays. It is a well-known principle that "news travels fast in a small town." This is because the communication network is so highly connected that a piece of gossip is quickly exchanged throughout the system. Insulation prevents this in the sparsely connected networks of the large city.

A number of network theorists have speculated about the relative merits of open and closed network structures. Frankenberg (1966, 241) thought that the greater social visibility characteristic of rural networks means that conflicts would lie closer to the surface and be more difficult to cover up, meaning that people would have to learn to live with and resolve conflicts amicably on a routine basis. Research has shown that people who are able to maintain denser and more homogeneous networks in urban settings more easily derive a sense of well-being (Bott [1957] 1971) and support under stressful conditions (Kadushin 1982) from them. However, the evidence on network structure and stress adjustment is mixed, with other findings indicating that a more dispersed network structure is advantageous. *Low* network density was associated with the successful adjustment of women who had become widowed (Hirsch 1981, 159) as well as those who had divorced (Wilcox 1981, 107–9). Hirsch speculated that the diversity of points of view in more open networks may offer a more adaptive orientation, while Wilcox thought the lower proportion of family members in more highly dispersed networks may provide a more supportive base for divorcing women.

All forms of social networks provide members with a pool of resources, and they can be vital to survival for people who have little in the way of material resources. As Espinoza (1999, 151) put it with regard to the urban poor of Latin America, "The economy of survival consists more of managing social ties to gain access to resources . . . Obtaining necessary resources involves dealing with a multitude of relatives, friends, neighbors, co-workers, shopkeepers, organizations, institutions and the like." For the poor, small cash advances from kin, loans of appliances or food from neighbors, and help finding paid work from a variety of social contacts are important strategies of survival (Espinoza 1999, 168–74). Studies of poor Asian immigrants in Los Angeles have demonstrated how the locus of vital network resources changed with time, gradually enriching an immigrant's pool of social capital. To begin with, immigrants were dependent on kin and members of their particular ethnic group (e.g., Filipino, Korean) for entry-level jobs, but experience and the expansion of the individual's network beyond the ethnic group leads eventually to opportunities for better jobs and income (Sanders, Nee, and Sernau 2002). In relation, Curley (2008) distinguished between the different kinds of social capital that resided in different segments of the social networks of poor women who moved to another neighborhood in the same city in the United States. Poor women's "strong ties" were to other women in their neighborhood, and these ties were helpful in finding the kinds of jobs that unfortunately limit the social mobility of the working poor while helping them to get by. When women moved to a distant neighborhood, many of the strong neighborhood ties were permanently broken, and after a period of two years few women reported being able to replace them in their new location. "Weak ties," consisting largely of links to people in government agencies

who the women knew only in their official capacity, were not neighborhood based and therefore were not affected by residential mobility. These ties, in addition to providing the formal services they were designed for, often provided incidental information on education and training services for the women or their children: Thus, it was the weak segment of their network that provided poor women with avenues for advancement.

The social-network approach has afforded some interesting ways of visualizing the overall structure of urban social relations. The social structure of each city can be seen as a network of networks (Craven and Wellman 1973; Boissevain 1974; Wellman and Leighton 1979, 379). Boissevain divided each individual's network into first- and second-order zones. The first-order zone consists of persons with whom the individual in question (ego) maintains direct contact; a second-order zone is comprised of people whom ego does not know directly, but who are known to his or her first-order contacts; that is, they are friends of friends. Consider that each person in ego's first- (friends) and second- (friends of friends) order zones maintains the same sort of network, composed of that person's direct (first order) relationships as well as potential (second order) relationships, as does each person to whom he or she is connected, and so on. In this way it is possible to envision each individual as potentially connected to every other individual in the city (or society). Each city (or society) then can be seen as a vast network of overlapping personal networks.

The "network of networks" metaphor of urban social relations presents a suitably complex image of the social morphology of the city. The picture of overall social organization of a city may be difficult to hold in one's mind. It is also difficult for the researcher to empirically trace this kind of structure. Barnes (1972, 3) noted that it was quite impractical for a single investigator to trace more than a small segment of the relationships within a network of any great size. We may speak of the network of networks, but it is an overwhelming task to measure or map such a structure in any detail.

Textbox 4.1. The Ultimate Liberation of Community

In 1995, Claude Fischer took the opportunity of the twentieth anniversary of the first publication of his *subcultural theory of urbanism* argument (Fischer 1975, as discussed earlier in this chapter) to reexamine his idea that cities provide a rich environment in which people with similar interests can come together to form subcultures. His perspective is consistent with the one that liberates community from local residential space, the idea that people associate on the basis of interest rather than neighborhood. It is also consistent with the imagery of the social network: A particular interest may provide just one of the many foundations for any individual's social interactions. Paraphrasing him, we can say that the larger a given city, the greater the number of networks based on mutual interest it will support; the larger the city, the greater the intensity of these interest-based liberated communities; the larger the city, the greater will be the subcultural reinforcement for unconventional thinking and behavior. Fischer wrote that after two decades of research and critical thought, he believed his theory still provided a promising alternative to Wirth's (1938) argument that urbanism produced

personal isolation. But Fischer thought that his own work needed some rethinking and qualification. His most fascinating qualification is contained in the following: "As modern technologies allow interaction without proximity . . . subcultural processes are revealed to be fundamentally about *intragroup accessibility*. Spatial agglomeration is only one way group members gain access to one another. In the end, subcultural theory is ultimately about the ability of subculture members to communicate . . . and it is not necessarily about *cities* per se" (Fischer 1995, 549, italics in original). While he doesn't elaborate much on this observation—and despite a brief comment that he believes space continues to matter and urban-rural distinctions in particular remain relevant, Fischer has struck upon a profoundly important point. The ultimate domain within which communities of interest may come together is not the metropolis or even the nation: It is the globe or, more precisely, the World Wide Web. Here, we may apply the central concept of Fischer's subcultural theory—critical mass, the idea that the city provides like-minded people with mutual access for building community—with maximum effectiveness. On the Web, we have the greatest number and potential intensity of subcultures of interest providing support for the greatest variety of unconventional thought and behavior. Genius can flourish, potential mass murderers can receive support and bomb-making advice, collectors of esoterica can bond, and experimenters on the sexual fringe can find each other. What is the impact of the Internet regarding observed differences between urban and rural social structures? Does life online negate or transcend the entire set of distinctions between rural networks (greater ease of communication among all members) and urban networks (more diffuse and restricted communication)? Fischer's (1995) tentative appraisal, "Perhaps these technologies are not as pervasive or as effective as imagined; perhaps people still need to meet face to face," has almost an old-fashioned appeal a decade and a half later. Paraphrasing him once again, we might say, "You can get sex on the Web but you can't really have sex on the Web." However, you can give and take ideas on the Web and develop those ideas and exchange them with new partners at any distance. It provides a forum for social intercourse that is not physical, that is safe by virtue of remoteness, contact that is superficial, where one's persona is shielded by anonymity, perhaps promoting a sense of daring that might become inconvenient if uttered or practiced within a local community, that provokes others to be more experimental in their mode of self-expression than they would otherwise be, and so forth. It would appear that on many levels we have reached a new plateau in the liberation of community that will require us to think critically about the ways we talk about rural-urban distinctions and cause us to question further the assumptions of our urban sociology.

Summary

Our review of the nature of social cohesion in the city reveals that the early efforts to develop an ideal model of urbanism paid little attention to the possibility of survival for traditional forms of sociability. Also neglected was the potential of the urban arena to give rise to new forms of community. The lost community was found, or saved, but the saved community turned out to confuse community with neighborhood. Community was defended, expanded, became limited, and finally identified as subcultural and liberated from spatial considerations. Once it is defined as a matter of mutual interests rather than as a residential area, community is

a phenomenon potentially global in its reach—if we are willing to accept that electronic communication is a sufficient minimal criteria for its existence. This stretches the concept of community to its limits as a useful sociological term, and we will probably continue to argue about this extension of meaning in coming decades in the broader discussion of the transformative significance of the Internet for society in general. The various interpretations of community are indeed complementary, and they help us to think about the diverse ways in which individuals are bonded to and communicate with each other. Each of us probably feels that we live within all of the types of community discussed here, from neighborhood to global network.

5

Ethnic and Minority Groups

Ethnic and minority-majority group studies have long been an important part of urban sociology. Cities are the showcases of ethnic contrasts, as well as the arenas of intergroup conflict. An urban sociology must assume that cities provide more than a backdrop for these events. In this chapter, we are interested in how the urban arena influences the shaping of ethnic and minority groups. Following the same principle employed in the preceding chapters, this chapter highlights those features of ethnic and minority processes that are in some degree a product of the urban environment. Although the historical references that follow primarily regard the case of the United States, the discussion of the principles of intergroup relations can be applied to all societies where similar distinctions and conflicts persist among urban populations.

The manner in which the population of the United States reached its current—if constantly shifting—composition makes the study of ethnic and minority relations a central concern to the sociology of its cities. During the 1800s, the area covered by the contiguous territories of the United States reached its present boundaries and engulfed millions of native and Spanish-speaking people in its westward advance; cities grew rapidly from coast to coast; massive waves of millions of immigrants transformed the meaning of America. Late in the century, many of the freed and displaced descendants of slaves found their way to the cities of the North and South, beginning a migration trend that would accelerate in the following century. The 1800s were a period when the country underwent a transition from a predominantly agricultural economy to an industrial economy. By the early decades of the following century, the need for industrial labor and workers to construct everything from railroads to cities themselves had drawn nearly 50 million immigrants. These were accompanied by some unknown millions more of unrecorded arrivals. Immigration was slowed by restrictive legislation from 1921 through mid-century but increased steadily thereafter. Between 1990 and 2003 approximately 18 million legal immigrants were admitted. Of the 33.3 million foreign-born people counted in the Census Bureau's 2003 American Community Survey, 31.4 million, or 94%, lived in metropolitan areas (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2008a). Both historically and at the present time, the story of America's cities is the story of its diversity, and vice versa.

Since the earliest days of independence, there has been concern with the long-term effect of the influx of foreigners. A "gangplank" mentality has persisted: Once established, each newly arrived group would prefer to pull up the ramp that led them from ship to shore, ostensibly in order to preserve the characteristics of the existing population stock and national culture but also to limit competition from other newly arriving groups offering cheap labor. There was always concern over whether each new wave could fit in, blend, and become indistinguishably American. In service to this concern, a "melting pot" theory emerged. The theory was as much an ideology of national unity, arguing that all the differences that set entering groups apart from one another could be melted down and made cohesive in a new cultural form that was identifiably American. The unspoken part of this creed was the understanding that what would melt away would be the Old World (more recently Third World) characteristics, except for those colorful traits of taste and tradition that could be unobtrusively incorporated in an Americanized product.

The melting pot thesis was based on the hope that people's cultural memories would not span generations, on the hope that the U.S. culture and its institutions would not be changed too much by the foreigners who came to participate in and interpret it, to adopt it and adapt to it. As the decades of the twentieth century passed, it became increasingly clear that ethnicity had a persistent quality, and beginning in the 1960s, there was a resurgence in people's interest in their cultural rootedness in other parts of the world. Moreover, ethnic identity was not a distant memory of generations past for many people in the United States. Among the richer nations of the world, the United States included, large numbers of immigrants over the last fifty years have come from the South, the world's poorer regions. The new immigrants added new diversities of cultural richness to receiving nations. Predictably, old prejudices emerged among more established citizens: the fear that the most recent newcomers were too different for the new differences ever to melt out. Everywhere, in-migration produces familiar tensions. Emerging ethnic diversity often presents the danger that the cultural other will come to be vilified and scapegoated; that interethnic tensions will develop; and that new *minorities* will be forged by the heat of diversity and by the power of some groups to restrict the freedoms and rights of others. Urban settings constitute the laboratories where frictions are magnified and certain majority-minority conflicts are incubated.

ETHNICITY AND MINORITY

The primary goal of this chapter is to understand how the urban arena affects intergroup relations and the dynamics of group experience. In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to distinguish among discrete concepts that unfortunately are often run together in popular discourse. In particular we are interested in defining the concepts ethnicity, ethnic group, and minority group. Stated simply, *ethnicity* refers to a quality of *experience* based on attachment to a *culturally* distinguishable group (ethnic group) that is contained along with other groups within a particular society. An ethnic group's members share the sense of a distinctive origin and experience. The term *minority group* identifies a group whose members share a subordinate *political* position, that is, a position marked by systematic disadvantage and a degree

of powerlessness, as well as some conscious conception of themselves as a distinct group. A minority group may or may not be an ethnic group (the Jews in Nazi Germany and the Basques in Spain are examples of ethnic minorities; women, handicapped persons, and homosexuals are minorities but are not generally considered ethnic groups). Thus, it may not be assumed that a discussion of ethnic groups is typically a discussion of minority groups. In fact, some ethnic groups are majority groups, but the important point is that ethnicity is a concept altogether independent (at least in the analytic sense) of minority-majority conflict or power relationships. The following discussion should make these distinctions clearer.

Although large numbers of immigrants to the United States have been political refugees or those seeking relief from religious restriction or persecution, the decision to emigrate was usually an economic one for the vast majority of those who came in the great waves of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For those seeking to escape from poverty, it was a rational choice among a limited number of options. Those who left behind less desperate circumstances also expected to improve their living standards. Some were recruited directly by hiring agents sent overseas by industry, the railroads, or domestic employment services in the United States, while others were recruited indirectly by the news of opportunity passed on by those who had already left. Many, in fact, were sent for by relatives who had arrived earlier. Although a few might have been lured by visions of gold lying in the streets, most came with a good idea of the hard conditions awaiting them (Steinberg 1981, 37).

The demand for immigrant labor ensured that most of those who were strong and healthy could meet their basic needs, but the typical immigrant still lived close to the margins of viability in the crowded, makeshift slum of a large northern city. As the nineteenth century drew on, crowded tenement slums and shantytowns grew and became more conspicuous. At the same time, the proportion of migrants from northern and western Europe dwindled, as the proportion of newcomers from central, southern, and eastern Europe grew. These newcomers were more rural in their origins, and their language and habits appeared more "foreign" to members of established groups than had that of earlier immigrants. The sheer number of immigrants was growing as well, with nearly 9 million arriving between 1901 and 1910. All of this contributed to increasing fears and suspicions among the established segments of the population, including many who were the offspring of earlier immigrants.

Foreigners were suspected of carrying disease, harboring radical political ideas, and the potential for undermining the existing American culture. They were blamed for the conditions of poverty in which they found themselves and were perceived as "racially" as well as culturally inferior. By 1921 increasingly restrictive legislation, limiting the total number of immigrants and imposing national quotas, had brought the era of large-scale immigration to a close, for the time being. In the meantime, confrontation and conflict among the various groups had crystallized ethnic identities, giving the population of the United States and, in particular, its cities a fragmented, mosaic quality.

It is only partially correct to say that ethnic identity was something that immigrants brought with them from their places of origin. Ethnicity cannot exist in isolation (Jaffe, Cullen, and Boswell 1980, 10–11; Cohen 1974, ix–xi; Cohen 1981, 317–18). That is, this form of group self-awareness comes about as a result of *contact* between two or more groups, and the term *ethnicity* is usually reserved for instances

in which the groups interact within the borders of a common society. For example, "the difference between the Chinese and the Indians, considered within their own respective countries, are national, not ethnic differences. But when groups of Chinese and Indian immigrants interact in a foreign land as Chinese and Indians they can be referred to as ethnic groups" (Cohen 1974, xi). In this sense, ethnicity is not something one carries from home to a strange place, but something one finds in a place where one is culturally different. Ethnicity is thus a product of migration. One exception to this rule occurs where two or more culturally distinct groups remain in place, but find themselves contained within the borders of a single society when borders are redrawn.

The content of the ethnic experience is multifaceted and rooted in recollections and expressions of a common culture. Shared values and beliefs, norms of behavior and taste, a feeling of membership involving shared group memories and loyalties, and a tendency toward endogamy may be among the features of this common culture. All ethnic groups do not share in these characteristics to an equal degree: Intensity or orthodoxy of belief and practice vary from group to group and within a particular group under different circumstances (Schermerhorn 1978, xiv–xv). The degree of intensity in feelings of attachment also varies among ethnic groups. Or as Cohen (1974, xiv) put it, "There is ethnicity and ethnicity." And just as the degree of ethnic experience varies among and within different ethnic groups over time, it will vary among individuals within those groups as well.

In order to fully understand the ethnic phenomenon, it is useful to consider it from two different perspectives: the objective and the subjective (Ross 1980, 5). The content of ethnic culture and group membership may be established objectively. This objective approach is appropriate for discovering ethnic boundaries and describing ethnic institutions—that is, for the study and understanding of the structure of the *ethnic group*. It cannot, however, yield an understanding of *ethnicity*—which requires a subjective approach in addressing the nature of the experience of ethnic membership. This is because ethnicity is neither a common culture nor a particular history, but, once again, the *experience* and *interpretation* of a particular culture and history. Ethnicity refers to the quality of bondedness among individuals. Milton Gordon (1964, 23–24) endowed this experience with clarity and simplicity. He referred to it as "a shared feeling of peoplehood." In this light, ethnicity may be most usefully seen as a social construction, the meaning of which is subject to an ongoing process of definition and redefinition by group members. This is not to say that individuals may make of their ethnic experience whatever they wish.

> What we must realize is that the patterns of behavior that we call ethnicity are not the products of the idiosyncrasies of individuals, but the collective representations of a group. They are certainly rooted in psychic processes . . . that are subjectively experienced. But the symbolic formations in which they are expressed . . . are social constructions which are impressed on the minds of members through continuous socialization . . . once they are externalized and adopted by a group they become collective and objective, assume an existence of their own, so to speak, and confront the individual from the outside. (Cohen 1981, 322)

In this way, ethnicity first confronts individuals as an external, ongoing fact. But this particular social form is susceptible to reinterpretation and redefinition by

members of the group. That is, ethnicity remains peculiarly open to modification so that its relevance and usefulness can be continuously revised. As will be seen, both the content of ethnicity and the membership of ethnic groups change over time, adding or dropping particular traits or categories of membership in response to changing circumstances. For example, European ways of life suited to agricultural activity and the village scale could not be transplanted intact by immigrants to the industrial cities of North America. Once transplanted, a newly emergent ethnic culture is born and endures as an adaptation. The cultural content of ethnic life is produced from its members' *selective* recollections of life as it was lived at home. Once removed to a foreign place, ethnic culture evolves separately from that of the homeland, as each new generation further modifies its heritage according to what is useful or adaptable from the old beliefs, styles, and customs.

There is disagreement over the long-term consequences of the tendency for each generation to revise the content of its ethnic identity. Some see the continuous adaptation as an inherent feature of the ethnic phenomenon (Ross 1980, 6–7; Cohen 1974, xiv). Others interpret the kinds of ethnic modification observed in the United States, at least with regard to the descendants of the early immigrant waves from Europe, as a gradual weakening of ethnicity. Stein and Hill (1977, 22–23) contrasted the ethnicity associated with the descendants of European immigrants with earlier forms of ethnic solidarity attributable to the immigrant generation itself. They characterized the contemporary version of ethnicity, where people may selectively retain what they like of the old country's culture and discard the rest, as "dime-store ethnicity." Steinberg (1981, 45, 58, 63) wrote similarly of cultural recollections that have grown thin with the passing of older generations and without the infusion of new life that would require continued, substantial immigration. In addition to facing this crisis of authenticity, there is little left of ethnic institutions or organization. Over time, members of ethnic groups *do* very little together. Steinberg believed that the symbolic value of ethnicity was not sufficient to ensure its continuation. In this view, the melting pot thesis is not incorrect, but its anticipation premature, waiting to be borne out in future generations.

Steinberg's (1981, 254–57) conclusion was based in part on his belief that the tradition of ethnic pluralism in America was built on systematic inequalities that existed in the past among various immigrant groups. The argument that a viable ethnicity depends on sustained intergroup inequality and conflict needs close examination. Although intergroup strife is an effective mechanism for reinforcing intragroup cohesiveness, the argument that inequality and conflict are necessary for sustaining ethnic identity and group cohesion appears overly restrictive. Ethnic and minority-majority group processes need to be kept analytically distinct, as cultural and political categories, respectively. If a group has suffered from discrimination in the past but since has become fully assimilated, then it has left behind its minority status. What has happened to the ethnic identity of its membership, on the other hand, remains an open question. The theme of having suffered together through injustice at some point in the past has proven to be one of the most cohesive themes in preserving strong feelings of ethnicity in subsequent generations. Much of an ethnic group's vitality may lie in its past political struggles, but the expression of its ethnicity is a cultural celebration of such themes—which, conceivably, may grow in symbolic importance over generations of retelling.

There is no identifiable point at which an ethnic minority becomes—or is no longer—a minority. Membership in a particular group may gradually take on minority characteristics if the group becomes stigmatized or is made a scapegoat for some social ill that has befallen society. Many immigrant groups entered the United States to find that they were the objects of prejudice and discrimination, if not at first, then as their numbers became conspicuous.

Wirth (1945, 347) devised a definition of minority group that is still useful today: "We may define a minority as a group of people, who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination." The classification is said to be *political* because it focuses on the *power* of one group or category, the majority, to discriminate systematically against members of another group who have been ascribed a subordinate status. This discrimination involves limiting the access of minority members to rewards and opportunities (life chances) that are more freely accessible to non-minority members of a society.

Discrimination is justified by a widespread belief in the inferiority and unworthiness of minority members. Members are perceived more or less to possess certain characteristics, such as laziness, craftiness, dishonesty, or disloyalty, which justify the inferior position and treatment of each person; that is, majority-minority relations are characterized by prejudice, which provides the justification for discrimination. Prejudice is the ideological support that legitimates the maltreatment of minorities. Often in the history of immigration and intergroup relations in the United States, the majority has distinguished itself from an emerging minority by employing the idea that the newcomers were from a separate race; for example, the Irish, Jews, and Italians were all in their turn labeled separate "races," just as Asians and blacks still are today. This particular form of prejudice, and its consequences for the treatment of minorities, is *racism*.

The distinction between ethnic group as a *cultural* category and minority group as a *political* one is important and is simple enough to see in the abstract. Actual immigrant groups, however, tend not to hold still for easy and final classification. Many ethnic groups of European origin in the United States, while they can hardly be regarded today as true minorities, are still the subject of stereotypes and ethnic jokes that reveal in varying measure the existence of prejudicial thinking. In a number of cities, movements have emerged to counter the defamation of particular ethnic groups and to bolster ethnic pride. Such movements, designed to improve the status of the group, are essentially political responses. Many groups that largely escaped the assignment of minority status nevertheless formed ethnic political organizations to advance the solidarity of their memberships. While ethnicity is essentially a cultural phenomenon, ethnic group members have often been political actors.

THE URBAN DIMENSIONS OF IMMIGRATION, ETHNIC PERSISTENCE, AND ASSIMILATION

The study of ethnic groups and the study of the city in North America are bound together in two ways. First, target destinations in every immigration era have largely

been cities. Second, the formation of ethnic identity was mediated by the fact that it took place in large, heterogeneous centers of population. So, in addition to the fact that the ethnic experience manifested itself primarily *in* the city, that experience was altered in many ways by the urban arena, making ethnicity a process *of* the city as well.

During the nineteenth century, there was a pronounced tendency for European immigrant groups to cluster around northeastern seaport cities. For those who ventured inland, it was most typically via chain migration directly to the large industrial cities of the Midwest, where work was known to be available (Cafferty et al. 1983, 68). By 1870, although immigration had added less than 15 percent to the size of the U.S. population, the foreign-born population of the fifty largest cities taken together was 34 percent (Klebanow, Jonas, and Leonard 1977, 76). The foreign-born population of St. Louis was 60 percent, of Chicago 50 percent, of New York 48 percent, and of Boston 36 percent (Still 1974, 118–19). By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, immigrant settlement had established a "great urban triangle" stretching from Boston to St. Louis to Washington, D.C., within which 80 percent of those who had emigrated from central, southern, and eastern Europe lived (Cafferty et al. 1983, 47).

Life in the city helped to shape the nature of the ethnic experience. Ethnicity is, of course, not confined to the city, but the diversity of an urban population makes it particularly evident there. In the United States, just as the ethnic experience was molded by the city, particular social qualities of the cities were molded by the large number of immigrants who had come together in them. In the nineteenth century "vast armies of clergymen, policemen, sanitation workers, teachers and social reformers were recruited to serve the immigrant neighborhoods bursting at the seams with people and problems. The size and complexity of government increased, especially at the municipal and county levels, as the crush of population propelled government into new roles and redefined old ones. Public servants became stewards of the American way as they frantically tried to force newcomers to adjust themselves to America rather than vice versa" (Kraut 1982, 180). This arm's length regard of the influence of foreigners persisted through the twentieth century in response to each new wave of immigration: But even as Latino, Caribbean, and Asian immigrants were eyed suspiciously, "othered" in the popular media and popular mind in the United States, they transformed the meaning and content of American popular culture (Rubin and Melnick 2007).

For most nineteenth- and early twentieth-century immigrants, the primary problem of adjustment was the transition from a rural to an urban way of life, rather than from a European to an American culture. Rural Italians, for example, probably would have faced similar problems of adjustment whether moving to a large city in the United States or in Italy (Nelli 1970, 20). The condition in which the immigrants found themselves was what Handlin ([1951] 1973) characterized as having been uprooted from a familiar social and cultural environment and thrust into an uncertain and precarious struggle for survival without the familiar support of the old community. Under these circumstances, the solidarity of ethnicity was a refuge against having to face the enormous uncertainties of a new life alone far from home. Common ethnic membership provided such modest practical advantages as favored access to particular lines of work (not lucrative occupations for the most part, but work, nevertheless), a dependable clientele of co-ethnics for small entrepreneurs,

or a reciprocal system of support and patronage for local political figures and their constituents (Hannerz 1974, 48–57). Competitive, face-to-face interaction among members of different ethnic groups in the city typically had the effect of crystallizing ethnic identities and elevating group awareness (McRoberts 1980, 243–48).

That the urban environment proved to be a mechanism of solidarity should not be surprising if we recall Fischer's (1975, 1984) subcultural theory of urbanism discussed in chapter 4. His theory is especially applicable to ethnic cohesiveness in the city. First of all, critical mass ensures that a large enough pool of co-ethnics exists to support a full range of common cultural institutions—churches, newspapers, stores, clubs, political organizations—which, in turn, help sustain ethnic identity. In addition, the larger the city, the more likely that friction will occur between ethnic groups. These groups will be more in number, well supported, and therefore mutually visible; and this will result in a stronger identification within each group. In short, we expect to find built-in supports for ethnicity in the urban arena. At the same time, however, the arena contains certain agents devoted to the reduction of cultural differences: For the immigrant, a tension exists between the forces of acculturation and the forces of ethnic cohesion.

The Elastic Qualities of Ethnicity

Ethnicity emerges and endures because people find it a useful or meaningful category of membership. In the culturally alien and heterogeneous U.S. city of the 1800s and early 1900s, immigrants naturally came to identify with others with whom they felt special ties of origin. In the process it was necessary to unlearn common identities that had defined group boundaries in the Old World: These proved unworkably narrow under the changed circumstances of immigration, urbanization, and a world of redrawn geopolitical borders. Handlin ([1951] 1973, 8) wrote that at first immigrants began stories of themselves by telling of the village from which they had come. It was a concrete place that could be remembered in each of its social and physical details, a place one could belong to. It was the village, county, or province of origin upon which a common sense of belonging was first founded. For example, in addition to distinguishing themselves as northerners and southerners, Italians initially distinguished themselves more precisely as *paesani*, people who came from a common locality. This was their allegiance and the bounds of their ethnicity as they left for America, an allegiance that needed to be expanded once they arrived:

> [When Tuscan immigrant Charles Fornesi was told] about the opportunities which were available for an industrious man in Seneca Falls, New York, he made up his mind to go there to seek his fortune. Fornesi became a pioneer, the first Italian to settle in Seneca Falls. To succeed, however, Fornesi needed help from his fellow Tuscans. He wrote to his relatives and friends in Licciana Nardi [his homeplace] and its nearby villages, inviting them to join him. Many came. Fornesi prospered by opening a bank and a grocery store which served his Tuscan neighbors.
>
> Sometime later, Benny Colella, an immigrant from Naples, came by mistake to Seneca Falls. Impressed with the possibilities he saw there, he urged his friends to join him. Immigrants from five or six towns near Naples established the community of Rumseyville in Seneca Falls, a neighborhood which for years remained isolated from the Tuscans living on the South Side. Colella and Fornesi established Neapolitan and



Immigrants arriving in the United States during the early period of large-scale immigration, like these at Ellis Island, would struggle to preserve identities attached to their place of origin—but they would discover a new ethnic identity in the new country. Portraits of immigrants at Ellis Island, New York. Lewis Wickes Hine (1874–1940), photographer. Used by permission of the New York Public Library

> Tuscan colonies, groupings of men and women who in their wildest dreams would never have imagined that, by early twentieth century, they would identify themselves primarily as Italian-Americans. (Iorizzo and Mondello 1980, 101)

In this sense, ethnic boundaries come to enclose "discovered identities, . . . the discovery by a group of people that they constitute a category in the minds of others that has not previously existed in their own system of classification of groups in society, or that they have not previously recognized as including themselves" (Cornell 2000, 98). In other words, the receiving or host culture has a powerful role in determining who one's co-ethnics are, and this is usually a broader category of membership than new immigrants are used to.

The ethnic categories so recognizable today in the United States were largely created after the immigrants had arrived. As Handlin ([1951] 1973, 166–67) pointed out, these ethnic categories referred to national states not yet created or just coming to be at the time of immigration. It was only "much later, in deceptive retrospect, a man might tell his son, '*Why, we were Poles and we stayed that way*'—or Italians, or Irish or German or Czechoslovaks." The need for broadened ethnic referents emerged in the New World where local and regional differences shrank into insignificance when confronted with the vast otherness of the whole urban immigrant population. Handlin relates one instance that, although it refers to a town only in its infancy, illustrates the demand for expanded categories of ethnic membership.

> In 1837 there was a falling-out among the men planting a new settlement in Illinois. One faction wished the name of the new township to be Westphalia, another, Hanover, each for its own native land. The compromise was significant—Germantown; the language took them all in. (Handlin [1951] 1973, 167)

National origin and common language were new ethnic categories that identified a much broader sense of belonging than had existed in the homeplace of the immigrants.

This expansion of ethnic membership, mediated by the perception of outsiders, has the capacity to create categories of inclusion even broader than nation of origin. "Pan-ethnic" identities emerge when previously distinctive membership groups, gathered together on distant shores, are effectively given a common label—such as African, Asian, Hispanic, or Scandinavian—that refers to an entire region of the globe comprised of more than a single nation (Cornell 1999, 99; Skardal 1974, 4). The existence of pan-ethnic designations underlines the importance of outsiders in the negotiation of the content and scope of ethnic peoplehood. A people might protest the assignment of a broader category of membership—the members experiencing themselves as more authentically Korean or Korean American rather than Asian American, for example. However, the perceptions and sentiments of the host society toward the pan-ethnic category are also strongly felt, and in this situation the identity in question becomes a source of struggle between insider and outsider. In that struggle, overt acts of aggression or discrimination by the social majority directed against members of any of the subgroups in a particular pan-ethnic category is likely to result in a strengthening of pan-ethnic ties within that category, as members come to perceive themselves as a belonging to a common "community of fate" (Okamoto 2003, 834).

Interethnic Hostility

Upon arrival in America many of the larger pools of immigrants were subject to prejudice and discrimination. German and Irish Catholics were the objects of ridicule and violence in the 1830s and 1840s. Anti-Catholicism smoldered until the 1880s when it flared anew with the influx of greater numbers of eastern and southern Europeans. (The eastern European influx generated a similar increase in anti-Semitism.) During the 1880s, Italian immigrants were commonly subject to especially harsh treatment by major newspapers that attacked them for suspected radical political and criminal tendencies, as well as blamed them for their impoverished condition. The Italian-language press fought back with a single voice, creating a focus for Italian American pride and identity (Nelli 1970, 11–12; Iorizzo and Mondello 1980, 79–80).

Dinnerston, Nichols, and Raimers (1979, 236) suggested that under such conditions of prejudice and discrimination it could be expected that a forging of an interethnic solidarity might have taken place among the different groups facing a common plight; but, as these authors observed, such a coalition did not emerge. Instead, each newly arrived group tended to displace the previous newly arrived group at the bottom of a hierarchy of interethnic domination. For example, in the late nineteenth century in Lowell, Massachusetts, the Irish continued to struggle

against anti-Irish, anti-Catholic sentiment and were only gradually establishing for themselves a position of relative economic security. Their eventual modest ascent within the working class was assisted by the arrival of a number of French Canadians, who were treated by the Irish in the manner to which the Irish, themselves, had grown accustomed as new immigrants. The French Canadians, in turn, reportedly transferred their subordinate position to the more recently arrived Italians. The bottom of the ladder in Lowell by the 1970s was occupied by Latinos (Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and other Latin Americans) who endured the position reserved for the newcomer (Kolack 1980, 341–43).

Interethnic hostility was the dominant feature of intergroup relations. In some cases, it was brought about by economic or occupational competition among ethnic groups. In other cases, antagonisms had been carried with the immigrants from the Old World, or hostility simply may have resulted from the venting of frustrations by groups low in the social hierarchy on the only other groups socially available to receive them (Dinnerston, Nichols, and Raimers 1979, 236–38). The lines of conflict were drawn among Hungarians, Swedes, Italians, Irish, Greeks, Turks, Slavs, Finns, French, Germans, Poles, Syrians, Czechs, and Jews.

Vestiges of these rivalries, which found their most violent expression in the large cities, have remained a part of the ethnic legacy. Some analysts of ethnicity claim that there is an inherent chauvinism and social divisiveness in this form of group solidarity (Patterson 1977). Undoubtedly, the initial usefulness of ethnicity as a shield and a weapon for protecting or gaining a favorable position at the cost of other groups has left its mark on the ethnic experience and interethnic relationships.

Ethnic Culture: Survival or Hybrid?

However, the ethnic participation of the descendants of European immigrants today is not a response to ethnic conflict so much as it is a desire to preserve or recapture ties to cultural traditions perceived as worthwhile in their own right. These long-preserved or recaptured ethnicities tend to be cultures distinct unto themselves, likely to reflect, in the former case, a historical anachronism, and in the latter case, something that would likely prove only vaguely familiar to the original, immigrant generation. In the case of *preserved* ethnicity, what we have is an idealization and romanticism, handed down from generation to generation from an early era of widespread immigration. Thus, when a group of Scottish Americans traveled to Scotland for the International Gathering of the Clans, they were met with ridicule by the native Scots for creating a spectacle with their bagpipes and kilts and also for associating with descendants of wealthy clan chiefs whose ancestors had driven the ancestors of the visitors from Scotland (Steinberg 1981, 62). In another instance, the arrival of a large number of displaced Polish immigrants under special legislation after World War II led to a similar disillusionment among Polish Americans. The newcomers, who reflected the changes that had taken place in Poland during the decades since the first wave of Poles had arrived in the United States, saw surviving members of the earlier immigration and their descendants as ignorant of Polish culture and history and criticized their archaic, Americanized language (Lopata

1976, 26–27). Similarly, in 1980 Tsai (329–37) described an enduring split among Chinese Americans, who were divided into the descendants of the early Chinese immigrants living mainly in the Chinatowns of large cities and those more recently arrived (since World War II) who were disproportionately better educated, more affluent, and whose settlement in the United States was widely scattered and suburban. Tsai reported that the latter group had little social contact with the former, although they found Chinatown convenient for shopping and services. The more recent immigrants looked down on those who lived there, however, as knowing little of genuine Chinese culture and as being backward. This simple division of Chinese American ethnicity underwent complications in New York and other U.S. cities as Britain turned Hong Kong over to the Chinese in 1997. The reversion led to the exodus of people and capital, and New York City's Chinatown district became a favorite destination for both. The most recent Chinese immigrants chose, primarily for business reasons, to live in the old or develop new ethnic enclaves. The answer to the question of "What is the loci authentic Chinese culture?" became more elusive as lower Manhattan's Chinatown became second in size to New York City's new center of Chinese concentration in Flushing, Queens. The new Chinese American cultural and population center is not homogeneously Chinese, and it incorporates a diversity of Asians as well as other recently immigrant groups (*New York Times* July 23, 2006). The area's emergent expression of "ethnicity" is bound to have a uniquely blended character.

Each of these examples reveals something important about the qualities of preserved ethnicity. First, it is a cultural form in relative isolation where, by definition, emphasis is on the conservation of the old ways. The culture upon which it was originally based will have continued to change. The transplanted ethnic version will continue its adaptation, imperceptible to its participants, in its foreign surroundings. In this sense, preserved ethnicity becomes increasingly anachronistic as an evolving culture complex unique to its own locale. Second, a lengthy interruption (a matter of decades) in the flow of immigration, causing nominal co-ethnics to arrive in two or more distinct waves, will probably result in a disparity in the cultural content of ethnicity among the different waves. This is likely to be reflected in some strain between the groups regarding claims of authenticity of cultural practices.

It is the case, then, that what appears to be a straightforward and homogeneous cultural grouping from the outside is often seen by insiders as containing serious divisions. Another source of division occurs when some members reject accepted cultural definitions and styles and adopt new ones in their place—an attempt to *recapture* the relevance of ethnic identity.

Hamill ([1972] 1977, 290–99) presented an insider's account in which he distinguished between the content of "old" Irish and "new" Irish ethnicity in the United States. It was an account by one deeply alienated from sentimental and ritualistic Saint Patrick's Day expressions of Irish American identity. In the 1970s, the conflict in Northern Ireland provoked, among many younger Irish Americans, a new interest in history, politics, and culture that had little in common with the carefully preserved *old* Irish ethnicity, proud of its hard-won rise to economic security and social acceptance. According to Hamill, the *new* Irish gained their sense of belonging from an intellectual tradition rooted in urban America, in universities and literatures sensitive to political and historical themes. The new Irish ethnicity

is a product of the city. It was "New York . . . which was the native place, the place of beginnings, the place that served for us the same function that Ireland served for our parents" (Hamill [1972] 1977, 296). In this case it was particularly evident that the content of ethnic experience was not simply a survival: The new Irish ethnicity was an urban hybrid, the result of the demand that ethnic experience be relevant as well as authentic. Hamill reworked the meaning of his ethnicity until he was able, as he put it, to once again march in the Saint Patrick's Day Parade without embarrassment. He knew that many of those marching alongside him were not marching with him. Of course, this made their experience neither less genuine nor less authentic.

Urban Ethnic Enclaves

The ethnic heterogeneity of growing U.S. cities was accentuated by the formation of residential enclaves of people from the same ethnic group who gathered in particular areas of the city. Necessity dictated that immigrants sought out the lowest-cost housing in areas of the city where their particular group was not barred or discouraged from locating. Most often, enclave patterns were produced by both voluntary and proscriptive factors. The dramatic increase in the immigration of Jews from eastern Europe in the 1880s resulted in the establishment of ghettos in major cities. These may be seen as "voluntary ghettos," efforts by people largely from rural backgrounds to reproduce the familiar *shtetl* (community) of the Old Country (Plesur 1982, 4–5). At the same time, it has been said of these immigrant settlements that "the American ghetto was from its inception a combined product of communal assistance and societal denial" (Rose 1969, 5). That is, the "choice" was reinforced by the perceived hostility of other groups toward the expanding Jewish population. The residential enclave offered refuge from more than the uncertainties of the strange urban way of life.

Each ethnic group's membership sorted itself roughly into distinct neighborhoods; sometimes there were micro divisions where ethnic division was by individual tenements. While these ethnic enclaves allowed the immigrants and their children to exist in a capsule of familiar (though not unchanged) culture, ethnic neighborhoods also provided a comforting home base for a more gradual adaptation to American society.

> In his neighborhood, the immigrant found those who understood his native tongue and, perhaps, even his dialect. There he could purchase familiar foods, prepared in traditional fashion, from merchants who might even haggle over the price or sell the merchandise in amounts small enough to fit every budget. In the neighborhood of an American city, an immigrant might find that group taboos and traditional codes of personal behavior derived from old world experience and wisdom all continued to have relevance. (Kraut 1982, 117–18)

In this way the immigrant appears to be enveloped in a protective cultural cocoon, able almost completely to avoid contact with the outside. If the group was large and the opportunities offered within it ample enough, it would be possible to avoid the social and economic barriers imposed by not knowing English. The immigrant's native tongue could be employed both at work and after.

Interaction across ethnic boundaries can be hazardous, and it is easy to imagine people from different cultural backgrounds engaging in behaviors that are mutually perceived as inappropriate, leading to confusion and animosity between parties. Rules and expectations vary. An expected small commission may be regarded as bribery; family loyalty carried out as a matter of obligation is nepotism or clannishness; and expectations regarding assertiveness and extroversion vary across cultures, just as they do with regard to what constitutes being on time. Expectations also vary with regard to the giving and accepting of gifts and the etiquette of business transactions, including how close interacting persons may stand to one another, what they should do with their eyes during interaction, and if and how they may touch one another. All of these expectations indicate important norms that often vary dramatically from one culture to another (Argyle 1982, 64–72). For example, gestures that one communicator may assume conveys a message of goodwill, like a hand raised in greeting or the thumbs-up sign, may be interpreted with great offense by another (Collett 1982, 85).

In addition to unintended insults that pass between ethnic groups, the intended ones are also a means of maintaining group boundaries. Allen (1983, 15), in his study of the language of ethnic conflict, observed that one means of maintaining ethnic solidarity against the pressures of assimilation was through ethnic name-calling, making pejorative or invidious distinctions between one's own group and all others. Ethnic slurs are "labels for negative reference groups; they are a device by which people know who they are not and thereby who they are." The cultural mix of the urban setting provides ample opportunity for misunderstanding and abuse, and the ethnic enclave provides a safe and familiar haven from them.

If ethnic neighborhoods were important and useful during the immigrant phase of settlement, what happens to them in the future, after generations of settlement? Research in the New York metropolitan region (Alba, Logan, and Crowder 1997) demonstrates that (1) some inner-city ethnic neighborhoods are transformed as new waves of immigrants take over older neighborhoods and give them a new ethnic identity (as Levine and Harmon [1992] found in the Dorchester-Roxbury-Mattapan area of Boston, discussed in chapter 4); (2) some older ethnic neighborhoods maintain their ethnic heritage, including the daily use of the mother tongue, for generations beyond the immigrant one; and (3) ethnic concentrations, somewhat culturally diluted, may move to the suburbs with the upwardly mobile descendants of immigrant groups. In a comparison of ethnic persistence among three European American cultures, it was found that Italians were most likely to maintain patterns of clustered residences and ethnic culture, both in the old urban and new suburban locations, the Germans least likely, and the Irish somewhere in-between. While each step away from the old inner-city neighborhood is associated with a weakening of ethnic clustering and cultural affinity, "Nevertheless, it seems beyond question that white ethnic neighborhoods, especially Italian ones, will continue to be prominent in the region for the foreseeable future" (908). However, in favor of the assimilationist view of the potential *weakening* of ethnic identity, the authors add that a continued thinning out of the availability of co-ethnics in the region can only lead to a decline of ethnic identity and culture, as Italians (especially) and other relatively concentrated groups disperse to other areas of the country. "This point underscores the critical function of ethnic neighborhoods in

maintaining forms of ethnicity that are more than private, beyond what can be transmitted by the family alone, and points up the larger significance of spatial assimilation in a region where ethnicity has flourished to a degree unsurpassed in the nation" (909).

Placemark 5.1—New Immigrants Remaking Ethnic Enclaves in New York

New York was receiving 105,000 new immigrants a year in the 1990s. The new sources of immigration transformed the city: Neighborhoods were changed dramatically by the continued tendency for immigrants to form residential clusters. Census Bureau estimates for 2006 listed the 378,000 Dominicans as the largest of all immigrant groups in a population of 3 million foreign-born: The next five largest immigrant populations were from China (303,000), Jamaica (175,000), Mexico (170,000), Guyana (143,000), and Ecuador (129,000). In all there were thirty-three sending-nations that contributed at least 20,000 people to New York's immigrant population: These included several countries that had been the source of significant immigrant streams in the 1800s and early twentieth century (Russia, Italy, Ukraine, Poland, Greece, United Kingdom, and Germany).



Ethnic neighborhoods have always enriched U.S. urban life, and today new ethnic areas are emerging in many cities. This area in Queens, New York, may be dominated by Asian shops, but the population is quite diverse. © Marcus Reidenberg

Immigrants were scattered in clusters throughout the city's five boroughs, giving neighborhoods in which they settled a distinctive cultural twist. Most Dominicans gravitated to Upper Manhattan or the West Bronx. Chinese immigrants that did not settle in Manhattan's expanding Chinatown founded new neighborhoods like the large enclave in Flushing, Queens. Jamaicans and others from the Caribbean lent an Afro-Caribbean atmosphere to sections of the North Bronx, Central Brooklyn, Southeast Queens, and many areas of the city were transformed by new concentrations of Latinos (roughly a million), Koreans (69,000), South Asians (75,000 Indians, 49,000 Bangladeshis, 40,000 Pakistanis), and Russians (70,000).

The new immigrants provide an interesting perspective on ethnic enclaves. As the intensity of residential clustering of immigrant waves from early in the twentieth century subsides—as the cultural stamp of German, Irish, Polish, and Italian neighborhoods fades—new ethnic subcultural flavors emerge—often in the same old neighborhoods. Yet, the dynamism of ethnic neighborhood formation in the city is not so simple as old European American neighborhoods being replaced by a set of new American immigrant neighborhoods. As the immigrant population of New York City continues to grow, rising housing costs are driving some of the new New Yorkers to explore the relatively less expensive cost of living on Staten Island. Many of Staten Island's newcomers were from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. But among them were Poles, many "emigrating" from nearby Brooklyn, but as many as 10,000 were recent immigrants from Poland (in 2006 there were a total of 60,000 Polish immigrants living in the five boroughs of New York). As their numbers grew so did the Polish American influence in Staten Island, and since 2000 the new Polish American enclave has been leaving its mark on what is an increasingly diverse island culture, hosting its own Polish Festival, sponsoring increasing numbers of Polish language classes, expanded Pulaski Day celebrations, and the Miss Polonia Beauty Pageant (*New York Times* May 30, 2004).

(Unless otherwise indicated, observations in this placemark were based on Lobo (2005) and New York City Department of Planning (2004). Population estimates are from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2006 American Community Survey).

The Rivalry Over Peoplehood in Immigrant America

One of the great secondary themes in the history of immigration to North America involves the struggle between immigrants' loyalties to their native culture and the nationalist's insistence that they adapt quickly to that of the host society. The major instruments in this battle for their identity—their sense of peoplehood—have been the institutions that ethnic groups have managed to erect as a means of preserving aspects of their own culture, arrayed against those of the host culture bent upon the Americanization of the foreigner. The major institutional supports erected by immigrants and their descendants have included mutual assistance societies, religious

institutions and parochial schools, and the native-language press. Similarly, the host society's efforts to acculturate the immigrants have been exerted through agencies that provided relief services, public schools, the influence of a religious hierarchy, and attempts to control the foreign-language press.

The most complete set of ethnic institutions can be found in the larger population centers where there are sufficient numbers of co-ethnics to support them. Among the earliest of these institutions to emerge was the mutual assistance society. Handlin ([1951] 1973, 155–56) suggested that these societies grew naturally out of the common practice of "passing the hat" among neighbors and friends for contributions whenever some grave misfortune befell an immigrant family. Personal disasters were so frequent and terrible that the need for a formalized system of mutual insurance became evident, and the mutual assistance society, with membership usually determined by ethnic affiliation, was born. The services supplied by the societies expanded quickly—covering the needs of members from "cradle to grave"—and included orphanages, lobbying efforts on behalf of the ethnic group and the homeland, and savings and loan services. Ethnic groups addressed their particular problems through these societies. For example, Polish miners, whose work was considered too risky for them to be sold life insurance, were offered coverage through their society; Jews, treated unfairly by employment service practices, set up their own employment agency and vocational school; and Polish printers and German bakers also developed specialized employment services (Cafferty et al. 1983, 69–70). Beyond the immigrants' material needs, mutual assistance societies also provided moral support, giving advice on the practical problems of living in the United States and helping to combat feelings of loneliness and alienation. One especially important service offered to immigrants was peace of mind in the knowledge that when they died they would be laid to rest with the observation of the rites required by their religion. For both Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews, correct practice included burial in consecrated ground. But whatever the immigrant's religious belief, no one wanted their remains to be relegated to an unmarked grave (Kraut 1982, 132).

Mutual assistance societies lent structure to ethnic identity, providing for the concrete expression of a group's social cohesiveness. Religious institutions added a further, spiritual dimension to these separate identities. Among Roman Catholics, each language group preferred its own clergy to conduct mass and serve congregants in the familiar manner of their native communities. In the 1870s Italians in North Boston, feeling that they could no longer share a church that had come to be controlled by the Portuguese, founded their own church and parish one block away. Anxieties mounted in the new location because, although the Portuguese stayed away, increasing numbers of Irish and southern Italians threatened the homogeneity of the parish—the founders of which were mainly Genoese (DeMarco 1981, 48–49). These ethnic religious institutions were strong vehicles of cohesion and identity. And where the Catholic Church (as well as other religious organizations) was a means of support for immigrant parishioners over a century ago, it is the new immigrant wave, especially Latinos, but also East Asians and Europeans, who are lending new life to urban Catholic parishes that had been facing declining memberships in the twentieth century (Pew Forum 2008).

Agents of Americanization

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the foreign-born were besieged by Americanization agents and programs. The general antipathy toward foreigners grew into anger and fear as their numbers and visibility in the cities grew. Both religious and secular movements to assist the urban poor aimed at their cultural adaptation as well. The Catholic hierarchy, generally unsympathetic to the ethnic divisions at the parish level, often provided assistance to parishes contingent upon local policies of Americanization (Kraut 1982, 121). However, the apparent fragmentation of the Catholic Church into several independent ethnic units, which in some quarters gave rise to concern over the ultimate unity of the church, actually worked as a safety valve (Dolan 1975, 93). It did so by avoiding the confrontation of antagonistic groups over the issue of religious practice, thereby preventing the splintering of religious factions and preserving the integrity of the church. Ethnic churches also acted as socializing and stabilizing influences on Catholic immigrants, providing them with a continuity of familiar beliefs and values. Through its charities, the church provided some relief from the conditions of poverty and cushioned the immigrants' adaptation to life in a new country. In the long run, as Henry Steele Commager recognized, "The Catholic Church was, during this period, one of the most effective of all agencies for . . . Americanization" (Ellis [1956] 1969,104–5). Like the residential enclave of which it was a part, the ethnic Catholic parish was, through its cushioning and stabilizing influence, actually a subtle agent of adaptation and, ultimately, of acculturation.

Religious and other private organizations increasingly competed directly with mutual assistance societies in the provision of aid to the immigrant poor. The settlement house movement, founded by social reformers like Jane Addams, who chartered Hull House in Chicago, demonstrated an appreciation of the immigrant's customs and skills and recognized the need for assimilation to proceed at a pace that was not destructive to family and social life (Gordon 1964, 137–38). Yet the goal of the movement was to prepare immigrants for improving their condition, and this meant assimilation. Many "lineage societies," like the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Society of Colonial Dames, designed educational programs for the Americanization of immigrants (Gordon 1964, 99, 137–38). The Protestant Social Gospel movement's motive for ushering immigrants through the initial material crises of settlement was to ensure that the process of Americanization would not be arrested (Kraut 1982, 127).

Another urban institution that devoted a good deal of effort to immigrant adaptation was the party political machine. These were permanent political organizations that coordinated the nomination and election of government officials through the systematic distribution of patronage in exchange for support at election time. An outstanding example was the protracted domination of Tammany Hall over New York City politics, and most prominent in its long succession of leaders was William Marcy "Boss" Tweed, who, in the tradition of political machine bosses, became rich through illegal dealings. The machine's interest in immigrants lay in their desperate condition and the potential votes they represented: For small gifts of material aid, legal help, or a note of introduction to an employer, an immigrant's gratitude could be drawn on at the polls for years to come. Control over voter registration

procedures meant that immigrants would be made "into voting citizens so fast that their heads whirled" (Moscow 1971, 24). Although the machine did undeniable harm in subverting the electoral process and corrupting political leadership, it had its positive aspects from the immigrants' point of view.

> The boss system took the immigrant . . . and made him an American citizen. It found him a place to live, kissed his babies, entertained his whole family on the district club's annual boat ride, picnic, or clambake, which was the event of the year in a lower-class society of limited pleasures. . . . The boss system made money for the boss and for the party organization, but it also made life more bearable for a lot of little people who had no access otherwise to government, who knew of its operations only through their contacts with the machine. (Moscow 1971, 10)

The machine eventually fell victim to restricted immigration (as well as political reforms that made it more difficult to control elections and distribute patronage), which dried up its compliant constituency. As immigrants became more independent and secure economically and as they were replaced by their more educated and affluent offspring, the machine lost its political leverage, its power to control votes.

By the beginning of World War I, various agencies of the federal government turned their attention toward Americanizing the foreign-born urban population in response to hysterical popular concerns over national loyalty: "100 percent Americanism" had become the cry of the hour. In 1915, Woodrow Wilson declared to a gathering of naturalized citizens in Philadelphia that "a man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American" (Gordon 1964, 100–101). The gradual increase in government public assistance programs, unemployment insurance, and social security meant that mutual assistance societies had served their purpose and were becoming redundant. Ethnic associations functioned more and more as vehicles for simple sociability and symbolism among European immigrants and their descendants.

In the public schools, foreign culture and history were largely neglected in favor of American studies. Concerned parents and grandparents worked in both city and rural communities to preserve instruction in the native tongue, either through permission to employ it as the primary medium of instruction in the public schools or to teach it in the parochial schools. Yet the culturally leveling effect of language and the cultural and historical emphasis of the curriculum was an irresistible Americanizing force.

The general condemnation of foreign habits and culture was influenced by the American press, which missed no opportunity to cater to the prejudices of its readership through stereotypes and caricatures. More surprising was the fact that the foreign-language press eventually joined in, criticizing what it saw as maladaptive traits and endorsing the goals of Americanization. Originally Italian American papers focused on local news stories from various immigrant points of origin in Italy; but by early in the twentieth century, these papers featured American as well as Italian news, ran articles on American historic and patriotic themes, and had become enthusiastic supporters of American culture and Americanization (Iorizzo and Mondello 1980, 116–17). Furthermore, Italian-language papers urged immigrants to adopt habits that would not make them conspicuously foreign to others (Nelli 1970, 168).

Thus, the foreign-language press, which could have continued as a formidable agent in the preservation of ethnic culture, was instead an ambivalent force. While it spoke to its readers in their native language, its message was of acculturation. There is evidence, however, that editorial policy may have been coerced in many instances. In his work on the rise of advertising and consumerism in America, Stuart Ewen (1976, 63–64) asserted that the directors of the American Association of Foreign Language Newspapers, through their control over the advertising patronage of large companies, could manipulate editorial messages of the economically struggling foreign-language papers. Robert Park, who was a close student of the foreign-language press, commented that the director of the association had the power to "make or break" a publisher. The avowed goal of the association was the Americanization of immigrants; its strategy was to require the publication of editorials and news stories that it supplied. Its philosophy, in the words of one of its directors, was:

> National advertising is the great Americanizer.
>
> American ideals and institutions, law, order and prosperity have not yet been sold to all of our immigrants.
>
> American products and standards of living have not yet been bought by the foreign born in America. . . .
>
> If Americans want to combine business and patriotism, they should advertise products, industry, and American institutions in the American Foreign Language press. (Ewen 1976, 64)

The question of the outcome of the tug-of-war between the forces of Americanization and those supporting old-country ethnicities can never be answered with any finality: The answer is always unfolding as people's sense of peoplehood changes. Events around the world, in Poland or Northern Ireland, for example, continue to stir a sense of identity among long-settled groups. Other events generate new emigrations from such places as Afghanistan, Central America, and Southeast Asia. The more settled segments of the population of the United States still harbor, at various levels, old European, Asian, and other ties. Some, like Steinberg, expect these ties to continue to fade, to wash out in the massive movement to middle-class status and the suburbs. Others worry about the "meltability" of new immigrant ethnic groups. Such a concern has generated the current xenophobic and nativistic sympathies at state and national levels for the passage of laws making English the official language. These concerns seem timely and insightful only to those who fail to recognize that they represent a long tradition of fear of outsiders in the great melting pot.

Everyone an Ethnic

Whenever the "survival of ethnicity" is discussed, ancestral origin is the inevitable frame of reference. This is a static and limiting perspective, however. Given this approach, some people are ethnics and some are not. Alternatively, it may be argued that given the appropriate circumstances, we are all ethnics; and perhaps these hidden or latent group identities have nothing to do with ties to a foreign culture.

In the preceding section, the struggle discussed was not one between ethnic identity and no identity, but between competing peoplehoods. In this struggle, the less one remained culturally tied to the homeland, the more one became culturally tied to the new land. In this light, it is inappropriate to speak of one who is a product of generations that have grown progressively remote from a foreign ancestral home as having lost ethnic identity. Abramson (1973, 9) put it somewhat differently when he said, "The idea of ethnicity as a deviant to Anglo-American norms leads to a confusion that everybody is 'ethnic' in the United States except those with Anglo Saxon Protestant background. This of course is absurd. . . . White Americans, with Anglo Saxon Protestant background have their own national and regional ethnicity."

Americans who travel and live abroad are regularly confronted with their "Americanness" and experience the awakening of a feeling of belonging—an American ethnicity. People who move regionally within the United States—for example, from the Northeast to the Sunbelt—commonly share a sense of special ties to other people they meet from their "home" region. In large Sunbelt cities like Houston, there are social clubs formed by northerners based on home-state origins. Sunbelt natives themselves are less likely to be so particular in assigning "ethnic" memberships and may react to all newcomers categorically as "Yankees." Migrants from rural Appalachia to northern industrial cities face stereotypes and prejudices keyed to their area of origin, and it has been suggested that it may be useful sociologically to consider them an ethnic group (Obermiller 1981; Philliber 1981, 11–20). Everyone is prepared to fill in the blanks when it comes to stereotyping the midwesterner or southerner, or still more narrowly the San Franciscan or New Yorker. We are reluctant to label the facts and fictions of regional differences as "ethnic" because of a century of melting pot ideology and because ethnicity is a sense of belonging that we associate with international differences. However, we know that ethnicity is a matter of being confronted with one's own special sense of cultural attachment to a group. In Albany, a New Yorker is likely to be a New Yorker; in Houston, a Yankee; and in London, an American—of course, in all instances the person in question also may be, in varying degrees, a Polish Catholic.

THE URBAN ARENA AND THE FORMATION OF MINORITY GROUPS

For as long as the United States and its cities have been the target of immigration, onlookers have never lost the capacity to agonize over the assimilability of the most recent arrivals. Always, there have been new categories of people establishing distinctive urban enclaves, perceived as culturally or racially more distant than the by-then settled old immigrant groups. Over the course of the twentieth century they included rural blacks migrating from the South; Mexicans and Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, displaced Cubans and people from elsewhere in the Caribbean and Latin America, new Asian, South Asian and Pacific immigrants, new waves of Eastern and Central Europeans, and people from the Middle East. The most common feature of all immigrants, new and old, is that they found themselves in the cities of the United States as a result of rational economic choice. What may set the various

groups apart is the degree to which their initial displacement involved an element of political coercion, with those arriving initially as slaves or political refugees representing the extreme instances of forceful displacement.

Population Trends and U.S. Minorities

The U.S. Census Bureau estimates a population of 310 million people for 2010. By 2050 another 130 million will be added to that. Current projections anticipate that an increasing proportion of the growing population will be made up of people of color. Between 2008 and 2050, the white (non-Hispanic) category will grow only slightly, from about 200 million to about 203 million (projections have this category declining slightly in numbers in the 2030s and 2040s). During the same period, the "Hispanic, non-white category will triple, from 47 million to 133 million, and make up 30% of the total population. The African American population will grow from 41 to 66 million, roughly maintaining its proportion of the whole. Asians will increase fro 16 to 41 million, and Native Americans and Pacific Islanders from 7 to 11 million. Those who classify themselves as being of two or more races will increase from 5 to 16 million. A rough estimate projects that sometime in 2042 people of color, a third of the population in 2008, will become a numerical majority (Bernstein and Edwards 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008c).

People of color make up very different fractions of major metropolitan areas in the United States. With notable exceptions, many of the metropolitan populations that include especially large numbers of African Americans are in the South, while a majority of the largest metropolitan areas with large Latino populations continue to be in the West, especially in Texas and California. Asians comprise a large and rapidly growing fraction of the population in many cities, expanding their numbers from West to East. Asian and Pacific Islander concentrations have long been notable in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, New York, and Chicago, but now are expanding rapidly in Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, and Minneapolis. Cities with relatively large numbers of Native Americans include New York, Los Angeles, Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Phoenix, Tucson, Seattle, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and San Diego (U.S. Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract, 2009, Table 21). An increasingly important ethnic minority, especially in East Coast cities, and most especially in New York where its members already numbered about 300,000 by 1990, is made up of people from the non-Spanish-speaking Caribbean. The category includes Haitians and Jamaicans, people who struggle to assert and maintain their distinctive Afro-Caribbean ethnic identities in a land that categorizes them as a part of the larger black minority (Kasinitz 1992).

Although the experience of each of these groups is unique, each has faced the risk of becoming a minority or of intensifying its minority status in the course of its urban resettlement. The degree to which newly immigrant groups are able to avoid minority status appears to be inversely related to their size and visibility in the urban arena. As a general rule, intergroup antagonism and discriminatory treatment are at least partly a product of the relative visibility of the group and the degree to which it is perceived to threaten the living standards of members of the majority. New urban immigrants are especially vulnerable to scapegoating—being blamed for

society's problems—in periods of economic recession. The urbanization of African Americans illustrates the urban aspect of minority group formation.

African American Urbanization

During the twentieth century, the African American population of the United States underwent a rapid transformation from predominantly rural to predominantly urban. The 1890s saw a gradual increase in the rate of migration of southern blacks to the industrial cities of the North. During the next seventy to eighty years, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Michigan, and other northern and mid-Atlantic states, as well as the major cities of California, drew millions of black migrants from the South. World War I marked the beginning of what later came to be called the Great Migration, a response to the dwindling supply of European immigrant labor, the efforts of labor-recruiting agents who had been sent to the South as early as 1915, as well as the technological transformation of agriculture in the South. During the 1920s, the urban black population of the United States increased by 46 percent (compared to an increase of 24 percent in the urban white population). In the austerity of the Depression that followed, rural blacks—typically without title to lands they worked and with a dwindling demand for labor in the rural South—continued with little option to gravitate to the cities. World War II saw the new recruitment of blacks into industry and added impetus to the northward movement. By 1950, almost the same proportion of the black population (62 percent) and the white population (64 percent) was urban, and the greatest concentrations and net gains from migration were in the larger central cities. In the early 1950s, a net out-migration of white population ("white flight") from major central cities began. As of the last full census in 2000 88 percent of African Americans lived in urban areas. While no overall measure is currently available, reports from individual cities (e.g., Boston, New York, Los Angeles) indicate that black populations are decentralizing within major metropolitan regions.

The factors that provided the impetus for the Great Migration are familiar. The imbalance in life chances between the rural South and the urban North provided more than adequate incentive for people to move, but southern racism and the repressive atmosphere it created must also be credited as motivating factors. Contributing to this atmosphere were collective acts of terrorism, including lynchings, and the mistreatment of blacks by law authorities in the South, especially toward the early part of the era. Whatever hardships they might contain, northern areas on the whole had a somewhat better reputation in the area of civil rights reform, reforms that generated white antagonisms in the South. Black women, who served as critical links in the migration chains that linked the regions, were driven as well by the fear of rape by whites in the South and also by the oppressive conditions and fears of abuse within their own poor, rural communities (Hine 1996).

Northern cities were not altogether welcoming social environments for new migrants from the South. From the beginning, northern populations often proved hostile, especially in cities where there was substantial black population growth. Beginning with the eruption of violence against blacks in the post–Civil War era and continuing periodically thereafter, in city after city migrants faced resistance to

their growing presence in the North (Zunz 1982, 373). Chicago, where the black population had grown from 15,000 in 1890 to 50,000 in 1915, was the scene of thirteen days of violence in 1919 that left twenty-eight people dead. While industries demanded more workers during World War II, city administrations failed to consider the pressures that would be brought by the growing numbers of black, migrant job seekers, and, as a result, especially serious episodes of racial violence occurred in Harlem, Los Angeles, and Detroit (Johnson and Campbell 1981). Urban riots, or short-lived uprisings, occurred frequently in the 1960s and early 1970s and have flared sporadically since then. Abu-Lughod (2007) has carefully explained the importance of understanding local histories as well as the society-wide structural inequalities in order to appreciate the roots of individual riots, and she describes a historical transition in the form of the disturbances (16–31). From the post–Civil War era through the early twentieth century, riots were largely attacks by white mobs on black residential areas. The underlying causes that produced the attacks were the intention of white residents to restrict black access to residences and jobs. Gradually the "border wars," particularly characteristic of clashes in Detroit and Chicago, gave way to protests featuring the destruction of white-owned property, a shift led by New York City where the African American community had been organizing as a political force since the 1920s. In these "ghetto revolt" riots, violence occurred primarily within poor black areas. In the 1960s they grew out of the rising expectations of the civil rights era and the failure of governments to put in place effective measures to provide opportunity and reduce poverty in ghettos that were increasingly isolated from the rest of society. The assassination of the champion of the civil rights movement, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, set off a series of destructive riots in cities throughout the United States.

Historically it may be said that African Americans who came in large numbers to the cities faced similar problems and prejudices to those encountered at first by European and Asian immigrants several decades earlier. However, although the experiences were similar, they were hardly equivalent; blacks faced greater obstacles to mobility and assimilation. Over time, residential segregation in the city became more pronounced, and blacks and whites, increasingly isolated from one another, traveled in segregated social worlds. In the South before 1954, the separation of races was mandated by laws that provided for segregated facilities for blacks and whites. In the North, segregation was the result of illegal but effective efforts on the part of the dominant majority to physically isolate the growing black minority.

European groups who were subject to discrimination were generally able, after a generation or two, to shake off the stigma of "race" that originally had distinguished them. Would-be discriminators would have found it difficult to effectively track "racial" distinctions based on physical features among the various European groups. But, as Lieberson (1980, 365) pointed out, this lack-of-distinction explanation of why prejudice and discrimination endured for some groups and not for others does not hold up in every case. For example, it doesn't explain why Chinese and Japanese Americans were able to modify substantially their minority status after rocky beginnings in the United States, while black Americans remained stigmatized. Lieberson raised the question of what it was that caused prejudice and discrimination against black Americans to persist. He believed the answer had to do with numbers and, in the case of blacks, urbanization.

Lieberson (1980, 368) observed that the Chinese and Japanese were subject to savage treatment in the areas where they were highly concentrated early in their history as immigrants. However, in response to the prevailing negative dispositions toward them among European Americans, their immigration was effectively brought to an end through modifications in immigration law. Gradually, Asian workers lost their attraction as a political issue and target of attack, and their numbers remained sufficiently low to enable them to find specialized occupational niches. In the case of black migrants, however, the flow and concentration of workers in larger central cities continued nonstop until recent patterns of deconcentration occurred. According to Lieberson, the most important effect that an unabated influx of an immigrant minority can have is to "raise the level of ethnic and/or racial consciousness on the part of others in the city; from the point of view of the dominant outsiders, the newcomers may reinforce stereotypes and negative dispositions that affect all members of the group" (Lieberson 1980, 380).

Lieberson perceived the conflict between blacks and whites and the enduring minority status of blacks to be the result of urban dynamics involving competition and containment. Blacks most certainly faced prejudice and discrimination in northern cities before the period of widespread migration. Curry (1981, 81–95), in his study of free blacks in urban America between 1800 and 1850, described the prevalence of the most blatant forms of racism and discriminatory practice. Even then, the most common concern among whites was that the tiny numbers of blacks in their city would increase. Lieberson's point was that, given relatively small numbers, race would have faded over time as a divisive factor. In this view protracted racism and discrimination are the outcome of the urban properties of population size and density.

Zunz's (1982, 6, 354) history of intergroup relations in Detroit from 1880 to 1920 lends indirect support to Lieberson's argument. Zunz wrote that blacks experienced a settlement process radically different from that of the earlier European groups.

> Compared with white ethnic groups, Blacks lived history in reverse: while foreign immigrants ultimately became assimilated into a unified structure dominated by the native white American world and based on rank and social status within it, Blacks were increasingly segregated from whites on the basis of race and irrespective of their social status. (Zunz 1982)

Although social class had come to challenge ethnicity as a basis for residential clustering among white groups by 1920, this was not the case for African Americans. For this group, race rather than class standing remained the major criterion of classification, and segregation was entrenched.

Contributing to the intensification of segregation patterns was a large-scale white exodus to the suburbs beginning in the 1950s. Also, restrictive covenants excluded categories of "undesirables" from certain neighborhoods (although such agreements were declared unconstitutional in 1948), and these were followed by other informal practices by realtors and homeowners' organizations that kept even affluent members of minorities out of certain housing districts through the 1950s (Kusmer 1996, 324).

By the 1970s the Great Migration had ended, and there was even some return migration to the South and some dispersal of the urban African American populations

to western and smaller cities. By that time, however, blacks comprised a third of the population of Chicago and Philadelphia, approximately 40 percent of the population of Cleveland, St. Louis, and Detroit, and were the numerical majority in Newark, Gary, and Washington, D.C. (Kusmer 1996, 323). Their presence in large numbers in the largest cities and subsequent tensions over employment, housing, and public education issues insured that the problem of racism in the United States was cast in terms of black and white differences. The city showcased African American and European American racial tension and kept it fresh in the popular mind.

At the end of the 1970s, William Julius Wilson (1978) advanced a controversial thesis: He wrote that the significance of race was declining and would continue to do so in the United States. The thrust of his argument, which we will consider in chapter 9, was that restricted employment opportunities in a changing economy would hurt all people with marginal skills, not just people of color. True, a disproportionate number of people in that category were African Americans, but their disadvantage was a product of technological change, especially the deindustrialization of the economy, rather than overt racism. From the vantage point of the end of the 1970s, what was arguably the end of the last U.S. liberal era (the progressive efficacy of an Obama presidency is still in question as of late 2009), Wilson believed that racial prejudice was on the wane, and he thought that the end of the Great Migration would hurry its decline, at least with respect to African Americans (Wilson 1983, 82). In light of Lieberson's (1980) argument regarding the importance of migration in sustaining minority status, Wilson hypothesized that a decline in the significance of race should coincide with the end of the recent history of African American migration patterns. Perhaps less controversial was his prediction that prejudice and discrimination against Latinos would grow with their increasing urban visibility. One marker, the number of hate-crimes committed annually against Latinos in the United States, increased dramatically from 595 in 2003 to 830 in 2007, as political debates over illegal immigration increasingly drew public attention to the issue.

The 1990s was a decade of improving economic conditions in many U.S. cities, and it demonstrated that a postindustrial economy could produce employment and improved living standards for some at all levels of society. But economic change produced dislocations from the middle class downward as well, and not all areas of the city offered access to the benefits of change. Jessica Gordon Nembhard (2006, 93) writes, "In the transitions from enslavement to wage labor, from industrialization to post-industrialization and the information age, African American and other subaltern populations held little control over the economic processes of change, or the assets required for success in each epoch. As a result these communities are underdeveloped, marginalized and underserved." The first decade of the twenty-first century has offered little evidence of fundamental change for the longest-suffering American minority. Instead it has been marked by the indelible images of the aftermath of hurricane Katrina. The popular mind was shocked by the consequences of what it meant for one inner-city population to be "underdeveloped, marginalized, and underserved." The best analyses following the storm emphasized the fact that the lack of material resources and disproportionate vulnerability of poor African Americans in New Orleans were no different than those that confronted the same population in other cities.

Contemporary Immigration and the Making of Minorities

Over the past several decades immigration became one of the most emotional political issues in the United States and other prominent immigrant-target nations. Among established national populations there has been a growing sense of limitation regarding the potential for a deindustrializing economy to produce adequate employment opportunities for present and future generations. This has been reflected in worker resentment directed toward the outside world over the "off-shoring" (export) of jobs, typically to poorer nations with lower labor costs. There is a concomitant nationalist backlash against people entering traditionally affluent but recently challenged economies from poor and often politically turbulent regions of the world, in particular, locations in underdeveloped regions. "The popular complaint of the day . . . is that America has an 'immigration problem,' coded language for the arrival of too many brown-skinned people" (Maharidge 1996, 8).

In the United States, public opinion has been especially sensitive and vulnerable to manipulation over the issue of illegal entry from the south, from Mexico, from the Caribbean, and from Central and South America. Conservative spokespersons have exploited fears associated with images of the consequences of immigration. Their themes are echoed by the European political right, whose anti-immigrant rhetoric has gained it some success there (Muller 1993, 11). The European Union has been working to develop a uniform policy to deal with legal and illegal immigration from nonmember states, again, by and large, from underdeveloped nations of the South. Simmering just below the surface of expressions of legitimate concern by leaders seeking to secure national borders is question of racism. The question asks to what extent are contemporary nationalist concerns in the more wealthy nations a reflection of underlying fears based on images of racial invasion? The case of California is instructive because its large Third World immigrant population and the visibility of brown-skinned people in major cities have made it a flashpoint of the fears and reactionism of members of the U.S. majority to perceived hazards of displacement. Barbara Coe, a leading spokesperson for the "Save Our State" campaign, reportedly believed that the continued influx of Mexicans would provoke a massive out-migration of Anglo Californians and might be linked to a planned Mexican political takeover of the state (Maharidge 1996, 170–71). A *Newsweek* headline, "Los Angeles 2010: A Latino Subcontinent," and statements attributed to a former U.S. Border Patrol chief that "major cities have already been turned into extensions of foreign countries . . . Aliens threaten to seize political power in a few short years" (Hoover Institution 2008) are only slightly less alarmist.

Inflammatory denunciations of the economic impact of illegal aliens spill over and apply to legal immigrants as well as to people born in the United States who physically or linguistically fit the general image associated with points of origin of undocumented workers. Immigration becomes a problem in the public mind as all immigrants are assumed to be part of an unskilled, uneducated, and minimally employable mass, their poverty-level wages destining them to become a burden on the state. This is the traditional concern that transforms new immigrants into stigmatized minorities in the United States and elsewhere. The burden of proof remains

as always with those who argue that the latest group, among all of the waves of new urban immigrants over the years, is the one that is truly different. However, today there are two differences that give new impetus to the argument of unmeltability. The first is the underlying and usually unstated concern referred to by Maharidge: This is the racial issue (although in the old days Europeans from one nation would have described people from another European country as being of a different race). Many of the new immigrants are brown skinned and from the Third World, raising, as Maharidge put it in the title of his book, the prospect of *The Coming White Minority* (1996). The second difference that lends impetus to the unmeltability argument is the point that today the structure of employment opportunity makes prospects more questionable than in the past for those lacking specific training and skills. However, there is a dynamic relationship between immigration and economic opportunity that must be appreciated.

Since the nineteenth century, the foreign-born population has sustained high rates of employment. People came to the United States then, as now, in search of economic opportunity. In 1890, labor participation rates (the proportion of a population defined as being in the labor force) were higher for both male and female immigrants than for people born in the United States, and they have generally remained higher. In 2007 the labor force participation rate for foreign-born men was 81.9 percent, in contrast to a rate of 71.6 percent for native-born males (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008a). Today, as always, immigrants gravitate to the inner cities and create ethnic employment niches. They have added to the economic vitality of the "gateway cities" that are the targets of many immigrants: Los Angeles, New York, Miami, San Francisco, Washington, and Chicago. Latino immigrants, especially Cubans, have vitalized the economy of Miami.

Stanford University's Hoover Institution undertook a systematic comparison on high and low immigration U.S. cities to determine whether large numbers of immigrants correlated with a positive or negative net impact. Employing nine measures associated with growth and economic health, the survey of conditions found that "the higher a city's percentage of foreign-born population, the higher its subsequent population growth, the higher its subsequent growth in employment, the higher its per capita income, the faster its increase in per capita income, the lower its poverty rate, the lower its subsequent increase in poverty, the lower its crime rate, and the lower its tax burden." The only negative measure among the nine employed was the unemployment rate, which was higher in high immigrant cities (Hoover Institution 2008, 2). An article in *Mortgage Banking* (Lachman and Brett 1997) also weighed in on the positive side of the debate over the impact of immigration on local markets. In this account, immigrants are described as ready and willing workers who are making up an increasing share of the labor market, business people who are revitalizing declining neighborhoods, retail shoppers who contribute significantly to sales, experienced hoteliers infusing the hotel and motel business with new life through their investments, and home buyers who have proven to be a boon to the real estate market. The article pointed out that while many immigrants have low incomes, in due time they become upscale consumers and investors and eventually make the move to the suburbs.

For decades, illegal as well as documented agricultural workers have subsidized the low cost of farm produce with their bargain wages. Everywhere, recent immi-

grants are seen in fast food and other retail work, taking the minimum wage jobs that are not widely sought after by the native-born adult workforce. Others have allowed clothing manufacturers in U.S. cities to compete with their Third World counterparts by replicating overseas sweatshop conditions and wages, particularly in the Los Angeles area (textbox 5.1).

Textbox 5.1. Sweatshops in the United States

Sweatshop is a highly descriptive term that was applied to working conditions in the garment industry early in twentieth-century America. At the time, it alluded to the conditions under which a largely immigrant female workforce worked long hours for little pay in a poorly regulated industry. In recent decades, the term has been revived to describe exactly the same abuses in the same industry producing clothing for major fashion labels and retail chains, some of it overseas, some of it in the United States. Los Angeles is home to countless sewing operations—most of them with fewer than fifty workers—that together employ thousands of illegal immigrants and others. The presence of the shops is no secret, and many of them operate in the downtown garment district near the Convention Center. Jo-Ann Mort presented the case histories of two of the workers employed in the district. She reported that Aracely works twelve hours a day, seven days a week, with no holidays. As a presser, with burn scars on her hands from the industrial iron she stands at all day, she was earning $80 a week in 1996. Minimum wage regulations, which have little relevance to the invisible illegal workforce at any rate, are easily circumvented. In Aracely's husband's case—he is also a sweatshop worker—the employer did not allow employees to punch in until two hours after they started work. Leticia, a documented Mexican immigrant who is paid by the piece for what she sews, reports that her employer routinely rejects worker's production reports, claiming, "I already paid for this work," or "This isn't finished," or "It's not done well." Leticia says that at times when she has worked thirty-five or forty hours, she will be paid for only twenty because of her supervisor's rejections. She makes up for the lost income by taking work home, finishing at ten or eleven at night, after her evening English language classes. These two workers reported that they labored under primitive conditions, with filthy toilet facilities, leaking roofs, and rats in the workplace. Undocumented Aracely says, "Every day I get up at four o'clock in the morning. At six thirty, I'm dropping off my kids at school. I pay someone to pick them up in the afternoon. . . . My worst nightmare is when a teacher wants to talk to me or I have to be at school. . . . Sometimes, I get very, very desperate but I know I have to keep up the struggle because I have children. We suffer a lot in this country, too much." Mort's sources indicated that the Southern California clothing industry in which Aracely, Leticia, and thousands of others worked was contributing $13.3 billion to the national economy in the mid-1990s (Mort 1996).

Research on the impact of immigrants on the lower reaches of local employment markets reveals a complex reality. Some research showed that recent immigrants were a replacement labor force supporting upward mobility rather than causing job loss for native workers, including local minorities (Muller 1993, 142–48). However, a comparative study of immigrant workers in New York and London (Model and Ladipo 1996; Model 1997) indicated that immigrants might take better jobs than those held by local minorities. In New York, black immigrant males from

Africa and the West Indies took jobs with higher average prestige rankings than those filled by nonimmigrant minority males. But in London, immigrant males from similar origins tended to come into the labor market nearer the bottom. Not surprisingly, differences in training and socioeconomic standing in an immigrant's place of origin help determine where that person enters the job market. In New York City, Caribbean immigrants who arrived with educational advantages from English-speaking cultures tended to take better jobs, as did women from islands where there was a tradition of high female labor force participation (Grasmuck and Grosfoguel 1997).

One impact of immigration on the local economy is through the creation of opportunities by immigrant entrepreneurs. Ethnic concentration in particular small businesses is often a well-recognized pattern, especially in modest-sized cities. In addition to the Chinese restaurant phenomenon that is the most evident example, in smaller metropolitan areas Koreans are found in laundry services and the grocery business; North Africans, Arabs, and Palestinians are also grocers; Iranians run bars, restaurants, and other retail establishments; Mexicans are in the construction trades and small gardening and landscaping businesses. In larger metropolitan areas with diversified economic opportunities, immigrant entrepreneurs follow the Cuban Miami model: In that metropolitan region, Cuban immigrants have entered into a broad spectrum of businesses, supported both by a large community of Latino immigrants and the general market for goods and services. Still, the association between particular immigrant groups and particular businesses even in some large cities is evident: A third of the Israeli Arab and Palestinian entrepreneurs in New York ran grocery stores, as did 43.5 percent of those in San Francisco, and 60 percent (when combined with liquor retailers) in the D.C. area (Razin and Light 1998, 350–52).

Where negative incentives, such as the lack of labor demand or discrimination, are the cause of going into business for oneself, earnings may be lower than what employed workers with similar skill-levels enjoy. Many self-employed Mexican Americans in the building and gardening trades are not occupied full time and have low incomes, especially in smaller cities. However, in larger cities with larger Mexican populations, self-employed Mexican tradespeople tend to earn more, perhaps due to the larger co-ethnic clientele or because more work is funneled to them through a larger network of Mexican American contractors (Spener and Bean 1999).

The immigrant stream is economically diverse, and the image of new urban immigrants waiting a generation or two to move up and out to the suburbs is as outmoded as the picture of old U.S. cities with heavy industrial cores. Since the sustained economic prosperity of the mid-1990s, U.S. businesses requiring employees with high-tech training are going directly to international labor pools to recruit them. The new recruits often go directly into the middle class and to the suburbs. Montgomery and Fairfax counties outside Washington, D.C., make the point. The greater D.C. area is home to thousands of high-technology firms employing a quarter of a million workers. The 2006 Community Survey by the Census Bureau counted more than a million foreign born in the D.C. metropolitan area, and suburban Montgomery and Fairfax counties each had over 230,000. While many of the new immigrant suburbanites fit the profile of the affluent suburban resident, a large number of others, who accept jobs in simple light industrial assembly and custodial

or day-care services, do not. The class polarization that divides inner-city workers into wealthy and working-poor social strata applies as well as to the immigrant suburbanite population (Suro 1999).

Herbert Gans (1992) cautioned that even successful first-generation immigrants, particularly people of color, may not see their favorable social position translate into security or acceptance in subsequent generations. A downturn in the economy can revive the receiving society's penchant for turning new immigrants into minorities. A contracting employment market historically has spawned resentment toward newcomers who are then seen as taking good jobs and business opportunities from mainstream groups who see themselves as having established a prior claim to economic advantage by virtue of generations of citizenship. Even during the relative prosperity of the 1990s, citizen's movements in many states mounted campaigns to declare English the state's official language, an act symbolizing the age-old American demand for the cultural assimilation of immigrants. By the end of the twentieth century, official-language legislative movements were either under way or had already succeeded in most states: By 2008 twenty-eight states had adopted the measure in some form.

Latinos and the Cities

The 46.7 million people in the United States in 2008 *with ties of identity (however distant) to New World Spanish colonial territories* will grow to 138.2 million or about 30 percent of the U.S. population by 2050, according to Census Bureau estimates (2008c). The term of reference may leave some question as to precisely what group is being described here. We are describing no group precisely. The reference is not to a specific nation of origin. The category applies to people from the Spanish-speaking Caribbean—especially Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba—Mexico, Central America, and South America. It also includes people who have been living in the United States all of their lives, and people descended from families that were living in territories in the Southwest, which became part of the United States long after their families had settled in those territories. Conventionally referred to as Hispanic because of shared language, many designees have rejected that term because its reference is to a European language of conquest, which negates pre-Columbian dimensions of identity. Many proudly prefer instead to be called Mexican, for example, or choose a more politically focused designation for themselves, such as "Chicano/Chicana": Perez-Torres (2006) and others promote a more self-consciously racialized label, "Mestizaje," that expresses the idea that a particular racial mixing (mestizo/mestiza) has fostered a unique cross-border consciousness, identity, and hybrid modes of cultural expression that have evolved from Mexican colonial and more recent history. Nevertheless, the outside world experiences the influence of Spanish language New World cultures collectively and, in the tradition of blending all into one for the purpose of reference, adopts the conventional term *Latino*, more acceptable than Hispanic but retaining some of the problems of European rootedness as well as containing a gendered suffix (*Latino* is masculine). (Similar problems of the inadequacy of terms of collective designation apply to the term *Asian American* in the next section of the chapter.)

Latinos are a prominent and growing urban presence, especially in the cities of the Southwest but also in other large metro areas, such as Chicago, Miami, and New York. Visibility has caused many non-Latinos to jump to conclusions about illegal immigration. While estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants vary considerably, there is no question that the vast majority of Latinos are native to the United States or have immigrated legally. Not only are Latinos heterogeneous in their places of origin, but they are also sharply stratified. While some have experienced upward social mobility, large numbers are absorbed into the ranks of the urban poor. All continue to face prejudice and discrimination.

For Latinos, as for African Americans and Asian Americans, a substantial improvement in the life chances of some in recent decades tends to obscure the fact that conditions have not measurably improved for most. In 1993 a lead article in the market-oriented *American Demographics* shouted, "Vivan Los Suburbios!" (Frey and O'Hare 1993, 32). During the 1990s the Latino suburban population grew by 71 percent, and according to the most recent Census estimates about 54 percent of Latinos live in metropolitan suburbs. Nevertheless, it remains the case that Latinos in general continue to experience discrimination in the rental housing market and are disproportionately poorly housed. In the extreme, we have the example of cross-border developments in Texas and Mexico called *colonias*. These mirror the conditions of Third World squatter settlements and consist of occupant-erected housing on leased plots without water or sewage services. Scores of these settlements along the Texas border housed 350,000 people by 1999. Residents are poor and subject to high rates of environment-related diseases (Ward 1999). Their peri-urban locations suggest that residents might qualify as "suburbanites."

As was the case with earlier immigrant groups, cities have quickly come to reflect the cultural influence of new immigrants. The life of some large cities of the United States, and large sections of many others, has been transformed and enriched by Latino cultural presence. Los Angeles has been proclaimed by some to be the capital of Mexican America (Steiner 1974, 141). Neighborhoods in New York reflect the influences of the large Puerto Rican, Dominican, and other Latin and Caribbean populations. Thirty years ago the city of Miami was conceded by the president of Ecuador to be "the capital of Latin America." Culturally and economically it is a worthy candidate for that designation. Entrepreneurs who left Cuba in the wake of Fidel Castro's revolution settled in the Miami area and provided the impetus for the growth of a heterogeneous Latino economic and cultural community there. In addition to recent Cuban refugees, the Miami area has been attracting non-Cuban Latinos who make up an increasing share of the wider metropolitan area's more than 2 million Latinos. Miami is a hub of international trade between Latin America and the rest of the world, host to Latin American international trade fairs, and is a headquarters for many Latin American banks. Members of the non-Latino population have found themselves ethnically transformed, by local definition, into "Anglos." Most residents are bilingual, local business is commonly conducted in Spanish, and most local radio and television broadcasts are also in Spanish. Anglos either adapt or move away but, if they move within South Florida, they are likely to find large and rapidly increasing Latino populations in cities and suburbs wherever they relocate (*Boston Globe* October 17, 2004). As the Latino population of Florida cities continues to grow, other cities in the South have been receiving large numbers

of Latino migrants and immigrants. In a review of the historical events that have transformed the Miami region and given it its diverse Latino population, Alberts (2006, 150) suggests, "Miami now may also be a template for what might happen in cities in the New South that have only recently been transformed by diverse immigration flows."

The minority status of Latinos in the United States reflects the dynamism of the process whereby minority group are created. As noted earlier in the chapter, Lieberson (1980) theorized that an increase in numbers and visibility, coupled with large-scale migration and the perception by members of the majority population that little can be done to control the growing minority numbers in their midst, is a situation that produces fear, anger, and prejudice directed against members of the minority. The growing Latino population of the United States provides a massive case study that seems to bear out Lieberson's hypothesis. In 2007 and 2008 there was an upsurge in anti-Latino violence, including the beating and stabbing deaths of three men in separate incidents in 2008. Senator Chuck Schumer said the men were killed "simply because of who they were" (Associated Press, December 16, 2008).

Latinos constitute the largest minority in the United States, with their numbers alleged to include millions of illegal immigrants, and like large immigrant groups the world over they have drawn the hostile attention of many among the majority. For years the United States has been building a security fence along its border with Mexico at a cost of $7.5 million per mile for pedestrian barriers and $2.5 million for vehicle barriers (*New York Times* September 10, 2008). While the practical effectiveness of the project is debated, the symbolic power of what it says about the perceived seriousness of the illegal immigration of Mexicans and other Latinos could not be more powerful. Projections are that Latinos will make up the majority of the population of California by 2040, with the ever-expanding population of Los Angeles leading the way. Latinos are the numerical majority in Miami. They make up an increasing presence in many U.S. cities, including those in the South.

As the federal government struggles to come up with a national immigration policy, local areas devise their own measures for dealing with the illegal population problem, typically lumping all Latinos together to face the consequences of increased official scrutiny. Manassas, Virginia, in the D.C. suburb of Prince William County, foreshadows the future of Latinos in areas where their numbers and visibility have reached critical mass. Between 2000 and 2006 the Latino population had grown by 150 percent, and services such as the education system were feeling the strain. In 2007 the county gave its police officers authority to ask anyone pulled over for any traffic violation, no matter how minor, to verify their citizenship status. The law immediately had a chilling effect on the Latino population, legal and illegal: They were suddenly less visible. One member of a Mexican advocacy group said, "We don't see the Spanish, the Latinos, the way we used to . . . Going to the malls, going to the parks. It's like, 'Where's everybody at?'" Some have apparently left the county. Others are afraid to leave their homes. But in what some saw as the answer to a problem, others saw as a problem in itself. Businesses experienced a drop in sales, schools lost students, employers lost workers. Community members realized how integral a part of the community the Latino residents had become (Khan and Sidhar 2008).

There are two key factors that will determine whether the future holds increased assimilation or increased stigmatization for this group. The first is the popularly perceived long-term effectiveness of the illegal-alien control laws. The other factor will be the popular perception of the long-term effectiveness of hemispheric trade agreements and the balance of employment opportunities between the United States and countries to the south. If it appears that there is a large-scale transfer of industrial work to Mexico, that will likely increase prejudice and scapegoating against all Latinos. At any rate, differences in the cross-border standards of living will certainly remain for the foreseeable future. Given the economic realities of the situation, the future status of Latinos in the United States lies partly in the hands of the potential immigrant pool in Latin America, separated from the opulent economy to the north by what will probably continue to be a permeable border, and partly in the hands of those groups and individuals in the United States who, for whatever ideological, economic, or political purposes, find this an exploitable issue.

Asian and Pacific Americans

The Asian population of some urban areas in the United States has grown considerably within the past several decades. In 1965, the restrictions in immigration laws that had long sought to exclude Asians were modified. The limited acceptance of refugees from Southeast Asia beginning in the mid-1970s also contributed to the growth in numbers and visibility. In 2008 the Census Bureau projected a population of 16.5 million Asian and Pacific Islander Americans by mid-2010, among them considerable numbers of Chinese, Koreans, and Southeast Asians.

The outflow of investment capital from Hong Kong that began in anticipation of its incorporation by China in 1997 has found its way into Chinatowns and other Chinese ethnic enclaves around the world, and these ethnic districts have continued to expand. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinatown in lower Manhattan spilled over its historical boundaries, and the upscale transformation of properties and increased costs of living and of doing business drove many residents to found new Chinese American communities elsewhere in the city. Meanwhile, many other groups of newly arrived Asians were transforming the cultures of residential neighborhoods and retail locations in several cities in North America and Europe.

In the United States, Asians have been subjected to varying degrees of discrimination, harassment, and brutality since the early days of immigration. In 1882, due to widespread anti-Asian sentiment, the United States passed the first of a series of Asian immigration restrictions, the Chinese Exclusion Act, which not only prohibited new entries but also restricted the rights of existing residents of Chinese origin. Prejudice and suspicion flared again during World War II, and more than 100,000 Japanese Americans were placed in internment camps: Japanese in particular continued to be the target of exclusionary practices and racial slurs in the decades following the war. Anti-Asian sentiments arose again, briefly, with the arrival of Southeast Asians following the end of the U.S. military actions in Vietnam. In 1975, the *New York Times* (May 2, 17) reported the results of a national poll in which 54 percent of respondents said that those fleeing what had been South Vietnam should not be permitted to enter the United States. The typical respondent was concerned that the refugees would become a welfare burden and would place further pressure on

an already stressed employment market (it turns out that 95 percent of employable Vietnamese refugees were employed within two years of arrival, though many were in employment that was not commensurate with their skills or training (Wain 1981, 188–89). It was official government policy to scatter refugees in family-size units throughout the country. This policy was designed to prevent Southeast Asians from becoming a conspicuous minority in a particular urban location. Efforts were made to find local sponsors to help settle, house, train, and find employment for new arrivals in order to make the refugee's transition as smooth and unobtrusive as possible: An unforeseen consequence of the policy of refugee isolation was that immigrants commonly experienced bitter loneliness. Secondary Southeast Asian migration within the United States did lead eventually to population concentrations and the establishment of sizable Vietnamese American enclaves in such cities as San Jose, San Diego, Los Angeles, Houston, and Portland in the West, and Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Boston, and New York in the East.

Korean immigrants to the United States began arriving quietly, but by the mid- to late-1970s large Koreatowns had become established districts in major cities, most notably Los Angeles and New York. As suggested by the name, Koreatowns feature a concentration of Korean businesses that cater to both the Korean and general populations and typically also contain a large number of Korean residents. Beyond Koreatowns, Korean grocers and shopkeepers have become a familiar fixture in most large cities, especially in areas with minority concentrations. Their economic niche is that of the recently arrived entrepreneur, the small family business.

Textbox 5.2. Resistance to Koreatown

Ethnic enclaves lend cultural diversity and richness to cities. They transform neighborhoods into distinct districts, often revitalizing declining business areas through assembling specialized services and a mixed clientele that includes co-ethnic and general customers. Reactions of local residents, business owners, and authorities vary. In the somewhat atypical case of Annandale, Virginia, the reaction was decidedly negative.

Annandale is a self-contained Washington, D.C., suburban township. The Annandale Chamber of Commerce Web site presents an image of the village, especially the Village Center business district, that is self-consciously small-town Americana in its theme. It makes no reference to what David Cho (2005) refers to as "its unofficial, oft-invoked moniker . . . Koreatown." Annandale's makeover began to take shape in the early 1990s as a number of Korean businesses were established in the area. By 2005 the town had Korean electronics stores, law and realty offices, medicine shops, karaoke bars, thirty-nine restaurants, and other businesses: The "Giant Directory," a Korean phone book, listed 929 businesses that served the Korean American population of the D.C. area. Yet, only 7 percent of the Annandale resident population was of Korean origin. This, plus the fact that store signs in Korean characters dominate the local business district (in some restaurants the menu is only in Korean), has led to resistance by the Annandale Chamber of Commerce and the town's other residents against becoming known as Koreatown. Cho says the case "illustrates the tensions that have developed across the [D.C. metropolitan] region as large-scale immigration transforms neighborhoods into ethnic enclaves." But in this case, a critical mass of Asian ethnic presence has transformed an

entire town. Business leaders pushed back against the transformation. The chairman of the area Chamber of Commerce argued that Annandale was much more than a Korean retail and commercial center, acknowledging though "that's the most visible because when you see signs and you see the businesses then you can get the impression from that . . . But that's not what makes Annandale what it is" (Cho). Yet the situation is not static. Cho reported in 2005 that as Korean American merchants continued to prosper they bought still more property. They were resistant to joining the Chamber of Commerce and had established a separate Korean American Association. Family members worked in family businesses twelve or more hours per day, leaving them little time to enter into community activities, and the wider area's 66,000 Korean Americans whom they reached through the fourteen Korean language periodicals gave them a sufficient customer base without needing to reach out to the general population. Within the Korean community some were concerned about replicating the kind of ethnic insularity that they thought was characteristic of Koreatowns in Los Angeles or New York, where one could do just fine without learning much English, without assimilating. The president of the Korean American Association said he hoped that assimilation would proceed with second- and third-generation Korean Americans. Indeed, second-generation Koreans overwhelmingly reject work in the ethnic economy built by their immigrant parents. The vast majority prefer to enter professions and take up other employment in the mainstream middle-class economy (Kim 2004). But for the parent generation in Annandale, Cho observes, "Having a Koreatown is a source of pride and comfort."

(Excerpt where otherwise indicated, based on David Cho, 2005, "'Koreatown' Image Divides a Changing Annandale," Washington Post, *March 14.)*

The capacity of Asian Americans to avoid conflict with the wider U.S. population appears to depend on both international and local factors. In the 1980s Asians provided a focus, however misplaced or illogical, for resentment over the eroding status of the United States in the world economy and for what that erosion meant in the loss of jobs and national pride. Foreign competition became an offhanded explanation for the deindustrialization of the economy, especially in cities long dependent on manufacturing employment, and Asians became a symbolic target of resentment against foreign competitors. This provides a classic example of the process of *scapegoating*, blaming society's problems on a group that can be easily identified and victimized. As the incidence of violence against immigrants in New York City increased, the city's human rights commissioner said, "I sense that immigrants are being scapegoated for a lot of our problems. A certain kind of xenophobic bigotry has come out of the closet" (*New York Times* December 11, 1992, A18).

Japanese Americans have been particularly wary of an increase in anti-Asian sentiment, due to the success of the Japanese economy in its direct competition with that of the United States. There has been a tendency among Japanese Americans to attempt to maintain a low profile and not to appear to be directly connected with Japan-based firms, in the fear that any worsening of tensions over trade policy would make them the target of anti-Asian resentment and acts of violence (*Far Eastern Economic Review* November 22, 1990, 36). Stating the matter in general terms, Watanabe (2001) asserts, "In the new world order of an emergent Asia, many of the concerns about the United States' relative standing in the global

economic picture have been blamed on global competitors . . . the fate of Asian Americans has been affected in substantial and often damaging ways by what has been happening in United States' foreign relations." As China now emerges as a world economic power, and as the Chinese American population of American cities swells both in terms of absolute numbers and enclave visibility, it is reasonable to anticipate renewed tendencies toward anti-Asian scapegoating and victimization. Currently the United States faces an uncertain economic future, focused by what appears to be a chronic balance of payments deficit with Chinese exports and services and a continued erosion of industrial employment. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy shows an enormous potential for continued growth. The present situation makes the 1982 beating death of Chinese American Vincent Chin by two out-of-work Detroit auto workers all the more ironic. The killers took Chin for Japanese, and being resentful of the success of Japanese auto imports, chased him down and bludgeoned him with a baseball bat. Clearly, the treatment of Asian Americans depends to some degree on the economic fortunes of the United States vis-à-vis the fortunes of China. As the sporadic episodes of Asian bashing that have taken place to date demonstrate, it will make little difference whether the victim is of Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Korean, or Vietnamese extraction. To the people who select the victims, all Asians look alike.

The perception and treatment of Asian Americans is also dependent on local events and the intergroup dynamics of the urban environment. The plight of Korean Americans, for example, is notable because while they have been subjected to anti-Asian prejudice by the white majority, they are have also been disdained by minority groups in the neighborhoods where they do business, particularly in black neighborhoods. The tension between African Americans and Korean Americans has been conditioned by the economic role that Koreans have typically played in poor communities and has also been based on cultural misunderstandings that may grow into open conflict, bringing black and Korean groups into open conflict in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and, most notably, South Central Los Angeles. During the riots in Los Angeles in 1992 following the trial of officers implicated in a videotaped beating of a black suspect, Rodney King, Korean businesses were the primary targets of looting and arson.

In poor neighborhoods, blacks have been resentful of Korean retailers, claiming that they overcharge, are rude, take over black businesses, and take dollars away from black communities. They charge that Korean merchants give little in return and that they fail to hire local people to work in their shops. Koreans have responded that blacks misinterpret their politely reserved demeanor, that Korean merchants buy only properties that are already for sale, and that they get by at such low profit margins that they must staff their operation only with family members. However, it is reportedly accurate that at least some Korean business owners harbor negative stereotypes toward blacks. In turn, some blacks have based their resentment on the mistaken belief that Koreans have somehow been given special assistance by the government in order to purchase their shops at the cost of would-be black business owners (Jo 1992, 399–400). Evidence contradicts this belief: A comparison of metropolitan areas shows a positive correlation between the number of shops owned by immigrants and the number owned by blacks in the same districts (Muller 1993, 192).

Asian Americans offer an example of ethnic dynamism and the interplay between ethnic group and minority group statuses. Because a large number of Asian Americans have achieved success—a sufficiently large number to pull the average educational attainment and family income figures upward to surpass those of the European American majority—Asians have been dubbed the "model minority." The designation supports the popular view that merit, diligence, and hard work are rewarded in America: It makes no difference where you come from. The widespread perception of the Asian success story also supports the notion that there are "good immigrants" (who take advantage of the opportunities supposedly available to all in the United States) and "bad immigrants" (who are willing only to take advantage of the largess of the welfare state) (Park 2002, 163). Yet the "model minority" image is a damaging myth. It implies that prejudice and discrimination against Asian Americans is dead. It creates the impression that upward mobility is more or less uniform for all Asian groups, at the same time that disaggregated data show that some (especially Southeast Asian ethnic groups such as Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians) have below average educational and income levels. A quick perusal of the enrollments of the most prestigious science, technology, engineering, and math programs in higher education will indicate a disproportionate number of Asian enrollees (32 percent), and perpetuate the positive stereotype of Asians' inherent capabilities in those fields. A closer look will reveal that 4 in 5 of the enrollees are citizens of Asian nations, not the United States. At the same time, a survey of college and university presidents will reveal that less than 1 percent are Asian American. Less visible is the fact that fewer than half the adult Hmong and Cambodians in the United States have finished high school (*New York Times* June 10, 2008). The myth of the "model minority" has led to the exclusion of Asian Americans from programs designed to assist American minorities, a policy shift that overlooks the difficulties of many Southeast Asians and others who are still struggling to adjust to the United States.

A focus on the Asian American success story threatens to draw attention away from the fact that members of the group continue to be subject to prejudice and discrimination. It has been argued that Asian Americans are perceived by the rest of the population as unalterably Asian: They "have been consistently racialized as disguised foreigners" (Watanabe 2001, 643). Ronald Takaki (1993, 1) describes how he personally has experienced this.

> I had flown from San Francisco to Norfolk and was riding in a taxi to my hotel to attend a conference on multiculturalism . . . My driver and I chatted about the weather and the tourists. The sky was cloudy and Virginia Beach was twenty minutes away. The rearview mirror reflected a white man in his forties. "How long have you been in this country?" he asked. "All my life," I replied, wincing. "I was born in the United States." With a strong southern drawl, he remarked, "I was wondering because your English is excellent!" Then, as I had many times before, I explained: "My grandfather came here from Japan in the 1880s. My family has been here, in America, for over a hundred years." He glanced at me in the mirror. Somehow I did not look "American" to him; my eyes and complexion looked foreign.

The incident highlights what it means to be othered by one's fellow citizens as somehow permanently foreign. The underlying perception is that if people are

fundamentally different then they can't be trusted to be fully like mainstream Americans. Watanabe (2001, 643) says that this translates into a suspicion that any evidence of activism regarding United States foreign policy directed at the ancestral homeland is evidence of a divided loyalty, a compromised Americanism. This does not appear to hold true for, say, Irish Americans lobbying their government on behalf of Ireland, Italian Americans on behalf of Italy, and so forth. To be permanently alien means to be subject to suspicions reserved for those who are fundamentally other.

Native Americans and the City

During the past several decades, the Census Bureau has recorded a dramatic increase in the Native American population, and most of this growth has been within the urban population, which now contains the majority of Native Americans. According to the 1950 census, there were 380,000 Native Americans: By mid-2005 the Census Bureau estimated a total of 4.5 million American Indian and Native Alaskans, and it projected that this population would grow to just above 5 million by 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau 2008b). The apparent rapid increase in population is in some part due to changes in enumeration criteria (the Bureau adopted the method of self-identification in 1960) and to a resurgence in interest and pride in Native American identity—involving "ethnic switching" in which a larger proportion of Native American people, including those of mixed race, chose to so identify themselves (Gonzales 1998). Whatever the basis of the rapid expansion in numbers, it had little impact on the visibility of Native Americans as an ethnic minority. In 2005, self-identified Native Americans still made up only 1.5 percent of the total population of the United States. The theme chosen for the National Urban Indian Family Coalition's 2008 conference made the point: "Revealing an Invisible Population."

The increase in the *urban* American Indian population is the result of a combination of factors. The Bureau of Indian Affairs adopted a relocation program in 1952 that produced fairly large scale migrations from reservation lands and contributed to increases of Native American populations in several cities. Underdevelopment of economic opportunities on tribal or council lands and poor educational and medical services at home made cities relatively attractive for many others and pushed them to migrate. Often the target of migration was an urban area near large Indian lands, but there has also been a general southeasterly nationwide movement of the native population (Ogunwole 2002). According to the U.S. Census Bureau's 2006 American Community Survey, the cities of Los Angeles, Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Albuquerque, Phoenix, Tucson, Seattle, Minneapolis/St. Paul, and San Diego all had large Native American populations. But New York City, home to 90,000 American Indians, had the largest. Washington, D.C., had the highest rate of growth of native peoples during the last decades of the twentieth century, attracting especially those with higher education to government jobs (Shumway and Jackson 1995). Anchorage is the city with the highest concentration of Alaskan Natives.

The minority status of Native Americans is well established in their treatment historically. They were subject to conquest, genocide, relocation, containment on isolated reservations, and cultural reprogramming, ostensibly in the interest of as-

similating them into Euro-American society—a society that regarded them with negative stereotypes and did not welcome their participation. Unlike other U.S. minorities, their minority status is not reinforced by a highly visible urban presence. Although as we have noted several large cities have substantial Native American populations, the proportion is so small relative to the total U.S. urban population that, as an urban minority, they receive little notice. The largest number of Native Americans in any city live in New York City, but they still make up less than one half of 1 percent of the region's population. The highest proportion lives in Oklahoma City, where Indians make up just over 5 percent of the population. Native Americans remain subject to stereotype and discrimination, but in contrast to other high-visibility urban minorities, their urban presence has done little to directly enhance their minority status in the eyes of non-Indians. It has, however, modified their ethnic culture and consciousness, and urban-based efforts to find an effective political voice have contributed importantly to these changes.

In the early 1970s, there was a resurgent interest among urban Native Americans in their ethnic roots. This produced the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) and the American Indian Movement (AIM) and a growing interaction between urban and reservation residents. The political goals of AIM included raising ethnic consciousness and pride and the promotion of a sense of common identity among all Native Americans. The activities and goals of this *urban-based movement*, to the extent that they created a *pan-Indian identity*, can be interpreted as undermining authentic native cultures (Svensson 1980). In this view, to be authentically Indian means to have remained Cherokee, Sioux, Apache, Navajo, and so on. The idea of a single Native American culture has no basis in tradition; instead, it grew out of the perceived necessity to mobilize all Native Americans into a single movement in order to make them a national political force. In this case, and from this perspective, to the extent that *urban* ethnicity became the basis of identity for Native Americans, it would replace traditional, autonomous identities among the various indigenous ethnic groups. However, it has also been argued that cultural identity, in the form of ethnicity, is ever evolving, not static. As we have noted earlier in the chapter, ethnicity is often a multilayered set of group affinities, not a choice of either-or. The "new Indians" that emerged out of the urban political arena and affected the views of Native American culture that had evolved on the reservation had both a *supratribal* and a traditional tribal identity. "Indian" identity did not simply replace tribal identification but interacted with it to promote emergent cultural forms on the reservation that were in part a product of the urban experience. "A number of researchers report that the Indian pride and rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s led to renewed interest in tribal history and sparked tribal activism that was often led by reservation returnees from urban activist experiences" (Nagle and Snipp 1993, 220). Urban experience, however, has also led to tensions between the urban migrant and reservation-based populations. Urban tribal members have at times favored different policies than reservation members; urbanites have sought the extension of programs and benefits to cover nonreservation populations, while rural members have sought long-term reservation development (Officer [1971] 1984, 61–62).

Other conflicts of identity and purpose emerge as natives reside for generations away from tribal lands. The rate of intermarriage between Native Americans and

non-Native Americans is much higher in the city than in homelands. When the adult children of these marriages become interested in seeking their native roots, their lack of native physical characteristics and cultural knowledge makes their acceptance as tribal members problematic, and this is true in both rural and urban Native American communities whose members are suspicious of "wannabes" and usurpers (Krouse 1999). There is more at stake than simple gatekeeping here, more than simple prejudice against absorbing "outsiders." A number of government programs have been set aside to partially compensate Native Americans for their losses as the United States absorbed their lands and resources and to assist native peoples in overcoming generations of imposed isolation and exclusion. People who have identified themselves as Native Americans all their lives and who have lived with the consequences of minority status regard the motives of newcomers with suspicion (Gonzales 1998). Also, some reservation-based native peoples have amassed substantial wealth through gambling casinos and, to varying extents, other private enterprises in which tribal members claim a share. Casinos have been a strong vehicle for raising standards of living, providing enhanced services for members, and have been a source of employment and general rural development (Taylor, Krepps, and Wang 2000). In such situations, long-lost members who find a new interest and can lay claim to a native identity based on having a native grandmother or great grandfather may be regarded with some doubt. What it means to establish oneself as a Native American—moreover to be recognized as such by insiders and outsiders, so long after the era of conquest, displacement, and the subsequent pressures for cultural assimilation—is to engage in a process of contested identity. This is especially so for urban Native Americans.

Earlier in this chapter, we discussed the manner in which European immigrants who came to the cities of the United States had to renegotiate their cultural heritage to suit their new circumstances. Native Americans are currently making those same adjustments. A few examples may illustrate the process. The city of Phoenix exemplifies some of the complexity hidden in the phrase "Native American community." Many native cultures are represented in the metropolitan area: Navajo, Pima, Apache, Hopi, O'Odaham, and others. Traditionally, native identities in the area were based on these separate groupings. Over time, however, some have subordinated their traditional tribal-based affiliations in favor of associating themselves with the more sophisticated, politically powerful, and urban-based pan-tribal council, which has received philanthropic and federal support. Since the mid-twentieth century, existing native ethnic divisions have been cross-cut by an economic division as some individuals and families became upwardly mobile and joined the middle class, while the majority remained blue collar and working class. The relationship between native and nonnative communities is, on the surface, contradictory. The native subcultural presence imparts some of the city's distinctive character. Native culture has been an important tourist attraction, with Indian-themed crafts shops and galleries catering primarily to the tourist trade, but native peoples remain the subject of negative stereotyping by the white population (Liebow 1989, 68–70). As is the case with immigrant groups, the dominant culture finds idealized and mythologized elements of exotics more agreeable than their personal presence.

The image conveyed here is that of the typical U.S. ethnic process, involving cultural adaptation to the immediate environment: In this case, specific tribal affiliations

interact with a nontribal identity that is a product of the urban environment. Some groups, such as the Navajo, may be able to hold themselves apart from the tribal meltdown because they have the large numbers—what Fischer (1975) referred to as *critical mass* (chapter 4)—to maintain a distinctive and separate identity. But, while the process is hardly complete for any of the tribes represented in the Phoenix area (Liebow 1989, 90–91), the ethnic identity known as "Indian" or "Native American" emerges despite resistance, as have the "Asian American" or "Latino" categorizations, which also subsume a diversity of cultural origins.

The members of some native cultures in the Americas have all but lost direct contact with the past and provide examples of the power of the urban environment to give rise to highly modified or novel ethnic experiences. One example of this comes from Chile, in South America, and another from New England. Urbanization threatens the practices and beliefs of the Mapuche Indians of Chile. Almost half the population was living in cities by the late 1990s, their communal lands had been divided and privatized by the national government in 1979, and that same decree declared that the Mapuche no longer existed. The remnants of their culture are undervalued by the nation, and most are content to be known by Spanish rather than Indian names, in order to avoid the lower status of anything associated with being Indian. However, some Mapuches in cities and rural areas had the feeling expressed by one that "something lacked inside of us." Those who were interested founded formal organizations to keep their culture alive by holding workshops and classes on Mapuche culture, and they go to great lengths to observe traditional ceremonies that need modification in order to work in urban areas (Orellana-Rojas 1998). What will emerge from these efforts in time? Will it be a sustained Mapuche traditional culture? Or a culture that is as much a novel product of the urban environment?

A similar but in many ways more complete attempt to eradicate a culture was visited upon the Narragansett Indians who lived along a section of the New England coast in the path of development of the earliest European towns. This group's territories were among the first to be engulfed by urban settlement. The state of Rhode Island in 1880 officially "detribalized" what little remained of the surviving community and sold off its few remaining holdings, just about 100 years before the same thing happened to the Mapuche. But by the 1930s, a half century after their official demise, descendants of mixed Indian, African, and European ancestry began an effort to revive the Narragansett's memory of their native heritage. Since then, the organization has held annual celebrations and meetings. As members consult museums and historical sources to aid them in reconstructing a picture of the past, "the modern Pow Wow is becoming more markedly ethnic. Indian dances, either self-invented or adapted from those performed by other groups, Indian clothing such as Plains area headdresses and beadwork, and names specifically introduced for this occasion, replaced the square dancing, conventional clothing and mainly English names of earlier years" (Simmons 1981, 46–48).

The Mapuche and Narragansett offer us parallel examples of groups struggling to assert native cultural identities in an urban world far removed from the environments that originally gave rise to their societies. Especially in the case of the Narragansetts, the cultural content of the heritage they present to themselves and the world is as much a deliberate invention as it is a historical recollection. It is full of errors of memory and odd borrowed pieces. Is it ethnicity at all? In fact, the par-

ticipants act like the members of any other urban ethnic group, trying to establish a sense of where they have come from and what that means for who they are. The only ones who can really answer such questions of meaning are the ones involved in the experience. As Gordon (1964, 23–24) taught us, ethnicity is not about cultural content; the urban context is bound to modify that. Rather, ethnicity is "a shared feeling of peoplehood" and wherever we find it we can assume that it has authentic meaning for participants.

6

Patterns and Consequences of Urbanization in Poor Countries

The most dramatic story of urbanization today is unfolding in the least urbanized regions of the world. These have the greatest potential for sustained urban growth. Within the last four decades, the urban populations of Africa and Asia have mushroomed, and those of Latin American countries are rounding out the dramatic growth of recent history. In poor countries, the populations of the largest cities sprawl outward, engulfing surrounding towns and countryside, and the skylines of city centers are transformed by the vertical glass and steel structures of the international style of architecture. By the end of the twentieth century, a substantial majority of the world's largest urban agglomerations (those with populations of over 10 million) were located outside the more industrialized nations. In 1975, there were three urban agglomerations with more than 10 million people, and of these only Mexico City was located in one of the world's poorer countries. By 2000, there were nineteen, and thirteen were in the less developed, poorer nations. In 2025, there will probably be twenty-seven, with eighteen in the less developed nations. At that time Mumbai may have 26 million residents, São Paulo and Mexico City 21 million each, Lagos and Kinshasa about 16 million (United Nations Population Division 2008, 10).

IMAGES OF THE "THIRD WORLD" CITY

Cities throughout the world share certain characteristics in common, yet striking differences are apparent between the cities of the more developed and less developed nations. In every large city, there is an obvious division between the conditions of the wealthiest and poorest people, but nowhere is the contrast between wealth and poverty more dramatically evident than in the cities of the world's poorer nations. The rich enjoy similar living standards throughout the world, but the poorest endure a much more trying level of deprivation in the cities of poor countries. This chapter will focus on the major social, political, and economic issues that attend rapid urban growth in poor countries. It also will attempt to convey

something of the experience of life in these cities. One terminological difficulty needs to be mentioned at the outset and then set aside rather than resolved: The terms *poor countries, less developed nations*, or *developing nations* are used to refer to nations with widely differing levels of wealth, population size, and global influence. Examples include Haiti, which in 2007 had 9.6 million people and a gross national product (GNP)—the value of all goods and services produced—equivalent to $560 per person; Mexico, with 105 million people had a GNP of $8,340 per person; India in 2007 was an emerging world power and had a population of 1.1 billion people, but had a GNP per person of only $950 (World Bank, World Development Indicator Data Base 2008).

Clearly, the category of nation we are discussing in this chapter covers a wide range of conditions that challenge categorization. Until the last decade of the twentieth century, the conventional term for pulling such diversified nations into a single category was the *Third World*. The term had a political connotation that implied that these countries often stood together in their shared interest in opposition to the First World (the wealthy capitalist industrialized powers) and were of strategic importance in the global contention between the First World and the Second World nations (the centrally planned or socialist countries). With the decline of the Second World in the post–Soviet Union era, as China came to play an important role within the capitalist global economy, Third World terminology lost a lot of its meaning. It is used in this text in juxtaposition with other terms that are equally ineffective for capturing the socioeconomic and political diversity of the regions we use it to describe. The compelling reason for continuing to treat these diverse nations as a unit is that the urban issues they confront—and the urban conditions under which so many millions live their lives—bear important similarities, especially when contrasted with prevailing conditions within the cities of richer nations.

In the cities of poor nations, there *are* large pockets of affluence in the neighborhoods where the families of business and government professionals live. Their wealth is clearly reflected in the size of their homes. Their grounds are manicured by individuals selected from a pool of underemployed labor, and their security is provided by public and private guards. The poor live in slums and shantytowns. The latter are constructed initially of cardboard, tin, plastic, or any other cast-off material that will serve to cover a section of a roof or wall. The houses of the poor, on the edge of the city, ring the modern center and the residential districts of the more affluent.

Early in the morning, the poor can be seen leaving their makeshift shelters to travel in their tens and hundreds of thousands toward the city center, markets, comfortable neighborhoods, and industrial sites, where they will toil to produce a subsistence income or continue the long search for work in the hope of finding a way to subsist. Many make the daily journey on foot, crowding the dusty or muddy paths that flank the roads and highways, which carry the autos of better placed citizens to offices and other business establishments. At dusk the pathways leading back to the slums and distant squatter settlements will be clogged again. It is often dangerous to be abroad after dark in many Third World cities, even for the poor.

Although it is true that the less developed nations of the world currently contain two-thirds of the world's population, plus the most rapidly growing urban populations and giant cities, the majority of people who read this text will probably

never set foot in a Third World city. Most of this chapter will be taken up with a political and economic analysis of Third World urbanization. But, we begin with an expanded set of what we have been calling in other chapters "placemarks," descriptions of Mexico City; Bangkok, Thailand; and Lagos, Nigeria, in order to make the analysis that follows more tangible. The descriptions convey only a hint of the economic, political, and social energies of the streets, markets, and neighborhoods of these places. The serious student of the city has no alternative but to visit the cities of poor nations in order to begin to gain a full appreciation.

THIRD WORLD MEGACITIES

Mexico City

Because it is one of the largest urban complexes in the world, Mexico City contains many of the problems of Third World cities in exaggerated proportion. It has serious and perhaps ultimately unmanageable environmental problems; it has a deserved international reputation as a wild city; and it provides an enormous stage for a rich, colorful social and street life.

In 2007 the Mexico City metropolitan region had roughly 19 million people, about the same number as Mumbai or São Paulo. Estimates of the city's population vary depending on which districts are included or excluded. Davis (2006, 5) describes the amorphous conurbation: "The Giant amoeba of Mexico City, already having consumed Toluca, is extending pseudopods that will eventually incorporate much of Central Mexico, including the cities of Cuernavaca, Puebla, Cuautla, Pachuca, and Queretaro, into a single megalopolis with a mid-twenty-first-century population of approximately 50 million—about 40 percent of the national total." Today, the rapidly growing portion of the population that lives in makeshift dwellings in unofficial neighborhoods without fixed street names or addresses has to be estimated rather than counted. The problem of air pollution is quite severe: "The levels of almost any pollutant like nitrogen dioxide (NO_2) now regularly break the international standards by two or three times. Levels of Ozone (O_3), a pollutant that . . . is dangerous to breathe, are twice as high here as the maximum allowed limit for one hour a year and this occurs several hours per day every day" (Yip and Madl 2002). And there is another serious environmental problem. This is the problem of subsidence: Mexico City is sinking. The city gets a substantial portion of its water from underground wells, and the growing need for water pumped from under the city has caused areas of downtown to sink by 10 meters (32.8 feet) over the past 100 years. Water is pumped out twice as fast as the natural rate of replacement. One of the practical consequences of subsidence is that a number of historical buildings in the central city continue to suffer damage due to the instability of the land they are built on. The city's water problems include treating and disposing of wastewater and keeping sewage and drinking water separated. Five percent of the urban population have no direct access to the municipal supply and buy water from tank trucks at a cost equal to from 6 percent to 25 percent of prevailing daily income (Tortajada and Castelán 2003, 124–25). Subsidence and increasing water demand, in the absence of serious conservation and monumental engineering efforts, will continue to compound the problem. Environmentalists have commented, "Judging from the

state of both air and water resources . . . one can conclude that the megalopolis of Mexico City is highly unsustainable in its present condition" (Ezcurra and Mazari-Hiriart 1996).

The city provides a colorful stage for the nation's political dramas. Protest marches in the capital are a frequently employed form of political expression: In one year (1996) there were 3,000 protest marches on behalf of various causes (*New York Times* January 20, 1997). In the summer of 2006 the former mayor of the city, Manuel Lopez Obrador, led a protest demanding a recount of ballots in a presidential election that he had just lost to Felipe Calderón. A year earlier, while he was still mayor, Lopez Obrador led a demonstration in his own city protesting charges of corruption against him (Associated Press August 1, 2006). Mexico City marches involve large numbers of protestors. In January 2007, 75,000 marchers protested the rapidly rising cost of the national staple, the tortilla. In August 2008 an estimated 200,000 marched in the capital to protest the incidence of serious crime, especially killings and kidnappings, that threatened the social order of the city and the nation.

Crime is a serious problem for the residents of Mexico City, and while estimates of its incidence vary, reported victimization rates are so high as to defy belief. In response to a newspaper poll conducted in 1996, 88 percent of respondents reported that they or a family member had been a victim of crime in the previous twelve months (Goldman 1996). In the first half of 2007, an average of 444 serious crimes a day were reported in the city, down from the 777 per day reported in 1994. Yet, the Citizen's Institute for Studies on Insecurity, which surveys residents annually, estimates that only 10 percent of crimes are reported. This would mean that the average number of crimes, including mugging, auto theft, kidnapping, murder, and less serious crimes, is closer to 4,444 per day, which would yield a victimization rate whereby "1.6 crimes per year are perpetrated against each [resident] in the city" (Inter Press Service News Agency January 29, 2008). Much of the high incidence of crime is clearly related to the drug trade: Long a conduit for drugs, Mexico now faces increasing rates of drug use itself. While many of the more violent crimes are the result of drug wars, gangland executions, and related assassinations of officials (including the head of the Federal Police Force in 2008), a share of serious street crime can be traced to the increase in drug use. At the end of the year various news sources reported that Mexico recorded over 5,600 drug-related homicides in 2008, with warring cartels competing to invent increasingly gruesome methods of killing as warnings to their competition and law enforcement agents. Regarding the nature of the executions, one human rights official commented, "They are going to the edge of what is possible for a human being to do" (*Washington Post* December 4, 2008).

Most of the international attention that Mexico City receives focuses on its considerable problems—problems magnified by its standing as one of the three largest Third World cities. What is it like to live in such a place? Opinions vary, but there are those who think that the quality of life is good, and many work actively to improve conditions and the image of the city. Tepito is a *barrio* in the center of the city—a self-aware "neighborhood" of 120,000 people. The area is perceived as a crime- and vice-ridden slum by officials, and every mayor of the city in succession has threatened to eliminate it. Yet, despite its reputation at mid-century as the worst place in the entire city to live (or the most dangerous to visit), by the 1990s its reputation improved considerably as the result of a determined effort on the part of the people

who live, work, and own businesses there. It became known as a district where a variety of shops produced and sold a wide range of consumer goods at bargain prices. But efforts to build a reputation of legitimacy continued to compete with its reputation as a place where one could buy anything, including illegal services, drugs, and pirated goods.

Tepito's redevelopment efforts were sufficiently successful and well publicized to attract more affluent patrons to its shops and markets, but these patrons drew pickpockets whose activities threatened the fragile legitimate retail economy of the area. Tepitans established a vigilante security system: When a pickpocket was detected, he was seized, his head was shaved, and his shoes were confiscated. Sent running through the barrio in this condition, he would be recognized by others and beaten as he ran. Common thieves are often harshly treated by crowds in Third World cities. For a time Tepitans could claim that vigilante justice had the effect of establishing a semblance of stability, but along with the general deterioration of order in the country, the image faded, and the district has now regained its reputation as *barrio bravo*, the wild neighborhood.

The Mexican economy competes for international investments with other world regions that have labor surpluses. It has benefited from its proximity to the United States and from the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994 with expanding numbers of assembly jobs and slowly rising industrial wages. However, by 2007, with the average Mexican manufacturing wage estimated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at $2.08 per hour, Mexican workers could no longer compete with bargain labor in such places as China (75 cents an hour) or Sri Lanka (48 cents) (Cañas, Coronado, and Gilmer 2007). Perhaps the Mexican industrial worker, who could scarcely afford tortillas, had become too affluent to be useful to a world economy seeking bargain labor.

Bangkok

In contrast to most Third World nations, the economies of a few Asian countries have grown remarkably during the last few decades. Those most usually cited are Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Thailand, with some allowances made for a series of economic ups and downs, can be added to the short list of rapidly growing Third World economies. The region around the capital city, Bangkok, has experienced a dramatic economic revolution in the past three decades or so.

In the mid-1990s the rapidly growing greater Bangkok area, with 7 million people, was thirty-five times larger than the next largest city in Thailand. In 2008 various estimates put the population of the metropolitan area at between 10 million and 15 million or more (the uncertainty of the estimate stemming from the usual large numbers of informally established Third World city residents), and the growth of the city continued to dwarf the country's other urban centers. Bangkok has a dual international reputation based in part on its accommodating nature as a place for business interests and in part on tourism, featuring, among other attractions, a sex industry that matches a supply of young Thai women from poor families to the erotic interests of tourists and business travelers. For the last two decades Bangkok has remained an attractive target for corporate investors from around the world, and industrial growth, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, was prodigious. Thai exports,

led by computer parts, consumer electronics, and toys, increased at a rate of 29 percent annually from the mid-1980s through 1990, and the economy overall grew at a rate of 8 to 13 percent between 1987 and 1995, which was one of the most rapid growth rates in the world. While Thailand, along with the other economies of Southeast Asia, suffered a serious financial crisis in the late 1990s, the economy gradually recovered and, before the international economic crisis that began late in 2008, the World Bank was predicting a respectable growth rate of 5 percent for the Thai economy that year.

Land use in Bangkok reflects a tendency for a haphazard side-by-side mix of residences, shops, and other businesses that characterize a good proportion of the city. This is despite the fact that there has existed since 1972 a Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) policy and planning unit that combines the Bangkok and neighboring Thonburi municipalities into a unified planning district. The city's characteristic hodgepodge mosaic of improbable commercial and residential neighbors appears at least in part to result from separate and noncoordinated government agencies having responsibility for different aspects of management: town planning, housing, construction, electrical, water, and police services (Laquian 2005, 162). Another factor producing the chaotic mix is that there is a tradition of informality in determining how a parcel of land will be used. Where planners have been effective in controlling space is in the historically and culturally important sites, like the district around the Imperial Palace and Jade Buddha (Laquian 2005, 59). The preservationist impulse in such locations is reinforced by the importance of tourism.

The wealth of corporate investors in the Bangkok metropolis is displayed conspicuously in the buildings they have erected to show off the up-to-date character and financial success of their companies. Office towers mimic architectural elements of gothic cathedrals and Roman temples. Condominium developments contain miniature Tudor mansions and rococo villas. In the competition among Thai architectural firms to create an authentic Thai style of architecture, boundless creativity produces interesting results. One of the most popular firms created a looming structure for the Bank of Asia in the form of a giant robot; another adapted abstract principles borrowed from European cubism to create a building in the form of a human figure sitting at a computer; and the building called the Elephant Tower purposefully if only vaguely emulates Thailand's national animal. As early as two decades ago, one critic was inspired to comment that the overall effect had "turned fashion into caricature, and given Bangkok the look of a Hollywood film lot" (Scott 1989, 40).

Amidst these structural fantasies, vehicular traffic crawls at an average four miles per hour along major thoroughfares. A new highway system had little impact on Bangkok's notorious, ever-increasing congestion and, if anything, reinforced resident's preference for private transportation. Although Bangkok has a relatively high population density in comparison to other cities, the city defies the usual *negative* correlation between high population density and private car use per capita: It has the highest car use per passenger mile in Asia (Newman and Kenworthy 2007, 68). The number of vehicles competing for space on city thoroughfares increases annually. A significant portion of Bangkok's motorists continue to prefer the two-stroke gasoline powered *tuk-tuk*, a three-wheeled vehicle that is handy in high traffic and for getting around in narrow lanes and alleys. The number of motorcycle taxis continues to grow, "despite the fact that they emit more than ten times the amount of

fine particulate matter per kilometer than a modern car" (Laquian 2005, 182). The hundreds of thousands of motorcycles in the city create a noise level that is a health hazard. A survey of traffic police in the 1980s found that 60 percent had suffered some hearing loss; also, more and more traffic control officers were reporting that they experienced weakness and trouble breathing due to the pollution created by vehicle emissions (*Far Eastern Economic Review* November 29, 1990, 52–53; Xoomsai 1987, 12). City officials were relieved to report that a light rail Skytrain system and a newly opened subway system had begun by 2004 to have an increased ridership. Still, potential Skytrain users complained that fares were too high, parking near stops was inadequate, suburbs had not been connected to the city center, and older people had a hard time climbing up to the elevated stations (Loquian 2005, 182). Bangkok's traffic congestion, pollutants, and noise continue to enjoy an international reputation as among the worst in Asia and the world.

Hundreds of manufacturing companies that have gone into operation since the 1980s contribute to Bangkok's air quality problems. By 2000, the government had undertaken pollution control measures and was hiring international consulting firms to develop further pollution control programs. The prospect for success was unclear. According to one U.S. firm that received a $7.7 million contract from the Thai government to work with the 500 companies in the industrial district of Samut Parkarn, emphasis was to be placed on *voluntary* adoption of new, less environmentally damaging technologies (Harrigan 2000).

During its period of rapid growth, it may be unfair to hold Bangkok to standards of orderly development and environmental responsibility that cities in Western nations failed to live up to during their periods of revolutionary growth. There is historical evidence to support the optimistic hypothesis that as economic development occurs in particular countries, environmental integrity suffers most only in the early stages. But, over time, when the public gains in affluence and demands a safer and healthier environment, government agencies respond accordingly and improvement occurs as inefficient and dirty technologies are replaced. However, this pattern of improvement is not automatic and depends on the development of effective government infrastructure and policies (Schwela et al. 2006, 3–4). If the conditions that attend the growth of Thailand's premier city are the price to pay for raising the living standards of the mass of its population, then the costs of growth may be understood as the kind of trade-off that may be expected on the frontiers of urbanization.

But one misuse of history is to assume that it will repeat itself in different places at different times, that past patterns in now more advanced economies inevitably predict the future of less developed ones, and that a hidden force guides the prospects of all nations along a convergent path toward equivalent and favorable outcomes. As we see later in the chapter, some find a different kind of speculation more convincing. This is the view that the existing international division of labor and wealth among nations may block the progress of poorer nations, especially improvements in the health and well-being of the poorest citizens of those nations. In Bangkok and other cities where their numbers are great, poor slum dwellers can't afford to wait on the chance that the life-threatening conditions under which they work and their children play may improve in future generations. While it is difficult to establish close estimates, most projections indicate that a fifth of Bangkok's population

are slum dwellers. Most of them live in makeshift shelters, in this case typically built on stilts above stagnant pools of pollution and over mosquito marshes, areas which are prone to flooding. Susanne Thorbek spent six months living in one of these slums while researching the lives of the women she writes about in her book, *Voices from the City* (1987). The slum was built on the edge of the harbor, and parts of it were at the time targeted for removal by the Port Authority. Thorbek's description is vivid:

> The houses are varied: some are good, built of teak, raised on stilts above the muddy ground; others are just small huts thrown together with odd bits of wood and sacking. There are large puddles and small ponds along the road, and tall coarse grass is growing between them. Rubbish lies everywhere . . . sometimes a pile of scrap metal which the Port Authority or one of the factories in the harbor area have thrown out.
>
> People, mostly women and children, are standing or sitting in the ponds washing plastic . . . a little further down the road a herd of the nearby slaughterhouse's cows are grazing. A good, solid, well-kept walkway leads up to my house. It was built the last time the people were forced to move. There is also a short-cut. Here the walkways are just built from single planks; several are broken and in some places supports have collapsed. When you go along the walkways it is like going through people's living rooms. Most of the houses are open out toward the walkways and groups of women, with an occasional man and many children, sit talking. (38)

Most of the women who lived in the slum had worked in the export factories at some time. Thorbek's subjects resented the conditions of factory work. Their supervisors were authoritarian; they were watched constantly and not allowed to talk with each other; and they often had to pay a deposit on the industrial machinery at their workstation in case they damaged it. If they were let go before the end of the sixth-month trial employment period, they lost the damage deposit. There was no accident insurance (Thorbek 1987, 52–58). The situation has not changed much since Thorbek's study. In 2006 Richard Swift described the precarious lives of the resident squatters of Klong Toey. This is Bangkok's largest slum, where squatters have settled along the waterfront on land that belongs (again) to the Port Authority. Residents had been removed from illegally held plots of land where they had built their shelters many times in the past and were ever watchful, anticipating another forced eviction. In 2006 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (later deposed in a popular uprising in 2008) declared that there would be an end to all slum settlements within a decade. But, as one resident said, the poorly paid employees of assembly plants and those who competed to provide goods and services in their home-based small shops and businesses had little option but to continue to find spaces to put up their do-it-yourself housing. He said, "There used to be 500 slums in Bangkok and now there are 2,000. In 10 years there will be 3,000. It's like a balloon—you push the air down in one place and it just pushes up in another" (Swift 2006).

The Thai government has developed admirable plans for dealing with the issue of slums and the concentration of urban growth in the congested capital. Yet implementation has been problematic on both counts. Thailand has received international recognition for devising a plan in the 1980s that proposed to reclaim squatters' lands and compensate both poor squatters and the land's rightful owners. Under the plan, squatters would relinquish their dubious claim to the plot they



It is a common feature of Third World cities that the housing of the poor—which often started out as squatter settlement—is found in close proximity to high-rise relative luxury. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

were living on in exchange for secure tenure in a modern apartment in a high-rise building that would be built on a fraction of the reclaimed land that they and their neighbors had been collectively occupying. Rightful owners would be amply compensated by the commercial development at market value of the vacated lands (Perlman and O'Meara Sheehan 2007, 179). It appears that the scheme is not universally appreciated by the squatters. They are wary as to whether they do indeed have a firm claim to the new apartments. The high-rises are associated with drug use and social isolation, and many depend on the villagelike organization of the slum for the viability of modest businesses they are used to operating from their doorsteps (Swift 2006).

Thailand has developed a plan to relieve congestion in and around Bangkok and to redirect growth to the rest of the country, an ambitious step in the direction of redistributing some of the economic growth associated with urbanization to formerly neglected northern regions of the country. The cities of Chiang Mai and Khon Kaen were chosen for promotion as new urban growth poles. The promotion of growth in the northern regions has included investment incentives such as tax write-offs for businesses, government-sponsored infrastructure developments in transportation and communication, and maintaining a minimum wage structure (wages will remain somewhat lower in the provinces than in the capital region). While the policy has been successful in generating substantial industrial growth in the two regional centers, critics charge that it has not relieved problems of congestion and environmental degradation in the capital, and it has created similar environmental problems

in and around Chiang Mai and Khon Kaen, including hazardous workplace conditions similar to those in Bangkok (Glassman and Sneddon 2003).

Lagos

Lagos, Nigeria, provides an example of the kind of difficult-to-control urban growth that has characterized urbanization in poor African nations. This is the former capital city of a nation of 150 million people; divided between the Muslim North and Christian South, Nigeria contains many more than 200 indigenous ethnic groups. The country has experienced attempted secession, civil war, periods of military rule, and guerilla banditry since gaining independence from Britain in 1960. The 2007 presidential elections marked the first time that power was to be transferred democratically between leaders; but the landslide victory of the ruling party was marred by widespread allegations of gross fraud, and more than 200 people were killed, including some political candidates for office (*London Times* April 23, 2007). The country is rich in oil but the annual income per capita income was only $930 in 2007, and the incomes of many Nigerians continue to fall far below that.

Despite serious internal problems and unrest, the country has made some faltering steps toward becoming a powerful nation commensurate with its size and resources. Through the early 2000s Nigeria's government was often ranked at or near the top of watchdog group Transparency International's list of "most corrupt governments." The scale of corruption has at times been quite impressive: For example, a 1991 audit revealed that $18 billion in oil income had vanished without a trace (Morris 1998). Yet, by 2008 the government's international image had improved, and Transparency International ranked the country at number 121 of a total of 180 nations surveyed, with a third of the world's nations seen as more corrupt than Nigeria (*Daily Champion* [Lagos] October 2, 2008).

In the mid-1970s, Lagos had a population of about 2.5 million. The 1991 census recorded 5.6 million, a figure generally considered by experts to be somewhat lower than the city's actual size: Rapid growth continues to make estimates difficult. The city may have had about 9 million people in 2005 and was expected to be home to 10.5 million by 2010. The transfer of the national capital and its government offices from Lagos, located on the coast, to the more central location of Abuja in 1991, has had a modest, at best, impact on the apparently inexorable growth of Lagos. While longer term projections are always risky, the United Nations has estimated that the population of Lagos will reach 14 million by 2020 (United Nations Population Division 2008, 176). The projection may well be off by millions at that date.

Historically, the heart of Lagos was located on a coastal island, which initially concentrated but failed to limit its growth. By 1990, growth had crossed the bridges and was well underway on the mainland, spreading along the coast and pushing inland. The city region includes much swampland and is administered by twenty separate local governments. The 200 poor residential areas scattered along the periphery of the city are without sewers or paved roads; some of these are built over marshland or water. The residences of the wealthy are concentrated on two islands, which are fortified for protection (Jacot 1999). Lagos has gained a reputation as one of the world's most dangerous cities. Police corruption is generally acknowledged

to be rampant. Various law enforcement operations within the city have been militarized, and affluent citizens hire security organizations to protect their homes and businesses (Babalola and Adepoju 2000).

Yet people continue to come to Lagos, hundreds of thousands of migrants each year, and they survive there. Half of the city's residents are estimated to be dependent on the informal or *underground economy* (a concept discussed later in this chapter), providing untaxed and unregulated goods and services. The informal economy is a vital feature of the organization of the city's poorer communities. In the early 1960s, Marris (1961, 129–31) reported that street sellers in Lagos depended on maintaining networks of regular clients in order for their businesses to survive. Thirty years later, Peil (1991, 94–95) again described how important informal self-employment was in giving people in poor neighborhoods a livelihood that allowed at least minimal subsistence. In one poor district of the city, one-fourth of the men and three-fourths of the women were self-employed street traders. Peil described how some of the businesses were very modest and barely provided subsistence incomes. All social classes contributed to a demand for prepared foods that were sold in marketplaces, door-to-door, and even on the grounds of the local police college where the illegality of the traders (they lacked proper licenses) has traditionally been overlooked. As the city sprawls outward, new arrivals with little cash, in addition to providing their own work, create their own squatter housing out of inexpensive or scavenged materials on land owned by the government or private interests.

Government policy toward street traders and unauthorized (illegal) spontaneous housing development has been inconsistent. In the past, squatter's dwellings were periodically destroyed and informal markets razed when their locations were considered problematic. In 1990, an informal housing district called Maroko with an estimated 300,000 residents was leveled by government forces. The community was located in a low-lying area along the coast and was visible from Victoria Island, the original heart of Lagos, which included one of the protected havens of the affluent. People reportedly were killed in the demolition of the area considered by the affluent to be an eyesore. Many of the survivors erected a "New Maroko," some distance down the coast, on a site sanctioned by government. In another case in April 1999, Ikosi Market, which reportedly employed 12,000, was destroyed by government forces. The official rationale was that it was a firetrap and magnet for criminals. The marketers, who fought back until police reinforcements arrived, estimated that several dozen of their number had been killed and a quarter of the market structures destroyed (Otchet 1999). According to an Amnesty International report, government forces were deployed to evict residents of a different part of the city, Makoko, as recently as 2005.

> During three days at the end of April 2005, approximately 3,000 residents of the community of Makoko in Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, were forcibly evicted from their houses. Bulldozers came in and started demolishing houses, churches, and medical clinics. Amnesty International visited Makoko on 5 May 2005 and spoke with dozens of evictees. None had been supplied with adequate alternative housing and many were deprived of schooling or means of earning a living. Those evicted claimed that they had neither been given prior notice nor consulted on the planned evictions. Some of them, including children, had been beaten up by the law enforcement officials and suffered

> injuries as a result of the disproportionate force used, others had had all their belongings and houses destroyed by the government forces (Amnesty International 2006).

A more ambitious and humane policy is now touted by government: The avowed aim is to provide housing for those evicted from strategically important squatter settlements, and to upgrade infrastructure in and around market areas that provide livelihoods. In mid-2008 there were several plans in effect including a nationwide slum eradication and resettlement project to which the government had committed the equivalent of about $12.7 million (*Africa News* July 21, 2008). In October that year, the federal government, in partnership with the World Bank, augmented its slum and market areas plan with a $110 million nationwide project (*Africa News* October 7, 2008). The probability that these programs will make a significant difference in the lives of poor urban Nigerians must be considered in light of the fact that the country's slum population will soon number an estimated 55 million people (*Africa News* December 20, 2006).

For many of the poorest residents of Lagos and cities like it, earning a living involves engaging in survival strategies that allow them to get by day by day. This means taking advantage of every informal opportunity, often making something from nothing. One man earned $65 a month, hauling garbage away for private households and another $55 from salvaging what was reusable. Children fill buckets with water during a downpour and offer to wash the mud from the feet of passersby for a few cents. A man pays $6 to a tanker driver to fill his 100-gallon drum and resells the water by the bucketful (Otchet 1999). At a construction site, wheelbarrows placed under an awning are rented out by the night as sheltered sleeping places. And "area boys"—loose gangs of unemployed young men—look for any opportunity to rob, shake down, and extort as an adaptation to a desperate situation where the rule of law is ineffective. In one organized, large-scale shakedown operation, gangs of area boys occupied the construction site of a proposed Central Bank of Nigeria building in July 2008, demanding "gratification from the contractors" before allowing them to proceed with the building project (*Africa News* July 17, 2008).

Because people *can* survive, and because there is a chance to tap into the nation's wealth where it is concentrated—65 percent of Nigeria's GNP is generated in Lagos—people will continue to come. In 2020, if trends hold, we will be describing a Lagos of 14 million or 15 million people or more. What are the prospects that the national government, deriving substantial wealth from oil exports, will be able to enhance living and earning conditions for the people living on the edge of survival in its cities? The fruition of ambitious plans depends on a fragile set of conditions including political willingness and stability in government. In 2008 oil production and shipment operations were still beset by rebels who kidnapped and sabotaged and reduced production to such an extent that major oil corporations threatened to withdraw from the country. The global economic recession of 2008 reduced world demand for oil and weighed especially heavy on the underdeveloped nations of the world, threatening to shut down the fledgling Nigerian stock exchange late in that same year.

These descriptions of Third World nations and their megacities convey some of the dramatic variety and contradictions that these cities represent. In fact, however,

most of the urban growth taking place in poor countries involves smaller cities of a million or fewer people. What we need are some conceptual tools for making sense of Third World urbanization in its many forms. We turn now to an analysis that provides us with some structural ways to consider urbanization in poor countries.

MIGRATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

Table 6.1 presents population data from selected countries in each of the major underdeveloped and developing regions of the world. These countries have been selected because they represent the substantial differences that exist within the major regions in overall population size, as well as in the level and rate of urbanization. There are several important points of contrast contained in the table that illustrate some of the difficulty involved in referring to "Third World urbanization" as if it implies some uniformity of patterns of change among nations. Comparing urbanization levels (the increase in the percent of a country's total population living in cities), there are meaningful differences both within and between regions for the periods 1980–1990 and 1990–2005. We have within Asia two countries with more than a billion people experiencing substantially different rates of urban growth, India with a 6 percent increase in the urban population sector over twenty-five years and China with a 20 percent increase. Malaysia experienced a 25 percent increase in the proportion of its urban population in the same period but had an overall population of just 25 million people in the most recent comparison year, a mere fraction of the size of many Asian nations. Yet, despite differences in size, urban growth produces similar challenges throughout the less developed and newly developing world, as we have seen in the Mexico City, Bangkok, and Lagos case studies, in terms of the concentration of wealth, the demands urban growth place on national resources, and the impact of growing urban centers on the environment. A comparison of world regions reveals that the increase in the proportional increase in urbanization levels is greatest in Africa and Asia in contrast to some of the countries in Latin America where urbanization levels have reached or exceeded levels in many European nations. Within Latin America we find a contrast between some of the poorer and smaller nations and the larger, more advanced economies. Overall it makes sense that the nations with the most rapid proportional increase over the twenty-five-year period tend to be those with larger proportions of the population still living in rural areas, hence the greatest potential for continued rural to urban migration. Table 6.1 also contains two measures of urban population concentration: the proportion of the *urban* population concentrated in cities of a million or more people, and the proportion of the urban population living in a country's single largest city. We will discuss the latter measure when we address *urban primacy* (the degree of concentration of population in the largest city) later in the chapter.

Urban population growth is the result of both the natural increase of urban populations (higher birthrates than death rates among populations already living in cities) and migration from rural areas. Even though migration contributes something less than half to the growing numbers in most regions, the characteristics of the migrant population cause it to have an especially significant impact on urban growth. First, the majority of migrants are young adults in the peak reproductive

Table 6.1. Population, Urbanization Levels, and Percent Changes for Selected Countries

	Total Population in Millions	*Percent Living in Urban Areas*			*% of Total Population in Cities of a Million or More*		*Largest City as Percent of Urbanized Population*	
	2005	*1980*	*1990*	*2005*	*1990*	*2005*	*1990*	*2005*
Africa								
Kenya	23.4	16%	18%	21%	6%	8%	32%	39%
Mali	13.5	19	23	31	8	10	36	33
Nigeria	131.5	27	35	48	11	14	15	17
Ghana	22.1	31	37	48	12	16	21	19
Côte d'Ivoire	18.2	35	40	45	17	20	42	44
Zambia	11.7	40	39	35	9	11	23	31
Asia								
Bangladesh	141.8	14	20	25	9	13	32	35
Thailand	64.2	17	29	32	11	10	37	32
China	1,304.5	20	27	40	13	18	42	40
Indonesia	220.6	22	31	48	9	12	14	12
India	1,094.6	23	26	29	9	12	14	12
Pakistan	155.8	28	31	35	16	18	22	21
Malaysia	25.3	42	50	67	6	6	13	8
Philippines	83.1	38	49	63	14	14	27	21
Latin America								
Guatemala	12.6	37	41	47	—	—	22	17
El Salvador	6.9	39	49	60	19	22	39	37
Bolivia	9.2	46	56	64	25	31	29	26
Mexico	103.1	66	73	76	32	35	25	25
Brazil	186.4	66	75	84	34	37	13	12
Chile	16.3	81	83	88	35	35	42	44
Argentina	38.7	83	87	90	39	39	37	36
Venezuela	26.6	79	84	93	34	37	17	12

Source: World Bank 2007 World Development Indicators, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/table3-10.pdf and World Bank 2000, 230-231, World Development Indicators, *www.worldbank.org/data/ivdi2000/pdfs/tab3_10.pdf* 150-154.

age groups, which increases their potential contribution to natural increase (Todaro [1979] 1984, 16). Second, the migrants arrive as ready participants for the urban labor force; consequently, their arrival places immediate demands on the employment market (Gugler 1986). In high migration areas (e.g., many African nations), it is often the case that a relatively small proportion of the adult population was actually born in the city. On the other hand, an examination of trends in the very largest cities indicates a lessening impact of in-migration there, accompanied in some instances by an overall decrease in reproduction rates in the nations with expanding economies (Gugler 2004, 13–14).

The great majority of rural-urban migrants have moved to the cities for economic reasons. Differences between rural average incomes and those in growing cities remain a strong incentive in producing waves of rural to urban migration in less developed nations around the world (Deshingkar 2006, 220). Although noneconomic factors may precipitate an individual's decision to migrate, it is the overall imbalance of life chances between rural and urban areas that favors the city and provides the general momentum for movement to urban areas. Contributing to the imbalance at the rural end of migration streams are growth in rural populations and changes in the structure of agriculture (the growing problem of landlessness among rural populations) that, in the most extreme cases, make migration imperative. With the understanding that the decision to migrate involves weighing the costs and benefits of rural and urban life, India has promoted "watershed development schemes" to try to stem migration from rural communities. These programs are designed to optimize water resources to enhance agricultural productivity, a strategy in line with the understanding that uncertain agricultural productivity is a key reason for rural out-migration. Meanwhile, India's growing cities and growing opportunities for employment in city-based industry continue to increase the magnetism of urban employment; in India, as elsewhere, out-migrants are simply attracted to cities by the fact that they can earn far more there than they could under the exploitative terms of rural employment (Deshingkar 2006, 213–14, 220).

In general, whether migrants move to small nearby towns or more distant larger cities depends on the relative income-generating opportunities of the areas and the level of resources that individual migrants carry with them. "In areas where tenant farmers and smallholders are expelled from rural areas because of increasing concentration of land in large, mechanized commercial farms, migrants tend to come from the surrounding region, essentially because they often lack the networks and financial means to reach larger, more distant urban centers" (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2006, 174–75). On the other hand, some migrants *prefer* to remain close to their home village, which means they will try to find work in towns and smaller cities—this way they can continue to raise food at home. Whatever the distance traveled by migrants, it is common for rural households to have one or more members away, working in the city. In three case studies from Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania presented by Bah and colleagues (2006), between 50 and 80 percent of households had at least one migrant member away. In some areas they found that some period of work in the city was normative for young men. "In southeast Nigeria, migration is considered essential to achieving economic and social success and young men who do not migrate or commute to town are often labeled as idle and may become the object of ridicule" (63). The researchers also observed the increasing independent movement of young

unmarried women in recent years in the three case-study countries. For women, migration is connected to more employment opportunities as domestic workers in cities and new tourist resorts. The migration of single rural women is acceptable so long as they continue to contribute to their parental household back in the village (Bah et al. 2006). Gugler (1986) has noted that, although many face hardship and few prosper, most migrant urbanites are convinced that they have improved their condition. Their stories, whether of survival or success, have kept others coming.

And while individual decisions to migrate result in the perceived improvement of personal living standards, the aggregate effect of millions of such decisions is reflected in high urbanization rates and attendant problems of city growth. Growth has created massive urban unemployment and underemployment rates, congestion and uncontrolled patterns of settlement, aggravated housing shortages, and reinforced an inability on the part of governments to provide adequate services. These conditions have generated both concern and sharp disagreement over the question of whether galloping urbanization in underdeveloped countries is beneficial or detrimental to economic growth and the welfare of the populations involved.

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

"Globalization," the Idea, has gripped the imagination of policymakers and social scientists around the world. In part the concept entails the assumption that a single global marketplace has emerged and that all local and regional economies are being shuffled into their natural niches as suppliers of raw materials, manufactured goods, services, and labor within a rational optimizing structure. The formula typically entails the notion that there is a certain efficiency, inevitability, convergence of attendant patterns of change, and the promise of improving material conditions for all peoples in the naturally evolving global system. The energy for the entire process is supplied by profit-seeking interests (private individuals and corporations) operating in the world marketplace. However, not all observers agree that the evolving system is essentially beneficent; that is, there is disagreement over whether the emerging economic order featuring market-led change will distribute greater prosperity to all peoples. This debate has been going on for some time among social scientists concerned with the problems of severe inequality and poverty in the Third World, and the debate interests us here as it touches on the role of cities and the process of rapid urbanization in underdevelopment and development.

Those who study Third World urbanization have long been divided over the fundamental issue of how to explain the persistent state of underdevelopment of poor nations' economies, particularly, the very poor circumstances under which a large proportion of the populations of poor nations struggle to get by in both cities and rural areas. Analyses proceed from the underlying assumptions of two opposed paradigms, the *modernization* approach and the *political economy* (largely, *dependency theory*) approach. Urbanization plays an important part in both schemes. In the modernization view, urbanization accelerates the diffusion of technological innovation and more efficient economic and social arrangements. According to the diametrically opposed arguments of most political economists, growing cities symptomize the inequality and parasitic domination that characterize the under-

development process. It is important to understand the reasoning involved in each approach and, since writers often do not explicitly acknowledge the assumptions upon which their reasoning is based, it is useful to be able to recognize which frame of analysis is being employed. This is especially the case in the present era, a decade into the twenty-first century, because the shift in language to "globalization," seen as an evolutionary process moving all societies forward toward greater prosperity within a common pattern of market-led development, fully embraces the assumptions of one paradigm (modernization theory) to the exclusion of the other. At times paradigm shifts in science signal the abandonment of an outmoded argument for a clearly simpler and superior one. In the *social* sciences, on the other hand, the ascendancy of a particular paradigm often represents something more partial and temporary. All of the major debates in sociology reflect the fact that two or more sets of opposed assumptions compete to explain the fundamental nature of the phenomenon under study, and that is the case with regard to understanding the role of the city in underdevelopment.

Modernization

The roots of the modernization school lie deep within classical sociology. What we are considering is not a particular theory, but a paradigm, a general framework of understanding that includes certain widely shared assumptions about how social change proceeds. This framework, reaching back to the work of Tönnies and Durkheim, sees modernization as a progression from simpler to more complex and interdependent forms of association. Change comes about as a society shakes loose from "traditional" technologies and archaic social and economic arrangements. Tradition and modernity are thus seen as polar opposites; as one emerges, the other subsides. In this view, change takes place at different rates in different societies, but eventually all societies will undergo such a transformation, converging toward a similar end point. In contrast to traditional society, which embodies the opposite conditions, modernization involves movement toward an industrial market economy that is characterized by continuous economic growth, the proliferation of bureaucracy and specialized knowledge, high rates of literacy and formal education, a reduction in inequality, lowered birth and death rates, a decline of religious influence, meritocracy, a tendency toward democratic political forms, and urbanization.

In its application to Third World societies, the modernization approach is presented as a formula for economic development. The problem of underdevelopment is seen as stemming from entrenched tradition and a failure to adopt modern values, methods, and economic and social arrangements. "Development is conceptualized as gradual, qualitative passage from less to more differentiated social forms" (Portes 1976, 63).

Although those who operate within the modernization framework often express concern about the disruptive social consequences associated with rapid urbanization rates, they find offsetting advantages in urban growth. For example, migration to the city is seen as an important source of positive change. "Employment in modern jobs in urban settings connects rural-urban migration to economic expansion and modernization, linking modernity to geographic mobility. Development,

occupational change and migration appear strongly interrelated, particularly when employment is expanding in modern sectors within large cities, drawing rural labor surpluses" (Goldscheider 1983, 237). Cities are the points from which productive innovations emanate; they are thus creators of wealth. The view is advanced forcefully by Tannerfeldt and Ljung (2006, 29–30). In a section of their text titled "Urbanization and Economic Development Go Together," the authors write, "There is no economic development without urbanization. Attempts to curb urbanization may have an adverse effect on economic development. Large cities are most productive." Their reasoning is based on historical correlations. "Countries with higher GDP and income per capita are more urbanized . . . Urban centers account for a much larger share of GDP than the population share. Thus they are in fact 'engines of development.'"

Roseland and Soots (2007, 152) would at first appear to be in full agreement regarding the potential benefits of urban growth in poor countries. "Cities make countries rich. Highly urbanized countries have higher incomes than other nations, more stable economies, stronger institutions, and more ability to withstand the volatility of the global economy . . . Cities are also engines of rural development. For example, improved infrastructure between rural areas and the cities that rely on them increases rural productivity and enhances rural residents' access to education, health care, markets, credit, information, and other services." However, the authors raise a caution regarding the *distribution of the benefits* of urban growth, and this is an important point here. "Despite the enormous potential of cities to reduce poverty, recent evidence shows that the wealth they generate does not automatically lead to poverty reduction. On the contrary, inequalities within cities are on the rise, particularly in Africa and Latin America" (Roseland and Soots 2007, 153). Moreover, they observe that serious inequality and exclusion appear to be permanent fixtures of urban life, and here they part company with modernization theorists. Modernization theorists acknowledge that rapid urbanization may involve social and economic dislocations, but these are simply inevitable, *temporary* by-products of the progress that they symptomize. In that view, rational economic competition may appear to treat the loser roughly in the short term, but in the end all will profit from the economic growth and the overall expansion of economic opportunities. It is a familiar invocation.

Political Economy

The political economy perspective on urbanization involves a critical interpretation of common patterns of market-induced economic change, focuses on the dislocations and systemic inequalities in the concentration of wealth and power, and sees these conditions as potentially permanent rather than temporary characteristics of prevalent patterns of change. Once again, we are not considering a particular theory but a set of assumptions about the causes of underdevelopment and the role of urbanization. In this approach, emphasis is placed on historical as well as the present relationships between rich and poor countries that have long been enmeshed in a common global economic system. Underdevelopment is understood as the consequence of the ability of rich and industrialized economies to dominate

poorer and less powerful territories. In the past, the political structure of domination involved the formal apparatus of colonialism. Powerful countries have since learned that their economic interests could be served with less trouble and obligation simply by dictating terms of trade to former colonies that have remained economically and technologically dependent. The condition is referred to alternatively as *neocolonialism* or *dependency*.

It is understood that this external structure of underdevelopment is articulated within poor nations by patterns of urbanization that still reflect the political and spatial arrangements of the colonial past. Urban centers are the collection and transhipment points for raw materials destined for the world market. In the hinterland, the labor that produces materials for export receives a small fraction of the market value of its product. Within the domestic economy, the greatest share of the value produced by rural economic activity is realized as profit in the largest urban centers. Cities are the centers of wealth, the home of the elite, and the seats of government. In this light, they stand in an exploitative relationship to the remainder of the nation. This feature of underdevelopment is aptly termed *internal colonialism*: "a process that produces certain intranational forms of patterned socioeconomic inequality directly traceable to the exploitative practices through which national and international institutions are linked in the interest of surplus extraction and capital accumulation" (Walton 1975, 34–35).

In an early formulation, Frank (1967, 8–12) linked together the internal and external structures of underdevelopment, seeing the condition as the result of a chainlike series of exploitative relationships. In these relationships, powerful world centers, *metropoles*, dominated the economic, political, and social life of intermediate satellites, the urban centers of the underdeveloped countries themselves. These intermediate satellites, in turn, extracted economic surpluses from smaller, subordinate centers, and so on down the chain. The weight of the entire system ultimately rested on the rural producer.

Although the rigidity of Frank's interpretation has been criticized, his basic thesis, that the relationship between the metropolis and hinterland is parasitic, continues to provide the cornerstone upon which political economy's analysis of urbanization is built. That analysis has increasingly focused on the question of how patterns of urbanization reflect the conflict between social classes as opposed to the more abstract idea of conflict between urban and rural places.

The political economy paradigm is linked historically to and shares certain similarities with the Marxian tradition's analysis of imperialism. These similarities include a distrust of market (capitalist) forces for producing for the general good and an emphasis on the primary importance of external relationships between rich and poor countries in perpetuating the impoverishment of Third World economies. However, the perspective has become so widely employed and ideologically diffused since the 1970s that any formal link to Marxist analysis is often indiscernible.

The conceptual division of the world's nations into two tiers, the former colonial powers and the former colonies, the core and the periphery, implies a rigid system in which wealthy nations are bound to succeed and poor nations bound to fail economically. The implicit rigidity of the model cannot account for the dramatic economic growth and the improved conditions of labor in such places as Taiwan and

South Korea. Wallerstein's (1979, 1980) *world system theory* corrected the stagnant bias of the dichotomous model by dividing the nations of the world into three tiers: the core, the *semi-periphery*, and the periphery. The semi-periphery includes states that have managed some upward (or downward) mobility within the past few centuries. Wallerstein's interpretation remains within the political economy approach. He sees the relationships between rich (core) and poor (periphery) countries as essentially exploitive, with poor nations remaining in a dependent role. However, he finds that the long view of history reveals that the international economic system makes adjustments that affect those particularly weak nations within the core and those particularly well-placed economies on the periphery, causing some of each to move into the second tier, the semi-periphery. In the present phase of world economic change, the internationalization of the labor market has allowed some Third World economies to move into the semi-periphery.

Urbanization and Social Inequalities

Political economists distinguish between economic growth and economic development. Measurable economic *growth* may occur with relatively few people enjoying its benefits, or it may even cost jobs or eliminate longstanding modes of livelihood. The import and sale of high-priced luxury goods may be measured as economic activity, but aside from elite buyers and sellers, few others may gain from it. The introduction of more efficient manufacturing technologies from advanced countries may produce more goods for domestic consumption or export but at the cost of jobs. The consolidation of small holdings of farmland and the mechanization and corporate commercialization of food production and distribution may lead to an increase in exports while impoverishing former small-holders and driving them off their land. By contrast, *development* refers to economic changes that involve broad or broadening participation as indicated by the improvement of the general material conditions of a population.

How does urbanization fit into this picture? According to political economists, patterns of Third World urban growth that were set in place in the colonial era continue to have serious consequences for the prospects of economic development—that is, widespread participation in the benefits of economic growth. For example, it has been argued in the case of West Africa that current patterns of urbanization stem from export-oriented colonial economies that concentrated economic activity around a dominant port city: The Lagos case study earlier in the chapter is a good example. After independence, these former administrative centers became the seats of national government, located far from interior populations. In the case of Nigeria, the transfer of the national capital from coastal Lagos to more centrally located Abuja was an attempt to remedy this. As peripherally located capital cities tended to receive a disproportionate share of attention and the investment of national wealth, the benefits of these investments came to symbolize regional inequalities that left out large segments of the national population (Gugler and Flanagan [1978] 2009). The growth of cities, even the growth of universities and medical centers in capital cities, may indicate a continuing concentration of benefits in terms of geographic location rather than signaling their diffusion, if the fruits of investments remain dis-

proportionately in and around the capital, and distant citizens remain underserved, for example, in terms of public education and basic medical care.

Those that subscribe to the modernization perspective, on the other hand, take the notion of the inevitable diffusion of the benefits of economic and urban growth as their central assumption. To speak of economic growth anywhere is to talk about development on the national scale. Urban and rural interests, and those of the rich and poor, are ultimately one and the same, since all share in the benefits of an expanding economy. And cities are ideal environments for growing the economy and increasing opportunities. The paradigm demands the following conclusions regarding urban investments, offered in this case by a senior World Bank economist:

> The fact that certain public investments are made in urban areas does not necessarily mean that they are primarily or exclusively made in support of the urban economy. Investments in urban port facilities, warehousing, marketing facilities, and transport terminals may be crucial ingredients for a strategy of accelerated rural development. It would thus be overly simplistic to aggregate all public expenditures in urban areas and compare this with aggregate public expenditures in rural areas and to conclude that the former are made in support of urban development and the latter in support of rural development. (Linn 1982, 631)

As long as the more efficient collection, transshipment, and export of raw materials are assumed to benefit rural populations, this reasoning is inescapable.

Evaluating the Modernization and Political Economy Perspectives

Does urbanization, especially market-led rapid urbanization, improve the material condition of national populations? It is impossible to argue with the historical record that demonstrates that living conditions improved dramatically in those nations that underwent urbanization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But it would be equally mistaken to assume that history automatically repeats itself. Those nations urbanizing today are doing so in a world much different from that of the nineteenth or even the twentieth centuries. Economic and political arrangements that crystallized in previous eras have carried forward in shaping today's globalized world economy. Today, rich and powerful nations, global financial and regulatory institutions, organize the terms under which poorer nations undergo change. In the introduction to a collection of essays titled *Market Economy and Urban Change* that he co-edited with Mohamed Hamza, Roger Zetter (2004) carefully unpacks the structural framework within which urbanization currently takes shape in a way that informs the modernization-political economy debate.

According to Zetter, all efforts to slow or discourage market-led urbanization have failed or been counterproductive: The continued growth of cities large and small in poor countries is a fixture of the present and future. "Cities in the developing world play a key role in a globalizing world, mediating the process of economic globalization, on the one hand, and domestic human and economic development, on the other. Their unique qualities and resources provide competitive advantages, enabling them to act both as engines of economic growth and agents of social

change." However, at the same time prevailing patterns of growth call into question the growing city's "sustainability as environmental conditions continue to deteriorate" (Zetter 2004, 13). So, as modernization theorists would have it, Third World cities have a key role to play as leading economic engines, but everywhere growth is producing conditions that have potentially irreparable environmental and social costs, including poverty and growing social inequality.

The World Trade Organization oversees the regulations that govern international trade, and the World Bank provides support for a variety of economic development and social expenditure (e.g., publicly funded housing) projects that require governments to borrow. Both of these international agencies have considerable leverage in influencing economic and social policy within poor countries. Together, they favor policies that aim to reduce restrictions on direct foreign investment by multinational companies, reduce what they see as unproductive government social expenditures that hobble national resources, and also reduce duties or tariffs that restrict the free-flowing import or export of goods. Governments that have resisted the adoption of stringent domestic policies and liberalized open door trade and investment attitudes regarding foreign capital have risked "marginalization, perhaps total exclusion . . . from the new world order" (Zetter 2004, 13).

While the market logic of the externally imposed policies is self-evident, in practice capital-friendly, low public-spending policies have produced serious social consequences. The restrictions have translated as reduced budget allocations for health and education initiatives, the elimination of government subsidies for certain food items and the subsequent increase in the price of basic foods, and a similar increase in consumer costs as governments are forced to allow the price of formerly cheaply supplied services like water and transportation to rise to market-determined levels. Externally imposed measures to limit government spending have meant a reduction in government jobs and, in general, strict curtailment of policies designed to help the poor. The World Bank has taken the view that "equity measures" undertaken by governments in the past, measures aimed at a more inclusive sharing of available resources among all social classes, have been unproductive (Zetter 2004, 15).

Thereby, foreign regulators have been keen to insure that urban policies emphasize "market enablement" rather than social equity strategies in cities. The effect of two decades of these external restrictions has been quite evident in cities. "The contrast between the city as a business and the city as a social entity in which its urban institutions respond to the needs of its citizens could not be more striking. By restraining the direct modes of intervention, market enablement displaces the capacity of urban administrations to tackle . . . the highly regressive social, environmental and economic patterns of urbanization generated by the dynamics of market-led city growth" (Zetter 2004, 16). Zetter remarked in his 2004 essay that the potential for increasing social and economic turbulence was already evident "in a few cities" (21). He has been cited at length here because he provides a balanced set of insights into the web of influence that has produced the policy circumstances that have in turn shaped the urban environment that we find in many poorer nations. It is an environment complex enough to sustain the debate between modernization theorists, who share the general consensus found among international capital and financial and regulatory agents, on the one hand, and critical political economists

who emphasize the costs of pursuing policies of market enablement while playing down social equity needs and concerns on the other.

Employment and Livelihood in a Challenging World

Gaining a livelihood in a Third World city can conform to the pattern familiar elsewhere in the world, where individuals seek and find jobs commensurate with their abilities and go to work. But the situation is often more difficult, both for highly qualified and poorly qualified candidates for employment, because in high un- and underemployment cities there are so many more of them than there are available positions. For those who can't find employment in the formal sector, the "near universal response" is self-employment in the informal sector (Rutherford, Harper, and Grierson 2002, 129). Not uncommonly, especially for those with the least resources, that means finding a niche and working a hustle in the gray area within and outside the law. If the opportunity offers itself, one can train in automobile or appliance repair. If legitimate work is hard to come by, and with survival at stake, one might join a gang of "area" (Lagos) or "car park" (Nairobi) boys to "insure" motorists against vandalism or theft as they leave their car.

Where substantial industrialization has occurred in less developed countries, it has at times meant relatively few new jobs for the army of workers who crowd hopefully into the cities. Elsewhere, when industrialization is labor intensive (requiring large numbers of workers, as in assembly plants), rapid urban growth is more commensurate with the need for new urban workers.

Textbox 6.1. Industrial Working Conditions

Since 1996, when a company associated with a popular television talk-show host was accused of labor violations in Honduras, the term *sweatshop* reemerged as part of the popular vocabulary in North America. People have become generally aware that some of the familiar brand-name items they have in their homes and on their person, purchased from high-priced retail outlets and discount chains alike, are tainted by the inhumane and exploitative conditions under which they were produced. Some are produced in the United States and other economically advanced nations, but systematic forces of global profit-seeking drive manufacturers to seek the absolute lowest-paid laborers in the world, and these, of course, are found in the greatest abundance in the poorest countries. There, foreign capital, in the form of industrial investments, joins forces with national governments to insure that the conditions of labor that drew foreign investment in the first place do not change sufficiently to drive it away.

Barbie Dolls and Disney Productions cartoon characters are produced at plants in Bangkok. In plants like these, thousands of young women work in the labor-intensive production process of sorting, sewing, and assembling the toys under what are reportedly health-threatening conditions. Common ailments related to working with and around hazardous materials in the hot and dusty plant atmosphere include hair loss and respiratory problems. Workers, in 1997, were earning $4 or $5 a day, from which they had to purchase uniforms, scissors, and optional protective masks. The medical doctor who headed Thailand's National Institute of Occupational and Environmental

Medicine was removed from her job when she raised serious concerns about occupational hazards. She was reportedly told that her investigation of large international investors was potentially damaging to her country and to its workers. The workers themselves, young women in their teens and twenties, were fearful of speaking out about health concerns because they believed they would lose their jobs, or worse. While their pay was meager, they were using part of it to support parents who remained in the areas from which the young women had migrated and to keep younger siblings in school (Foek 1997). Reports are widely available indicating that working conditions in textiles, toys, food production, and electronic and other assembly plants remained largely unchanged during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In this pattern of industrial growth, modernization theorists find strong support for their view of development, and the examples that support this view are the Asian economies where industrialization has produced an improved standard of living for workers. However, critics emphasize that large numbers of poor people—in the city and countryside—have not benefited from marketplace globalization, and for many of them conditions are worsening. This is true even in countries that have experienced industrial expansion under the widely accepted market enablement and social neglect model discussed earlier. Writing in the *New York Times* (July 19, 2002) Juan Forero observed, "Across Latin America, millions . . . are letting their voices be heard. A popular and political ground swell is building from the Andes to Argentina against the decade-old experiment with free-market capitalism. The reforms that have shrunk the state and opened markets to foreign competition, many believe, have enriched corrupt officials and faceless multinationals, and failed to better their lives." Forero continues, "The broad prosperity that was promised remains a dream for many Latin Americans. Today those same reforms are equated with unemployment and layoffs from both public and private companies, as well as recessions that have hamstrung economies . . . 'We privatized and we do not have less poverty, less unemployment,' said Juan Manuel Guillén, the mayor of Arequipa and a leader in the antiprivatization movement here. 'On the contrary. We have more poverty and unemployment. We are not debating theoretically here. We are looking at reality.'" By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the market enablement model of the international financial and regulatory bodies was facing sharp criticism (e.g., Rakodi 2002; Zetter 2004) and in Latin America the democratic process was producing leftist leaders (who were not without their own policy problems by the end of the decade).

In a world swept by internal unrest and impacted by an international market that finds new uses for those pockets of poor people who have languished, underutilized, the argument between modernization and dependency theorists may seem an overly formalized debate among old ideological warriors. But we can only leave the debate behind once we have all agreed that international capitalism produces positive results for all of those in the world whom it touches, and that those it neglects will benefit in fair measure in due time. For our purposes, as students of the city and its relationship to issues of inequality, the same questions remain. What is the balance of risks, penalties, and benefits of market-led patterns of growth for local

populations? To what extent is participation in economic change generally available to all members of a nation's population? To what extent are benefits concentrated? Why are entire regions excluded? And what are the long-term effects of such exclusion? To what extent will exclusion lead to dissent and insurgency by those in distant and neglected regions who feel left out? Will concentrated economic growth produce urban unrest, crime, and insecurity? Will it lead to more or less global instability, state repression? These are important questions that in some measure arise out of patterns of uneven progress as it is experienced by those who feel unfairly neglected. At the very least, the marginal or excluded are forced to move outside of the formal economy and system of rules that apply to obtaining shelter and other necessities; where conditions are the most severe for the largest numbers we find a proportional increase in participation in the informal sector.

THE INFORMAL SECTOR

While the urban population of the Third World was experiencing massive growth during the second half of the twentieth century, the increase in official unemployment rates appeared relatively modest. This is because the increase in self-employment in the informal sector served as a safety valve, absorbing the overflow labor supply generated by migration to the cities (Sethuraman 1981, 188–200). During the 1990s development measures that led to privatization and reductions in the typically massive level of public sector urban employment (government jobs) increased urban hardship for many and, in particular, unemployment. In the critical words of Mike Davis (2006, 178), it established "informal survivalism as the new primary mode of livelihood in a majority of Third World cities."

The informal sector of an urban economy can be defined as any unregulated (untaxed, unlicensed, officially unmeasured or unsanctioned) economic activity. Unlicensed street hawkers, backyard beer brewers, uncertified taxis and other forms of informal transport for hire, doorstep repairers of all sorts, and sex workers and suppliers of other illicit goods are a few examples of people who make a living in the informal sector. Ethnographic accounts of informal sector workers reveal that there is a hierarchy of employment strategies, that some self-regulation within trades takes place, and that entry is not always an easy default choice for the unemployed, especially where higher levels of investment or training are required for entry. It would be a mistake to conclude that the self-employed trades and services forces are made up primarily of new rural-urban migrants (e.g., McCutcheon 1983, 98 [for Indonesia]; Peattie 1975, 113–18 [for Bogotá]; Peil 1981, 85, 111 [for West African cities]). Anyone may set up a stand and sell a few vegetables in a less profitable location but making a viable living in a coveted highly trafficked site with more affluent patrons, where access to commodities is controlled by those already established, takes some combination of experience, apprenticeship, and/or street influence.

The proportion of the active workforce in underdeveloped countries that is occupied in the informal sector is significant but, given the nature of the work, is difficult to estimate. It may represent more than 50 percent of nonagricultural workers in developing countries in Asia and the Pacific and contribute as much as 30 percent to the value of all economic activity in that region (United Nations

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Interregional Cooperation on the Measurement of Informal Sector and Informal Employment, October 2008). In Latin America, the urban informal sector was the primary job generator in the 1990s. An average of six out of every ten new jobs were created by microenterprises (UN International Labor Organization 2000a). Available estimates for the 1980s and 1990s for North Africa put the numbers employed in the informal sector at about 27 percent, and for sub-Saharan Africa at about 40 percent. Informal work produced about one-fourth of the exchange value produced by the economies of those regions (fourth Meeting of the Delhi Group on Informal Sector Statistics, Geneva August 28–30, 2000). The net profit realized by each self-employed worker varied considerably with the size and relative success of the enterprise. In Djakarta, the average yield was about $1.50 per day in the early 1980s. Twenty percent earned less than 50 cents a day from their activities, and only one-third earned near the equivalent of $2.00 or more (Moir 1981, 116). While the majority struggled at the level of subsistence, there were a few at the top of a very wide range of earnings. A few lottery ticket vendors in Bogotá drove their own cars (Peattie 1975, 115). Peil observed that the government-regulated minimum wage in West African countries meant that the regulated-sector employees would earn more than the least successful of the self-employed but that the regulated wages had a relatively low upper limit. Craftspeople working on their own in printing and building trades could do better than the well-paid wage earner (Peil 1981, 88, 111).

One general principle that appears to hold all across the majority of urban informal sectors in the Third World is that occupations and earnings are stratified by gender, with women holding positions of lower status and income. Women typically outnumber men, accounting for between 60 and 80 percent of informal sector workers, although in a few countries men appear dominant in numbers as well as status. However, in every city active women workers systematically were undercounted, comprising as they do a gray area of unpaid family helpers and home-based workers (UN International Labor Organization, November 2000b). So, while women generally have more opportunity to earn a living in cities than rural areas, they remain more vulnerable to downward pressures on the urban economy (Rakodi 2002, 29), such as those brought about by the continued crowding in of more competitors as formal alternative employments dwindle. As a rule, women traders face additional formal cultural restrictions or are handicapped by a lack of capital, less formal education, and responsibilities for children (Nelson 1988, in the case of Nairobi, Kenya). Their precarious economic arrangements make them susceptible to transitioning into illegal activities, particularly sex work. While there are exceptions, such as the accounts of wealthy trading women in West African cities (Granmaison 1969), self-employed women in Third World cities operate closest to the margins of survival, operate the smallest and least lucrative enterprises, and earn the lowest incomes. As elsewhere in the world, the situation is made more desperate where they have sole or primary responsibility for the support of their children.

Overall, it can be said that the informal sector has operated as a safety valve in poor cities crowded with more individuals seeking work than there are jobs to employ them. The informal sector provides enough room to get by, but few will get ahead. Migration continues because even the poorest conditions of urban survival

most often represent a material improvement over life in the rural areas. Yet, the overcrowding of the informal sector as an oversupply of people sought to make a living there was depressing incomes in this sector by early in the new century (Rakodi 2002, 29). Among the millions of new faces seeking and working angles to eke out a living in the streets, a modernization theorist will find the entrepreneurial spirit that understands how to make something out of very little. The market critic will find desperation in many of those same faces, and potential political unrest.

Informal Housing

Just as the populations of growing Third World cities have had to invent their own personal solutions to the challenge of earning a living, they have also of necessity invented an informal response to the provision of shelter. In the absence of existing affordable housing, people in need occupy land and erect their own housing. They are called *squatters*. In many Third World cities they comprise a significant segment of the population. The proportion varies widely among cities, and of course exact measurements of how many squatters are living in large cities are not possible: It is typically estimated that between 25 percent and 70 percent of urban populations across Asia, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab States live in "irregular settlements" (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002, 3). Most have no choice but to shelter themselves as cheaply as they can. They do not have the resources to purchase land legally. Rental property available to the poor, where landlords hold reasonably secure title to the land, is generally in limited supply, overcrowded, decaying, and typically located in neighborhoods with reputations for high rates of crime. In addition to those who are squatters by necessity, some who could afford to do otherwise choose to pursue this risky strategy in order to minimize costs and, with the money saved by not renting or purchasing land, obtain the maximum benefit from their housing investment. The strategy is risky because governments, whose lands are typically targeted for takeover by squatters, have often pursued violent eviction policies, involving the destruction of property and brutal attacks on residents. The prospects for such official reaction vary from country to country, and from city to city.

The question of whether the occupation of a lot or a house is legal or illegal is often a difficult one, and the issue may become more complicated over time. In addition to illegally occupied space, an even larger portion of residential land is in legal limbo, as in some sub-Saharan African cities. Some of the land may have been granted according to custom; deeds may or may not be registered; or some construction, service provision, or other business may take place outside of labor, commercial, and tax regulation (Cooper 1983, 31). In the past, patently illegal appropriation of property has been less widespread in Africa than in Latin America, because those wanting to set up their own housing in African cities were able to acquire land from local chiefs in the area. Many "squatters" in suburban Kinshasa believe they have obtained legal title to their residences in this way; however, there is no official acknowledgment of their tenure. Many illegal residents of Lusaka and Nairobi may not know that the property they rent does not belong to their "landlord" (O'Connor 1983, 185–86). In Kingston, Jamaica, people living in makeshift housing may or may not be squatters. Some of them are legal tenants of "rent yards," properties divided by landlords and

rented to those who construct their own housing from whatever materials they can manage (Cross 1979, 86). In Bangkok the "land rent system" prevailed in the past allowing poor people to settle relatively cheaply. As the Bangkok economy saw the construction of more and more condo towers, shopping malls, and hotels, landholders began either to sell or develop their land themselves. They stopped collecting rents from those living on their properties; the prosperity of others and of the city in general had thereby turned legal tenants into squatters (Swift, 2006).

There is considerable variation among illegal squatter settlements with respect to construction standards of the housing and the economic position of inhabitants. Within Latin America, conditions range from the desperate squalor of the most-crowded *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo to the solid houses of the older *barriadas* of Lima. At the upper end of the scale, squatter housing is indistinguishable from modest middle-class legitimate housing. Buildings are made of concrete block or other materials, cars are parked on streets or in yards, satellite dishes break the skyline. In Turkey, illegally occupied land has undergone decades of development and redevelopment. Multistory buildings in these *gegekondular* give large districts the appearance of long-established neighborhoods. While at the other end, newly thrown-together shelters on the outskirts give every appearance of tentative occupation.

One of the most remarkable features of squatter settlements is the speed with which an area is invaded and settled by its inhabitants. In Mexico, squatter settlements have long carried the designation *pueblas paracaidistas* because it appears that a whole new town of people has parachuted from the sky, literally overnight, to cover a formerly unoccupied tract of land adjacent to built-up areas of the sprawling metropolis. Such simultaneous incursions are no accident; invasions are carefully planned, often a long time in advance. Castells (1982, 274) reported that new invasions of squatters are assisted by those who have already settled elsewhere as the result of similar mass takeovers. The objective is to undermine the possibility of effective countermeasures by the government. Decades ago, Mangin (1967, 23) reported how the squatters of Lima plotted their invasions:

> The enterprise generally took the form of a quasi-military campaign. . . . For the projected barriada community the leaders recruited married couples under 30 with children; single adults were usually excluded (and still are from most barriadas). Lawyers or near-lawyers among the recruited group searched land titles to find a site that was owned, or at least could be said to be owned, by some public agency, preferably the national government. The organizers then visited the place at night and marked out the lots assigned to the members for homes and locations for streets, schools, churches, clinics and other facilities.
>
> After all the plans had been made in the utmost secrecy to avoid alerting the police, the organizers appealed confidentially to some prominent political or religious figure to support the invasion when it took place; they also alerted a friendly newspaper, so that any violent police reaction would be fully reported. On the appointed day the people recruited for the invasion, usually numbering in the hundreds and sometimes more than 1,000, rushed to the barriada site in taxis, trucks, buses and even on delivery cycles. On arriving, the families immediately began to put up shelters made of matting on their assigned lots. (Mangin 1967, 23)

As is typical of squatments in underdeveloped countries, housing in the Lima settlements was gradually upgraded, with cement and brick construction gradually

replacing the original makeshift huts of the invaders. The organizers of the original movement became the leaders of named barriada associations (e.g., "Fathers of the Families of Mariscal Castilla," "Defenders of Mirones," "House Owners of Santa Clara de Bella Luz"), which performed such functions of government as the regulation of conflicts over lot ownership. Eventually, the authority of the association would give way as the city recognized and provided services for the squatter settlement, and came to regulate it as part of the metropolitan community (Mangin 1973, 318–19). Castells (1982, 256) argued that land speculators often used the poor as an advance guard to open up new areas of the city, thereby forcing new portions of land onto the real estate market.

Analysis that proceeds from within the modernization paradigm has portrayed squatters as politically unsophisticated and disengaged. This is because the modernization thesis anticipates the orderly diffusion of legal-rational modes of political participation characteristic of Western nations. Leeds and Leeds (1976, 199–201) commented critically on the ethnocentric bias that this interpretation represents. In their study of the political behavior of squatters in Brazil, Chile, and Peru, they observed that such an approach implies that Anglo-American forms of institutionalized political expression (voting, letters to the editor, or congressional representatives, etc.) are more rational and politically mature. According to that "unilinear evolutionary principle," urban proletariats will learn the appropriate behaviors as development proceeds. In contrast, they cite one researcher's observation that in Rio de Janeiro, "the *favela* resident who says he can do something to influence the government is not more efficacious, more modern, or more competent a citizen, but simply more deceived by the rhetoric of government—less in touch with reality. It is a tribute to the *favela* residents' common sense that this group is in the minority" (Perlman 1971, 383). It may be argued that squatters who have seized land have already engaged in the most effective collective political strategy available to them. The reality of Third World politics is that waiting for the government to act on behalf of the poor, in light of international pressures to pursue strict market enablement-low social overhead policies, is indeed imprudent. Through collective action squatters can be a potent oppositional force that governments must reckon with. And they are aware of this. Castells reported (1982, 275–76) that in Monterrey, Mexico, squatters were somewhat resistant to the proposed legalization of their property claims. They believed that legalization would undermine the solidarity of their urban movement by allowing the government to put pressure on individual property owners to fall into line. There is clearly a pattern of political transition involved in the initiation and maturation process of the squatter community experience. Initially, the political significance of the squatter movement is that it represents defiance of the authority of the state. Gradually, squatters become less a revolutionary force, to the extent government policy involves acquiescence and accommodation rather than confrontation with the concentrated numbers that have moved outside the law to gain a foothold in the city.

In recent decades, squatters and others with insecure claims to urban shelter have found sympathetic allies in the international community. An international congress in New Delhi in 1996 won a verbal commitment from national governments that, in principle, "security of land tenure should be given to inhabitants of irregular settlements, slums, shack dwellers, and all precarious living environments" (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 2002, 2). The United Nations since 1999



The poor make use of marginal urban land to erect shelter. Where cities abut waterways it is not unusual for shelter to be built on no land at all. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

has engaged in programs to assist government decision making through compiling comparative studies that document best-practices, government-sponsored housing policies, and through the promotion of a perspective that sees universal access to adequate shelter and security of land tenure as ultimate goals. The work of UN-HABITAT, the UN organization on human settlements and housing, received a reaffirmation for its efforts from the General Assembly in 2001, to continue its efforts in promoting policies of balanced urban and rural opportunities, the provision of basic services, the promotion of gender and other equalities, and seeking the means of establishing livable and inclusive human settlements worldwide. Such themes may find limited practical application due to the enormity of the scale the social problems included in the mandate and in particular the dimensions of inadequate and insecure housing worldwide. But the agency does provide a voice encouraging a government-responsibility counterpoint to the market enablement perspective that has prevailed in earlier decades.

Textbox 6.2. A Childhood Perspective on Squatment Living in Johannesburg

Canaansland is a modest-sized squatter settlement adjacent to the central business district of Johannesburg. It consisted of about 250 shacks that were home to about a thousand residents at the time of study. The one-and-a-half acre site originally belonged to the Department of Public Works. The sum-total of infrastructure supplied to the site consisted of a single water tap. The population was well aware that they could be forcibly removed at any time, as they knew other squatters had been at other sites

in the city. The people were poor. Women explained that the alternative to living in the rough settlement was to live on the street, and possession of a shack at least gave their children shelter from the elements and a place to call home. There was a free school for street children where most of the local kids were enrolled. Residents eked out a living as street peddlers, by gathering and selling scrap cardboard or scrap metal for recycling, or working at very temporary odd jobs.

Contrary to opinions commonly held by outsiders, children's lives were structured by school attendance, family chores, and child care (of brothers and sisters). Respect for elders was expected and given. Children were prevented from roaming about by parental rules, and by the dangers and hostility that hemmed them in. They were victimized and abused by outsiders. They were blamed for anything that went wrong in the area; they and their parents were followed around in shops by suspicious shopkeepers who, if young people were not accompanied by an adult, demanded to see their money before they were admitted. If they played on one road that ran parallel to the squatment, they could be thrown down, beaten, spat on, and cursed by pedestrians of all races. On the other bordering road, drivers would charge at high speeds, steering to scatter children at play, sometimes knocking them down, never stopping, except for a laugh.

Of course the children were aware of the stigma they carried. They knew of their reputation as being dirty, fouling the food they tried to sell, carrying lice and infectious disease, of being dishonest and thieving. The very environment they called home carried systemic liabilities. The lack of electric lighting prevented them from doing homework after sundown and created pools of darkness that might be filled with danger around their shacks. They were surrounded by noise. They feared that the flimsy walls of the shacks would not prevent burglars from breaking in. Yet, relative to the world they knew, children spoke of their shacks as safe and happy places. When asked what improvements they would like, their wish lists were eminently practical: toilets, better water, better garbage collection and disposal, stronger shacks, strong fences to keep out criminals, electricity, perhaps a sheltered place where they could do their homework and play. (Swart-Kruger 2002)

While squatters represent a rapidly growing element of the urban population, some poor people and others of limited means who seek housing in Third World cities do have another option. They may rent their shelter. Central slums tend to draw the poorest of the poor—the unemployed and unskilled, the alcohol- or drug-dependent, and the criminal. In the case of rented slum housing there is no incentive for occupants to upgrade the condition of the properties that temporarily house them, and there is little about these areas that engenders positive identification or commitment. How different from the mushrooming squatter settlements on the periphery, which embody committed habitation and offered informal economic opportunities and political participation.

But Eckstein (1990), in a case study of slums and squatments in Mexico City, has provided evidence that draws into question any simple generalizations about land tenure classifications and the social welfare of residents. She criticized what she called the conventional approach that contrasts positive features of the squatter "settlements of hope" with the negative features of the inner-city "slums of despair." She argued that the economic crisis faced by Mexico and other Third World economies during the 1980s, when national governments were cutting back expenditures

for urban social services, actually created relatively favorable consequences for the residents of centrally located slums when contrasted with disadvantages for squatters located in isolated settlements at the edge of the city. While the real wages of all of the poor declined, local economic activity in the inner-city area that Eckstein studied intensified. Due to its central location and its reputation for offering hard-to-come-by, novel, and contraband goods, the location offered a living to residents who tapped into the popularity of the local market. While the quality of housing remained generally poor, rent-control laws were partially effective, keeping the average cost of housing reasonable. Meanwhile the debt-ridden state neglected social services that it was once prepared to provide to squatter settlements. Population growth had generated crowding in these areas as the children of homeowners were marrying and having children. This next generation stayed to minimize expenses and avoid the inconvenience of newer squatter settlements more distant from the city center. Second, many owners had erected multifamily rental units on what they considered their property. This led to an overall decline in the socioeconomic status of squatter settlement populations, as tenants were reputed to be poorer than homeowners. At the same time, changes in land-tenure laws that allowed for the sale of squatter properties had caused a dramatic inflation in land and housing prices in these settlements, and they led to a division of residents between the poor and the middle class. It is only the latter who can afford to purchase houses and sites in established squatter areas where a legitimating real estate market establishes the price for shelter.

Eckstein has provided a provocative case study. The stratification of the population of former squatter areas, among the poor home owner, the transient tenant, and the middle class, obviously compromises the basis for political solidarity and collective action to the extent that common residence is crosscut by ownership and class issues.

GLOBALIZATION AND URBAN POLICY

Patterns of economic change and urban growth in Third World countries have for the most part reflected those nation's economic and political ties to the rest of the world. This has been true in the colonial past and will remain true in the global future as regional and local economies find their way in the continually restructuring international division of labor. In the new world economy, national boundaries are permeable, are seen in light of the prevailing ideology to offer no barrier to trade and investment, except as holdovers from a previous age. From an optimistic perspective, the future is seen as a seamless web of opportunities. Large concentrations of poor people, for example, can now be seen as an asset, transmuted by their poverty into a competitive labor force on the international labor market. In that market, today's underpaid workers will eventually become tomorrow's advancing consumers, whose demand for processed and manufactured goods will spur further development. Presently the rest of the world is bracing itself in anticipation of the full impact of Chinese and Indian consumer demand on the global supply of non-renewable and other resources, as those societies experience economic growth and rapid urbanization.

Critics remain skeptical. They question whether the experience of China and India provide realistic role models for smaller countries that have fewer resources and consumer bases that are a fraction of the size of the two giants. For many nations, the international division of labor means that they will remain distant from and subordinate to centers of product design, marketing, profit taking, and control. The Third World represents, as we have said, a diversity of economic situations, and what the future holds for areas that historically have gained far less than they have given in their peripheral role in the world economy remains to be seen. Africa remains largely devoid of newly industrialized countries. Shaw (1995) suggested that many of its nations are best described as Fourth or Fifth World states, in terms of the lack of promise for their participation in a global economic revolution and in terms of their remoteness from any generalized prosperity. Davis (2006, 14–15) argues that Africa continues to suffer from World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies on agricultural deregulation and financial discipline that have created surplus rural labor that the cities could not productively absorb. Preexisting national programs designed to support peasant and other small to medium producers were eradicated as the rule became competitiveness in the international market. Small producers were the most vulnerable to fluctuations in prices, demand, or personal ill-fortune and were the quickest to lose their land.

In pursuing social policies directed at the softening of the inequalities that have been generated by market-led growth, Third World nations today are at a critical juncture. Pressures remain in place for further liberalization to allow foreign capital to operate freely. Any decision to control or divert patterns of urban growth may appear to interested outsiders a symptom of a meddlesome orientation toward the free operation of capital. Urban planning, in the form of policies designed to control urban growth and redistribute economic opportunities in a more balanced pattern, constitutes a defiance of the legacy of the prevailing market enablement philosophy.

At one time, in 1990, many nations around the world sought to manage urban growth. A United Nations survey (1992b) of 131 nations found that a majority (88) had policies in place to control urban growth. There was a concern, as there continues to be at present, that the supply of urban services, jobs, and housing was being overwhelmed by large and growing city populations: The condition was sometimes referred to as *overurbanization*. Today, as Third World cities and urban populations reach sizes that would have been difficult to imagine decades ago, and as environmental degradation is added to the list of concerns associated with megacity development, the term has largely passed out of fashion.

Another tendency of urbanization in poor countries that has caused concern in the past is that of urban *primacy*. The *primate city* concept was developed to describe a situation whereby one city had grown to several times the size of any other city within that country. Primate city patterns contrast with national urban systems that conform more to the *rank-size rule*, which is assumed to mark more "mature" or "balanced" systems. The rank-size rule predicts that the largest city will be roughly twice the size of the second largest, three times the size of the third largest, and so on. A primate city, many times the size of the next largest urban settlement, is thereby considered to be overgrown. The most outstanding examples of primate systems tend to occur in the Third World. Included are Mexico City, Dakar (Senegal), and the greater Buenos Aires area in Argentina. The primate tendency is especially

common in smaller nations. For example, the populations of Caribbean capitals are several times those of their second-largest cities. For a long time the most pronounced example of primacy was greater Bangkok, which in the 1980s was 40 times the size of Thailand's next largest. By the mid-1990s other urban centers had begun to catch up, largely because the central government promoted growth in other areas.

The economic consequences of urban primacy must, of course, be seen differently from the perspectives of modernization and political economy. Primacy promotes the avowed goals of modernization. According to one analyst, "High levels of primacy may be critical in certain historical states of economic development. If the world city system is considered as a hierarchical diffusion mechanism, the larger the primate city the higher the rate of technology transfer and innovation adoption from abroad" (Richardson 1984, 134–35).

On the other hand it is argued that primate cities concentrate economic activity, public investment, services, amenities, and political power in a narrowly circumscribed location. Since the benefits of growth are concentrated in this way, primacy is the graphic antithesis of true development. Populations in peripheral and remote areas are neglected in equal measure to their distance from the capital-chief port-economic hub and their relative lack of strategic political economic importance. Sensitive to this pattern, a few nations, for example, Brazil, Nigeria, and Tanzania, have undertaken the extraordinary and costly step of moving their capitals and national government centers to more central geographic locations.

Will governments be inclined to continue to pursue control policies in the present climate, which recasts the arena of competition for growth initiatives as occurring not so much between rural and urban populations *within* nations as *between* nations, all competing for international investment and tourism? In this light, showcase investment in the capital and largest cities is seen as the formula for success in the international competition for trade, at the same time it is a recipe for continuing neglect and inequality within nations. Remote and neglected populations have shown varying amounts of patience with being left out of the national plan, with waiting for the natural workings of the global market to notice and incorporate them into its unfolding scheme. The difficulty of developing national policies that temper the urge to serve further growth with measures to balance the distribution of opportunities has become greater within the new visibilities and sensibilities of the global arena.

COMPARATIVE URBAN STUDIES

There is a body of social research on Third World urbanization that does not focus explicitly on the issue of underdevelopment (although underdevelopment and the attendant patterns of inequality can be shown to underlie the social forms we consider here). This research is concerned, instead, with changes in the organization of social life and the experiences brought on by urbanization as it takes place under the challenging conditions faced by countries with large numbers of poor citizens. There are contrasts, as well as parallels, to be drawn in comparing the experiences of urbanizing Third World populations to those of industrialized Western countries. In seeking parallels, it is necessary to bear in mind Janet Abu-Lughod's (1975, 13–16)

admonition that comparative urbanologists have tended to be too quick in recognizing common patterns between cities in rich and poor nations. It is a mistake to gloss over significant differences between the West and the Third World and to ignore the different historical circumstances that have generated what may appear superficially to be similar results. Most important, she criticized the bias that observers bring to such comparisons: that change means evolution toward some common, "modern" form, most closely approximated at present by Western urban life.

Abu-Lughod's point is a fundamental one for the practice of urban sociology. It raises the question, at least implicitly, of whether the city as a social form exerts a common independent causal effect on other forms of social organization and on behavior. We have already seen that the historical factors that gave rise to the city in Western industrialized countries and in the Third World were very different—despite the fact that cities have been bound together in the same world economy. It seems that if an awareness of the different historical circumstances is taken as a starting point and if notions of convergence are avoided, cautious comparison—including a readiness to recognize parallels where they exist—may be productive. Urban sociology has failed to profit sufficiently from comparative studies that systematically incorporate Third World evidence. Any effort to establish general principles of urban sociology that neglects Third World examples reinforces the Westerncentric tendency to treat Third World examples as exotic exceptions to prematurely established principles. As urban sociologists we proceed under the assumption that cities everywhere have an independent capacity, as social arenas, to modify experience and the organization of social life. Since the time of Max Weber urban sociology has been an implicitly comparative exercise seeking universal principles that define the urban form.

Communities and Networks

The poorer, more run-down sections of cities give outsiders the impression that social life in these areas must be disorganized and predatory—as was reported in the case of the Johannesburg Canaansland squatter settlement earlier in the chapter. This is at least as mistaken a view in Johannesburg or Lima or Lagos as it is in Boston or London. The well-organized social structure of squatter developments, bristling with a self-conscious determination to survive, qualifies as urban "defended neighborhoods." In the case of Canaansland the neighborhood phenomenon called the "face block" was also much in evidence (these are among the terms that were used to identify urban communities in chapter 4). In Canaansland, adults were familiar with large numbers of the children who lived in the squatter settlement, and they would scold or admonish children encountered outside the community and suspected they were wandering about and shirking their chores (Swart-Kruger 2002, 120). In poor areas, where so many are dependent on a steady clientele for informal trading activities, the community develops a face-to-face quality and level of mutual recognition among inhabitants that belies the large numbers involved. In the apparent jumble of housing and subdivision of dwelling spaces, which make servicing by authorities or utility agencies difficult or impossible, intricate and complex arrangements are worked out among residents. This can be observed in agreements for the sale and metering of electricity, for example, where multiple households tap

the line of a single utility customer, or the cooperative building and maintenance of boardwalk passageways elevated above the swamp waters or marshland that are the sites of so many squatter settlements in coastal areas.

Also relative to our discussion of community in chapter 4, we are reminded by patterns of social ties in poor countries that it is necessary to "liberate" the concept of community from the confines of the urban neighborhood and substitute the imagery of social networks not confined to the local area. The social network concept has been applied profitably to sub-Saharan African urbanization for several decades to understand the important home village connections of rural-urban migrants. Although they may be away from the village they migrated from for their entire working life, with only occasional return visits, people from village origins typically remain involved in the social affairs of their "home place." Yet, on a day-to-day basis, they are largely cut off from contact with those at home.

Epstein's (1969, 111) distinction between the explicit portions of an individual's *effective* and *extended* network has been useful for understanding the social context of life in such situations. Boswell (1969, 287–96) pointed out that those individuals with whom a person spends most of their time (effective network) may not be the same individuals a person will depend on in a time of personal crisis (extended network). At such times, long-dormant ties may be revived as individuals call on those who share claims of obligation, such as kin, or other special categories of relationship from the past, such as schoolmates from home. In more recent work, Gugler (2002) reassessed and reaffirmed the continued importance of rural social ties, especially in Africa, where a large segment of the urban adult population are migrants from rural areas. He pointed to the multiple dimensions that provide the incentive for urban migrants to remain engaged in their community of origin. These include access to farmland, a site and cheap labor for house building, a source of cheap and loyal labor to be employed in a small enterprise, a supply of goods to be traded at the urban end, a political constituency for office seekers, refuge in case of political persecution or civil war, prestige and admiration of the worldly migrant from those in the home place, the site for remaining grounded in one's own culture of origin, and an important basis for identity. Most migrants are obliged to remain engaged because they have parents and other relatives, perhaps spouses and children, living in their birth community. In Gugler's classic phraseology, urban migrants live in a "dual system."

Family ties to a migrant's original home place tend to cement the continuing involvement there. Individual migration means that some members of extended families have gone to the city while others have remained at home. The pattern ties rural and urban family elements of the same family system together in a complementary arrangement. Most migrants not only have family still living in their village of origin, but they also visit as frequently as they can and may expect to retire there (Gugler and Flanagan [1978] 2009, 64–70). Urban workers provide a source of income for kin in rural areas through the common practice of remitting a portion of their urban incomes. Obligations of kinship, especially a debt to parents, can be life long. In Thailand, sons can repay their debt for being brought into the world and having been raised up through the prestige the family receives when the son is ordained as a monk for a period of his adolescence; adult daughters, on the other hand, are expected to provide material support over the course of their parent's life-

time (Wilson 2004, 14, 93). Such a sense of duty is not unusual in Third World cultures. Beall (2004, 59) echoes decades of research findings for Africa: "In the African cities, in particular, linkages between urban and rural populations were found to be strong and to play a crucial role in family survival, as households diversified their livelihoods across the urban-rural divide . . . Intra-family resource flows included not only urban-rural remittances but other forms of reciprocity that indicate important interdependencies between rural and urban environments." Such urban-rural interdependencies are longstanding in Africa. During the 1960s about 10 percent of all the income earned in the city of Accra, Ghana, was reported to flow annually out of the city, most finding its way into rural Ghana (Caldwell 1967, 143). Aronson (1970, 289–90) concluded that in the amount of money, energy, and advocacy invested by urbanites in their rural home areas, the Ijebu Yoruba of Nigeria "do far more in self-help than the Nigerian government can hope to do for many more years to come in the way of social and economic development." Today, widespread diasporas of international labor migrants from Africa, Latin and Central America, and the Middle East make important contributions to their families at home and, in the aggregate, to the economies of their homelands through cash remittances.

Within poor countries, the familiar market-enablement policies that were discussed earlier are making urban-rural linkages more critical. Reporting on the African countries of Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania, Bah and colleagues (2006, 56) write:

> Increases in food prices and service charges, cuts in public expenditure—especially health and education—and in infrastructure expenditure have been felt particularly by low-income groups. This has resulted in changes in livelihood strategies along two main lines: a widespread increase in mobility accompanied by strong social and economic links with home areas, which depend on migrant's remittances but also provide them with safety nets and social identity.

In many places, urban-initiated home improvement projects, such as the construction of schools or clinics or the supply of pure water or electricity, have clearly provided a net benefit to rural recipients. Such projects leave little doubt that the issue of community identification and involvement for migrant urbanites is not confined to the city. Also, city styles and tastes reach far into the countryside of every Third World country, carried by migrant daughters and sons. As elsewhere in the world, revolutionary changes in communication have drawn city and rural populations closer. But one set of factors reinforcing these ties is the continuing hardships that poor populations face and the need to strategize for survival. For now, in places where it remains possible, that strategy includes finding a way to link urban earnings with rural security.

Understanding the urban phenomenon in those areas of the world that contain most of the largest cities and the most rapidly growing urban populations is challenging. But for those of us interested in the sociology of cities it is also necessary. Early in the twentieth century, Robert Park, an important figure in U.S. urban sociology, considered cities like Chicago the social "laboratories" of his time, experimental environments that tested the limits of human adaptation to large dense settlements. Today, as they test limits that reach far beyond the dimensions and challenges of Park's Chicago, the megacities of poor and developing nations test the capacity of the human imagination: How can the needs of all of the millions concentrated

there, and other millions of living in health- and life-threatening conditions of cities of all sizes in poor nations, be served? How can order be maintained? How can environmental balances be restored? Here we have dwelt on the most problematic aspects of Third World urbanization. There are other sides to these places and many of them—Bangkok, Mexico City, Mumbai, and São Paulo—draw millions of tourists every year. It is true that they are the fiery engines of economic growth and that they produce varying levels of wealth and affluence. It is also true that they concentrate the poor and poverty's worst consequences, and the wealth that is created in these cities comes at the expense of the neglect of the urban poor and of distant rural populations who receive little from the concentrated economic activity. The enormous cities of the Third World stand as symbols of regional inequality, and they provide what we have come to recognize as "soft targets" for criminals and dissident militants. They will continue to demand a considerable and increasing share of the attention of urbanologists and other social scientists.

7

Urban Growth and Transitions in the United States

As we turn to an examination of the cities of the United States, we are reminded that the urban form is not a static entity. Cities grow, decline, and grow again, as they are continuously transformed in form and function. Today's cities continue to undergo fundamental economic and demographic transformations that are rooted in their individual and collective past. Over the past several decades, the decline in the fortunes of many cities has given rise to urgent discussions about the future of cities in the United States. But in the same period cities primarily in the South and West grew vigorously, building upward and outward, often across ecologically vulnerable landscapes. Analyses of the shifts in economic activity that have brought about current urban conditions typically focus on changes associated with the post–World War II era. It may appear that the early histories of contemporary U.S. cities have little to offer an analysis of the current conditions of the urban United States.

It is not possible to fully understand contemporary urban patterns and prospects, however, without considering the history of urbanization that has created over the past two centuries a dynamic, nationwide network of metropolitan economies. The size, situation, and economic conditions of cities today are linked to their origins, their relationship to regional neighbors, and their place in a continuously refocusing national and international economy. Current changes need to be understood as an articulation or revision of earlier arrangements.

The most striking feature of the urbanization of the United States is that in every period of development and in each newly emerging urban region, urban growth was spurred by an open competition among promoters interested in achieving regional domination for their city. The competition stemmed from the recognition that a city's economic prosperity was tied to the relative importance that could be achieved for the city within the developing national system of intermetropolitan dominance and subordination. Local urban boosterism was more a matter of self-interest than of civic passion, for it was understood that having the world believe that one's city or town was the premier settlement in the region (hence, *the* place to do business) could help to make it so. For the entrepreneur and property owner, who would benefit from the subsequent growth, the rewards would be more tangible than

symbolic. "More people" translated simply into "more customers" as well as higher property values.

Today, it is still appropriate to focus on the competition between cities within the United States as they vie with each other to attract auto assembly plants, promote themselves as the high-tech research and development site of the future, or wrangle for their share of government programs. The difference between past eras and the present is that now municipal governments are involved in global competition for investments and jobs. The outcome of global competition will reshape the urban landscape here, as it will in Europe, Mexico, China, Japan, and elsewhere. For now, we begin with a focus on the historical forces that produced the U.S. urban landscape.

URBAN GROWTH BEFORE THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The urbanization of the United States followed the same east-to-west pattern as the opening and settlement of new land. It involved three distinct phases, which are shown in table 7.1. In 1790, the date of the earliest census and the first phase of growth, the settlement pattern was dominated by the major eastern and southern

Table 7.1. Urban Population Growth, 1790–1880

	1790	*1850*	*1880*
Urban Population* As Percent of U.S. Total Population	5.1%	15.3%	45.7%
East, Southeast			
New York	33,131	515,547	1,164,673
(Brooklyn)		(138,882)	(599,495)
Philadelphia	44,096	121,376	847,170
Boston	18,320	136,881	362,839
Baltimore	13,503	169,054	332,313
New Orleans		116,375	216,090
Charleston	16,359	42,985	49,984
Midwest			
Chicago		29,963	503,185
St. Louis		77,860	350,518
Cincinnati		115,435	255,139
Cleveland		17,034	160,146
Detroit		21,019	116,340
Milwaukee		20,061	115,587
West			
San Francisco		34,776	233,959
Los Angeles		1,610	11,183
Seattle			3,533
Denver			35,629
Omaha			30,518
Dallas			10,358
Houston		2,396	16,513

Source: Adapted from Still, 1974, 79, 210–11. *U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982, 1–49.

ports, cities that already had relatively long (i.e., for the United States) histories. A second phase of urbanization got underway largely between 1820 and 1850 and scattered rapidly growing cities throughout the central Midwest. By 1880, the third phase, urban growth had pushed past the Rockies to the West Coast, although the gold rush had given San Francisco a head start by midcentury.

During the colonial era, U.S. cities served the same function as colonial cities anywhere. They were commercial ports where goods, gathered from the productive hinterlands, were collected for shipment overseas, in exchange for imports from elsewhere in the expanding world economy.

> Even farmers in distant villages were brought into the commercial world of the Atlantic economy through a series of complex interchanges. Country storekeepers concluded dozens if not hundreds of small trades with local farmers in order to accumulate sufficient inventory which, in turn, could be exchanged with a town merchant in places such as Salem, Massachusetts, New London or Hartford, Connecticut, or Lancaster, Pennsylvania, for supplies of "West Indian" goods (sugar, molasses, rum, or spices) or English commodities. (Klebanow, Jonas, and Leonard 1977, 16–17)

Early Promoters

In the late 1600s, competition was already underway among promoters and city builders to attract population and commercial investors. Textbox 7.1 is from the pamphlet *A Further Account of the Province of Pennsylvania* that William Penn published in England in 1685 to promote his new town, Philadelphia. Note the emphasis on order and the good prospects of return on investments.

Textbox 7.1. Philadelphia: The Orderly Colonial City

From . . . a Year within a few Weeks the Town advanced from fourscore to Three hundred and fifty seven Houses; divers of them large, well built, with good Cellars, three stories, and some with balconies. . . . There is also a fair Key [quay] of about three hundred foot square . . . to which a ship of five hundred Tuns may lay her broadside. . . . We have also a Ropewalk . . . and cordage for shipping already spun at it.

. . . There inhabits most sorts of useful Tradesmen, as Carpenters, Joyners, Bricklayers, Masons, Plasterers, Plumers, Smiths, Glasiers, Taylers, Shoe-makers, Butchers, Bakers, Brewers, Glovers, Tanners, Felmongers, Wheelwrights, Millrights, Shiprights, Boatrights, Ropemakers, Saylmakers, Blockmakers, Turners, etc. . . . The hour for Work and Meals to Labourers are fixt, and known by Ring of Bell. . . . After nine at night the Officers go the Rounds, and no Person, without very good cause, suffered to be at any Publick House that is not a Lodger.

. . . Some Vessels have been here Built, and many Boats; and by that means a ready Conveniency for Passage of People and Goods—Divers Brickerys going on, many Cellars already Ston'd or Brick'd and some Brick Houses going up. . . . The Town is well furnish'd with convenient Mills. . . . The improvement of the place is best measur'd by the advance of Value upon every man's Lot . . . The worst Lot in the Town, without any Improvement upon it, is worth four times more than it was when it was lay'd out, and the best forty. (As reprinted in Still 1974, 15–17)

Philadelphia fulfilled Penn's promise and by 1790 had grown to more than 44,000 in population, larger than its rival New York and more than double the size of Boston or Baltimore. Like many of the New World cities (e.g., Charleston, Hartford, New Haven, and Providence), Philadelphia was laid out in a variation of the gridiron or checkerboard pattern of right-angle streets and avenues for the sake of order and efficiency. Apart from the additional designation of a few open places as public parks or commons, there was little more to the planning of cities in these early times than the laying out of streets. Land use in early colonial New England towns was closely governed from the start, as were all aspects of life, but by the 1760s or 1770s, land regulation of any kind was under attack in New England because it was believed to pose a potential hindrance to trade and economic activity (Klebanow, Jonas, and Leonard 1977, 30). The grid plan, on the other hand, served commercial interests well. It lent itself to the ready transfer of property ownership and use by offering standardized lot sizes and shapes that could be converted from one use to another with a minimum of resistance. "It accommodated a distinctly modern attitude toward city building that considered nothing permanently fixed but the individual parcels of real estate. These lots enjoyed a life of their own, unrelated to any more general schemes of ordering the cityscape" (Barth 1980, 30). Urban merchants were vigilant in their opposition to government interference in trade. In the 1760s, the merchant classes led the early resistance to restrictive colonial policies. The rank and file of the urban-based movement may have consisted largely of urban workers and sailors (the latter comprised the largest occupational group in colonial seaport cities), but it was instigated and led by angry men of wealth and position.

The Race for Regional Domination

During the Revolutionary War, most cities experienced a drastic drop in population. With independence, however, the competition for trade and population resumed, and within a few decades, New York emerged as the leading port and most populous city in the United States. It achieved this position by adopting policies congenial to commerce, through innovations in shipping and by virtue of having become the leading hub of finance. After 1817, New York permitted British manufacturers to consign goods directly to auctioneers in the city, eliminating British exporting and American importing agents, and thus ensuring merchants in other cities of the lowest wholesale prices. In the same year, New York ship lines began regularly scheduled transatlantic service (packet service), which offered merchants an attractive predictability and dependability in that they would now know by advance scheduling when ships would sail. By the 1820s, New York also began to emerge as the financial capital of the hemisphere, doing extensive business throughout the United States and extending its influence into the nations of Latin America as they gained their independence (Glaab and Brown 1983, 38). In 1825, New York's hegemony was consolidated again with the completion of the Erie Canal system. In the expanding United States, a city's fortunes were dependent on the extent and wealth of its hinterlands. The Erie Canal opened new land for commercial development along its entire length and greatly enlarged New York City's access to vast new

territories by forging an "overland" route to the Great Lakes network of waterways. The canal cut transportation costs to a fraction of their former levels. In addition, it set off a flurry of canal building among New York's rivals that lasted until the mid-1850s (Warner 1972, 67–68).

The period from 1820 to 1870 marked the era of most rapid urban expansion. The proportion of the total population of the United States living in cities grew from just over 7 to more than 25 percent. To appreciate the hidden significance of these numbers, it is necessary to keep in mind that the total population of the country expanded from 9.6 million to 39.8 million during this period. The number of people in urban areas increased from just under 700,000 in 1820 to just under 10 million in 1870 (Klebanow, Jonas, and Leonard 1977, 41). The changing geographic distribution of the urban population was as impressive as the numbers involved, as urbanization spread westward across the continent. During this period, cities with 25,000 or more people grew from a string of a few such centers along the East Coast to an urban system comprised of fifty-one cities of that size (Warner 1972, 70–71). It was a period in which the canal system that had just emerged was made practically obsolete by the growth of the railroads. The railroad had its most vital impact in the West and Midwest, but the significance of this new transportation technology was quickly recognized everywhere. In the following excerpt from a letter to the mayor of New York City, the president of the New York and Albany Railroad urged that action was once again required for New York to maintain its hegemony over its East Coast rivals.

> The announcement of the completion of a railroad from Boston to Albany demands the attention of the people of this city; . . . this new avenue of trade and travel, with such inducements as are offered for its use, must make . . . serious inroads upon the trade and commerce hitherto enjoyed by this city.
>
> This new avenue also opens a continuous line of railroad (nearly completed) from Boston, through Albany and Troy, to Buffalo. It branches off, in the New England States, by a web of well constructed railroads, carrying the products of the western country direct to every eastern seaport; inviting the producers of our own State, as well as the hardy sons of Michigan and Ohio, by an uninterrupted channel, to markets beyond the borders of this State—open at all seasons, and therefore offering unquestioned advantages during many months of the year, while our water course and canals are fast bound by ice.
>
> The facilities of rapid transportation, the ready market for interchange of commodities, in winter or summer; the establishment of steam packets with England, and probably with France, are advantages held out by Boston—a proof of her wealth, and highly honorable to her character for [*sic*]; at the same time an example is held up to us, and a warning given, that if we omit to improve that natural advantage we so eminently enjoy, we must revert to the position of deriving supplies from Boston and elsewhere, instead of being the great center of trade and commerce of the Union. (As reprinted in Still 1974, 81–82)

It would be difficult to overstate the impact of the railroads on the urbanization and economic integration of the United States. They opened new land for development. The routes taken by their main long-distance lines determined whether a town would grow into a city—by being drawn in a central way into the expanding national economy—or remain a locally oriented outpost. Rail lines allowed and

encouraged specialization and national economic integration both for growing smaller cities and for agricultural regions. Warner (1972, 88–89) offered the following examples: "Albany concentrated on shirts, nearby Troy on collars; Bridgeport on corsets, brass, and machine tools; New Bedford and Fall River on cotton textiles; Elizabeth, New Jersey, on electrical machinery; Chester, Pennsylvania, on iron and steel; Allentown, Pennsylvania, on silk goods . . . etc." Similarly, the railroads provided for the efficient distribution of regionally specialized agriculture: oranges from Florida, lettuce from California, strawberries from Louisiana, lumber from Idaho. As urbanization spread from coast to coast and cities grew in every region, a national economy began to crystallize. Urbanization was an extension and physical expression of the voracious appetite of the growing economy.

The Midwest

City building in the Midwest amounted to a competition among towns to make the most of their locations on important water routes. River sites, like those at Pittsburgh and Cincinnati on the Ohio River, developed where natural obstacles interrupted navigation. Upriver ports, like St. Louis, benefited from the introduction of steamboats, which turned rivers into two-way transportation routes. Where river currents had previously limited the direction in which heavy cargo could travel, steam provided a powerful means of carrying goods and people upstream. River city merchants and manufacturers grew and prospered. "The region's huge agricultural surplus created an opportunity for mass production of animal products on a hitherto unimaginable scale. Soon dubbed 'Porkopolis,' Cincinnati boasted vast slaughterhouses that dropped rivers of blood into Deer Creek and from there into the Ohio" (Kotkin 2005). After the mid-1800s, the leadership of the river cities in the Midwest was challenged by the rapid growth of the Great Lakes cities of Cleveland, Milwaukee, Detroit, and especially Chicago. Chicago grew from a population of less than 5,000 people in 1830 to a half million in 1880—by which time it displaced St. Louis as the Midwest's most populous city. Ten years later, more than a million people lived there.

Chicago's growth may be accounted for by a number of geographic and technological features that tended to reinforce its position as a regional magnet for population and economic activity. Warner (1972, 100–101) observed that "Chicago owed its importance to its situation at a point where cheap long-distance water transportation met the more expensive land transport. Even more significant was the fact that at the very moment the inventions in farm machinery, the perfecting of the railroad, and the unmistakable westward flow of the American population made the occupation of the Midwest profitable, Chicago rose to service this giant hinterland." Like other major Midwestern cities, Chicago quickly added manufacturing to its function as a regional trade center. As Warner (1972, 101) pointed out, Chicago soon made "every item needed to run a railroad or start a farm, to build a town, to furnish a home, or to clothe a family." In 1848 a visitor published a report of his visit to the city. "Steam mills were busy in every part of the city preparing lumber for buildings which were contracted to be erected by the thousand the next season. Large establishments were engaged in manufacturing agricultural implements of

every description . . . A single establishment, that of McCormick, employed several hundred hands . . . Real estate agents were mapping out the surrounding territory ten and fifteen miles into the Interior, giving fancy names to the future avenues, streets, squares, and parks." The visitor goes on to describe how crafty promoters, working with no assets other than their wits, fleeced eager eastern and southern speculators with their shady land deals (Peyton 1848, as reprinted in Strauss [1968] 2007, 64–66). By 1856 Chicago's position in the national economy had been anchored by its crossroads location on ten trunk-line railroads.

The first transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, and by 1885 there were four. The futures of cities that could attract such a line were assured, while places like Parksville, Missouri, and Auraria, Kansas, became historical footnotes, significant for their failed efforts to attract a major route (Miller 1973, 29). Entrepreneurs in Kansas City, a modest town struggling for regional leadership in the 1860s with such similarly modest neighbors as Leavenworth and St. Joseph, financed construction of the first bridge across the Missouri River and attracted a leg of the transcontinental Union Pacific line. In this way, Kansas City's dominance over the territory was established. Civic leaders in the city of Denver, to which gold mining had given the initial impetus for growth, similarly engaged in a vigorous campaign of railroad building in order to tie into the transcontinental system (Glaab and Brown 1983, 118–20). Omaha, which was already an important trading town on the Missouri River by the time the railroads reached it in the late 1860s, developed rapidly into a city on the transcontinental route.

The West

On the West Coast, San Francisco established itself as "the city" of the Pacific region. By 1880, its importance as a port supported the development of a wealthy and sophisticated population, which ranked ninth in size among U.S. cities. Los Angeles expanded more gradually in the nineteenth century, despite the vigorous efforts of promoters who attracted competitive rail lines to the city and who laid out and sold land to speculators in more than 100 "paper" new towns in Los Angeles County from 1884 to 1888. Although most of the speculative plans fell through as the land market in the area folded in 1889 and the city lost a third of its population, the rail lines and attractive climate set the stage for the spectacular growth that would begin a decade or so later. By 1910, Los Angeles's population was well over 300,000.

Along the northern coast, Seattle's business interests held off the challenge of rival Tacoma (touted by promoters as having a potential greater than that of Chicago and New York), as Seattle became a key northwestern terminus for transcontinental rail lines (Glaab and Brown 1983, 122–28).

The cities of the South were slow to emerge in the 1800s. Houston was one of a few Gulf port towns that had begun to grow into cities by the latter decades of the century. Dallas remained a relatively small settlement until the railroads arrived in the 1880s. Birmingham, Alabama, pronounced by its promoters as the "magic city" of the South upon its establishment as an industrial center in 1871, also grew quite slowly until after the turn of the century.

By the 1890s, most of today's major cities were in place, even though, owing to the small size of many of them, it would have been difficult to project their relative importance a hundred years into the future.

Nineteenth-Century Arenas of Wealth and Poverty

The cities of the nineteenth century were part of a process of economic expansion that produced a powerful national economy and enormous individual fortunes. In the 1850s, big-city merchants competed with one another as each built palatial dry goods stores, celebrated in tourist's guides as "places to see." In Boston, it was Jordan Marsh; in Philadelphia, Wanamaker and Brown; and in 1859 in New York, Lord and Taylor opened the doors of a five-story, white marble emporium that was described as being "more like an Italian palace than a place for the sale of broadcloth" (Still 1974, 148). After the 1880s and the architectural innovations of steel-frame construction and the elevator, such temples of commerce were joined by the skyscraper. By the end of the century, New York could boast more than half a dozen buildings more than 300 feet tall and many more nearly that height. Standing together, these buildings embodied the wealth-generating capacity of the economy, and U.S. cities took on their reputation as arenas in which the actors were obsessed with the making of money. Visitors to New York described the "mad race for wealth"; an Italian visitor to the city in 1882 labeled it "la Mecca del dollaro" (Still 1956, 206–7).

Just as the urbanization of the United States produced great wealth, it also concentrated poverty and hardship in the cities. The conditions of the poor, especially with regard to housing, had been a social concern in the older urban centers since the beginning of the period of rapid urban expansion in 1820. As urbanization proceeded, popular concern for quality housing for the poor was overwhelmed by the sheer demand for all types of housing. In districts avoided by people who were better off, private interests devised ways to take advantage of the desperate situation of the poor. The inadequate, partitioned space provided by landlords was often subdivided by the tenants themselves in order to meet their rents, which were due in advance (Barth 1980, 44). Immigrants added increasingly to the demand for cheap living space as the century wore on. As reflected in the following commentary from the 1850s, the fact that even the poorest, in adequate numbers, could constitute a profitable market, was not lost on enterprising landlords.

> It was soon perceived by astute owners or agents of property, that a greater percentage of profit would be realized by the conversion of houses and blocks into barracks, and dividing their space into the smallest portions capable of containing human life within four walls. . . . Entire blocks of buildings, worn out in other service, were let in hundreds of sub-divided apartments, and rates of rent were established, as well as seasons and modes of payment, which while affording the wretched tenantry some sort of shelter within their scanty means, secured at the same time prompt payment of weekly dues, and an aggregate of profit from the whole barracks (risks and losses taken into account) of twice or thrice the amount which a legitimate lease of the building to one occupant would bring, if granted for business purposes at the usual rate of real estate interest. (State of New York [1857] 1963, 270)

In New York, affordable housing for the poor included cramped rented space in cellars, attics, and shacks put up on the back lots of existing housing. These forms of accommodation were replaced in time by four- and five-story tenements that could house about twenty families, exclusive of boarders. The profitability, and ostensibly the healthfulness, of these structures was improved upon after 1879 by the "dumbbell" design. These six-story structures were so called because of an indentation two-and-a-half feet deep that ran for fifty feet along each side of the building, vaguely suggesting a dumbbell shape if viewed from above. They were designed to provide space for about 300 people but accommodated many more because the poor families who lived in them took in boarders and relatives. The prizewinning design was much applauded at the time for its improved provision of light, ventilation (every room had a window), and toilet facilities (every story had two toilets) (Jackson 1984, 325). In fact, the buildings created congested neighborhoods with their high population densities, and the deep air shafts between each building provided little daylight or air and were quickly recognized as convenient trash receptacles by tenants (simply throw any unwanted materials out the window).

Cities remained unhealthy places throughout the century, becoming more so with time, especially for the poor. Death rates were higher and life expectancies shorter than for rural populations. Epidemics of contagious diseases, such as yellow fever and cholera, were recurrent; dysentery, malaria, and tuberculosis were regular threats as well. The streets of the city, both paved and unpaved, were used by residents as common dumps for all types of refuse. Heavy horse traffic added manure to the litter. Streets were cleared only irregularly. After midcentury, growing U.S. cities found it increasingly difficult to supply their populations with clean water and to adequately manage sewage problems. The first professional, nonvolunteer firefighters were not introduced until midcentury, and the number of major conflagrations that consumed large tracts of urban real estate in various cities attested to the fact that their resources and methods remained inadequate through the turn of the century.

The Walking City

What remains to be added to this picture of nineteenth-century cities is a description of their spatial arrangement or land-use patterns. The U.S. city of 1820 to 1870 was not quite a "disorganized hodgepodge" of businesses and residences, but there was a remarkable mix of property use within local areas. Commercial houses tended to center around transport nodes, like dock facilities; but in the blocks beyond, one might find sugar refineries and slaughterhouses side by side with banking and insurance firms. Sam Warner (1962, 15–16) referred to the "discipline" imposed on the spatial configuration of the "walking city"—a city where all but the most affluent depended on their own leg power to get around. He noted that in 1850 the walking city of Boston was a densely settled area within a two-mile radius of city hall. In order for the whole city to retain a unity of focus and function, he reckoned that access by foot to any point within an hour or less was necessary. On the other hand, Hawley (1981, 86–88) emphasized the "cellular" operating structure of the

nineteenth-century walking city. The fact that most people worked long hours and had to travel their daily rounds quickly and efficiently afterward meant that "the urban agglomeration was a congeries of more or less self-contained districts or quarters, each with its own industries and shops and other institutions. Within each district there was no clear separation of rich and poor. Employers and employees, if they did not share a place of residence, lived side by side." Although some general patterns of spatial separation had emerged by 1870, such as the exclusive residential enclaves of Beacon Hill in Boston, Chestnut Street in Philadelphia, and Washington Square in Manhattan, the mixing of groups, classes, and functions remained a distinctive characteristic of the nineteenth-century city. Warner considered that there may have been some virtue attached to this pattern:

> If the criterion of urbanity is the mixing of classes and ethnic groups, in some cases including a mixture of blacks and whites, along with dense living and crowded streets and the omnipresence of all manner of businesses near the houses in every quarter, then the cities of the United States in the years between 1820 and 1870 marked the zenith of our national urbanity. (Warner 1972, 84)

Early Public Transportation and the First Suburbs

Changes in transportation technology transformed the shape of the cities and their patterns of land use. More efficient means of moving people about meant that urban patterns were no longer controlled fundamentally by walking distances. The tendency for skyscrapers, introduced before the turn of the century, to concentrate in one area of the city fixed the central business district; this was the specialized, high land-value area that tended to focus on white-collar employment, attracted certain types of retail stores, and, therefore, caused traffic to converge. Residential densities in these areas declined as housing of most types proved less able to support the high costs of central location. The urban radius of settlement was increased by transportation technologies that allowed people to commute between more distant residences and places of work.

The omnibus, horse drawn and capable of carrying a dozen passengers, was introduced in Paris in 1819 and reached New York in the late 1820s. The larger and more efficient horse-drawn streetcar, first employed in New York in 1832 and adopted in the 1850s and 1860s by Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and San Francisco, ran more quickly between points on its own tracks. It was still too expensive for the average worker to use as a daily conveyance. Further improvements in transportation were represented by cable cars, the use of elevated rails that ran above the congested streets, and electric streetcars and trolleys. Subways appeared just before the turn of the century, with Boston leading the way in 1898. The net effect of these improvements was to allow residents who could afford it the chance to move yet farther from the business district, making "the daily commute part of their urban existence" (Barth 1980, 53–56). Certainly, many people rode. In the 1860s New York's principal street rails were already carrying 45 million passengers annually, and Boston's, 6.5 million (Still 1974, 86). Nevertheless, in 1899 the *average* commuting distance was still only about a quar-

ter of a mile in the country's largest city, New York (Pred 1966, 209). This suggests that for many the cellular pattern described by Hawley still characterized the urban experience at the turn of the century.

Those who migrated to the periphery in the late nineteenth century—away from the congestion, grime, and smoke of the increasingly industrialized cities—were among the earliest, although not the first, American "suburbanites." A new type of community had, in fact, emerged earlier, around midcentury, which gave new meaning to the term *suburb*. Binford (1985, 1ff.) noted that after the 1850s, suburbs had become the location of communities that housed many city workers. These had the nature of small towns, communities in themselves, but were "influenced by an urban economy and inhabited by urbane citizens."

The number of urbanites who joined in the migration to the suburbs increased gradually from midcentury "until by the 1890s it had attained the proportions of a mass movement" (Warner 1962, 22). The city's residential radius increased dramatically by the end of the century, but the pattern of urban extension retained a certain discipline reminiscent of the old walking city. Rather than sprawling thinly in every direction, the population extended from the densely built center of the city in narrow fingers or spokes of settlement, leaving green undeveloped space in between. Although rail lines freed the affluent from the center of the city, commuters had to remain within walking distance of the transportation spokes. Uncontrolled urban sprawl would wait until the following century.

By the end of the 1800s, the urban network of the United States was clearly outlined. Between roughly 1840 and 1880, the Northeast urban industrial region had established its dominant position. In this region, the command centers of the national economy were located, as well as the cities that led the others in innovation (Miller 1973, 39). As industrial growth came to play an increasingly important role in the national economy, intercity rivalries focused on efforts to attract new manufacturing plants. Some manufacturing had been a feature of the urban economies since the colonial period. By the late nineteenth century, it had become the most vital element. In 1899, Detroit's twenty carriage and wagon shops—the forerunners of the automobile industry—employed 318 of the city's 38,000 workers. By 1916, the auto industry in Detroit employed 120,000 (Glazer 1965, 51, 79).

THE EXPANDING METROPOLIS: THROUGH WORLD WAR II

The 1900s were the urban century for the United States. The urban proportion of the population continued to grow rapidly during the early part of the century. As table 7.2 shows, according to the 1920 census, there were for the first time more than 100 million people living in the United States, of which the majority (51.2 percent) were urban. By 1950, nearly 60 percent of the population, or just over 90 million people, were classified as urban. Table 7.3 indicates how much the cities whose growth we traced in table 7.1 had grown by 1940. What the figures alone cannot show is that as the country was becoming more urbanized, the urban population, and the cities themselves, were undergoing a fundamental transformation.

Table 7.2. Urban Population Growth, 1900–1950

	Total Population	*Number Urban*	*Percent Urban*
1900	76,212,168	30,214,832	39.6
1910	92,228,496	42,064,001	45.6
1920	106,021,537	54,253,282	51.2
1930	123,202,624	69,160,599	56.1
1940	132,164,569	74,705,338	56.5
1950	151,325,798	90,128,194	59.6

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982, 1–49.

Table 7.3. Size of Selected Cities in 1940 by Region

East	*Size*	*Midwest*	*Size*	*West*	*Size*
New York	7,454,995	Chicago	4,825,527	Los Angeles	2,916,403
Philadelphia	3,199,637	Detroit	2,377,329	San Francisco	1,461,804
Boston	2,177,621	St. Louis	1,432,088	Seattle	504,980
Baltimore	1,083,300	Cleveland	1,267,270	Houston	528,961
New Orleans	552,244	Milwaukee	766,885	Dallas	398,564
Charleston	121,105	Cincinnati	787,044	Denver	407,768
				Omaha	325,153

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1952, 166–68.

The Growing Edge

One of the most significant changes had been underway since the beginning of the twentieth century. Every subsequent census showed that the population of the metropolitan areas *outside* the central cities was increasing at a more rapid rate than the population of the central city. As the century progressed, it became increasingly evident that the densely concentrated cities of the 1800s, whose industries, stores, offices, and residences were crowded together, had been a temporary arrangement. The earlier pattern was attributable to the fact that the limitations of transportation and the needs of industry and commerce made the condensed arrangement the most workable. After 1920, however, the automobile age would see these cities "come apart."

During the 1920s, there was already substantial suburban development around several large cities, such as Atlanta, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Buffalo (McKelvey 1968, 42). Together with this early suburban growth, the unprecedented growth rates of warm-climate cities, such as Miami (234 percent) and Los Angeles (133 percent), over the course of the 1920s hinted at major future shifts in the redistribution of urban growth patterns.

The 1920s also marked a change in the source of new urban populations. The decades of southern and eastern European migration had hardened biases against the foreign born. World War I had stifled the immigration flow, which caused it to build up through postponed emigrations and additional dislocations in Europe; thus, when immigration resumed, it was with a renewed intensity. In 1921 alone there were 805,000 new arrivals. A mounting xenophobia helped to bring about the implementation of a strict immigration policy in the following year. Labor recruit-

Table 7.4. U.S. Farm Population, 1920–1990

Year	*Total Farm Population*
1920	31,974,000
1930	30,529,000
1940	30,547,000
1950	23,048,000
1960	15,635,000
1970	9,712,000
1980	7,241,000
1990	4,591,000

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 1981, 35; 1991, 363.

ers had already turned to southern blacks as a replacement for the sharply curtailed supply of immigrant European labor during the war years. This marked the beginning of the era of the Great Migration from the rural South to the urban North, which was described in chapter 5. It would have a pervasive impact on the social structure of the urban United States in the decades to come.

The 1920s also witnessed changes in agriculture that accelerated migration to the cities from the rural areas. Table 7.4 shows that the farm population declined from nearly 32 million in 1920 (the first census that separately enumerated farm population), to just over 4.5 million in 1990. This represents a corresponding decline from 30 percent to 1.8 percent in the proportion of the national population living on farms. Actually, this decline in farm population represented a much more substantial loss of rural population than the numbers suggested: The reduction of farm families led directly to a reduction in the number of people employed in agriculture related sales, services, and the processing of agricultural goods in rural areas.

The mechanization of agriculture, especially the introduction of the tractor and mechanized harvesting began to have an impact on farming in the 1920s. The adoption of agricultural technology expanded rapidly just prior to and during World War II. As farmers turned to machinery, the larger capital investment that the machinery required meant that individual farmers had to acquire more acreage and become bigger operators. This meant fewer farm families. It also meant that young people would have greater difficulty getting started in farming due to higher investment costs; as a result, more would leave rural areas. Higher efficiency meant less need for hired labor, and this change also reduced the number of tenant farmers. Overall, this represented a substantial decline in the agricultural population. This decline was bound to affect the volume of trade done by local businesses in small rural towns and service centers where livelihoods were dependent on these populations. The situation was made worse for nonfarm, but agriculturally dependent, businesses and occupations because of the automobile and improved roads that ended the relative isolation of these communities. Improved transportation meant that rural businesses no longer had the monopoly on local trade on which they had been dependent (Field and Dimit [1970] 1978, 308–9). Many of the smaller population centers that depended on local trade declined or vanished altogether.

Metropolitanization

The early decades of the twentieth century marked the early stages of *metropolitanization* for cities in the United States. Developments in transportation and communication technologies meant that the effective population of a given urban space included not only those who lived and worked in the central city or within the political boundaries of a particular municipality. By the early 1900s cities that we have been discussing like Chicago, Cincinnati, or New York had become the centers of sprawling urban growth that extended beyond the official boundaries of those places. These were now urban centers that determined the residential location and economic situations of populations that grew in the adjacent region surrounding them. The urban center, in combination with its satellites and suburbs, comprised a single metropolitan community or region. Hawley (1981, 151) offered the following distinction for differentiating between a *metropolitan community* and a *metropolitan region*. The zone of daily interaction and communication with the center comprises the metropolitan community. Zones of lesser frequency make up the region. Whichever we happen to be describing with reference to a particular case, the point is that the urban arena has enlarged dramatically. In contrast to nineteenth-century populations, particularly those that can be described by the term walking city, any accounting of urbanization at this point has to take into consideration both central-city or core populations and outer-city, suburban, and fringe populations who, all told, effectively make up the total population of an integrated urban space.

Together, these metropolitan areas represented the mainstream of the national economy. A U.S. government study reported that by the end of the 1920s, the country's ninety-six major metropolitan areas, with a combined population of 38 million urbanites and 17 million suburbanites, contained 45 percent of the total population. The 155 U.S. counties (of the over 3,000 total) that contained the larger cities held 74 percent of all industrial wage earners, 81 percent of all salaried employees, and 65 percent of all industrial establishments, as well as accounted for 80 percent of the value added by manufacturing. The report also reflected many of the concerns of the time regarding the conditions of the cities. In particular, it noted that "an overemphasis on individualistic enterprise and speculation, in the face of unparalleled growth and expansion," along with the lack of effective regulatory controls, was the cause of some of the more acute problems the cities were facing. Among its concerns, the study listed traffic congestion, "the herding of the low-income groups into dark, poorly ventilated dwellings, the contagion of blight near the heart of the city, . . . undue concentration of land values, inequitable apportionment of local tax burdens, and inadequate public services" (Urbanism Committee of the National Resources Committee [1937] 1963, 452, 455). Planners and administrators remain occupied with these issues until the present time.

Remaking Cities: Transportation, Government Policy, and the Wheels and Wings of Industry

As we have seen, suburban development predated the automobile. Streetcar companies pursued two policies that encouraged suburban settlement. They ran their

lines well beyond the built-up areas of the city, into the green and inviting open spaces beyond. Also, they maintained the 5-cent fare and a policy of unlimited transfers, which made travel to and from these more remote places economical, not only for daily business commuters but for their families as well. Population grew in new developments along and at convenient points between transportation arteries, and the growth of existing villages within commuting distance of the city was also encouraged (Jackson 1985, 119). By 1900, industries in Chicago that were pressed for space began to locate outside the more built-up areas of the city, and by 1910 Chicago's Outer Belt Line Railroad, circling thirty-five miles from the Loop, stimulated the growth of the satellites of Waukegan, Elgin, Aurora, Joliet, Chicago Heights, and Gary (Miller 1973, 137). By that date, the suburban trend was already a threat to central city business in the older cities of the Midwest and the East. Scott remarked that businesspeople had only to look to the popularity of the automobile, as measured by its sales, to gauge the momentum of the trend.

> [The automobile] released a man from dependence on the crowded transportation system . . . it enabled him to live on the edge of the city, where larks sang in the fields and wildflowers bloomed in the spring; it invited him to explore the rural lanes and quiet valleys on Sundays. It gave him more power for his personal enjoyment than the ordinary man had commanded in any previous age. (Scott 1969, 185–86)

Not every sufficiently affluent urbanite would be beguiled by such imagery, but millions were.

The Automobile Age

In 1908, when there were twenty-four companies in the United States producing low-priced cars, Henry Ford introduced his Model T. In 1914, he introduced the moving assembly line, which featured a highly rationalized and integrated assembly process. An even larger plant with even more simplified worker operations was opened in 1919. Essentially the same car that had cost $950 in 1910 could be owned for $290 by 1924. Moreover, wages were rising during the 1920s; consequently, more people could own cars (Jackson 1985, 159–75). In the ten years from 1905 to 1915, the number of registered automobiles increased from 8,000 to 2.3 million. By 1925 there were 17.5 million; by 1930, 23 million. The production of automobiles and auto-related manufacturers provided an especially important impetus to urban growth after 1910. Cities that experienced the greatest growth from 1910 to 1920 were those that built cars (where Detroit led the way), those that made auto parts (as was the case in Akron and Youngstown), or those that produced fuels (e.g., Los Angeles, Dallas, and Houston). Chicago, Milwaukee, and Buffalo grew from the manufacture of iron and steel, an industry closely tied to the production of automobiles (McKelvey 1969, 78).

Americans may have been enjoying the new freedom provided by the automobile, but there was a paradox in this apparent liberation: They were becoming dependent.

> The enormity of the shift was apparent by 1941, when the Bureau of public roads surveyed commutation patterns. It found that 2,100 communities, with populations ranging from 2,500 to 50,000 did not have public transportation systems of any kind

> and were completely dependent upon the private automobile for personal travel. Such a situation would have been inconceivable twenty-five years earlier. (Jackson 1985, 189)

In order for the full potential of the automobile as a device for shaping the pattern of human settlement to be realized, streets and highways had to be improved. In 1921, only 13 percent of the roads outside of cities were paved. The first federal highways act, passed in 1916 in response to popular and business demands for improved roadways, directed every state to establish a state highway department to plan routes, supervise construction, and maintain roads that federal funds would help to build. A series of related provisions during the early to mid-1920s created the familiar, numbered "U.S." route system that served as the framework of interstate transportation until the superhighway system was built in the 1960s (Warner 1972, 38).

The growing highway system meant that trucking enjoyed an increasing advantage over railroads for hauling freight. The expanding network of good roadways meant that shipping by truck could provide a greater flexibility in routing and scheduling, especially for relatively short distances where shipping by train proved a cumbersome alternative. Since the open highway, not the central city or the railroad's freight yard, was of primary importance in determining the location of firms that were highly dependent on trucking, this change in transportation contributed in the long run to the decentralization of industry.

Of course, the greatest impact that the motor vehicle would have on the shape of the city was provided by the automobile. The physical area covered by the city had always been limited by travel distances. Before the widespread ownership of cars and the improvement of roads, a radius of sixty minutes from the city center seldom covered more than six miles, limiting the area of cities to perhaps one hundred square miles. With the improvements in transportation, the area of the urban radius was increased to about twenty-five miles, which meant that the city's effective population now resided in a "zone of accessibility" amounting to just under 2,000 square miles (Hawley 1981, 148).

As the margins of city after city sprawled outward, the people, economic interests, and government bodies of the United States were making some important decisions about the future of transportation and the shape that cities would take. The public was using public transportation less, especially the electric streetcar. The number of electric streetcars in the country peaked in 1917, as did total ridership in 1923 (Jackson 1985, 171). The number of people using public transportation continued to decline during the Depression years of the 1930s, just as motor vehicle registration continued to increase. When public transportation looked to government for support, as it often did in the early decades of this century, it was turned down. It was refused subsidy because, unlike the wholly subsidized highway system, it was considered a private investment rather than a public good. When the companies took their case to the public, as they did in Detroit and Los Angeles, their appeals for financing through taxes were rejected. The position of streetcar companies was made worse in many cities by the refusal of the municipalities in which they operated to allow them to raise their fares above a nickel (Jackson 1985, 170).

With regard to the demise of metropolitan rail-transportation systems, there is a longstanding controversy over whether or not corporate motor-transportation

industries were up to something in trying to hurry the decline of public transit. There had been allegations that General Motors, Standard Oil of California, Firestone, and others sought to stimulate the sales of private autos by reducing the attractiveness of public transportation. They allegedly did this by buying up viable electric public transit lines and converting them to diesel bus lines that used motor transport, rubber, and petroleum-based energy. The argument goes that the noisy, smelly buses that had to compete with cars on crowded city streets (streetcar and other rail lines had their own lanes and rights-of-way) were cumbersome and less efficient modes of transport that put off would-be riders. The charges were sufficiently plausible to be brought before a congressional subcommittee, and eventually the courts (Snell 1974). In the courts, GM was convicted on a lesser charge (forcing bus companies in which it had an interest in to buy GM buses). Although a number of publications (e.g., Adler 1991; Bianco 1998; Bottle 1991) have systematically dismantled the heart of the conspiracy-to-end-effective-public-transit-systems argument that was leveled at the supposed conspirators, stories surrounding corporate wrongdoing in the matter persist, perpetuated in part by wide news media reporting, and through such films as the PBS (POV) 1996 documentary *Taken for a Ride* and the 1988 Hollywood animated feature *Who Framed Roger Rabbit?* The story continues to be widely circulated. The conventional wisdom on the matter currently is that whatever might or might not have been done to speed its end, the old rails that ran along city streets were in decline and, at any rate, could never have effectively served the sprawling populations of modern metropolitanized cityscapes.

It would be difficult to overstate the degree to which motor vehicles altered the cities and urban life. The parking lot and traffic light became ubiquitous features of the cityscape. By the year 1925 the attraction of the open road was accounting for 24,000 deaths and 600,000 injuries due to traffic accidents. Younger cities and those that grew rapidly after 1920 took their sprawling shapes from the automobility of their growing populations. The suburban growth around older cities was often even more remarkable. Between 1920 and 1930, the suburbs of the ninety-six largest urban areas grew twice as fast as the central cities. Some suburbs, like Grosse Pointe outside Detroit and Elmwood Park near Chicago, grew at several times the city rates. A *National Geographic* feature, published in 1923, that focused on the new suburban phenomenon, already counted distant Long Branch and Morristown, New Jersey, and Stamford, Greenwich, and New Canaan, Connecticut, as New York suburbs (Jackson 1985, 176).

In 1925 Harlan Douglas struggled to define the nature of the emerging urban fringe in his book *The Suburban Trend*:

> Out toward the fringes and margins of cities comes a region where they begin to be less themselves than they are at the center, a place where the city looks countryward. No sharp boundary line defines it; there is rather a gradual tapering off from the urban type of civilization toward the rural type. It is the city thinned out.
>
> Confronted with the expanding cities the adjacent country also begins to look cityward. The result is not, however, a compromise of equals. The original movement was, and the major movement is the city's. The suburb is a footnote to urban civilization affecting the near-by country-side. . . . The brand of the city is stamped upon it. It straddles

> the arbitrary line which statistics draw between the urban and rural spheres; but in reality it is the push of the city outward. . . . It is the city trying to escape the consequences of being a city while still remaining a city. (Douglas 1925, 3–4)

Besides describing the suburbs, Douglas (1925, 216–19) expressed concerns about their social impact; he wasn't the last one to do so. Among his concerns was the prospect that suburbanites who worked in cities would experience a divided loyalty and lead a bifocal existence. Living in one environment and working in a different one would mean that people would be torn between the two, unable to devote more than half their will or half their heart to either. From this point in its history onward, the suburb would become a favorite target of critics and social commentators.

The Great Depression and Urban Conditions

The stock market crash and the Great Depression that began in 1929 interrupted the rapid expansion of the suburbs. Although they continued to grow at greater rates than the central cities through the 1930s, the construction of residential housing was off dramatically, by 95 percent from 1928 to 1933 (Jackson 1985, 187). Millions were unemployed, and cities had neither the social programs nor the financial means to deal with the scope of the problem. Their revenues contracted along with the private sector of the economy. In New York City, a million people were without work; in Chicago, 660,000. Unemployment in Toledo and Akron in the early 1930s was running more than 50 percent of the workforce. In Detroit, government leaders hoped at the outset of the Depression in 1929 that the number of families on relief would not exceed 3,500. By 1930, 12,500 families were dependent on city welfare, and in 1931 there were almost ten times that many. At its worst point, in 1933, one-third of the city's workforce was unemployed (Glazer 1965, 97–99). In cities throughout the country, municipal tax bases declined along with urban land values, as the numbers of tax delinquencies grew (Miller 1973, 160). Every large city had a "Hooverville," a shantytown that housed the otherwise homeless. These settlements were so called in honor of the president, who favored dealing with the economic problems that beset the country through policies that would extend aid to businesses, thus stimulating the economy.

The early 1930s marked an intensification of a long-term, growing awareness and concern in the country regarding the conditions of the urban poor, in general, and the conditions of urban housing for lower-income people, in particular. These concerns received focus and expression in Edith Elmer Wood's *Recent Trends in American Housing*, published in 1931. By her estimation, there were 9 million housing units that needed to be replaced at the time at an estimated cost of $40 billion. At the end of 1931, Hoover convened the National Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, but his instructions were to keep the federal government out of "the housing business" (Scott 1969, 283–84). Characteristic of his administration's approach was the week set aside in October 1931 when cities were to conduct a community chest drive to raise funds to help themselves (Miller 1973, 160).

Cities did not receive substantial help from the federal government until 1937 when Congress finally passed the Housing Act of 1937 (also known as the Wagner-Steagall Act), a policy consistent with the spirit of Roosevelt's New Deal programs. The act, which was opposed by real estate, construction, and some financial interests, and supported by mayors, social workers, the NAACP, and some business interests, provided subsidy for low-income housing development. Most important, it contained a commitment to the ideal of providing "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of low income," and it created the U.S. Housing Authority. Low-income families were defined as those who could not "afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their locality . . . to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for their use." According to its provisions, the federal government could loan up to 90 percent of the total cost of a project at low-interest rates for a period of up to sixty years, making the undertaking of such projects, especially during the Depression, attractive and viable. There was also a provision for rent subsidies. The $800 million provided for the program did not go far. During the next four years, only 21,600 units were built, and an additional 168,000 subsidized; the need, however, was for between 8 million and 10 million units (Scott 1969, 328–30). Still, the federal government had entered the housing business, an area in which European governments had long provided services.

World War II and the Altered Course of Urban Growth

As the United States geared up for war production in the early 1940s, many of the problems and dislocations of the Depression remained unresolved in the cities. Although industries were gradually converting to the production of weapons and other war materials prior to direct U.S. involvement in the war, the sudden entry of the United States into the conflict had a convulsive effect in urban areas. Housing stock was aging and in poor repair and, for lower-income groups, in short supply. Industry had not fully recovered from the Depression, and many people remained unemployed, underemployed, or employed in positions they found unsatisfactory. Large numbers in the agricultural population had been marginalized. The war meant expanded industrialization and more urban growth, but these would take place in new and often wholly unexpected locations.

A number of cities grew substantially during World War II as a result of orders placed with local industries by the War Production Board, which was interested in achieving the maximum utilization of all regional labor pools. The larger cities of Norfolk, Miami, Phoenix, and San Diego grew between 72 and 92 percent during the war, largely as a result of the war industry. Smaller cities that achieved spectacular growth for the same reason included San Bernardino, Lubbock, and Albuquerque (McKelvey 1968, 122–23). Within four months of the initiation of the U.S. defense program, the combined contracts of San Diego's four aircraft industries amounted to more than twice the total assessed value of the city. As the city struggled to accommodate the 15,000 to 30,000 newcomers attracted by industrial expansion between the months of April and October 1940, the army, the navy, and

aircraft companies announced that another 45,000 new migrants would be seeking housing in the next eight months, while an additional 16,000 would be accommodated in military barracks and camps (Scott 1969, 373–74).

San Diego's experience was repeated in a number of other cities. During the war, Philadelphia absorbed an additional 150,000 industrial workers; Pittsburgh 30,000. Tacoma had 10,000 new building and shipyard workers. Louisville had 40,000 new workers; Indianapolis 20,000; and Wichita 15,000. In the eighteen months after the raid on Pearl Harbor, 350,000 migrated to Detroit. Los Angeles, where the reorganization and growth of aircraft industries had been underway during the 1930s, played a major role in producing aircraft during the war. Between 1940 and 1944, its population grew by 780,000. A special 1947 census revealed that one-third of the population of Los Angeles had not lived there in 1940 (Clark 1983, 283–84).

Under conditions of rapid growth, people were often forced to live in whatever shelter they could find or build in the housing-short cities. In Gadsden, Alabama, newly arrived steelworkers set up house in garages, barns, old store buildings, and shacks with dirt floors. At Abilene and Mineral Wells, Texas, men paid $3.00 a day to rent cots in tar-paper shacks with no sanitary facilities. In Jacksonville, Florida, some made shelters of palmetto leaves spread over wooden frames. Clearly, the circumstances were exceptional, but the war merely intensified the housing shortages that had been characteristic of U.S. cities.

Many of the newcomers came from rural areas. Nearly 1.3 million had left the farm and migrated to war production areas by the fall of 1941, just a year and a half after the start of the defense program. However, many more than this were migrants from other urban areas (Scott 1969, 386–88), relocated by employment opportunities brought by the war. The migrants included large numbers of poor blacks from the rural South. The black population of Detroit doubled during the 1940s, from 149,000 in 1940 to 300,000 in 1950, and represented a proportional growth of 9 to 16 percent of the population. The number of blacks in Los Angeles grew from 64,000 to 171,000 or from 4 to almost 9 percent of the city's population. The sorting and reconcentration of populations in crowded, decrepit urban centers and the combination of economic boom and political neglect produced a legacy of tension and disorder that would be punctuated in many cities, including Detroit and Los Angeles, by conflict and riot in the coming decades.

THE CONTINUATION OF URBAN TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II: PATTERNS OF GROWTH IN DECLINE

The beginning of the war was marked by an increase in marriage rates that was soon followed by an increase in birthrates—the so-called good-bye babies born to couples about to be separated. After the war, marriage and birthrates continued to rise. In 1947, 6 million families were "doubling up" with relatives and friends due to housing and apartment shortages. Another 500,000 lived in Quonset huts or other temporary shelters (Jackson 1985, 232). These conditions indicated that major changes in the nation's urban structure could be expected.

The Federal Government's Role in Suburbanization

In 1944, Veterans Administration mortgage loans had been added to the other loans available through the Federal Housing Administration, and, together, these government guarantees helped to fuel an unprecedented growth in the housing industry. Housing starts, which numbered only 114,000 in 1944, were at 937,000 in 1947, and 1.692 million in 1950 (Jackson 1985, 233). After a brief stumble, the postwar economy was stable and strong. Millions of urban apartment dwellers, with new families and a modest degree of affluence and security, took to the suburbs.


From 1950 to 1970, population densities in the largest central cities (cities with a population of a million or more) declined by about 10 percent, while the densities of smaller central cities declined by about 35 percent. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of people who lived *in* metropolitan areas but *outside* of central cities increased at a rate five times that of central city populations; from 1960 to 1970, the increase was about four times as fast (Zimmer 1975, 26).

Cities lost more than population. Beauregard (2006, 21) offers a succinct sketch of the trauma of decentralization which we will flesh-out in the following section:

> The loss of residents was only part of the trauma. Employment fell as factories closed, fled to the suburbs, or laid off workers. Slums expanded, blight spread across central business districts, and industrial areas witnessed large-scale abandonment. Urban tax bases shrank, and local governments entered into years of chronic fiscal crisis.

The central business district, which had once been at the center of all major urban activities, declined in importance as automobiles continued to replace public transportation. Whereas the central city had served as the hub of a managed public transport system, traffic management schemes for private transportation generally included efforts to orient traffic away from downtown. While cities of all sizes tended to suffer from a decrease in retail trade, the decline was sharpest in cities from 250,000 to 500,000 in population. Between 1950 and 1967, cities in that size range lost two-fifths of their retailers, while cities above that size range averaged a loss of about one-fourth. Moreover, the decline in the *share* of the total sales for metropolitan areas that was claimed by central city establishments was much greater (Zimmer 1975, 55–63).

Besides the encouragement the federal government provided through its mortgage and underwriting schemes (FHA and VA loans), it provided further impetus to urban decentralization through its highway building programs. The 1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act set aside $100 billion over a period of thirteen years for the revision and expansion of the interstate highway system; the new system was designed to link most major cities with superhighways. Coupled with vigorous local road building and improvement projects, the effect was to expand the suburban commuter radius of cities. As Popenoe (1985, 95) pointed out, the effective size of a metropolitan community was limited by the daily journey to work. Typically, that distance did not exceed one hour's driving time (one way). Calculated in this way, it was easy to see that as roads improved, more distant points of destination were accessible within a given driving time. In effect, the radius of the metropolitan community expanded. In Providence, Rhode Island, between 1955 and 1965,



It is widely understood that the automobile modified the urban form, allowing cities to sprawl outward across the countryside. There were just a few decades between the manufacture of the iconic Model A and the Cadillac depicted here. But the difference in the potential for sprawl represented by the two cars and the roads built to accommodate them was enormous. From the collection of automobile photographs and news releases, 1877–1938 in the New York Public Library. Used by permission.



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the ten-minute travel zone from the city center increased by about two miles; the twenty-minute zone grew from seven to fourteen miles; and the forty-minute zone grew from eighteen to twenty-five miles (Zimmer 1975, 29–30). In Los Angeles, between 1953 and 1962, freeway construction expanded the area within half an hour's drive of downtown from 261 square miles to 705 square miles (Clark 1983, 273). Inexpensive gasoline and oversized and overpowered automobiles, which somehow combined the comfort of living room furniture with instrument panels and exterior designs suitable to the awkward dawning of the aerospace age, further softened the time-distance friction between home and work.

In 1950, the U.S. Census Bureau attempted to accommodate the expanded urban form—the metropolitan community—by instituting a new unit of measurement. In that census year, the bureau began to enumerate metropolitan populations by employing the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) as a unit of measure. The term was simplified to Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in 1990. This measure counted all cities or closely clustered cities with a population of 50,000 or more, and adds to this the population of the surrounding county or counties shown by commuting patterns and other economic measures to be integrated with the urban core. Since the county/counties measure was standardized for all such cities, countywide Metropolitan Statistical Areas sometimes contain farms and even unsettled tracts. But the measure does recognize the fact that the populations of suburbs and other immediate outlying areas are a functionally integrated part of any urban core, and the closest approximation available to the Census Bureau is typically the county population unit. In 2007 the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, the government unit responsible for maintaining standardized measures, approved the continued use of existing criteria for Metropolitan Statistical Areas and added a new category of measurement for smaller urban centers, the Micropolitan Statistical Area. These are defined as having at least one urban cluster of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000 population, plus adjacent territory (measured, again, as whole counties) that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. Thus defined, the 363 metropolitan areas contain about 83 percent of the population of the United States, and the 577 micropolitan areas about 10 percent (Office of Management and Budget 2007, 2).

The Selling of the Suburbs

The building and selling of the suburbs was a remarkable achievement in and of itself. Although the population was being transformed during the 1950s from a predominantly blue-collar to a white-collar workforce, and U.S. Americans were increasingly encouraged to think of themselves as middle- rather than working-class, the new prosperity was modest. If they were to buy suburban housing in large numbers, it wouldn't be the expensive, prewar variety that had been limited largely to the upper middle class. In every large city, however, a number of builders found innovative ways to lower construction costs in order to capture a share of the new market. None competed more successfully than Abraham Levitt and Sons.

Before the war, the Levitts operated their construction company on a modest scale on Long Island, their most ambitious project having been one 200-unit development

in 1934. During the war, they mass produced housing for the federal government. In 1946, they began to plan their first large-scale housing development, called Levittown, on Long Island. It would eventually consist of 17,400 housing units in a single development and house some 82,000 residents. The company kept the cost of the housing units low (the units sold for $7,990) by standardizing the components that went into each house, precutting and prefabricating parts wherever feasible, and by dividing the production process into twenty-seven separate operations, each one performed in sequence by a specialized crew. In effect, the Levitts had done to the construction of housing what Henry Ford had done to the building of automobiles. The Levitts' "Model T" was a uniform, Cape Cod–style house, built on a concrete slab, with only the lower of the one and a half stories completed. Designed "not to stir the imagination, but to provide the best shelter at the least price," these developments, consisting of repetitious units of housing, row upon row, on 60-by-100-foot cookie-cutter lots, soon drew the attention of critics. But the huge project was such a popular success that it was repeated near Philadelphia and in Willingboro, New Jersey (Jackson 1985, 234–38). These subdivisions simply represent the most massive examples among the hundreds of suburban subdivisions that emerged in the 1950s and thereafter in response to the clamor for this most tangible of all the components of the American Dream.

Just as massive urbanization had given rise to concerns about the social consequences of the new and unfamiliar settlement pattern in the previous century, suburbanization raised similar questions in the minds of many in the 1950s. It was suspected that suburbs would prove to be the great cultural and political leveler, that they would, among other things, present a compulsory obligation to neighbor, destroy individualism, and create a monotonous homogeneity. Alternatively, suburbs have been portrayed as lacking in the kind of sociability generated by socially heterogeneous urban neighborhoods (Jacobs 1961; Sennett 1970).

It remains unclear to what extent and in what ways middle-class suburbanites differ from their urban counterparts. It has been argued, especially with regard to the more critical comparisons, that supportive evidence is lacking (Donaldson 1969). In an era when suburban populations were somewhat more uniform in terms of their social characteristics, Berger (1960) suggested that myths about deadly dull and neurotic suburbia persisted despite the lack of supporting evidence because they were myths we loved to hate. His point was that, given the lack of a clear image or theme with which to symbolize "American culture," Americans seized on the image of the suburb, most easily pictured in all of its negative stereotypes, to fill the void. Over time the suburb has taken on a more complex imagery and set of meanings, as depicted in a 2006 exhibit titled I Love the 'Burbs' featured by the Katonah Art Museum, itself located in an upscale suburban region forty miles north of New York City. Artworks included upbeat images of the taken-for-granted, affluent social environment of Americana, the environment that most Americans associate with suburban life. But depictions also included updated criticisms. Of course the exhibit had to include a reference to Levittown, in this case in a painting of the massive housing development's tract housing, a monotonous patchwork of housing units. A photograph by Lee Stoetzel depicted the larger, more up-to-date suburban homes, nicknamed "McMansions." In his work "he photographs miniature monstrosities that he builds from McDonald's food and packaging materials; No. 5 is a rustic

palazzo with stones made of Chicken McNuggets, windows of plastic drink lids, skylights of sweet and sour sauce containers and a hipped roof of Quarter Pounder boxes. The house sits in dirt made from ground beef flecked with onion" (*New York Times* Art Review March 24, 2006) .The work recalls the fact that the suburb in popular culture is more than a place to sleep, that it does frame a way of life, including the notorious North American foodway, fast food.

Textbox 7.2. The Migration to the Suburbs

Broadcast journalist Ray Suarez wrote about some of the sociological consequences of suburbanization in *The Old Neighborhood: What We Lost in the Great Suburban Migration* (1999). One consequence, explicit in his title, was the loss of the old neighborhoods—cells of inner-city sociability and identity, places that made life in the industrial city livable, places especially attractive once they were left behind and when embellished by nostalgic memories. He said that reminiscence "takes on a rhythm of ritual and truth" when repeated often enough by former residents of the old neighborhood: "We *never* had to lock our doors. Everybody knew everybody. We weren't afraid" (12). But sometime after midcentury, people were afraid, especially as their children reached their teen years, and even urban diehards left for the suburbs as schools and services declined and neighborhoods became browner and blacker. White middle-class families left as the image of white America was dissolving and the city proper came to symbolize the diversity of the nation's population. It would be difficult to overstate the significance of the physical separation by class and race that was entailed in the movement to the suburbs. The myth that all Americans were "in it together" became insupportable. "When we no longer lived and worked in proximity to one another, we no longer knew the same things. Once we no longer knew the same things, we no longer had a need for cultural cohesion. Once we no longer had cultural cohesion, it was easier and easier to draw circles of concern more narrowly around one's own doorstep" (15).

Richard Sennett (1970) believed that middle-class residential suburbs actually were a way of sustaining the myth of cultural uniformity—the cultural uniformity of those who lived in the suburbs. In his version, people who fled the cities were able to preserve their prejudices and protect themselves from the complicated business of learning more deeply about both themselves and those who were culturally different; they escaped the demanding task of learning to deal with people as individuals, learning that real people in real situations resisted easy categorization according to class, race, and subculture. The sociological significance of the racially and socioeconomically homogeneous suburb is that it is a protected haven for the preservation of ignorance. In his provocative interpretation, Sennett portrayed suburbanites as having entered a perpetual intellectual adolescence, an arrested know-it-all state of social development, in which prejudice and misconceptions about other people will seldom be tested by the actual experience of face-to-face contact. There is an added tendency to retreat further into the private world of home and family, with only superficial contact with neighbors in middle-class suburbs. This sustains the idea that all suburban families are just about the same and intensifies a kind of abstracted commitment to an image of local community. So, in a sense, the suburbs preserve the idea described by Suarez, that "we're all in this together," meaning all suburbanites who fit an idealized profile, with circles of concern drawn "more narrowly around one's own

doorstep." Both writers agree that the old neighborhoods of the inner city provided richer opportunity for meaningful interaction than the suburban housing tracts that later came to symbolize the typical American residential setting. But it is interesting that Suarez portrayed the image of the old urban community as mythological, in part, while Sennett found the notion of community in the suburb where people have little contact with each other a pure myth.

While individuals are free to hate or love the suburbs as they choose, there can be little question of the harmful impact overall of metropolitan suburban growth. That those living outside central cities continue to commute to work or use the central city for other purposes has been seen as suburban exploitation of the city. This is because suburban populations tend to rely on urban services, at least part of the time; but because they reside in a different municipality and pay taxes where they have their residence, they are using urban services without paying for them. This means that those who reside in the central city must pay proportionally more for urban services, and if the tax base cannot support those services, do without. Studies have shown, in fact, that the proportion of the metropolitan population living outside the central city is directly related to the per capita costs of providing urban services. This is because the cost of providing services to nonresidents when they are in town increases the cost of running the city; this then appears as a higher per capita cost (Zimmer 1975, 76).

The Blurring of the Suburbs

The alterations that suburbs are currently undergoing demand a change in their popular image and in the ways they are seen to relate to old central city areas. It must be conceded that, from the beginning, suburbs have resisted meaningful generalization. The term simply refers to an area immediately adjacent to a city, extending outward beyond that point. As such, *suburb* has referred to residential clusters and corridors, small satellite towns and villages, industrial expansions, and even cities subordinate to a greater central influence, like those in the New York metropolitan area. As Teaford (2008, 218) puts it, "Nothing about suburbia precludes any form of endeavor or way of life. And as America becomes more suburban, the suburbs will continue to reflect the rich diversity of the nation." For some time even residential suburbs have been changing in ways that offer new challenges to the meaning of the concept.

By 1973, Masotti was already describing the growing heterogeneity of residential suburbs. Except for members of the "marginal underclass," suburbs were becoming more heterogeneous by class, race, ethnicity, marital status, and life-cycle stage. While single-unit dwellings continued to predominate, increased housing costs were providing a market for multiunit construction. These multiunit structures were attractive to many childless households. Thus, suburbia was no longer exclusively a family place.

Masotti also observed that the suburb was becoming less an urban fringe and more an independent "neocity." Post–World War II commuting patterns increasingly reflected a decentralization of manufacturing, service industries, commerce, and retail trade. Many older suburbs were successful in maintaining their exclusively residential quality through increased property taxes and zoning restrictions; but newer suburbs, along with some older ones, worked to attract industries, office complexes, or major shopping centers. This has reduced suburb-to-center-city commuting and increased intersuburban commuting for work, residence, shopping, and recreation. Moreover, many of those living in the central city, especially skilled and semiskilled workers, began to commute to work in the suburbs.

Meltzer (1984) tried to name the trend. He emphasized the new balance of the various suburban and formerly central urban locations and argued that the metropolitan concept, which implied domination of a system by its center, be dropped in favor of "metroplex." He allowed that the old central city could retain some of its exclusive functions, especially as an administrative and commercial location; but he reasoned that the specialization, as well as the growing complexity, of those sites originally developed as suburbs would make them central or equally important in other ways. The urban form, transformed over the course of the century into a metropolitan community, was transformed again into a network of more or less equal urban nodes.

Meltzer's metroplex description applies better to some cities than others and it is still not clear that it describes a common future for all cities in the United States. Certainly, when a city attains this form, the complexity of the question of where one lives carries us far beyond the experience of the suburbanites of the mid-1920s, whose supposedly confused loyalties troubled Harlan Douglas. Consider the case, related by Jackson (1985, 265), of one resident of the "centerless city" of Orange County, California (south of Los Angeles): "I live in Garden Grove, work in Irvine, shop in Santa Ana, go to the dentist in Anaheim, my husband works in Long Beach, and I used to be the President of the League of Women Voters in Fullerton." Jackson doesn't say whether the woman found the variety troubling or attractive.

Edge City

Journalist Joel Garreau (1991) observed further that the typical U.S. city was demonstrating a dispersed growth pattern. He called these growing conurbation tack-ons "edge cities" because, in his view, they represent a new frontier of urban growth, a mass emigration of not only people but also function away from old urban centers. The fringe performs the traditional functions of the city. Among the more than 200 of these places that Garreau identified are the Route 128 and Massachusetts Turnpike corridors outside Boston, the Schaumburg area west of Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, the Perimeter Area north of Atlanta, and, of course, sections of Orange County.

Garreau identified the minimal qualifying features of an edge city as having growing perimeters with 5 million square feet of leaseable office space (more, e.g., than there is in downtown Memphis); 600,000 square feet of leaseable retail space (the



Contrary to the popular image of suburbs as continuous residential housing tracts or "bedroom communities," U.S. suburbs contain a variety of land uses. The photos here and on the next page depict metropolitan suburbs. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation



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equivalent of a "fair-sized" mall); more jobs than bedrooms; the local perception that it is a more or less self-contained, mixed-use area; and it needs to have taken on its present dimensions rather rapidly, within the past few decades. Taken together, edge cities are presently the most important feature of North American urban space, and they are changing the character of urban life. Two-thirds of the office facilities in the United States are located in edge cities, and most of the buildings that house them have been built within the past two decades. The commuting pattern that sends commuters around rather than in and out of the metropolitan region's center has become a reality in these places. Edge cities rarely have a governing body, nor do their dimensions respond to official municipal boundaries. More of the residents of these areas live outside the city proper than within it.

Garreau attributes the creation of the edge city world to popular taste. In his view, this world is a collective spatial representation of how North Americans think they want to arrange their lives—until they are confronted with the aggregated consequences of so many people making similar suburban (the term is in jeopardy of a total loss of meaning here) choices. But his analysis makes it clear that to the extent popular taste is responsible for the endlessly sprawling built environment, it is led and manipulated by those who engineer and build these new urban spaces for profit. Garreau points out that the elements of developed space that are found in an edge city must be understood with reference to the developer's worldview (see textbox 7.3). Developers are close students of human nature, and they are developing their own pragmatic pseudoscience. The emerging discipline has no interest in

how humans should operate, only in the question of how they will: Being able to anticipate consumer behavior translates into profit (117).

Textbox 7.3. Talking the Talk of Real Estate Developers

A most revealing insight into edge city development is found in the hard-edge language speculators and developers use. The insider's code reveals, through metaphor and implication, a mindset that is one dimensional and bottom line in its orientation. Physical space is a "blank" until it is developed. The aesthetic dimension of space and form is leveled by a bitingly utilitarian frame of reference: Open landscapes are in need of "animation" through the use of flagpoles or "active water features" (e.g., fountains) or "plop art" (large abstract sculpture). Alternately, a "beautiful building" is one that is fully leased. Language is emptied of meaning in application to market goals: A "community" is anything the promoter says it is, from the businesses gathered into an industrial park to those collected in a shopping mall. "Negative-absorption" refers to a development where more tenants are moving out than moving in. Gadgets and innovations designed to attract the attention of clients and provide a rationale for higher rents are referred to as "ooh-ahs" (the sound the client is supposed to make), while upscale shops receive the more widely recognized designation, "chi-chi, froufrou." "Class-B space" is where the "grunts" or "wage-slaves" will work. Difficult situations in which developers find themselves hemmed in by circumstances that threaten the profitability of the project are referred to in metaphors that depict attacks by Mexicans or American Indian tribes. The competent developer will have left a "back door" to escape through (Garreau 1991, 443–51).

The capacity of automobile Americans to forge new sprawling settlements has kept demographers busy developing new terminologies to capture emerging spatial living and working arrangements. The Federal National Mortgage Association (the Fannie Mae foundation) identified a "new" form of suburban development after the 2000 census revealed that fifty-three such developments were home to a total of 9.5 million people in the United States. The "boomburb" is defined as an incorporated place with more than 100,000 people, but it is not the largest incorporated place in a metropolitan area (hence, it remains "suburban" to some larger place). All but nine of the fifty-three are located in Southwestern states: This is no accident. Water is scarce in this region (that scarcity is discussed later in this chapter), and only newly incorporated populations of considerable size can lay claim to a share of the water supply. Thus, many boomburbs are deliberately planned developments that are intended to grow rapidly (Lang 2004, 2). They are in fact "fast growing suburban cities" and include Tempe and Mesa, Arizona; Arlington and Irving, Texas; and Irvine, Daly City, and Anaheim, California (Lang and Simmons 2003, 102). They continue to provide a moving target for those who would name and define them. Some threaten to outgrow their suburban status as they outgrow nearby regional centers. Some are larger than older established cities and rank among the 100 largest places in the United States. Mesa, Arizona, is larger than Atlanta, Georgia, and Arlington (Texas), Santa Ana, and Anaheim (California) have dropped St. Louis, Missouri, off the list of the fifty largest U.S. cities. By 2005 an additional list of eighty-six "baby boomburbs" with rapidly growing populations between 50,000 and 100,000

had been identified (Teaford 2008, 80). While many boomburbs more or less fit the popular image of the white middle-class suburb, all contain some element of diversity, including lower-income households. The term "New Brooklyn" has been devised to designate certain diverse boomburbs like Hialeah (Florida); Daly City, Sunnyvale, and Anaheim (California) that equal or exceed prototype Brooklyn, New York's 38 percent foreign-born population (Lang 2004, 4). As we take into account these emergent "fast growing suburban cities," the diversity of places referred to as "suburban" stretches the concept, suburb, to a point where the meaning of the term threatens to evaporate.

But the suburb, for all of its variety, is such an important part of Americana that we must continue to address its burgeoning reality. That reality is that Americans who can afford it have long been opting out of central urban life, as have employers and merchants. The edge has become the center of settled American life, symbolically and authentically. The authenticity of the suburb is institutionalized as the Smithsonian Museum of American History undertakes a quest to acquire for its collection an unmodified specimen of a Levittown house (as soon as the current residents are no longer living in it). The suburbs have aged in place, and many first-tier or older suburbs are in decline and some face urban challenges of deteriorating housing, job loss, and decline in services similar to those of the central cities to which they are adjacent (Lucy and Phillips 2000; Hudnut 2003; Vicino 2008). Newer suburbs present planners and policymakers with new environmental and management challenges that we return to examine in chapter 10. Ultimately they raise questions of sustainability as the world drifts uncertainly toward a post-gasoline age. And where once the large-lot, single-family dwelling was almost a uniquely U.S. ideal, the model is quickly being adopted around the world (Duaney, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck 1999). That means that the U.S. experience of sprawling suburbanization becomes something between a universal prototype and planning nightmare elsewhere in the world.

THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT AND THE CRISIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL CITY

In recent decades there have been a number of shifts in urbanization that reflect nationwide and even international economic trends. Many of these represent a continuation or acceleration of more long-term trends, the cumulative effects of which have in past decades spelled crisis for long-established industrial centers. The cities of the U.S. South and Southwest, the Sunbelt, that have experienced recent rapid growth rates have encountered problems of their own.

Delineated in various ways, the Sunbelt is generally considered to include that part of the country situated below a line running along the northern borders of North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona, and incorporating Las Vegas and Southern California. Alternate schemes include Denver, all of California, and even all of the West Coast. These inclusions test the "Sunbelt" designation but combine urban regions that share the feature of having recently experienced population increases and economic expansion at rates higher than the national averages. These increases and expansions occurred while cities in other

regions, particularly the Northeast and North Central areas, collectively designated as the Frostbelt or Snowbelt (and, in part, the Rustbelt), were stagnant or declining.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the economies of older northern cities that had grown during the industrial age bore the brunt of the impact of a national decline in manufacturing, a trend that had actually begun much earlier in the century. The proportion of U.S. workers employed in manufacturing peaked in 1920. Even in predominantly industrial cities like Detroit and Pittsburgh, by the 1920s the largest gains in employment were being made in the trade, clerical, and professional categories. Among the seven large U.S. cities that had more than 50 percent of the labor force in manufacturing in 1920, only Akron maintained that proportion a decade later (McKelvey 1968, 33–34).

After the industrial resurgence of wartime, the national economy resumed its gradual shift away from its industrial base, as the proportion of service jobs steadily increased against the numbers employed in manufacturing. As the economy expanded, the number of workers employed in wholesale and retail trade, transportation, and teaching, as well as those employed as counselors, caretakers of people and property, installers, repairers, gardeners, and the like, increased at a much faster rate than the number of industrial workers. Of the 19 million jobs added between 1970 and 1980, 90 percent were in the service sector. And between 1996 and 2006 there was a net loss of 3 million manufacturing jobs. The loss in manufacturing jobs continues. In 2007 the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics projected a further loss of 1.5 million more over the course of the following decade (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007, 1). In 2007 the Bureau could not have anticipated the massive recession that began in 2008: In that year alone manufacturing trades lost 791,000 jobs, putting the industry well on its way to achieving the projected 1.5 million total loss by 2016 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009, 3). By October 2009, 2.5 million manufacturing jobs had been lost to the recession, and some of these would never return.

As the availability of manufacturing jobs decreased, the location of industrial employment also changed. Industry long ago joined the suburban movement. From 1963 to 1977, the total number of manufacturing jobs in the central cities of the twenty-five largest metropolitan areas dropped by 700,000, while their suburbs added about 1.1 million (Logan and Golden 1986, 430). In the northeast, in the more or less continuous conurbation that links Washington, D.C., and Boston, central cities had a total of more than 1.5 million manufacturing jobs in 1958; by 1997, they had less than half a million (Short 2007, 59). What was more serious for the populations of the older industrial regions was that such employment opportunities were moving out of the older MSAs altogether. While the more established industrial cities of the North were losing manufacturing jobs following 1958, the cities of the Sunbelt increased theirs between 60 and 100 percent by the early 1980s (Checkoway and Patton 1985, 6).

During the second half of the twentieth century, even though new jobs were opening up in northern central cities at the same time that manufacturing jobs were shrinking in number, northern cities also lost population to the Sunbelt. Between 1970 and 1980, a decade of rapid growth for the southern and southwestern cities, St. Louis lost 27.2 percent of its population; Cleveland 23.6 percent; Detroit 20.5 percent; and Cincinnati 15 percent. Except for Cincinnati, each of these cities also experienced a net population loss from their total metropolitan area (Checkoway

and Patton 1985, 3). Meanwhile, Phoenix grew by 35.8 percent, its MSA by 56 percent; the city of Houston by 29.4 percent, its MSA by 46.4 percent; and the city of San Diego by 25.7 percent, its MSA by 37.1 percent (Rice and Bernard 1983, table 1.3). For most of the second half of the twentieth century and on into the twenty-first, urban prosperity and population growth belonged to the cities of the Sunbelt. Between 2000 and 2006, among America's 100 largest rapidly growing cities, seventy-seven were in the Sunbelt. Among U.S. cities with a population above 100,000, forty-four of the fifty with the greatest proportional population gain were within that geographic region. Among the thirteen cities with the greatest population *shrinkage*—not counting New Orleans which lost more than half its population following Hurricane Katrina—only one was in the Sunbelt (Birmingham). The list of the most rapidly shrinking cities in the first decade of the new century included many of the heavily industrialized centers: Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Flint, and Toledo were among the top losers (City Mayors 2007).

The Nature of the Sunbelt Advantage

The shift of population and economic activity to the South was the result of certain economic advantages offered by the region and of government policies. The inherent economic attractiveness of the Sunbelt stemmed from the relative advantages the region offered to businesses seeking to expand profitability by reducing the costs of operation. The South offered lower land, labor, and energy costs, as well as lower taxes. In addition, federal government policy, from military spending to highway programs, had bestowed disproportionate benefits on the cities of the southern rim. The location of energy reserves and the continued attraction of warm climates also played a role. Cities in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana prospered after World War II as the result of gas and oil exploitation; the climate in Arizona and Florida invited the development of retirement havens; and many of the newer cities, as well as the more colorful older cities, benefited from tourism. Meanwhile, the decline of industrial employment and central city populations in older northern cities, which had been built around central industrial cores, tended to accentuate the growing contrast between the declining and developing regions of the country.

The U.S. heavy industrial complex, geared to maximum production during World War II, came through the war fully intact, while the industrial capacity of a good portion of the world's other industrial powers had been devastated during the war. In the early 1950s U.S. industry produced more than 50 percent of the world's steel. That leadership would not last. In the following decades U.S. steel producers failed to innovate to keep pace with changes evolving elsewhere in manufacturing technology. The productive capacity of overseas competitors naturally expanded as their economies rebuilt and prospered, and by the late 1970s, the U.S. share of international steel production had fallen to 16 percent. By the mid-1980s, U.S. steel companies were struggling to reorganize into diversified holdings that would include scaled-down steel production operations. The problems of the steel industry were rooted in the international marketplace and, therefore, not readily amenable to domestic policy solutions. Steel was heavily dependent for demand on U.S. motor vehicle production, an industry that was sharing 44 percent of its domestic market with imported vehicles by 1985. In addition, an increasing proportion of

the components of U.S. cars were manufactured overseas. By 2008 the total sales of imported vehicles sold in the United States and Canada exceeded the number of U.S. manufactured vehicles for the first time (*Financial Post* [Canada] January 7, 2009), and a deepening economic recession saw the U.S. Big Three car and truck manufacturers receiving billions of dollars from the federal government in efforts to avoid bankruptcy. The economic consequences were being felt most in older industrial regions, already suffering from the long-term trend of industrial decline and manufacturing job losses.

The elimination of manufacturing employment has not been due solely to the replacement of U.S. workers by overseas workers and imports. As U.S. industry adopted more efficient, cost-cutting technologies the innovations meant that fewer workers were required, even as production levels increased. Between the representative years of 1982 and 1986, for example, the volume of U.S. manufactured goods increased by 23 percent, which meant that the proportion of the GNP represented by manufacturing remained constant within the expanding economy (Herz 1991, 6–9). Yet the numbers of U.S. workers employed in industry continued a steady decline. In 2008, Jared Bernstein, a senior economist with the Economic Policy Institute, summarized the declining fortunes of U.S. labor for a House subcommittee. Since 2000, although there had been strong growth in worker productivity, the real (adjusted for inflation) median wage had declined. The average job tenure (the length of time a person stayed in the same job) had shortened, underemployment (people who want to work full time but had to settle for part-time jobs) was increasing, and the average period that people were unemployed and looking for work had grown longer. Bernstein attributed the overall decline in job security and lack of worker confidence to a weak record of new job creation (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on House Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support, September 11, 2008).

While workers throughout the United States were feeling the combined pressure of foreign competition and job-eliminating technologies, conditions remained in place that had made the South a more attractive environment for business formation and expansion. In the era of the rise of the Sunbelt, the South had deliberately courted and accommodated to the wishes of business. City governments eased restrictions, such as those stemming from environmental concerns, and states saw to it that industry maintained a strong bargaining position relative to labor. All of the southern states except New Mexico and California had "right-to-work" laws (Rice and Bernard 1983, 16). In the late 1970s the Texas labor force had only a 13 percent union membership rate, compared to a rate of 28 percent for the country as a whole.

The remarkable growth and momentum that the Sunbelt achieved would not have occurred without vigorous assistance from the federal government. During World War II government policy called for the redistribution of defense industries under a plan that would take advantage of all sizable population centers. This meant that cities in the relatively less-industrialized South would receive large plants, which, in turn, attracted dramatic increases in industrial populations. The policy was sufficiently effective that at the end of the war the reduction in military production threatened the same traumatic upheaval and dislocation in the Sunbelt as elsewhere. In Los Angeles, at the peak of war production, 280,000 had been employed in the aircraft industry. In 1946, that number dropped abruptly to 55,000.

The crisis that had been created by peace and the idling of the great war apparatus was relieved by the Korean and cold wars, and by 1955 aircraft industry employment was at 275,000 in the sprawling metroplex. By 1967, 350,000 were employed by the aerospace industry in Los Angeles. The city, with its vast military, industrial, technological, and educational complex, was a jewel in the crown of the "Space Crescent." The designation refers to a linked network of cities fanning across the continent from Cape Canaveral, Florida, through the Southwest and up the Pacific Coast to Seattle. It is a region where, broadly speaking, traditionally conservative political values had by the 1980s been crystallized by a concentration of aerospace and defense-dependent industries (Clark 1983, 284–85). "The Sunbelt has perennially included Republicans and Democrats, but its political culture has skewed conservative . . . Sunbelt residents who moved to the expanding suburbs favored low taxes, opposed unions and school desegregation. These views and others coalesced into an anti-federal government philosophy that has been the hallmark of modern conservative politics" (Crespino 2008). It is telling that McGirr (2001) chose to focus her case study of the rise of the powerful right-wing conservative movement in the United States on Orange County, California: The concentration of like-minded L.A. area suburbanites opposed to taxes and liberalism, whose grassroots organizing was funded by local business interests, was a prototype for similar right-wing "suburban warriors" movements elsewhere. Until the election of well-traveled Senator Obama from Illinois in 2008, no successful presidential candidate had come from outside the Sunbelt since John Kennedy (Crespino 2008) (Gerald Ford of Michigan filled the office following Richard Nixon's resignation). The terms "Red State" and "Blue State" entered the nation's political vocabulary: The rough correlation between the political map the terms identify and the Sunbelt-Otherbelt divide is readily apparent.

The overall contrast in the fortunes of North and South led to what *BusinessWeek* referred to as "A Second War Between the States." By 1979, the Sunbelt states were receiving 78 percent of the defense payroll and 58 percent of all major government contracts. Between 1975 and 1979 Snowbelt states sent Washington, D.C., $165 billion more in taxes than they received in aid, while the Sunbelt received $112 billion more than it sent (Macdonald 1984, 24). The subsequent reductions that have occurred in interregion disparities in federal funding projects do not alter the historical fact: In the past, economically declining northern states helped pay for the growth of the South. Even programs that were ostensibly region-neutral had a differential impact. The federal highway assistance programs came in just as Sunbelt cities were growing most rapidly and helped shape the largely suburban quality of their growth. Highway systems elevated the national ranking of leading regional cities, like Atlanta and Dallas, by funneling people and products to them. Federal programs designed to redevelop urban areas were put to good use by cities like Tampa and New Orleans that were interested in creating impressive downtown centers, helping to showcase the region's new vitality (Rice and Bernard 1983, 15–16).

The long tradition of conscious interurban rivalry had by the 1960s evolved into an interregional rivalry, pitting North against South. In addition to active chambers of commerce that promoted individual cities, and growth-promoting statewide organizations, southern interests marshaled their forces in 1971 to present a common front to promote the region's economy. The Southern Growth Policies Board was

founded in part to determine how states in the region could best profit from federal policy (Rice and Bernard 1983, 13–14). Today it continues as a regional think tank devoted to strengthening the South's economy. To that end it coordinates economic development policies by bringing together a cross section of the region's governors, legislators, business, and academic leaders. It has focused its efforts in recent years on securing energy and other technology-related regional development. In response, northern states coalesced their efforts around a congressional caucus called the Northeast-Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition, founded in order to help redirect federal funds northward (Rice and Bernard 1983, 13–14). Due to the redistribution of population from North to South, and from northern to southern metro regions in particular, the Sunbelt has gained significantly in national political representation since 1980. As a result of the 2000 census, the North lost ten House seats to the South and Southwest. This followed a loss of fifteen seats in northern states in 1990, when the South gained eighteen. The big gainers were Texas, California, and Florida.

Sunbelt Liabilities

For all of its promise, the Sunbelt's potential for growth was not unlimited. The natural ecology of a number of states is fragile and poorly suited to the demands that large concentrations of population place upon it. Florida is a low peninsula of alternating sandy soils and low-lying swampy areas, without the capacity for storing the large volumes of fresh water required by urban populations and industries. The delicate nature of the balance of vital natural resources in the South was highlighted as officials in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida fought over dwindling water supplies when a drought threatened to dry up common water courses and reserves in the years following 2006. Water is an even more serious problem in the Southwest. Industries and suburban residential demand in arid zones demonstrate what can be done through determined hydraulic engineering. But these projects draw contested water supplies from distant locations. The Colorado River symbolizes the Southwest's chronic water shortage problem. It supplies much of the water requirements of the region and is contested along its length by seven states, several Indian nations, and Mexico (Macdonald 1984, 37). The World Commission on Water for the 21st Century cited the Colorado River as one of the world's most serious river water supply problems, along with Egypt's Nile and China's Yellow River (Rice 2000, 18). Projections of continued population growth in metro areas of the Southwest point toward an ever-increasing demand on the Colorado. There are complex legal provisions that restrict use by the various states and require preservation of a certain volume of water for each downriver location. In 2002 a prolonged drought threatened to dislodge the balancing act. By early 2009 talks among the U.S. states and Mexico included the prospect of treating and buying back water that had already flowed out of the United States. The project would involve desalinization and be quite expensive, but as one regional water authority put it, "Mark my words, unless we do something considered outrageous by today's standards, the West is going to run dry" (*Denver Post* January 15, 2009).

All forms of environmental pollution have become increasingly serious in the Sunbelt. In the mid-twentieth century, relocation to Phoenix was a standard pre-

scription for people suffering from serious respiratory problems. By the 1980s, however, urban growth had created air pollution levels that caused area doctors and the president of the Arizona Lung Association to warn people who needed to breathe clean air to stay away from the metroplex. At the time several Sunbelt cities were in trouble with federal regulators regarding air-borne pollutants. Carbon monoxide levels in Arizona led the federal government to threaten to withhold highway funds: By mid-2007 Phoenix had met national carbon monoxide standards, but there was once again the prospect that Washington would cut off highway funds due to high levels of microparticle pollution, a serious threat to human health (Associated Press June 13, 2007). Other southwest metro areas in New Mexico, Nevada (Las Vegas), and Colorado (Denver) continue to find it difficult to comply with microparticle standards since there are multiple points of origin for this source of pollution (autos and trucks, building sites, farm fields) where dust particles become airborne, combining with other pollutants to form brown clouds over cities. Until recently, Los Angeles had ranked number one among cities with the poorest air quality. Los Angeles and nearby Long Beach have attempted to reduce nitrogen oxide and diesel particulates by offering millions of dollars in incentives to diesel-truck owners to buy cleaner rigs and by ordering idling ships to use cleaner-burning fuels. L.A. air quality management agents are subsidizing the replacement costs of gas-powered lawnmowers with electric models for area homeowners. Such extraordinary measures have had some measure of success. L.A. air quality had improved sufficiently by 2008 to allow old industrial Pittsburgh to overtake it as the city with the most polluted air in the United States. But Los Angeles still ranked second, and among the eight cities with the worst levels of air pollution in 2008, seven were in the South, five of those in California (*Washington Post* May 2, 2008).

Sunbelt cities have been vulnerable to a common tendency that occurs whenever rapid growth generates the possibility for earning spectacular profits from investment. An investment herd mentality sets in and this often means that demand saturation occurs just as the point of greatest investor activity is reached. A boom-and-bust mechanism has operated in the Florida and other Sunbelt housing markets. Florida has been a popular East Coast retirement and vacation destination since early in the twentieth century, and since the 1960s and 1970s the state has shared in some of the industrial expansion experienced by other areas of the Sunbelt. The steadily growing population along with seasonal residents who buy winter vacation homes created substantial housing demand that has been met by large development firms. The combined capacity of these firms to build new luxury residences, mass-produced tract homes, and condominiums has periodically resulted in oversupply. The increasing share of wealth and income that has gone to the more affluent Americans in recent decades has been reflected in Florida as elsewhere in a demand for larger and fancier housing. The industry response is described in the following from *Professional Builder* (1998, 72). Referring to several residential building projects, the authors wrote, "These projects exemplify some of the hottest trends in new housing today: European design; value engineering; neotraditionalism and nostalgia; timeless, distinctive detailing; high-density infill; small homes that live big; courtyard plans that play off outdoor living areas; high-end attached product; and multiple flex options for move-ups." Seasonal and permanent residents were dreaming bigger and builders were providing grander versions of the American Dream. At the

end of the 1990s, smart money knew that the Florida housing market was one place to be. The median sale price of homes in most areas continued its upward trend, and brand new townlike developments such as Seaview and the Disney Company's fanciful "neotraditional" community called Celebration were created out of capital and thin air. But seven years into the new century the Florida housing market was once again overbuilt, and the results were disastrous for investors and home buyers. The cities of the Sunbelt once again had been experiencing a surge in population growth, and in 2007 (November 7) *Forbes* business magazine noted that among the fastest-growing were cities in California, Florida, and Nevada. A year later, in the early stages of what promised to be a prolonged economic recession, *Forbes* (October 15, 2008) predicted that of the ten metro areas that would be hardest hit by the economic downturn, nine were in California, Florida, and Nevada. The most rapidly growing areas were the most vulnerable, as unsound mortgage lending practices led to foreclosures and the devaluation of residential properties. Generally, cities with the highest former demand for housing and the most active housing markets turned out to have the most inflated real estate prices, and these were most vulnerable to losses in value.

Placemark 7.1—At Home in Las Vegas

Las Vegas may be the near-perfect example of the "fantasy city" discussed in chapter 1. By 2008 the metro area was also simply "home" to nearly two million people, having grown by 84 percent between 1990 and 2000, and then by a more manageable 15 percent from 2000 to 2006. By some measures, it remained that fastest-growing major city (ranking 28th in size among U.S. cities) for nearly two decades. In the midst of this period of growth Matthew Jaffe (1998) sketched the following portrait. Las Vegas is a boomtown that mixes permanent Mardi Gras for visitors with everyday living for residents. In 1998 the city had nine of the world's ten largest hotels. More than 26 percent of its residents worked in the tourist industry, serving 30 million visitors each year. It is a city where continuous building and rebuilding rapidly revise the urban landscape, where little remains the same for long, and where once-distant points of desert quickly become new residential subdivisions engulfed by the growing edge. Bruce Babbitt (2005, 79) adds the following vivid portrait of the desert city that never sleeps (except in shifts): "The best way to see what is happening is to go into downtown Las Vegas, to a casino called the Stratosphere Tower, and to ride the elevator to the observation deck just before sunset. At first there is not much to see in the glaring afternoon light, but as the sun sets behind the Spring Mountains and the sky darkens, the patterns begin to emerge. The city is an island of bright lights, with shorelines where the city stops and beyond that nothing, no lights at all, just darkness, like looking out to sea from the land. The nighttime city is an island of light in a desert archipelago."

What is it like to live in a metropolitan area calculated to make fantasy the paramount reality, where hotels attempt to "authentically" mimic other times

and places, where a housing development company gives away as part of a promotional campaign a full-sized replica of Homer Simpson's cartoon house in a subdivision where real people will be living? According to Jaffe's local informants, newcomers are surprised to discover just how much they enjoy living in the city. One compares it to Detroit in that city's heyday, a place where blue-collar workers and their bosses could afford to enjoy themselves. Another booster likened it to New York in former times, another city that grew so boldly and quickly that it never had time to look back.

During its period of runaway growth it appeared as though Las Vegas might indeed replace Los Angeles as the image we think of when we picture the quintessential metropolitan environment, just as Los Angeles replaced New York and Chicago during the twentieth century. In its forever unfolding newness, it represented an American frontier of urban experience. But, even fantasy city can't escape the everyday realities faced by all cities. Dependent on the overused Colorado River for 90 percent of its water, there remain unanswered questions about how sustainable such sprawling urban growth is in a desert environment. And playground cities are especially dependent on the availability of discretionary spending dollars, and therefore vulnerable to economic fluctuations that might cause many of its free-spending 30 million visitors a year to stay home. By 2009 Las Vegas was especially hard hit by the economic recession: Thousands of jobs had been lost in the past year, unemployment was above the national average, commercial construction was down by two-thirds, home prices had declined by a fourth, and the area was near the top of the nation in the rate of home foreclosures. The economic reality that was gripping the nation had come home to fantasy city.

By February 2008 the highest foreclosure rates were predictably in California, Florida, and Nevada: But, while thirteen of the twenty cities with the highest rates were in the Sunbelt, deindustrializing Detroit led all others as the city with the highest overall foreclosure rate, and deindustrializing Cleveland, Akron, Dayton, and Indianapolis also made the list (CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/12/real_estate/realtytrac/index.htm). So, while the North and South experienced contrasting recent historical trends in terms of decline and growth, there are differences as well as similarities among cities within each region. There are also commonalities between regions as North American cities become reoriented to a single geographic force field: the global economy.

SHIFTING URBAN FORTUNES

It is tempting to sum up a chapter that chronicles development and change in U.S. cities in broad strokes, indicating outcomes that will be produced by current trends. However, at the present time, the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the economic future of the nation and its cities is murky enough to warrant extreme

caution among would-be forecasters. That said, in recent years a number of optimistic analyses of American city trends have emerged. While generally owning that there are still problems in older urban centers, they emphasize the positives, citing population growth and improving economic indicators.

Some manage a positive emphasis by focusing on the metropolitan community or region as a single unit of analysis. That is, they leave behind the perspective that contrasts the problems of old inner cities in comparison to dynamic edge cities and metroplex regional development. By refocusing analysis on the general condition of the metro area as a whole, it is often possible to argue, on average, that the economic prospects for many large cities have been improving. The implication is that for the last decade or so cities have been moving beyond an era of crisis, and that analyses that continue to direct attention there are telling only part of the story and are out of step with a new urban energy in North America. The emergent urban optimism is summed up by McDonald (2008, 251): "It would be fairly accurate to say that economic growth largely happened (and still happens) in the suburbs of America's major urban areas. However . . . both suburbs and central cities grow more rapidly together as parts of the same metropolitan area."

Studies that chart positive change in social units as large as metropolitan areas must rely on gross measures. Most often researchers rely on government-generated population and economic measures. It is not unusual for the opacity of this kind of data to leave room for difference of interpretation. Simmons and Lang interpret the 2000 Census as showing that the 1990s saw a major population turnaround, in terms of population growth, for MSAs that had lost population in the 1970s. But they suspect that what appears to be a measure of the resurgent drawing power of metropolitan areas is accounted for to some extent by a liberalization of U.S. immigration policy, with most of the rapidly growing immigrant population gravitating to cities. Berube (2003), analyzing the same data, questions the significance of the 1990s as a period of positive urban change. He notes that only five of the nation's largest 100 cities experienced an actual turnaround (i.e., a reversal of a previous trend) in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s, making them the exception rather than the rule. "Of the top 100 cities, fully 83 followed the same population path in the 1990s (growth, decline or no change) as in the 1980s" (39). But more significantly, *suburban* populations grew, on average, twice as fast as city populations for the nation as a whole. Which cities were growing? In their survey of "resurgent" cities, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006, 15) sum up the difference between those cities that are and those that aren't resurgent: "The fundamental fact is that places oriented around the car have continued to gain relative to places oriented around public transportation, that suburbs and edge cities have continued to grow relative to traditional downtowns and that density continues to predict decline." The kind of urban growth they described can only be interpreted as positive if we assume that decentralization and sprawl signify the health of a metropolitan area: Once again, the interpretation rests on considering the urban region as a single unit. It follows that this kind of "urban" growth favors Sunbelt cities. "While New York, Boston and Chicago have seen a renaissance, the big story in American society continues to be that of car-based living in the warmer climates of the country. The good news from the 1980s and 1990s is that this rise doesn't need to mean complete disaster for older cities" (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006, 16).

At another level of analysis, one that focuses on cities' global influence, a different picture of urban strength emerges—yielding a viewpoint that does not clearly favor the cities of the South and Southwest. Analyses of the relative economic influence of cities worldwide indicate that many northern cities maintain a powerful place among a global network of cities. John Rennie Short (2006a) uses findings compiled by the Globalization and World Cities project (GAWC) that arranges an international network of cities into four tiers according to the degree of command and control they have within the global economy. Just two world cities, London and New York, stand atop the international network and dominate world trade. Chicago and Miami (the latter continues to appear at the center of the *Latin* American economy) share a second tier with such cities as Hong Kong, Paris, and Tokyo. Los Angeles stands alone as the single U.S. city in the third tier, a mid-range player in world trade, and shares its rank with such places as Amsterdam and Sydney. Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, Indianapolis, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., populate the fourth and last category of "Minor" world cities, along with Lyon, Munich, and others.

In a subsequent work, Short (2007) reframes his analysis: Expanding the "urban" geographic reference to its maximum dimensions, he takes as his unit of analysis the Northeast conurbation referred to as megalopolis (Gottman 1961). This is the more or less continuous urban region running from Boston to Washington, D.C. This "globalizing city region" contains a "spine" made up of the large metropolises of the Northeast and commands an important share of the enormous wealth that is created and managed within the global economy. Again, in company with the galaxy of contiguous urban spaces around London, the Northeast megalopolis centered on New York City stands atop a hierarchy of globalizing city regions, followed (in order of importance) by the urban regions dominated by Hong Kong, Paris, Tokyo, and Singapore. The respective cities within megalopolis generate enormous wealth in the form of gross domestic product: Among world cities New York ranks first with $170 billion, Philadelphia fifth ($90.6 billion), Washington sixth ($79.4), Boston-Providence seventh ($76.4 billion) (Short [2007] employed data from 2005 compiled by Florida [2006]). Paradoxically, these old industrial cities have been at the center of the deindustrializing spiral discussed in this chapter: Yet they remain the "motors of the global economy" (Short 2007, 141) as mixed economies that provide the globe with financial, management, legal, advertising, and other advanced services. Other measures that indicate the continued vitality and drawing power of these global nodes include their central place in the global web of communications and travel and indirect indicators such as the share of international immigrants that they receive and put to work.

So the picture of the contemporary cities of the United States is a complex one, best pictured as a series of transparent overlays, where each transparent layer involves a slightly different focus and provides a different piece of the whole. Is optimism warranted regarding the urban future of the United States? The answer has much to do with focus. Analyses that focus widely on the metropolis as a whole can aggregate changes in the troubled inner cities with the growing development of metro edges to show, overall, that things are improving. We can aggregate developments in the growing Sunbelt and the contracting economies of the cities of Michigan and Ohio for a frame that shows the American city is in pretty good shape.

We can abstract the image by focusing on measures of population growth (which will show that the Sunbelt continues to run ahead) or wealth production (which reveals that the old industrial cities of the Northeast continue to be economic powerhouses). If we ask a different kind of question—How are the people doing? How are lives being changed by the shifting urban landscape?—we will need yet a different kind of focus. Short (2006b), along with other observers, says that one of the consequences of globalization and the rise of the world city hierarchy is social polarization within cities. He points to the fact that the urban elite have done well from the changes brought on by the global economy. But many other Americans have been hurt. Overall, the middle class has slipped from its secure position as a result of internationalization and the out-sourced labor market. The working class has found that the "solid seventeen-dollar-an-hour" jobs have evaporated in the same way. Short reminds us that the cities we are talking about, the widening metropolises, are the ones "with central cities politically cordoned off from the suburbs and different groups partitioned into different urban spaces." He notes that although the global elite "may live in the same cities as the rest of us, they inhabit a very different world" (Short 2006b, 238–43). An article in *Crain's Chicago Business* magazine (Hinz 2007) focuses the lens for that city, which we recall is in the second tier of international dominance according to GAWC: "While the average income here remains well above the national level and overall production comes close to matching national growth, the list of economic losers is growing. The middle class is hollowing out faster here than nationally, as educated people with the right skills . . . prosper, but the local economy produces too few good jobs to replace the factory work that once gave hundreds of thousands of people . . . a secure middle-class lifestyle . . . Builders of the Chicago Spire are hustling for buyers in London, Moscow and Mumbai, India, at the same time that home foreclosure rates are soaring in western and southern suburbs once rich in factory jobs."

While it is important to take the most macroscopic view of metropolitan change, and to recognize the global might of a megalopolis, the sociology of the city must continue to concern itself fundamentally with issues of systematic patterns of inequality that result from regional and global spatial shifts. In order to do that, it would appear necessary to continue to distinguish between what is going on within inner cities and changes on the edge.

8

Ecology, Capitalism, and the Expanding Scope of Urban Analysis

Chapter 7 described changes in the shape and functions of cities in the United States from the nineteenth century through the first decade of the twenty-first. The account was largely descriptive. In this chapter, we tie urban structural changes to theoretical frameworks that attempt to identify and explain in a systematic fashion the nature of the forces that modify urban environments. There is disagreement here, and theoretical disagreements in the social sciences are serious and difficult to resolve. This is because theoretical differences often reflect opposite assumptions about whose interests are best served by prevailing political and economic arrangements: The disagreement comes into sharpest focus regarding disadvantaged people, and the question of whether some remote set of factors, or people themselves, are responsible for the hardships they face. These are precisely the differences that divide theories about urban structures and futures. They have to do with fairness and social justice, on the one hand, and the capacity of individuals and governments to control the effects of global forces on local conditions, on the other. In part, the arguments are over whether market forces can be trusted to produce the maximum benefits for the greatest number. In part, the disagreements are about how much we are in control of our own fates.

First, we will consider the efforts of classical *urban ecology*, or *human ecology*, which bases its analysis of how cities grow and change on the joint influences of the market and technology to produce a rational and predictable urban form. Next, we will examine the *political economy* perspective—and in particular its Marxist influence—which emphasizes the destructive, socially divisive, and wasteful effects of market operations on the urban environment and on the lives of people who live there. The differences that separate ecologists and political economists are somewhat similar to those that separate the modernization and political economy theorists discussed in chapter 6. We then will consider the need to expand the framework of spatial analysis beyond the metropolis or even the region, in order to understand the changes affecting cities: This reflects a recognition among social scientists and policymakers that the appropriate frame of analysis for understanding local conditions is the globe. This realization has serious implications for the subdiscipline that

has until now been called "urban sociology," a designation somewhat narrower in scope than the analytic task at hand. Finally, we will bring people back into the picture, with a critical examination of the argument presented by some contemporary theorists that it is a mistake to ignore the capacity of people acting locally to affect their own futures. To the extent that the fate of localities is not determined wholly by distant forces, we must attend to analysis of local distinctions that lead to differences in the impact of global factors. Explaining these differences is the work of a sociology of locality, and at least in this sense urban sociology has important work to do.

URBAN ECOLOGY AND URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

As the early twentieth-century cities were taking and changing shape, some urban sociologists began to devote a large share of their work to an understanding of the morphology of cities. They developed predictive models in an attempt to identify a general pattern by which cities grew and changed. These early efforts resulted in the development of a subdiscipline of urban sociology known as urban ecology. Rooted in the traditions of the Chicago School of urban sociology (discussed in chapter 3), this approach has sought to uncover systematic relationships among the various types of land uses commonly found in urban areas.

In recent years, political economists, whose arguments are often derived from Marxist analysis, have offered alternative interpretations of the patterns of urban spatial development under capitalism. These interpretations have emerged as fundamental criticisms of urban ecological models. In its most Marxian form, the alternative scheme sees the city as the spatial expression of market forces and capital accumulation, as well as an arena of conflicting class interests that pits the demands of efficient and convenient market operation against the needs of labor. Recent urban political economy explores the rise and fall of urban regions as these changes are tied to economic trends.

Both ecologists and the political economists see the city as an arena in which competition between different interests determines the overall territorial pattern. Where the two are likely to differ fundamentally is in the interpretation of the underlying significance of the conflict and its outcome. Both approaches are increasingly drawn toward expanding geographic units of analysis.

Urban Ecology

The study of the social effects of the urban arena is, in the broadest sense of the term, the study of *urban ecology*, or, as some refer to it, human ecology. *Human ecology* may be considered the study of people-environment relationships. Therefore, the idea that the city, as a physical *environment*, exerts an effect on human behavior and relationships is at base an ecological idea. In this sense, Wirth's analysis of the impact of the size and density (and the consequential heterogeneity) of urban populations is an ecological analysis. However, the term *urban ecology* can also be understood in a somewhat more restricted sense, having to do with the process and patterns by which the spatial features of urban areas emerge, the ways in which the

various population and functional elements in the city arrange themselves over its limited surface. In that sense, urban ecology is the study of the distribution and relationships among populations, services, industries, and open space in the urban arena. The ecological orientation is tied to Robert Park's interpretation of the forces that order urban space. His frame of analysis was introduced in chapter 3. According to Park, populations tend to break down urban space into "natural areas." The inspiration for his modeling of the organization of urban space came directly from natural science, in particular the observations of biologist Eugenius Warming. Warming observed that in the natural world different species of plants tended to cluster together. He called these "plant communities." These communities come into existence gradually and over time are eventually broken up and succeeded by other varieties of plant communities. Whether plants in nature or humans in cities, Park thought the forces of a natural ecology were responsible for determining the distribution of communities or natural areas.

> Within the limits of every natural area the distribution of population tends to assume definite and typical patterns. Every local group exhibits a more or less definite constellation of the individual units that compose it. The form which this constellation takes, the position, in other words, of every individual in the community with reference to every other, so far as it can be described in general terms, constitutes what Durkheim called the morphological aspect of society . . .
>
> Local communities may be compared with reference to the areas which they occupy and with reference to the relative density of population distribution within those areas. Communities are not, however, mere population aggregates. Cities, particularly great cities, where the selection and segregation of the population has gone farthest, display certain morphological characteristics which are not found in smaller population aggregates. (Park 1926, 3–4)

In this passage, taken from Park's address to the American Sociological Society in 1925, the influential sociologist repeated his observation that the spatial organization of the city followed a natural order. Before the same forum, R. D. McKenzie (1926, 172–81) cataloged the major features of the ecological framework, which included the following:

- Tendencies toward area specialization and the segregation of dissimilar populations
- The centralization of services and activities that were most specialized or most in demand, along with the decentralization of nonspecialized services like grocery and drug stores
- Population concentration as the result of concentrated patterns of commercial and industrial growth, along with tendencies toward dispersion as motor and electric transport grew in importance in contrast to steam locomotion (a formerly centralizing transportation technology)
- Invasion and succession—the processes whereby one segment of the urban population took possession of a specific urban territory from another

A great part of the attraction of early ecology was the idea that natural laws could be borrowed or adapted from the natural sciences, thereby providing the basis for

predicting the distribution of urban land uses. An important underlying assumption of this line of analysis is the idea that natural forces produce a spatial outcome that is efficient and beneficial. The idea is that cities marry structure and function in an orderly and optimal fashion. The most notable and well-known effort to develop a comprehensive description of the forces that shaped the urban environment was Burgess's (1925) *concentric zone hypothesis*. Based largely on the familiar case of Chicago, Burgess's model of urban structure was founded on the view that various elements of a heterogeneous and economically complex urban society actively competed for favorable locations within the city. The model assumed steady urban growth and the desirability of central location for commercial and financial interests. As the number of wealthy and powerful institutions competing for desirable central locations increased, this growth at the urban center meant a continuous outward process of the invasion and succession of businesses and different population segments across a series of existing, spatially specialized zones that encircled the center. Together, these concentric zones comprised the total area of the city (figure 8.1).




Figure 8.1. Concentric zone hypothesis. This is a quaint drawing that appeared in Burgess's original essay. It is one of the most famous diagrams in all of sociology.

Source: Ernest W. Burgess. 1925. "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project. In *The City*, edited by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, 47–62. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Burgess identified five major urban zones. The commercial heart and center of the city was Zone I, occupied by department stores, banks, office buildings, and expensive specialty stores that could afford to share the rental costs of this most desirable commercial location. The outer portion of this zone was occupied by commercial and industrial enterprises that were less dependent upon the most centralized location, less able to pay the highest ground rents, and perhaps required more space (e.g., warehouses).

Zone II was the zone in transition. This was the old residential area surrounding the commercial core, containing the oldest housing in the poorest state of repair in the city. The area was continually being invaded at its margins by the outward growth of the central business district. It housed the poorest populations of the city, including the most recent immigrants as well as minorities. These populations were forced to share their residential areas with criminals, prostitutes, and other undesirable company, all of whom used the common territory as a locus of operation. This was the zone, in an otherwise orderly process of urban expansion, where "social disorganization" was most apparent. In the competition for urban space, the poor did not have the means to choose to live elsewhere.

Zone III was the zone of workingmen's homes. It was characterized by a predominance of two-family dwelling units and represented the upward mobility of its working-class residents who had managed to leave behind the deterioration of Zone II. Zone IV consisted of better residences, including residential hotels and better-quality apartments. Single-family dwellings in this area tended to be situated on large lots, reflective of the ability of their owners to support such residential investment. Zone V was the commuter zone where, for those willing to bear the inconvenience of distant, peripheral location, the already-growing suburban population was able to satisfy its desire for home ownership.

Based on the example of a single city, Chicago, Burgess's land-use hypothesis raised questions about the adaptability of the model to other cities. Subsequent efforts to discover consistent features in the physical arrangement of the urban environment came to emphasize the complexity of the factors that shape cities. Consequently, the Burgess model came to be regarded as an oversimplification. Homer Hoyt (1939) studied changes in residential patterns in 142 cities for the years 1900, 1915, and 1936. By largely restricting his attention to housing costs and looking at the changes that had taken place over time, Hoyt found that homogeneous areas of residence tended to grow outward from center toward periphery in wedge-shaped sectors, rather than in alternating rings as Burgess had thought (figure 8.2). In Hoyt's *sectoral theory*, housing of a particular type and value followed definite paths, typically along communication corridors. Variations in topography also had a pronounced effect on residential patterning, with better residences generally occupying higher land. The attractiveness of adjacent and nearby land use also exerted a significant influence on the development of areas, with good transportation routes, access to shopping and business districts, and the residential location of community leaders offering attractions to the more affluent.

Hoyt's work began to suggest a problem for the early ecologists' hopes for developing a general model of urban land use. It suggested that the variety of influences to which the physical patterning of cities was subject would defy reduction to a single generalizable description. Harris and Ullman (1945) would also show




Figure 8.2. Sectoral theory: shifts in location of fashionable residential areas in six U.S. cities, 1900–1936.
Note: Fashionable residential areas indicated by solid black.
Source: Homer Hoyt. 1939. *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Housing Administration.

that the tendencies toward metropolitanization would make generalization more difficult.

As indicated in chapter 7, the shape of U.S. cities had already begun to change dramatically over the course of the first four decades of the twentieth century, producing a more decentralized urban pattern. Harris and Ullman described a much different city in 1945 than the one on which Burgess had based his model. Many rapidly growing cities were annexing or incorporating formerly outlying and independent townships, previously self-centered communities in their own




Figure 8.3. Multiple nuclei model.
Source: Reprinted from "The Nature of Cities" by Chauncy D. Harris and Edward L. Ullman in Vol. 242 of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. © 1945 by the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

right. No simple concentric zone or sectoral hypothesis could be applied to such amalgamations of population. Although Harris and Ullman believed that a single major business district could still be identified for most cities, the new urban form they diagrammed had more the quality of a patchwork than of a centralized design (figure 8.3).

According to this scheme, called the *multiple nuclei model*, patterns of growth and change still followed the general ecological principles identified by Burgess. The location of particular activities was still determined by their need for certain facilities, such as a central business district's requirement of transportation routes. Similar activities tended to profit from proximate location, as in the case of the entertainment district. Other activities were mutually repellent, for instance, residences and certain types of industry. Finally, the cost of location remained a major factor in deciding whether access to the most desirable sites was feasible for a given enterprise or social class. The main difference between this model and earlier formulations was that there were multiple nuclei that attracted and repelled newcomers in the broadened urban arena. Each area was formed in consideration of multiple adjoining areas. As the city grew and changed over time, new districts became attractive. For example, outlying areas attracted heavy industry from increasingly congested inner-city locations, which were most attractive in the era of centralized transportation routes when the city was smaller and relatively compact; with highway access, inner-city locations lost favor to outlying sites. As a result, heavy industry was likely to emerge in two or more locations, perhaps far removed from one another. Similarly, metropolitan growth generated multiple business districts, as those of existing towns on the periphery were incorporated into the sprawling ecology of the growing metropolitan centers, and new business districts emerged to serve populations some distance from existing centers. Likewise, different grades of housing, various types of commercial activities, and so on emerged not in one but in multiple locations.

Harris and Ullman's model was "conceived as a further move away from the massive generalization and toward reality" (Carter 1972, 175). But where did it leave the effort of urban ecologists to anticipate the distribution of population, open space, services, industry, and commerce within a particular urban arena? Harris and Ullman's work did not suggest any uniform patterning of land uses among cities, and with respect to any given city, locational decisions were ad hoc and based on the existing distribution of land uses. All that could be said was that the future of a given space would be determined by the future uses of those spaces nearby and the manner in which the space was connected to or cut off from other areas of the city. That is, the predictability of the pattern of urban space seemed to be limited.

Evaluating the Classical Ecological Schemes

Despite the frustrations encountered in the attempts to develop an ecological model of the city, urban ecologists continue to probe urban environments for uniform principles of spatial organization. The search for a general, predictive model has failed for a number of reasons. For one, ecological models were based on the premise that economic competition for space would ultimately determine the use to which an area is put. They did not take into account of the capacity of government to influence patterns through planning. Moreover, they failed to consider the potential role of sentiment, such as favoring the preservation of historic sites or open areas.

With regard to criticisms of specific ecological schemes, it is interesting to note that most critics have taken aim at Burgess's early model, bypassing its later revisions. To the extent that the concentric growth model appeared useful, it was conceded to have been so with respect to those rapidly growing cities of the Midwest that had large immigrant populations at or just after the turn of the century. The greatest problem with the model was its limited generalizability. Schnore and Winsborough (1972) studied the residential location of different status groups (status measured by education) in 184 cities in the United States and found that the concentric hypothesis, which predicted that lower-status residents would be concentrated nearest the city center, was borne out in only about half of the cases. Cross-cultural application of the model to cities in different parts of the world that experienced their most rapid growth in different eras and under differing economic and technological conditions find a wide variety of spatial patterns (London and Flanagan 1976).

Responding to Burgess's critics, Hawley (1981, 98–101) noted that the Burgess hypothesis works better as a formulation of growth processes than as a generalized description of spatial patterns of cities. Most of the critics focused on the spatial description, however, and pointed out that there was considerable heterogeneity within the proposed zones. Hawley believed that the argument as to whether a zonal or sectoral description works best results from a too literal interpretation of the zonal hypothesis—which Burgess intended only as an ideal typical description. He suggested that the concentric pattern be considered a descriptive formulation, a useful first approximation. It may be the case that if we simply look for common trends in land-use patterns that can be generalized from city to city—without looking for particular shapes or designs—ecology remains a more useful orienting

framework. Textbox 8.1 makes this point with regard to current residential trends that were being repeated in many cities at the same time.

Textbox 8.1. Re-Invasion and Succession Downtown

For urban ecologists, the city is less a map than a dynamic, animated arena of shifting land uses. It is also a mosaic of *natural* processes and natural areas, where residents and businesses gravitate to certain areas in a shifting process of invasion and succession, exemplified most clearly in Burgess's concentric zone theory. But Burgess was describing the process as he witnessed it in Chicago in the 1920s. In that era, the endlessly expanding central business district was the engine that drove changing land-use patterns, rippling outward from the middle of the city, where the wealthiest corporations and other businesses were best able to meet high land costs. How has the pattern changed at the turn of the century, when most commercial growth is located on the periphery of urban areas, when the city form has sprawled into the metropolitan region, and the urban center has become a less desirable location for many businesses?

Ellen Perlman (1998), focusing on the city of Memphis, provided a brief and useful overview of the contemporary version of invasion and succession, which is taking place in cities of various sizes with different kinds of downtown histories. In this pattern, residential use is replacing business use in the old centers of such cities as Philadelphia, Dayton, Denver, Tulsa, Baltimore, Dallas, Atlanta, and Richmond, Virginia, in addition to Memphis. The simultaneous nature of the change is important because it supports the classical ecologists' contention that shifting patterns of land use are a natural phenomenon, representing general *cultural preferences* and tendencies within the population, as they are expressed under particular *historical circumstances*. In this case, the cultural preference is that of affluent professionals and others without young children who are attracted to central urban locations because they are bored with the suburbs. The historical circumstances that allow the residential invasion of commercial properties include the fact that central location is no longer as attractive to commercial interests as it once was—the commercial buildings built decades ago in central locations are not suitable for current business needs. Many of these properties are physically sound; can be economically converted to residential use as lofts, apartments, and condominiums; and are aesthetically attractive to consumers looking for funky alternative living space. In Memphis, the buildings renovated by private interests for residential use include the 1913 Hotel Grand that had been ruined by fire in the riots that followed Martin Luther King's assassination in 1968, a warehouse, an old National Biscuit Company distribution site, the Goyoso Hotel, and the Memphis Cotton Exchange, which was converted into 202 apartment units. The scale of the invasion is modest but significant, with an estimated 1,000 new residents moving to pricey, renovated (and some newly built) downtown properties each year.

The re-invasion of the central city may reflect a "natural" convergence of preferences for a segment of the affluent population, but the movement is avidly supported by the efforts of local government, which recognizes the importance of attracting to the downtown a resident population with a substantial disposable income. The movement is also supported by developers and realtors who enthusiastically support the arrival of well-heeled newcomers. The invasion does have a downside. Often referred to as "gentrification," critics are concerned about the impact of the combined activity of government, businesses, and the new renters and buyers on the cost of housing in the inner city. The consequences for the poor and those with modest incomes are discussed in the section of chapter 10 that deals with gentrification.

The Evolution of the Methods and Scope of Urban Ecology

As a consequence of the general perception that the classical ecological models were overly simplistic, urban ecologists refined the methodology with which they approached the complexity of the urban environment. A widely employed technique, referred to as *social area analysis*, was developed by Shevky and Williams (1949) and later formalized by Shevky and Bell (1955). Shevky, Williams, and Bell identified three fundamental features according to which urban populations could be identified and differentiated: economic status, family status, and ethnic classification. They observed that these social characteristics were found in identifiable concentrations that set various areas of the city apart from one another. These clusters were identified as "social areas" by the researchers, who argued that the areas were also popularly perceived as distinguishable by both residents and outsiders alike; that is, that they had a popular subjective reality independent of that which was discovered by researchers.

Computer technology, employing a statistical technique called "factor analysis," expanded the number of variables (factors) that could be easily considered. In *factorial ecology* any number of available social variables may enter the equation to determine which variables among them are found clustered together in different areas of the city. These areas are then identified—that is, labeled—on the basis of the social variables concentrated there. For example, an area distinguishable from surrounding areas by a high concentration of young adults, single or married without children, with relatively high educations, high incomes, and short average residency would suggest a distinct and identifiable district and a label would be devised to capture its essential character.

A major appeal of these techniques is that they can be readily applied to periodically available census data, and in this way detailed changes in the spatial configuration of urban land-use patterns may be revealed. However, social area analysis and the closely related factorial ecology have been broadly criticized as theoretically weak approaches. Whereas the older and, admittedly, overly simplistic schemes failed to describe too much regarding existing patterns, the new methods were seen as describing much while explaining little.

Urban ecologists along with other urban analysts have struggled to keep pace with the enormous changes that have affected cities and urban systems. Hawley (1986) attempted to accommodate the sprawling metropolitan form of cities in the United States within an argument that assumes that societies evolve naturally toward greater efficiency and take on forms that appeal to and serve the greatest numbers of citizens. In Hawley's work the underlying assumption in classical ecology, that the expansion of cities and the arrangement of land use proceed in an orderly and predictable fashion, becomes formalized and explicit. His thesis borrows heavily from the social model of Talcott Parsons's (1951) functionalism. According to that model, as societies evolve they become more complex and their major components accommodate one another, both in their form and the way they work; advanced societies are characterized by a functionally integrated set of institutions. Parsons's model of society (or the *social system*) emphasizes a continuous tendency toward balance among the various components of the system, a process he called "dynamic equilibrium," and consensus among its human participants.

Whether metropolitanization and the emerging forms of settlement discussed in the last chapter—edge cities, metroplexes, and boomburbs—represent greater efficiency and appeals to and serves the greatest numbers of citizens is open to debate. In what sense do the residential choices of individuals and the sites of enterprises today reflect consensual appreciation on the part of citizens, and to what degree do the emergent forms represent efficiency in terms of the collective interests and needs of society as a whole? A moment's consideration should yield a wealth of hypotheses on either side of the question.

In another development, ecologists have shifted their focus away from the analysis of individual settlements and toward the relationships among cities (F. D. Wilson 1984, 283–88). Within a regional, national, or international urban system, cities are linked together in a hierarchical division of labor according to the financial, commercial, and political institutions they house. This division allows the largest metropolitan areas to exert powerful influences over areas lower on the chain. This kind of system was identified by Short (2006a, 2007) in chapter 7 with regard to the hegemonic role of New York and London in the Globalization and World Cities' (GAWC) mapping of international influence, and in the dominant position held by the Northeast megalopolis and its urban nodes within the urban system of the United States. Patterns of domination are subject to modification over time, because existing arrangements are vulnerable to changes in transportation, communication, and the ability of major economic decision-making, power-wielding units to change locations within the urban system. This broader perspective in human ecology appears to hold promise for the development of greater insight into contemporary settlement patterns. It is, however, a major step away from the more familiar ecological approaches, a step in the direction of political economy (discussed in the section that follows).

The spatial concerns of urban ecologists are an intrinsic part of the study of cities (Flanagan 1993, 62–68). The background assumption that the spatial nature of settlement patterns of all societies will conform to a common, efficient design affects comparative research on European and North American cities. Even the old debate between Burgess and Hoyt about whether patterns of urban land use in this city or that conform more to the circular or wedge-shaped models resurface occasionally. And in practical terms, the fact that the concentration of certain populations has powerful consequences for the people who live in those areas means that ecological concerns will forever remain an important element in understanding cities.

Placemark 8.1—The Urban Ecology of Violence

One of the characteristics that Robert Park associated with the natural areas that make up the city was that each made up its own moral world, a characteristic worldview and way of life that to some extent distinguished its residents from others in the city. Current researchers attempt to understand the differences in the levels of violence, particularly homicides, that prevail in different urban neighborhoods. Some of the most influential work in the area

(Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Vigil 2003) finds that homicide rates are highest in certain areas that might well be identified by studies employing factorial ecology: areas of concentrated poverty that have high male unemployment, single-parent mother-headed families. These will be areas that are poorly served by law enforcement and that are socially isolated from other communities.

Vigil (2003, 233) emphasizes the importance of "place" in his approach to understanding violent street gangs and refers back to the work of the Chicago School and Burgess's concentric zone theory. Recall that the second ring, where the poor were concentrated in the zone in transition, was also the locus of social disorganization and criminal behavior. For Vigil, places associated with violence are anywhere immigrants and the poor settle in concentrated isolation from the rest of the population; here the relegated space becomes a potential battleground. Among all of the conditions that produce urban violence, "Place alone seems to have an explanatory power beyond most of the other factors because so many other human habits and adjustments emanate from the demands of place." Despite differences in their analyses, both Wilson, and Massey and Denton, can be read as arguing that it is the concentration of people into neighborhoods that are overwhelmingly poor that explains higher rates of violence there (Lee 2000, 190). Wilson refers to the "concentration effects" of having a critical mass of economically disengaged and discouraged people living in isolation from other social classes. Massey and Denton make the case that poor blacks have been forced into certain concentrated areas of the city under a system they refer to as American Apartheid. Elijah Anderson (1994), distinguishing between what he calls "decent" and "street" oriented poor families, argues that the latter live in an urban environment that produces what Park would refer to as a separate moral world. In the ethical world of the street, violence is a way to solve disputes; agents of the law are seen as indifferent or oppositional, not likely to deliver satisfaction. Vigil observes that in such a world, the ideals of public behavior are radically transformed. If one is young, then taking on a crazy or loco persona is one way of protecting oneself, the best defense being an offense that includes the reputation that this person is likely to do anything in retaliation, and is best left alone in favor of a less "loco" target of aggression. Sanyika Shakur, street name Monster, understood this growing up in Los Angeles. His street name was a title of distinction granted by those around him in honor of his unrelenting ruthlessness as a gang member.

Shakur was a student of what we would call the ecology of the district of L.A. that he lived in, and for him a thorough understanding of its spatial social order was a serious matter. In the following he outlines the complex divisions of allegiance based on territory.

I had ceased to recognize people—that is to say, gang members—by name. Gang members became recognizable as streets or sets. Further recognition fell into "enemy" or "friend" categories, which of course meant kill or let live . . .

All participants are obligated to represent their allegiance wherever they go . . . Each set actually functions like the different divisions of, say, the U.S.

Army. For instance, one who is in the army may belong to the First Infantry Division, 196th Infantry Brigade, Second Battalion, Delta Company. A member of a gang might belong to the West Side Crips, Eight Tray Gangster, North Side Eighty-third Street, or West Side Harvard Park Brims, Sixty-second Street. My point here is the complexity of both organizations. There is the Crip Army and the Blood Army. Each has various divisions or chapters. These are noted by streets and initials . . . With each new generation of Crip and Blood bangers comes a more complex system, which is now reaching institutional proportions (Shakur 1993, 77–79).

All city people carry an image of their city in their heads. The image is made up of the multiple zones or divisions that have personal meanings, including areas mentally constructed as safe or unsafe. These mental images coincide to some extent with the actual physical compartments that cities are divided into. Urban ecology, as the study of the spatial organization of cities and the behavioral consequences of that organization, is an inseparable part of the study of cities.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND URBAN SOCIOLOGY

The basic premise of classical ecology is that the economic competition for urban space shows a tendency to produce a spatial order that is natural and universal. As noted above, Hawley extended the assumption to encompass the idea that cities tend to evolve into shapes that are efficient and serve the interests of most of those who share the space.

It is possible, however, to begin with the opposite set of assumptions and to come to a very different conclusion regarding the question of who benefits from patterns of growth and change, patterns that are shaped by the marketplace and the ability of those with the greatest wealth to have their way. If we begin with the idea of scarcity of resources, that is, the idea that there are not enough of the generally coveted goods and benefits that society produces for everyone to get as much as they want, then we can look upon the outcome of competition for urban space in which wealthy individuals and institutions prevail in a different light. Many social scientists start from the premise that conflict between groups with unequal resources represents the underlying reality of the social order, not harmony and common interest. Some have focused on the urban arena as one of the key settings where the manipulation of markets and the battle for resources are carried out.

Political economy is the study of how political decision making and social policy articulates with the economic interests of different social classes, how it advantages or disadvantages particular groups of actors. What kinds of divisions are we talking about? Do wage earners and employers have the same interests? Are there ways in which the policies of government might benefit one at the cost of the other? The same questions might be asked with regard to the propertied and the propertyless, the affluent and the poor, members of minority and members of majority groups, established residents and more recent immigrants, men and women. With specific

regard to urban populations, we may raise questions about whose neighborhoods are torn down to build new highways; whose interests are served by the decision to build highways rather than to support mass transit through subsidizing its costs of operation; the pursuit of policies that promote the hiring of disadvantaged people for public jobs, or the prohibition of such policies; the taxing of business in order to support city-run day care centers; or the offer of tax incentives to corporations to keep local plants open—leaving the city with less in the way of revenues for vital services. These are policy or political decisions that affect the ability of different groups to be more or less successful in the competition for their share of society's scarce resources and benefits.

Beginning in the late 1960s, a growing number of critical theorists turned their attention to cities and to the signs of social unrest that were most evident there. In 1968, a series of student and worker riots occurred in Paris, which were interpreted officially as *urban* uprisings. In Britain, declining employment in major industrial cities and housing shortages led to questions about the economic processes that determined the allocation and utilization of urban space. A series of urban riots in the United States during the decade, the economic decline of central cities, and the loss of urban industrial jobs also attracted the attention of critical urban analysts. Classical theories in urban sociology, which focused on how individuals experienced urban life, were largely silent on such matters and failed to predict unrest.

The questions that were raised at the time by political economists were consistent with those raised by Marx a century earlier, and categories of analysis that focused on capital accumulation and class conflict came to the fore in the effort to understand urban conflict. Although Marx himself did not focus on cities in his examination of capitalism (he did believe that they were important to the development of revolutionary class consciousness), the mode of critical inquiry developed during the 1970s by urban theorists was strongly influenced by his ideas. This new Marxist perspective was particularly critical of traditional urban sociology, of ecologists, and of those who worked in the urbanism tradition because nothing in that body of work had anticipated urban uprisings. At the core of classical traditions was a distraction, according to the Marxist view, a "fetishism of space," meaning that the classical schemes mistakenly saw in urban space an independent or ultimate causal factor. According to the Marxist perspective, the ultimate causal factors that explain arrangements and events in any society are its economic structures. What Park, Burgess, Wirth, and others in the ecological school and the urban tradition should have focused on was *how a particular set of urban structures and effects were produced by capitalism*. Capitalism created particular forms of land use and the massive cities that instilled feelings of alienation and anomie. The urban environment itself was an effect—a product of a capitalist industrial revolution and its aftermath—rather than a cause. The analysis of space, as having a reality in and of itself, was a conceptual dead end. And now that cities were declining as economic centers and were routinely beset by class and racial tensions and disturbances, the point was clearer than ever, according to the Marxist view. The key to understanding urban problems was to focus on economic conditions rather than some mysterious property of size, density, or ecology.

The distinction being made here is not so subtle or academic as it may at first appear. In terms of social action, cities or ecologies are not real agents that create social



One form of neighborhood gentrification involves renovating old buildings for upscale residents; another is to replace buildings with totally new structures. What affect will this architecturally inconsistent four plex with units selling at around a half million dollars have on this Chicago neighborhood? © Jeremy Gantz

conditions or social change in the same sense that individual capitalists, corporations, or collective movements based on class interests are. In this view, it makes no sense to speak in terms of the suburbs versus the cities, or of the competition between Chicago and St. Louis. These are

> fundamental distortions of reality. Two points on the earth's inanimate surface cannot have opposing interests. History is made only when groups of people have interests opposed to those of other groups of people. The city is considered appropriately as a mere reflection of the larger economic and social fabric. . . . In analyzing any urban problem and, therefore, in analyzing any mode of production, class relations are paramount. (Sawers 1984, 4–7)

The new mode of analysis was given much of its impetus by the work of Manuel Castells, first with the publication of and then with the English language translation of his *The Urban Question* ([1972] 1977). Castells was critical of the idea that a given ecological context (the city) can give rise to a specific system of social relations (urban culture, or urbanism). He attributes the development of this perspective to the German school of urban sociology, "from Tönnies to Spengler, by way of Simmel," which we reviewed in chapter 3. These ideas were developed further in Chicago by Park and his student Wirth, whom Castells credits with the most serious attempt

within the conventional urban studies paradigm to establish a distinct subject matter and field of study specific to urban sociology (Castells [1972] 1977, 75–77). However, Wirth's effort failed, in Castells' view, because the assumptions of the paradigm on which it was based were fatally flawed.

For Castells, the problem with the argument that the urban environment produces a particular effect on culture is that those conditions described as a consequence of urban environment are, in fact, produced by capitalist industrialization. The fragmentation of roles, the predominance of secondary relationships, and accentuated individualization are not produced by urban life but by the industrial system under capitalism (Castells [1972] 1977, 81). What had been recognized as "urban life" was itself produced by economic forces. What had been seen as a cause of behavior and experience was in itself merely a consequence of a more fundamental set of causes. To miss this point and to treat the urban environment as an independent variable with consequences for experience, behavior, and organization is to engage in an exercise in "bourgeois ideology." This is because any science not built upon a clear appreciation of class antagonisms will stand in the way of the recognition of the fundamental conflict at the heart of capitalist society.

Following the appearance of Castells' work in English, many Marxist analyses were applied usefully to such issues as urban industrial decline, the Sunbelt phenomenon, uneven economic development, metropolitanization, and other trends. These various efforts can be broken down into two areas of emphasis: those that were primarily concerned with capital accumulation and those that focused more on class conflict (Gottdiener 1985, 72–73). Looking at these separately helps us to see what it means to apply Marxist analysis to urban space.

Capital Accumulation

We need to begin by acknowledging that separating capital accumulation and class struggle as we do here is somewhat artificial since, as David Harvey (1985a, 1) reminded us, they are very much interwoven aspects of the same system of production and distribution, capitalism. In that portion of his work devoted primarily to the issue of accumulation, he wrote that "the urban process," whatever else it may entail, "implies the creation of a material physical infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange, and consumption." The *built environment* is produced by the accumulation and organization of capital. That is, it takes time for capital to complete its circulation from money back to money plus profit. The urban environment was built, and is continuously destroyed and rebuilt, for the sake of creating a more efficient arena for circulation. Buildings and machinery that are destroyed in the process may still be perfectly useful, but they are not optimally efficient for current purposes; consequently, they are discarded before their time in a process of "creative destruction" that is continually accelerating.

> We look at the material solidity of a building, a canal, a highway, and behind it we see always the insecurity that lurks within the circulation process of capital, which always asks: how much more time in this relative space? The rush of human beings across space is now matched by an accelerating pace of change in the production of landscapes

> across which they rush. Processes as diverse as suburbanization, deindustrialization and restructuring, gentrification and urban renewal, through the total reorganization of the spatial structure of the urban hierarchy, are part and parcel of a continuous reshaping of geographical landscapes to match the quest to accelerate turnover time. The destruction of familiar places and secure places . . . provokes many an anguished cry. (Harvey 1985b, 28)

The capital for investment in the built environment is produced by capitalism's chronic overaccumulation, the failure of direct competition among commodity producers to fully absorb investment resources. That is, under normal conditions, more saleable commodities are produced by capitalism than can be consumed. Investment in the kind of fixed capital that the built environment represents, such as homes or offices, is less attractive from a profit motive standpoint than is the production of saleable commodities. However, such investment provides a temporary solution (heavily subsidized by state guarantees and dependent upon the availability of credit) to capitalism's chronic overaccumulation problem. Harvey observed that just such a potential overaccumulation dilemma faced the United States after World War II. From this perspective, rapid suburban development may be interpreted as a strategic market response that simultaneously created a mass-market investment opportunity for surplus capital and an outlet for the pent-up demand for individual home ownership. In this view, private ownership of housing provides a mechanism of social stabilization, which was employed in the United States both during the unsettled 1930s as a means of generating social stability among the more affluent elements of the workforce and again in the urban confrontations of the 1960s when the suburbs were opened to promote home ownership for lower-income and minority families (Harvey 1985a, 28–29).

Class Conflict

Sawers's (1984) urban analysis focuses primarily on class conflict. The division between those who receive their income from property and those who receive their income in the form of wages is fundamental and unalterable. Owners have no choice under capitalism but to do whatever is in their power to realize profits to be reinvested as capital. As a class, they must try to organize society, and more particularly, urban space, to enhance profit maximization. Workers are primarily interested in an organization of space that enhances their interests as consumers. In this way, the fundamental conflict between capital and labor extends beyond the division of society into wages and profits. Capital and labor are also in conflict over the manner in which space in the urban arena is to be used. This conflict is manifest in battles over rent control, traffic safety, health issues, land use, and other divisions of interest that are basically thinly disguised forms of class struggle (Sawers 1984, 6–9).

In the current phase of the evolution of capitalism, the globe is enmeshed in a single capitalist system of producers, markets, and labor reserves. The decline of the older industrial cities of the United States may be understood in this perspective. In fact, every urban era and the condition of any society's cities can be understood only with reference to their particular histories. The crisis of older industrial cities is



The city is in a constant state of demolition and reconstruction. According to Marxist theory, useful buildings are destroyed before their time in the quest to make urban space more profitable. © Joe Fox, photographersdirect.com

simply a result of the fact that when confronted with cheaper labor reserves, industrialists will usually vote with their feet (Sawers 1984, 7–10). Chapter 7 provided an overview of the urban history of the United States. Textbox 8.2 briefly reexamines that history employing Marxist categories of analysis.

Textbox 8.2. U.S. Urban History from a Marxist Perspective

David Gordon (1984) interpreted U.S. urban history from the perspective of Marxism. He identified three distinct eras of capitalist development, each associated with a particular kind of city.

1. In the colonial and postcolonial city, merchant capitalists made profits from the sale of commodities not produced by themselves or others in their employ. Merchant interests that were located in one city struggled for regional and national dominance over those in other cities. The wealth of the owner class grew throughout this period, dating through the mid-1880s, in contrast to the general poverty of many of their fellow citizens.
2. The second era emerged between 1850 and 1870 and was characterized by the emergence of the industrial city. During this period, the wealth of capital accumulation was increasingly invested in manufacturing. The efficiency of the factory production system was perfected through (1) the deskilling of craft work into standardized production processes that could be staffed with semi-skilled labor and (2) the relocation of factories among reserve armies of the unemployed, which

had the effect of extending a strong element of discipline over the labor force. In this second stage, segregated working-class housing districts emerged, closely associated with factory locations. The dense concentrations of labor were increasingly restive by the 1880s. During this period, worker resentment and industrial disputes grew in reaction to the acceleration of the work process, an acceleration that was demanded by manufacturers who were locked in competition with one another. Conditions were right for creating the kind of class consciousness and worker actions that Marx had predicted. Gordon argued that labor unrest was, in fact, a powerful enough force to contribute to the demise of the industrial city and the rise of the corporate city in the period between 1898 and 1920.

3. The corporate city sprawled into the metropolitan region, not in response to innovations in transportation technology, but as the result of intensifying activism, which had sprung up in the concentrated working-class districts of the earlier industrial city. Gordon offered the examples of Hammond and Gary, Indiana, two outposts of industrial development beyond the urban fringe of the Chicago area. These were developed in response to what Chicago industrialists of the era identified as a "hotbed of trades unionism" as they complained about "all these controversies and strikes we have here." The emergence of a resistant class consciousness was a concern of the times. The corporate city featured an intensification and expansion of the central business district. The dispersion of the manufacturing operations, in response to labor activism, freed the new corporate giants to locate their executive and administrative offices convenient to those of other corporations, banks, law offices, and advertising firms and marketing agencies. The image of the massive corporate headquarters dominating the skyline of major metropolitan centers describes the cities that we became familiar with over the course of the twentieth century. The question of what shape the market will demand of the city of the global future remains open, from a Marxist or any perspective.

Evaluating the Contributions of the Marxist Approach

Western sociological thought may be classified according to various traditions; one of the simplest is to divide it between mainstream and Marxist analysis. As the labels imply, there will be those theories that fall within a broad core of the more widely accepted frameworks of thought and a separate body of ideas, Marxism, that stands outside this tradition. That this classification holds for urban sociology is underlined by the fact that, for the most part, it has been possible up to this point to discuss what has been done in the name of urban sociology with minimal reference to Marx. Principles of classical Marxism are not easily synthesized with mainstream assumptions. Also, given that Marxist theory both attacks the legitimacy and questions the viability of capitalism, it has been perceived as a set of arguments based primarily on ideological rather than scientific assumptions. Put simply, in this view Marxism is not a science but a political position, and from within the mainstream, its practitioners are perceived as less than legitimate. This, in fact, is the same way that many Marxists tend to view the main body of mainstream or "bourgeois" sociology.

The incompatibility of mainstream and Marxist traditions in urban sociology stems from the basic differences in the assumptions of the two approaches. The early ecologists understood that urban land-use patterns were the result of competition (facilitated or constrained by transportation and communication technology) among various elements of the urban population. Marxists argue that urban patterns, like all areas of social relations in society, are the result of the basic economic process of capital accumulation, profit-taking strategies, and various particularly urban manifestations of the class struggle.

During the 1970s and through the early part of the following decade, the Marxist perspective appeared to provide a useful alternative to the ecological, urban culture and community studies approaches—approaches that had failed to predict or explain the urban disturbances of the 1960s. However, the heyday of radical criticism was short-lived. Although Marxist thought remains part of the mix of current urban sociology, as it does with regard to sociology in general, it has lost some of its influence and some of its adherents. By the mid-1980s, many critical writers ceased referring to what they did as "Marxist," and the political economy approach became a catchall category for a variety of work that emphasized the idea that social arrangements were based fundamentally on conflict among various categories of social actors with different levels of access to power. Some who considered their work political economy operated within Marxist assumptions, while the work of others bore little relationship to Marxism. Readers have been left somewhat on their own, without the encumbrance of weighty labels, to decipher and take what they find useful from the literature.

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF "URBAN" SOCIOLOGY: A SOCIOLOGY OF SETTLED SPACE

When urban sociology first began to emerge as a distinctive concern in the work of classical theorists, the city was portrayed as an integral feature of the wider society. Weber observed that cities existed within economic fields that extended beyond their individual borders and control. Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* was not devoted specifically to the study of cities, but of societies. Cities appeared only as points of concentrated settlement in which emerging patterns of modern society were most pronounced. With the development of the various subfields of sociology, there was a tendency among the urban sociologists who followed that first generation to divide societies into urban and nonurban elements, studying the former with little regard for the latter. More recently there has been discussion of the need to conceptually reintegrate society, supported by a general recognition that the settled environment has undergone modifications that render old ways of thinking about cities as more or less socially isolated units obsolete.

In the older ways of thinking about space, "urban" and "rural" represented different extremes, opposite conditions of social life. In the urban tradition it was the effort to *distinguish* urban culture—to describe urbanism as a distinct way of life—that reinforced the popular habit of thinking about country and city life as *opposites*. In the current consideration of economic structures—of the globalization of economies and of culture—we are drawn to emphasize the connectedness among all the

places in the world, to see the way that all points large and small are part of the same world system. This economic and social integration of space is best expressed as spatial *rationalization*, the unification of the economic value of different elements of population and other resources into a single strategic worldwide market system. The well-worn conventional terms *rural* and *urban* will doubtless survive alongside new and often awkward forms of expression (megalopolis, edge city, metroplex, boomburb, micropolitan area). But they can no longer be understood to refer to opposite conditions, independent subject matters, and, least of all, independent arenas of action.

Sociology has just begun to develop a subdisciplinary perspective of appropriate scope that is able to transcend the old subdisciplinary boundaries and to address much broader categories of spatial analysis. We have learned to consider, in quick succession, regional or national space and then global space in order to understand the changing fortunes of particular cities and urban regions. Here we consider some of the issues in the emergence of regional and the global perspectives and how these broader perspectives relate to traditional urban studies. At the end of the chapter, we focus on the question of the continued relevance of urban sociology as a distinct and worthwhile division of social science.

Regional Studies

In the 1970s, demographers in the United States were taken by surprise by a significant change in population trends. During that decade, for the first time, the population of nonmetropolitan areas grew more rapidly (in proportionate terms) than metropolitan populations. This amounted to a reversal of the longstanding, steady pattern of increasing urbanization. At the same time, the continuation of a somewhat longer term trend also helped to draw the attention of analysts away from cities toward distant and smaller population points. Manufacturers were moving assembly and processing operations out of larger metropolitan areas to smaller towns with lower labor and other production costs. The pattern of non-metropolitan population and employment growth was repeated to some degree between 1990 and 2000 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2007). The reversal of historical trends in the two decades drew attention to the connectedness between changes in the largest and smallest population centers. As migrant, investment, and employment streams between nonmetropolitan and metropolitan areas reversed and re-reversed themselves, the overall process reinforced the view that these areas are components of a single system consisting of relative costs and opportunities and should be studied as such by a single body of information-sharing scholars. This seems reasonable, since people who are deciding between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan living apparently employ this kind of comparative consideration. The same is true of large, urban-based real estate speculators and developers, and metro-based corporations considering relocation of their manufacturing or clerical divisions. Locational decision makers large and small operate within an expanded field of action that incorporates central and remote locations.

Gottdeiner (1985) is among those who have emphasized the need to treat space as a continuous field of action, considering, for example, that developers and real

estate speculators can strike at will within a tract of wilderness as easily as they can within the heart of the metropolis. Modern transportation and communication technologies, in the service of the investment calculus, lend a seamlessness to physical space. Investors are guided by trade journals and encouraged by the popular media to consider nonmetropolitan locations: *Site Selection Magazine* tracks metropolitan and micropolitan location prospects for entrepreneurs, and in March 2004 it offered its top ten choices for micropolitan investment. In June that year, *USA Today* made an effort to explain the collapse of the longstanding urban and rural distinction for readers, while emphasizing the promising economic growth that was taking place in smaller centers (June 27, 2004). Thus the fluidity of spatial demographics was being introduced to the popular imagination.

The idea that a regional frame of analysis is important for understanding local conditions is not altogether new. The recognition that smaller communities have increasingly been subject to the influence of larger and more remote political and economic forces is, in part, an offshoot of the community studies tradition in sociology. A classic study that emphasized the importance of external influences on small-town life was Vidich and Bensman's ([1958] 1968) *Small Town in Mass Society*.

Vidich and Bensman's work remains a valuable source of insight into how external economic and political influences systematically transform a small and formerly remote center into a dependent and passive recipient of plans, prices, and cultural influences that originated elsewhere. Their identification of the concept "mass society" as the force of change reflected one of the prevailing theoretical themes of the 1950s when their work was carried out in New York State. It is a variation of the same mainstream perspective that characterized Wirth's "urbanism" model. The depiction of the small town of "Springdale" showed the erosion of its local economic base and the degree of political autonomy it had formerly enjoyed. Its merchants lost business to a somewhat distant shopping district that had in effect been brought closer by state-built highway projects; decision making with regard to taxes and spending projects was increasingly influenced by the state legislature; and practices within Springdale's educational institutions were being increasingly drawn into line by external mandates. The proportion of in-moving middle-class commuters was increasing to the point that they were becoming a potentially powerful political force in the limited range of issues left to the locality's decision. Springdale's traditional sense of itself was vanishing as the town became a peripheral location in relation to distant centers.

Another older argument for expanding the scope of community analysis is Roland Warren's *The Community in America* ([1963] 1972). He distinguished between "horizontal ties," the relationships among the various organizations within a community, and "vertical ties," the linkages between affiliate or branch organizations located in the community and their headquarters located elsewhere. The horizontal ties collectively represented the degree of internal systemness or integration within a local community, and the vertical ties indicated the degree to which the community was a fragment of an external system. Warren argued that a "great change" had occurred in the organization of the American community, whereby the degree of external linkage had increased dramatically. *Communities* were not the units that were linked, but the links were instead among the economic and political institutions that were located within the community. External linkages were those

between chain store and regional headquarters, branch plant and national office, and schools and the state education bureaucracy. These linkages were hierarchical and were "enacted," which is to say formally created and bureaucratically structured. Thus they provided more direct and powerful channels of communication and command than did the informal "crescive" ties between different organizations (the bank, the supermarket, the public school) located within the same community. The implication, of course, was that communities of all sizes had been infiltrated by mechanisms of manipulation from outside and had lost whatever degree of internal connectedness and autonomy they may have formerly had. Warren was presenting in analytical terms what Vidich and Bensman had described for Springdale.

The direct business investment of the 1970s and 1990s signaled a strengthening presence of outside influences in small communities. A striking feature of nonmetropolitan demographic and economic trends is their responsiveness to wider economic conditions. Employers are drawn to rural areas by their low taxes and land costs, weak regulatory restrictions, and nonunionized labor forces. Wage labor in smaller remote communities tends to earn the lowest average wages of any settlement type. Wage increases correlate positively with each increment in settlement size (Beeson and Groshen 1991). Rural income levels also vary by region, and the rural workforce in the South has historically been among the lowest earning.

In addition to assembly operations, more remote locations have attracted routine data-processing and customer service operations; this has been made possible by advances in telecommunications technology, including satellite communications, the Web, e-mail, and fax. Testa (1992, 23–25) warned that the prospect for rural sitings of such jobs tended to be oversold, and that increased opportunities for employment stemming from new technologies are offset, in rural areas as elsewhere, by the labor-saving (job-reducing) advances in technological innovation. In addition, certain aspects of marketing, communications, and finance operations that come to be located in nonmetropolitan areas suffer from a lack of the kinds of opportunities for face-to-face meetings and contacts that exist in metropolitan centers. Any new positions that may be created in nonmetro areas will be "back office" or lower order jobs with lower pay. They suffer from the same transitory siting prospects that lower order manufacturing jobs are subject to, particularly off-shoring—exporting of jobs to other nations with much lower labor costs.

Still, the governments of virtually all of the small towns in the United States have for some time been locked in competition with one another to attract industry and employment opportunities. Local governments are preoccupied with overcoming the negative features that they fear would discourage industry from locating in their area. When they can access the financial resources to do so, they willingly provide additional incentives to those offered by the low-wage and low-tax character of their town. In these ways, small-town municipal governments become partners in the risks of private enterprise by gambling that their investments will pay off in net gains for the community. It is difficult to calculate costs and benefits in such cases, since even the strictly economic costs often defy measurement, and costs and benefits tend to be absorbed by different segments of the population. Expanding industrial activity and any attendant population growth will soon uncover any existing shortcomings in local environmental and land-use planning codes. Once the relationship between the municipality and the industry is established, it is difficult

to bring pressures to bear that will correct the situation. Some of the long-term costs of population and industrial growth that are incurred by local communities are difficult to see and may not immediately manifest themselves. An increase in the average household income leads to an increase in the cost of living as prices of housing and services are adjusted to meet demand. Low- and fixed-income people share the costs of development, although not all share in its benefits. In some communities increased economic activity or people moving in from areas with higher wages and costs of living drive up housing costs, making it difficult for long-time residents to find affordable housing.

Still, the majority of those living in small towns, given the century-long pattern of general out-migration, tend to view positively the prospects of a reversal of the long-term decline of the local population, services, and opportunity for employment. The promise is that more neighbors, friends, and offspring will have a better chance to stay close to home and that residents will be able to share in increased prosperity and improved services. Enough serious questions have been raised, however, to cast some doubt on the issue of the aggregate benefits of nonmetropolitan growth. The overarching concern is that nonmetropolitan economic growth is most often instigated by extralocal conditions and orchestrated by nonlocal actors. Dependence on any one industry in small towns creates a particular vulnerability. Given the dynamics of the international marketplace and competing global labor supplies, it is likely that the conditions that make a particular location a rational choice at one point in time will change. Once established, the decision to remain in a given location must be remade repeatedly by decision makers remote from the local concerns of the dependent population. This vulnerability must be considered in any calculation of the costs of industry-related nonmetropolitan growth.

The expanding scope of urban sociology from urban nucleus to metropolitan to regional and national levels of analysis have been necessary steps in developing an understanding of how local conditions are shaped by forces operating on a larger scale. But regional and national conditioning factors are themselves conditioned by shifts in the global political and economic arena. There have been few periods in human history when the connection between global shifts and local conditions has been more dramatic, and the impact has never been more immediate.

International commerce, international finance, international law, and the identification and coordination of global resources and markets are the utilitarian art forms that characterize the present age. This is the space in which business is done, in which fortunes are made, and play in this global arena is not restricted to huge multinational companies. Consider the case of the small (twenty-eight employees) computer design company "in" California. The financing for the company was raised internationally; its components were engineered and produced in Japan and were assembled and distributed to the world marketplace from Taiwan and Singapore. The spirit of the international marketplace is summed up by one of the new global managers: "We plan to manufacture in any country in the world where there is an advantage—to make things in Thailand where the cost is low, or Germany because the market is big, to do R&D in Boston" (Reich 1995, 164–65).

Governments in every region have recognized the need to accommodate to the importance of international trade, the value of which was about $16.3 trillion in 2008 and amounted to roughly 50 percent of world GDP. Regional trade agree-

ments are a direct response to this inspiring reality. Europe has taken a major step in the direction of becoming a single economy, with a single currency and just fewer than 500 million consumers. In North America, Canada, Mexico, and the United States have responded to the realities of the international economy with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which lowers trade barriers among these nations with a combined population of 440 million. Across the Pacific, ten Asian nations with about 585 million people have created a special trading unit (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN). In Africa, joint undertakings are underway to bring together several existing regional trade organizations, and a core of leaders of South American nations aspire to the unification of the continent under a single trade organization.

It is not only national leaderships that recognize the need to plan for a future of much closer global coordination. Most U.S. states and Canadian provinces have permanent offices in foreign countries, the sole purpose of which is to attract trade. Most U.S. governors and Canadian premiers lead delegations on annual overseas pilgrimages designed to promote their products and entice investment. Periodic missions to other countries by U.S. mayors have been sponsored by the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. These efforts of local government officials reflect the fact that the United States is the leading host nation in the world for foreign investment: about 5 million U.S. citizens worked for foreign-owned companies by 2004. Local politicians are aware, as one commentator pointed out in the mid-1990s, that "the lives of local constituents are being increasingly affected by actions that occur and decisions that are rendered outside the boundaries of their own nation state" (Fry 1995, 25).

So the "smokestack chasing" spectacle of small towns competing for new industries, prisons, landfills, or anything else that would create employment in nonmetropolitan regions in the United States is now repeated on a global scale by municipalities of every size. In the new era, the efforts of city officials are directed not only at interurban competition but also at coordination among leaders from different cities to make their entire region more attractive. One of the most striking features in this regard is the coordination of efforts between city governments in different countries. "Cascadia" is the Pacific coastal area that extends from Alaska southward through British Columbia to Oregon; it is a region united by vital common development interests that overshadow its straddling an international border. The region's economic and urban focus is the Vancouver-Seattle-Portland corridor. The businesses in the port cities on either side of the Canada–U.S. border have traditionally been and remain competitors, but there is also an appreciation among all parties, especially planners and government officials, that the entire area comprises a single transportation and trade corridor on the northern reaches of the export-import–oriented international Pacific Rim economy. Urban officials have come to recognize the mutual advantages, in terms of growth potential, of increasing the attractiveness of the entire region. The development of the Vancouver-Seattle-Portland corridor is being monitored and managed jointly by local and regional cooperative government initiatives devoted to *sustainable urbanization*, which means that attention is paid to ways that the region's tendency for economic and population growth can be managed to maintain the attractive natural resources that contribute to the enviable quality of life enjoyed by many residents (Artibise 1995).

This sort of international policy orientation on the part of local officials has come to be called an "intermestic" governmental perspective. The term combines the traditionally separate spheres of policymaking that are undertaken by national governments: "international" and "domestic" policy. However, here the concerns are combined with reference to strategies now undertaken by city governments themselves, to promote domestic or local economic well-being by taking an active and promotional role in international affairs. Now cities address policy issues that were formerly the exclusive domain of national governments, as urban officials forge relationships and agreements with international partners and vigorously lobby national policymaking bodies to develop foreign policy legislation and agreements consistent with regional interests. The internationalist orientation of municipal governments is evidenced in specialized trade negotiations, official international ties among foreign cities, and the establishment and the development of many "sister city" linkages—where two cities in different countries proclaim a special relationship with each other. Some of these relationships have developed into locally sponsored foreign aid programs for poorer sisters (Cohn and Smith 1995).

In sum, globalization describes a future that is not as clear as many would hope and raises questions about what role various regions, governments, and individuals will play, how they will participate, who will benefit, and whose fortunes will decline. Despite the energy with which public bodies and private interests prepare for that future, the efforts are generated as much by a sense of uncertainty about the economic future as they are by an enthusiastic conviction that all will be well. Above all, there is a sense of inevitability, that the proximate future will be ruled by the logic of a single marketplace that is in no one's power to control.

URBAN SOCIOLOGY AND STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM

A good part of this chapter has been concerned with delineating the differences that set apart urban ecology and Marxist roots of critical urban theory. There is, however, one fundamental similarity between ecology and urban Marxism. Contemporary critics point out that both suffer from a simplified *structural determinism*. What this means is that each theory claims that structural requirements move social change unfailingly in a particular direction and that a particular outcome is inevitable. Ecologists sought the logic of spatial organization in natural forces that were produced by the urban environment itself—the competition engendered by the value of centrally located real estate—resulting in an overall efficiency and harmony of land-use patterns. Marxists found the answer to the question of expanding metropolitan environments in class conflict and the volatility of a concentrated urban proletariat. In Marx's hope for the development of a revolutionary class consciousness and the overthrow of capitalism, consciousness and revolution were the inevitable results of nineteenth-century urban working conditions and the relationship between wages and profit. Revolutionary ideas were the inevitable intermediate consequences rather than causes in themselves.

In a structurally determinist scheme, human action is dictated by the social conditions that give rise to the action. Similarly, critics of theories that emphasize balance and progress leading to uniform outcomes have pointed out that

the proponents of such ideas (such as structural functionalists or modernization theorists) don't need to talk about human action at all. The social system acts. We simply assume that humans are in there somewhere, staffing the required statuses and providing the energy that allows society to move steadily and eternally in the direction of equilibrium—the balance among institutional forms, accompanied by improvements in living conditions and consensus among all citizens. Both the classical Marxist and equilibreal schemes are deterministic because they point to a limited set of factors that produce an inevitable result.

Determinism is generally regarded in the sciences as weak theory because it reduces complex reality. It oversimplifies. If society really operated so simply, the predictive abilities of the social sciences would be far greater. As it is, we are often surprised by human actions and social outcomes. This would seem to be as true of urban sociology as in other branches of science concerned with human behavior. How is it that several cities faced with the same set of conditions will show widely varying consequences in terms of growth or decline? Why do some old inner-city neighborhoods continue to decline while others remain stable and still others reverse their formerly declining fortunes with improving conditions and new people moving in?

Two possibilities might explain why local changes are not more predictable. The first is that they occur by chance, randomly. This would indicate that society is a disordered environment, which makes predictive social science impossible. The second possibility is that patterns of change vary among local areas because people are not really so helpless and passive as determinist theories make them appear. That is, localities and cities change along different lines because local populations are effective agents in responding to social forces—to threats and to opportunities. They are able to change the changes that confront them.

Is Globalization Another Determinist Theory?

"Globalization" is fundamentally a label applied in a descriptive manner to the internationalization of the market economy and its various social and cultural consequences. As a description, it is theoretically and ideologically neutral and can be incorporated equally in service to a Marxist, functionalist, or any other macrological (large-scale) theoretical perspective. In a critical political economy, globalization can be understood to describe the final stages of capitalism, the period when every inch and every inhabitant of the globe, to the extent that they are useful elements that can be exploited for profit, have become incorporated into the world marketplace. Castells (1985b) was among those who observed that international capitalism has placed a relative handful of large transnational corporations above the control of national governments; it has given them a new power to be exercised in pursuit of profit. Within classical Marxism, there has always been the question of whether capitalism could survive its ultimate success. Is it a system that can survive a state of no growth, no further expansion? Will it collapse? Globalization as an idea, as a purely descriptive interpretation, is silent on such questions; it is neutral ideologically.

Most of the world, especially its journalists, policymakers, and leading entrepreneurs, are poor Marxists—better at seeing balance of interests and progress,

although they are not likely to think explicitly in terms of the theoretical frameworks that order their habits of thought. The idea of globalization has been captured by those who see in the future a more perfect world with a single economy based on market principles. Therefore, in practice, globalization represents an apparently worldwide capitulation to the notion that there is no alternative to the rational organization of international resources by market factors, that it is folly to resist the influences of the crystallizing international marketplace, that this represents the logical and inevitable future that is ultimately beneficial to all consumers and all workers. A single world marketplace, it is believed, ultimately lowers prices, creates work, raises wages, and increases standards of living everywhere. In an editorial commenting on the allegedly misguided rioting of strikers in South Korea, France, and Argentina—where events and government decisions had heightened concerns over job security—*The Economist* (January 18, 1997, 16) counseled that governments must work harder to get their citizens to understand "that open economies and flexible labor markets are net creators of wealth and jobs." With reference to the deindustrialization pattern that has afflicted the labor market in the United States and other countries, the essay points out that workers need to be educated to appreciate that many good new jobs have been created, that it is a mistake to dwell on the image of the deadbeat "McJob" replacements for lost industrial work. The editorial appeals to the workers of the world and all interested others for "perspective, please—and consent." Consent, and trust, that the economic reorganization that has swept the globe is about to deliver, finally, that which has always been the inevitable outcome of market democracy, the best of all probable worlds, the greatest good for the largest number at any given moment, a dynamic system in which economic displacement is short term and adjustment always yields long-term improvement.

The argument reflects the assumptions of functionalism on a global scale and coincides with modernization theory discussed in chapter 6 in application to underdeveloped economies. Two important conceptual points need to be recognized: First, to the extent that we accept this popular interpretation of globalization, we are coming very close to embracing the most conservative traditions of social and economic thought with regard to the beneficence of the marketplace as a force for human good. Second, there is a strong element of *determinism* imbedded in the idea that a single, remote force is shaping all societies, pointing toward an inevitable set of progressive and universally positive outcomes, converging toward similar futures for all cultures. Note that globalization does not have to be interpreted this way, but arguments to the contrary do not represent the prevailing doctrine in much of the world today.

As students of social science we need to insist that the term be used in a descriptive and ideologically neutral manner. The global perspective on change, to the extent that it remains a descriptive proposition, permits us to circumvent ideological debates and avoid the trap of determinism. It admits to the possibility of the effectiveness of local efforts directed at self-determination, without predicting whether particular local efforts will or will not be effective. As such, it is in step with developments in urban sociology in recent years. The new perspective draws our attention back to cities and to the efforts of local leadership to balance the effects of global forces with human action—to local efforts to direct change.

Human Agency and Urban Change

Just as it is undeniable that the global economy is a powerful force affecting local conditions, it is also true that conditions vary considerably between localities. This is a troublesome feature of reality with regard to sweeping theories of change: General theory is not capable of explaining or predicting variations among similar communities precisely because general theory describes typical or average outcomes. Then it must be that in similarly situated localities, where the same external forces have resulted in different consequences (some places more favorable, some less favorable), local actors have employed different strategies to manage these changes. That is, it must be that local people are capable of altering the impact of external forces.

As we have seen, sociology and other social sciences have been faulted for developing theories that dictate human action, and some thinkers have been involved for the past few decades in "deconstructing" social theory in a way that acknowledges people's greater freedom to choose and to act. Many find this a more attractive and humanizing way to portray the conditions of our existence.

Especially influential has been the work of Anthony Giddens (1981; 1984; 1985). He argued that it was a mistake from the beginning for social science to attempt to adapt the model of the natural sciences—sciences that deal with processes and materials that produce unvarying results under similar circumstances over a number of experimental trials. The subjects of social sciences are human beings, and one key difference is that they are aware of the forces of change that confront them and their communities. They are also aware that they have choices about how to react to the remote and powerful forces that we have been discussing, and they mobilize resources, including the ideas provided by the relevant social sciences, in order to redirect change in a way that suits them. What this means for urban sociology is this: If we want to understand how particular urban regions, cities, and neighborhoods change, then we have to depend less on theory and more on local histories, resources, and the imagination of local leadership. The deliberate effort of human beings, thinking and acting, alone or together, is called *agency*.

Giddens' approach, called *structuration theory*, helped to shift the research agenda in sociology since the 1980s. There has been a general call to place more emphasis on discovering the sources of local differences and to mistrust theories that are unable to account for these variations in local outcomes. This newer emphasis on agency and local history repeats a pattern that has occurred before in urban sociology, as the field has vacillated between an emphasis on theory and empirical research (Flanagan 1994). From time to time, there has appeared a consensus that abstract theories are leading in the wrong direction (the community studies correction to the errors of the urbanism thesis reviewed in chapter 3) or that unstructured empirical research is producing fragmented and theoretically uninteresting facts (e.g., the factorial ecology approach in this chapter). In recent decades, growing attention has been devoted to local factors, especially the power of local political and business elites to influence change.

The work of Logan and Molotch (Molotch 1976; Logan and Molotch 1987) is especially influential in the growing body of material describing "growth elites." Logan and Molotch argued that every city contains a number of influential actors who

are eager to promote their own interests. While elites themselves may be divided into different factions—for example, those interested in promoting heavy manufacturing may hurt the prospects of others who promote tourism or residential real estate development—elites share in common a pro-growth mentality and constitute a local "growth machine." Whether depicted as working together or locked in competition over the direction of growth, the outcome is predicted to be the same: This group is an effective lobby that will insure that local resources will be expended on projects that enhance the relative attractiveness of the city or metro region (Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997).

The question is, How effective are local efforts in the face of the kinds of global economic restructuring we have described? For growth elites, success is a matter of figuring out how to sell their location, to be more attractive to investors, tourists, and anyone else who has capital or disposable income and is looking to invest-spend it somewhere in the world. The formula generally involves an all-out cooperative effort on the part of government and private enterprise (the pool of local elites). In addition to attempting to retain or attract manufacturing, generally considered the jewel of development strategies because of the employment and tax benefits historically associated with it, local developers recognize that urban economic strategies need to be diversified. Growth strategies should also focus on attracting or enhancing existing research and development facilities and services at all levels. The strategy should capitalize on any tourist attractions an area may have or be able to develop, and it might include ways to commodify (offer for sale) any cultural, leisure, or informational activities or facilities that may be found in or attracted to the area (Proulx 1995, 172). With specific regard to technological research, development, and manufacturing firms, it is wise to try to develop a certain number of complementary enterprises and support systems and to develop among them a sense of the need for the coordination of efforts in order to create the kind of flexible responses to product and service provision demanded by client vendors and consumer markets. What this means is that modernizing industrial districts, such as Baden-Württemberg in Germany and Silicon Valley in California, foster the appropriate regional technological culture as well as a local political force that is in step with the shifting demands of today's markets and is likely to be readily served by benevolent local political leaderships desperate to sustain or improve the local economy (Indergaard 1997). The effectiveness of local political support is enhanced by government units with broad geographical jurisdictions: This prevents any lingering inclinations toward local municipal competition that might stifle regional development, enhances the capacity of a single government body to coordinate the economic assets of a larger region, and is a more effective representation in the international arena. Canadian governing bodies tend to fit this qualification more than those in U.S. metro areas (Kresl 1995), but as we have seen in the example of Cascadia, cities in separate jurisdictions can cooperate even when located in different countries.

Those who urge local action and help formulate growth strategies are mindful that local efforts to control the future are limited and may be canceled out by such external constraints as the withdrawal of federal programs or the "perverse leverage of corporations in a threatened industrial order" (Indergaard 1997, 678). Even John Logan (Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997), who worked with Molotch on

expanding the local-elite "growth machine" thesis, is forced, on the basis of a survey of empirical research efforts stimulated by that thesis, to conclude that "after two decades of research, we are still unsure whether growth machines make a difference to urban development" (624). There is very limited indication that cities that competed vigorously for economic growth were more successful in attracting investors and new firms, but the study was not able to show a significant improvement in employment. The authors qualify even that evidence by pointing out that the direction of causality between promotion and growth is in question. Faster-growing local economies may attract growth promoters. This is similar to the pattern related by Kresl (1995, 64; Heenan 1977) regarding the competitive edge of Coral Gables (Florida) over the larger Miami area in luring Latin American investments in the 1970s. A number of Miami's senior development advisors fled the city government for what they thought was the more progressive development atmosphere of Coral Gables, in a pattern where growth begot promotion. Logan's (Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997) second qualification regarding the effectiveness of growth elites is that promotion may only work in larger areas, since no evidence indicates smaller places that work hard to promote growth are more successful in attracting it than their less active counterparts. Logan and others propose that cities probably should be divided into two tiers with reference to this issue. The objective situation facing some places that lack advantages to offer investors is that they are not likely to be winners in the zero-sum game of attracting growth. So, one category is reserved for attractive places with momentum on their side, and "at the other extreme, [are] cities unlikely to succeed, for which policy choices are largely symbolic or—when they divert public funds—pork-barrel allocations to favored insiders" (623).

There is one very important consequence of the pro-growth mentality that local elites stir up—a feature until recently neglected by elite theory, also unthought-of in the current political atmosphere that single-mindedly subscribes to the equilibreal model, which portrays economic growth as serving the interests of all concerned. This is the social cost of placing foremost on the political agenda expenditures directed at attracting investors. Infrastructural investments designed to make a local area look ripe for development that is likely never to occur means that funds that might have been expended elsewhere are no longer available. To the extent that the growth machine dominates the political agenda, public school and crime protection budgets may be left wanting. Logan, Whaley, and Crowder (1997, 626) concluded that further research needs to be directed at

> a distinctive set of outcomes other than those directly related to growth. These include the intensification of inequalities within cities, and the preemption of political space by privileged minorities. In cities dominated by pro-growth regimes, do deeper gaps develop between rich and poor neighborhoods? Is there more intense racial segregation? Are there greater disparities in police and fire protection between residential and commercial districts? Is there less local support for social welfare expenditures relative to infrastructure development?

These are the issues to which we turn our attention in the next chapter, as we discuss poverty, power, and crime. As we once again narrow our focus to the problems that occur *in* cities, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that these patterns have their roots in political and economic issues that are located in the global sphere of

shifting and uncertain fortunes. Let us remain mindful of the global dimension of our narrower focus, our "urban" sociology.

Dissolving Urban Structures: The Los Angeles School and the Postmodern City

In this chapter we have watched urban sociology struggle to predict the shape of cities, to incorporate political economy, and we have entertained the question of whether urban sociology can find a place for itself in the sociology of globalized space. Today the city itself has morphed into a shape that could not have been anticipated by either the early ecologists or by Marx. In response a perspective has emerged in urban sociology involving a group of theorists who believe that Los Angeles (their home base) represents the future of the urban form: They are identified loosely as the Los Angeles School. While we have discussed the polycentric urban form that Los Angeles epitomizes in this and the previous chapter (the metropolitan region, metroplex, edge city), the Los Angeles School argues that their city is the prototype for the urban future everywhere. They believe that the time is long overdue to supplant the urban ecology and urbanism models based on the early twentieth-century experience of Chicago and the Chicago School.

There is substantial overlap in their visions of what the city of the twenty-first century, based on present-day observations of Los Angeles, holds in store. Edward Soja (1996, 2000) emphasizes an ecology featuring the random and far-flung distribution of enterprises and attractions in an environment that features theme-park elements geared to hyperconsumerism dotted by highly secured gated communities. The polarization of rich and poor populations is the dominant social feature of these cities where the affluent need to be protected so that they may move freely among consumerist fantasies. Another member of the school, Michael Dear (1998; Dear and Flusty 1998), offers a similar image of theme park cities, where "privatopias" are heavily fortified and policed and conditions are made fluid by the influences of remote and continuous global restructuring, cities where the periphery dominates and shapes the center. Mike Davis (1990) described "Fortress LA," a city where public and private buildings have turned their fortified backs on public spaces, and where people of meager material means are watched and buffered in the belief that they threaten to disrupt the normal flow of commerce and social life.

In the view of the LA School, the themed environment of the postmodern city is a fantasy structure, a landscape of marketed images, a stage set that may mimic past authentic urban themes and formerly existing spaces of real cities, but these are now managed and presented in a manner more characteristic of a Hollywood set or a theme park. The Los Angeles School thus provides a glimpse of a certain kind of urban present that is dissolving into a certain kind of urban future: It does advance our effort to understand evolving urban forms. But it is hypothetical, and if the models based on early twentieth-century Chicago appear only partially successful in describing the present, then can we expect the Southern California urban agglomeration to any more accurately predict the future? If it seems difficult to grasp exactly what that image is, that is not surprising. The perspective has been criticized as not so much a school of thought as a collected imagery that has self-consciously invented a difficult to understand jargon that frames "a hodge-podge of ideas that

happen to be developed by people living in Los Angeles" (Sui 1999, 405). John Rennie Short (2006b) writes that while it gives "a spatial face to postmodern thought," he questions "the extent to which the fantasies of southern California capture the complexity of the globe" (Short 2006b, 50). As we consider the multidimensionality of the contemporary urban places we have described in chapters 6 and 7, from the squatments of giant Third World cities to the sudden boomburbs of the U.S. Southwest, it is doubtful that any theory of urban space could do justice to all forms. The Los Angeles School has offered what may be considered a complex hypothesis regarding what we may watch for in a certain kind of urban space.

9

Poverty, Power, and Crime

Cities offer dramatic contrasts in wealth and poverty. This has been a feature of urban settlement since the time of the first cities and is accentuated today in both rich and poor countries in the size, concentration, and physical separation of impoverished segments from the rest of the urban population. Ordinarily we do not find the poorest of a country's population in its largest cities because they live in economically isolated and neglected rural areas. However, the segregation and concentration of large numbers of the poor make poverty more highly visible in urban areas. This chapter focuses on the conditions of life of the systematically disadvantaged segments of the urban population in the United States and the social correlates and consequences of that disadvantage.

THE FEATURES OF URBAN POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

Poverty is a serious problem in the United States: It casts a shadow over the future of millions of children whose chances for full participation in the economy may be blocked no matter what level of prosperity is granted to others. Among the richest nineteen countries in the world the United States has the highest level of inequality, the highest overall poverty rate, and the highest child poverty rate (Burtless 2007). Table 9.1 presents an overview of poverty in the United States in 2007. In that year, more than 37 million people, or 12.5 percent of the population, fell below an official poverty threshold or "poverty line." The poverty threshold is a dollar amount calculated to represent a minimum or adequate standard of living and is adjusted for the number of people in a household. In 2007 the line was set at an income of $20,650 for a family of four in the forty-eight contiguous states and the District of Columbia (Alaska and Hawaii have somewhat higher thresholds reflecting the higher costs of living in those states). Many critics regard the poverty criteria to be quite conservative and believe the measure should be set 25 percent higher. If this had been done in 2007, the poverty threshold would have been set at $25,812 (for the forty-eight states plus D.C.), and more than 50 million people in the United

Table 9.1. Number and Proportion of the Population below the Poverty Level by Race, Hispanic Origin, Age, and Region, 2007

	Number (000s) below Poverty Level				*Percent below Poverty Level*			
	All Races[a]	*White*	*Black*	*Hispanic Origin*[b]	*All Races*[a]	*White*	*Black*	*Hispanic Origin*[b]
All ages	37,276	16,032	9,237	9,890	12.5	8.2	24.5	21.5
Under 18	13,324	8,395	3,904	4,482	18.0	14.9	34.5	28.6
18–64 years	20,396	14,135	4,602	4,970	10.9	9.4	19.8	17.9
65 or older	3,556	2,590	731	438	9.7	8.1	23.2	17.1
Northeast	6,166	2,966	1,469	1,512	11.4	7.7	22.2	24.5
Midwest	7,237	4,114	1,887	839	11.1	7.9	28.3	20.9
South	15,501	6,101	5,207	3,616	14.2	9.0	25.0	22.0
West	8,372	2,852	674	3,923	12.0	7.4	19.2	20.3

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2008d, Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Tables POV01 and POV41.
[a] Includes other racial categories not shown separately.
[b] "Hispanic Origin" is the term chosen by the Bureau of the Census for Latinos. Hispanics may be of any race.

States would have been below the poverty line—17 percent of the population (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2008, 16).

Table 9.1 indicates that while non-Hispanic whites make up the single largest category of those in poverty, African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately represented among the poor. In all groups, children bear a disproportionate share of the burden. This is especially true for black and Latino children: 34.5 percent of African Americans under the age of eighteen lived in poverty in 2007, as did 28.6 percent of the under age eighteen Latino population. The sixty-five-and-older generation no longer represents an especially disadvantaged category as it did until recent decades. Poverty is distributed generously throughout the four regional divisions of the United States and is everywhere higher for members of minorities.

Table 9.2 shows the distribution of the poor among metropolitan (MSAs), principle cities within MSAs, and nonmetropolitan locations, and the numbers and proportion of these divisions of the population that fell below the poverty line in 2007. Given the greater proportion of the U.S. population living in cities, it is not surprising that both metropolitan areas as a whole and the principle cities within them (a subset of the metropolitan population roughly equivalent to central city population) contain more poor people than nonmetropolitan areas. Note, however, that when we contrast metropolitan and nonmetropolitan populations we find that a higher proportion of people living in nonmetropolitan areas is poor. But the highest concentration of poverty overall is found within central cities: 16.5 percent of central city populations were poor in 2007, in contrast to a 11.9 percent poverty level for metropolitan populations in general, and slightly higher than 15.4 percent of the nonmetropolitan population who were poor.

Poverty within the urban core is concentrated in so-called poverty areas. These are census tracts where at least 20 percent of the population is poor according to official measures. A high proportion of the urban poor live in these tracts. Minorities, and therefore minority poverty, are especially concentrated in designated poverty areas within the inner city (Devine and Wright 1993, 89–90). This is one of the features of poverty in the United States to which we pay special attention in the discussion that follows.

Poverty is an enduring problem of vast proportions in the United States, with the number of poor averaging around 35 million people annually over the past decade. While poverty is not a wholly urban phenomenon, it is useful to analyze urban poverty alone because, as it occurs in U.S. cities, poverty is closely related to the nature of contemporary urban experience and the structure of opportunity in cities.

Table 9.2. Poor in Metropolitan Areas, Central Cities, and Nonmetropolitan Locations, 2007

	Total Number of Residents	*Number below Poverty Threshold*	*Percent below Poverty Threshold*
United States	298,699,000	37,276,000	12.5
Metropolitan Areas	251,023,000	29,221,000	11.9
In Principle Cities[a]	96,731,000	15,983,000	16.5
Outside Metropolitan Areas	47,676,000	7,355,000	15.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2008d, Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Table POV41.
[a] "Principle Cities" is the Census Bureau's replacement term for the older "Central Cities" designation. It refers to the largest incorporated or census designated city in an MSA and may also include other adjacent large population entities.

In order to be understood fully, poverty must be considered in connection with the economic and political system that distributes opportunities and rewards, as well as in connection with race and ethnic group membership, age, and gender.

Explaining Poverty

The recognition of poverty as a serious social problem has come slowly and reluctantly in the modern era, despite its widespread nature. Certainly there was a general awareness that serious deprivation existed during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The nation found it more difficult to think seriously about poverty in the 1950s, a period of general growth and improving conditions for the working and middle classes. The prosperous mood of the decade of the white collar and expanding suburb admitted to few problems outside of "the bomb" and the cold war. Michael Harrington's book, *The Other America* (1962), injected a stiff jolt of reality at the beginning of the decade, however. Harrington's message was that the poor existed in the millions and that their existence became only too apparent if one took the trouble to look for them. The poor were not gone, but simply hidden away, out of sight from the rest of the nation.

The question for scholars and policymakers was, Why did poverty persist in affluent society? The chorus of responses that emerged has taken the form of a debate where the partisans held strong opposed positions. The point of contention that lies at the heart of the issue is, To what extent are the poor responsible for their poverty and to what extent are they locked into their condition by forces beyond their control? Once again, the division in responses is familiar: The debate is between a cultural and a structural interpretation of poverty. A strict culturalist asks, "What is wrong with the poor?" A structuralist asks, "What is wrong with the distribution of opportunities and rewards in society?"

The questions themselves determine the kinds of answers that will be found. If the opportunity structure—the social mechanisms for getting an education and a good job—is assumed to work fairly and well, but the attitudes and behavior of the poor are obstacles to a better life, then minimal programs can be directed at helping poor people redeem themselves, mostly for the benefit of their innocent and neglected children and for the purpose of keeping all family members out of jail where they will only create additional tax burdens for the rest of society. Alternatively, an approach to poverty that emphasizes the way economic changes eliminate the need for blue-collar workers, the lingering consequences of racism for poor minorities, or the way wealth is highly concentrated is essentially a critique of the fundamental nature of the existing social and economic order. As such, it can be taken as a call for sweeping increases in the role of the state for the care of the dislocated and the poor. Such social theories, which question the legitimacy of the basic features of society, are difficult to incorporate into social policy. Certainly, proposals to study the ways that cultural and structural factors interact to produce the problems associated with poverty are a good idea. In practice, however, such approaches end up focusing on how to change the habits of the poor rather than on the built-in disadvantages imposed by structure and global change and, therefore, do not represent a comprehensive alternative.

The "Culture of Poverty" and Its Critics

Oscar Lewis, to whom the formal development of the "culture of poverty" thesis is attributed, was not a strict culturalist. He began with the assumption that poverty tended to be a feature of a highly stratified, competitive economic system that included high rates of unemployment and underemployment for unskilled labor, low wages, and a failure to provide for social, political, and economic integration. He noted also that it was the poorest members of society who suffered the greatest dislocation and hardship during periods of change (Lewis 1966a, 21; Lewis 1966b, xliii–xlv). These are features of the contemporary urban arena that are emphasized by those who cite *structural* elements in explaining the persistence of poverty in the midst of affluence. However, Lewis parted company with the structuralists at this point. He held that the cultural adaptations of the poor to economic disappointment and defeat, which were a response initially to the broader features of the economy, became a system of values and attitudes that poor people passed on to their children—a *culture of poverty*. In this way, even if opportunities improved around them, the poor would not be able to take advantage of them because poverty had become a way of life. It would be a way of life for their children as well, because by the time children were six or seven years old, they would have internalized the values and philosophies of the permanently poor. Thus, poverty was a vicious behavioral cycle, based on subcultural adaptations and passed on from parents to children; that is, each generation was trained (socialized) to be poor by the previous one.

The empirical basis of Lewis's work was provided largely by the urban slums of Mexico and Puerto Rico. His conceptual argument, however, has been traced to the Chicago tradition in urban sociology and the work of Robert Park. It is based on Park's argument that natural areas generate their own moral order, like that of the slum. Once emerged, the social orders characteristic of these areas become self-generating and self-perpetuating. From such an assumption, it is a logical step to the culture of poverty argument (Waxman 1983, 48–49). Lewis identified some seventy interrelated psychological and social characteristics of the poor. These characteristics worked to perpetuate poverty. Among the most essential were the following:

- A strongly fatalistic belief (They left their future to chance or to fate.)
- Weak ego development (incapacity for self-control)
- Strong present-time orientation (They lived for the moment.)
- Little ability to defer gratification or plan for the future
- Preoccupation with *machismo*
- Knowledge only of one's own neighborhood and one's own way of life
- Lack of class consciousness (They failed to appreciate the economic forces that generated their position in society.)

In addition, the poor failed to value childhood as a protected and prolonged stage of development. Initiation into sexual activity occurred early in life, and the family structure was characterized by the central place and authoritarian rule of the mother and by bitter sibling rivalry for limited material and emotional resources (Lewis 1966a, 23).

Lewis's thesis was given its most widely known urban application by Edward Banfield ([1968] 1974). The publication and revision of his *The Unheavenly City* gave rise to a great deal of controversy. The tone of the following excerpt should suggest why those who believed poverty to be a quality of the poor themselves were appreciative of the book's thesis, and why those who felt the fault lay with the structure of society were inspired in their criticism.

> Each class culture implies—indeed, more or less requires—a certain sort of physical environment. It follows that a city (or district within a city) which suits one culture very well is likely to suit another very poorly or not at all. . . . The lower class individual lives in the slum, which, to a greater or lesser extent is an expression of his tastes and style of life. . . . The subcultural norms and values of the slum are reflected in poor sanitation and health practices, deviant behavior, and often a real lack of interest in formal education. With some exceptions, there is little general desire to engage in personal or community efforts for self-improvement . . .
>
> In the slum one can beat one's children, lie drunk in the gutter, or go to jail without attracting any special notice; these are things that most of the neighbors themselves have done and that they consider quite normal. (Banfield [1968] 1974, 69, 72)

Like Lewis, Banfield distinguished between people who were poor—a broader category of persons of disadvantaged economic circumstance—and the lower-class poor—a subset of the poor who comprised a cultural category of persons possessing the traits he described. Although Banfield (again, like Lewis) acknowledged that what he identified as lower-class culture had more remote or "ultimate" causes, the immediate and practical cause of an individual's or a family's poverty were ways of thinking and behaving which, if they were not built into the personality, were at least a set of more or less deeply ingrained habits.

What bothered critics, above anything else, were the policy implications of Banfield's (and Lewis's) position. Since poverty is, in this sense, internally caused—carried around inside of people—improving the circumstances of the poor is unlikely to have any appreciable impact on their behavior, at least not in the short term. "In principle, it is possible to eliminate the poverty (material lack) of such a family, but only at great expense, since the capacity of the radically improvident to waste money is almost unlimited" (Banfield [1968] 1974, 143).

For Lewis's part, it is generally forgotten that his motivation was to develop a sympathetic understanding of the poor. He argued that any analysis that attempted to understand poverty as the outcome of strictly cultural factors was bound to fail. He was concerned that middle-class persons, including social scientists, were prone to focus on the negative aspects of this subculture and would fail to recognize the practical utility of this adaptation, of "the readiness to exploit the pleasures of the moment for people with few resources and little hope." He believed that if such an adaptation were not possible, "the poor could hardly carry on." Yet, although he recognized the importance of wider social, economic, and political conditions in providing a foundation for his culture of poverty, his focus was, after all, on the habits of the poor. He believed that these habits were primarily to blame for what he saw as their sadness and suffering, the emptiness of their lives, and their inability to understand or avail themselves of whatever opportunities might exist. In his

own words, “Indeed, poverty of culture is one of the traits of the culture of poverty” (Lewis 1966a, 25; Lewis 1966b, xliii–xliv).

Critics of the culture of poverty thesis surfaced almost immediately, arguing that the interpretation distorted reality, prejudiced understanding, and encouraged the formulation of policies that would perpetuate the disadvantages associated with poverty. In 1968, Charles Valentine published a detailed criticism of the culture of poverty approach, arguing that in its most extreme form it represented “little more than a middle class intellectual rationale for blaming poverty on the poor and avoiding recognition of the need for radical change in our society” (1968, 144). These concerns were echoed by William Ryan (1971) in his book, *Blaming the Victim*. Ryan noted that blaming the victim had become the generic excuse for the shortcomings of a society that had failed to provide adequately for all of its members. He observed that this approach to understanding the poverty of individuals and families had much in common with the literature on the Third World that explained the lack of economic development and technological progress in terms of some aspect of national culture or character, such as a lack of achievement motivation (Ryan 1971, 6). The culture of poverty approach to understanding the place of poor people within societies is the counterpart of the modernization approach, reviewed in chapter 6, to understanding why some countries are poorer than others. The most serious concern for the critics of the culture of poverty is the kind of policymaking for which its assumptions have provided the basis. That is, the “war on poverty” programs were developed to attack the vicious cycle of poverty, to save the poor from themselves. In Ryan’s words,

> There is a terrifying sameness in the programs that arise from this kind of analysis. In education, we have programs of “compensatory” education to build up the attitudes and skills of the ghetto child, rather than structural changes in the schools. In race relations, we have social engineers who think up ways of “strengthening” the Negro family, rather than methods of eradicating racism. In health care, we develop new programs to provide health care information (to correct the supposed ignorance of the poor) and to reach out and discover cases of untreated illness and disability (to compensate for their supposed unwillingness to seek treatment). Meanwhile, the gross inequities of our medical care delivery systems are left completely unchanged. (1971, 7–8)

Critics argue that the antipoverty programs undertaken in the mid-1960s as part of the War on Poverty were based largely on culture of poverty assumptions and were more misguided and less effective than they might have been. Those programs were based on the idea that poverty was a product of people’s habits; the programs, therefore, failed to address economic and political processes beyond the control of individuals.

The Structure of Poverty

A survey of people below the poverty line in the United States would reveal that they are in that position for a variety of reasons. Among those reasons are certain categories of explanation that affect large numbers of individuals. There are former industrial workers whose plants have closed, people who are not working and who



The degree of inequality in the United States is extreme; people in the lowest-strata conditions are desperate. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

have not worked for a long time, or people who are working, but at wages that do not allow them to rise above formal poverty status. There are those living in regions that formerly hosted more robust economic activity, such as mining or agriculture, but where the area's productivity has been played out or the product has simply become uncompetitive, and now there is no work. There are those who continue to bear the burdens of prejudice and discrimination in their past and present forms. There are other victims of social and economic change who have been pushed out of the mainstream and onto the margins of the economic process.

All of the people in these categories have one thing in common: What they have done to become poor is far less important in determining the size of the poverty population than changes in the structure of the economy. What kinds of individual cultural or attitudinal adjustment they make to cope with poverty is, in this light, simply not interesting or important in understanding the dimensions of the problem of poverty.

The argument is that poverty is built into society, that it is *structural*, rather than cultural, in origin. There are those who argue that poverty comes about in the form of dislocations that result from periodic adjustments in the focus of the economy, while others see the poor as a built-in, permanent, and normal feature of the distribution of rewards. In either view, the general argument is that poverty is not something that the poor do to themselves, nor is it something that they individually can do much about.

Both cultural and structural arguments can be applied to either urban or rural locations. Analysts who approach poverty from a culture of poverty perspective have applied their analysis to relatively isolated populations as well as to urban neighborhoods. Structural arguments can be applied to declining mining towns, depopulating farming regions, or cities abandoned by industry. From a structural point of view, it is important to attend to the historical characteristics of a particular locality in order to explain poverty there.

A number of structural elements combine to affect the rates of poverty in cities in the United States. One of the major factors is the restructuring of metropolitan economies and shifts in the kinds of jobs that are available in the changing U.S. economy. These shifts in employment structure include the loss of central city manufacturing jobs to the suburbs, redistribution of industry away from the older industrial cities toward the southern and western regions of the country, employers seeking cheaper labor in overseas markets, and changes in the occupational structure brought about by technology. One other glaring structural feature of stratification in the United States is the disproportionate number of poor who are people of color. Furthermore, the inner-city minority poor tend to be crowded within large inner-city districts that intensify social and economic isolation and their effects. However, as we will see, the seemingly logical argument that ties together the persistence of disproportionate levels of minority poverty with relative isolation from industrial jobs must be qualified. There remains room for culture of poverty theorists and structural exclusion theorists to continue to disagree.

Chapter 7 described the seriousness of the loss of urban industrial work. The displacement of workers whose jobs are eliminated has become a serious economic issue in all industrialized nations. Between January 2005 and December 2007, 3.6 million U.S. workers who had worked at their job for at least three years were displaced because their company closed or moved or their position was eliminated: The figure for all displaced workers, including those who had been on the job for less than three years, was 8.3 million. One-third of the former long-term employees were still out of work in January 2008, and of those who had found employment, a fourth suffered a reduction of at least 20 percent in their earnings. Women were less likely to be reemployed than men (twice as many women as men had dropped out of the labor force—were no longer seeking work), and older workers were somewhat less likely to have found new employment, as were blacks (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008b).

The loss of industrial jobs is serious in small towns, where the local economy may be heavily dependent on one major employer, but the aggregate loss of many large and small industries also has had devastating effects on metropolitan economies. The losses mean that some central city populations are physically distanced from the kinds of employment that provided a living to the waves of immigrant poor who had come to these cities to seek work in earlier times. The distance between central city poor and working-class neighborhoods and suburban employment is not trivial, and the distance increases as metropolitan mass transportation systems are withdrawn. And when jobs are exported to other nations, the isolation of workers from industrial work moves beyond the question of adequate transportation systems.

Local jobs in the inner city tend to be in the service sector, and it is in this sector that most new inner-city jobs are being created—just as in the national economy as a whole. Some service jobs, like fast food employment or office cleaning, do not demand much skill or training and are poorly paid. Other service sector jobs, in areas like medicine, finance, or technical consultation, are well paid, but demand skills and formal training. To the extent that city centers have become centers of finance, marketing, and corporate management, they offer the image of an odd economic environment in which a *dual employment structure* exists, that is, workers are recruited for jobs at the top and bottom of the wage system. As a general rule, white-collar positions commanding attractive salaries are not available to the urban poor today, just as they were unavailable to poor immigrants at the turn of the century.

Life in large cities is expensive. The cost of apartment rental is a good cost of living indicator: In 2009 the monthly rental of a two-bedroom apartment (which might be considered a minimal standard for a small family) in Manhattan ranged from $2,099 in Harlem to $5,994 in TriBeCa (the tip of Manhattan below Canal Street). In 2009, due to the economic recession and an oversupply of units, rents came down in many cities, but a two-bedroom still averaged $1,650 in the San Francisco–Oakland area, roughly the same in greater Los Angeles, between $1,500 and $2,000 in Boston, and over $1,500 in Arlington, Virginia. In other large metros rents ranged from about $800 to $1,200 according to reports from various rental advisory services. Expensive urban space and expensive workers who earn high wages are naturally matched to one another. Service workers with on-the-job training and nonunionized, unskilled industrial workers who are able to get by on the low wages are out of place in the economic environment of the great commercial and financial centers. In these places, people without special skills are among the working poor, others have dropped out of the labor market, and yet others have become part of the frantic hustle of working several jobs and shifts, and working angles and hustles in the informal economy. Many of these workers are chronically deprived of sleep and leisure in order to maintain some semblance of the material conditions associated with the American Dream. Cities include many people whose labor is simply of marginal utility and therefore has low exchange value in a period of rapid change. With periodic economic downturns in the economy and labor-force adjustments in industries and other businesses, waves of un- and underemployed slip below the capacity to get by. In this light, how surprising is it that we find serious poverty in the city along with serious levels of crime and frustration?

PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

It has become evident that urban residential segregation plays a large role in reinforcing the greater poverty of minorities, particularly with regard to African Americans (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). According to analyses of decennial census data, patterns of black-white residential segregation have been slowly declining in many metropolitan areas over the past several decades, but the separation of these populations remains serious, and the segregation of other minorities appears to be increasing. In a classic early study, Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) employed one segregation measure, the *index of dissimilarity*, to measure the degree of black-white

racial segregation in the 207 largest cities in the United States. The method continues to be employed today. The index of dissimilarity would yield a score of 100 for a perfectly segregated population; a score of 80 would indicate that 80 percent of either the white or black residents would have to move strategically from their present neighborhood in order to achieve perfect integration. That would produce a score of 0, indicating perfect integration, where each tract would house blacks and whites in proportion to their numbers in the city's population. An alternative set of segregation indicators measures hypothetical degrees of group isolation from or exposure to members of other ethnic or racial groups in that society. The *isolation index* determines the percent of same-race or same-ethnic residents who live within a census tract: A high percentage of same ethnic-race co-residents reflects the relative isolation of that group. There is a lower likelihood they will encounter and interact with members of other groups on a routine basis. The *exposure index* measures the converse—the percentage of members of other ethnic and racial groups within a tract. A higher percentage of Asians, Latinos, or whites with reference to black residents would predict greater opportunities for routine exposure of blacks to members of those other groups.

In 1960, using the index of dissimilarity, the mean score for the 207 cities studied by Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) was 86.7, indicating a high degree of racial segregation as the norm: A score of 60 or more is considered "extreme" (Charles 2003, 170). On a city-by-city basis, scores ranged from a low of 60.4 for San Jose to a high of 98.1 for Fort Lauderdale. Taeuber (1983) found that segregation continued at high levels between 1970 and 1980. Analysis of data for the twenty-eight cities with black populations of more than 100,000 revealed a range of scores from a low of 59 for Oakland to a high of 92 for Chicago. Overall, the segregation index for the twenty-eight cities had declined from 87 in 1970 to 81 in 1980. Taeuber noted that even assuming a steady rate of reduction similar to that which occurred in the ten-year period, cities would remain highly segregated for decades to come.

Analyses of the 2000 census data revealed a continuing decline of black-white segregation since 1980 but nevertheless a still serious degree of segregation between these two groups (Lewis Mumford Center 2002; Charles 2003; Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004). These analyses also indicated moderate but *increasing* levels of segregation between white and Latino and white and Asian American populations. Using the index of dissimilarity measure, Logan, Stults, and Farley report that the 2000 Census results indicate black-white segregation was still averaging 65.2 across all U.S. metropolitan areas. Having declined by 5.8 percent between 1980 and 1990, segregation declined at a slightly lower rate of 4.6 percent between 1990 and 2000. Segregation had declined in 240 of the metropolitan areas between 1990 and 2000 and increased in only fifteen. At the same time the somewhat more moderate degree of segregation that existed between whites and Latinos and whites and Asian Americans had shown a slight increase between 1980 and 2000. Latino-white segregation, measured at 51.6 overall, had increased in 124 cities, and declined in 86. Asian-white segregation, which scored 42.2 in 2000, had increased in sixty-nine cities, declining in only forty-seven. There are important features of residential segregation imbedded in the data that are not readily apparent at this level of aggregation. First, among the three groups, Asian segregation patterns differed from those of African Americans and Latinos in that Asians "typically lived in neighborhoods that were

majority white and where Asians were a small minority" (9). Latinos were increasingly isolated during this twenty-year period. For example, in Los Angeles in 1980 Latinos were located in neighborhoods that were 50 percent Latino; by 2000, 63 percent of their neighbors were Latino. The comparable figures for Dallas were 24 percent in 1980 and 45 percent in 2000. Latinos were thus experiencing increasing levels of segregation (9). Meanwhile, the vast majority of blacks continued to live "in metropolises with the highest level of segregation" (7). It will be important to continue to focus concerns over segregation beyond the black-white division—given the rapidly growing number and proportion of other urban minorities, especially Latinos and Asians. However, the consequences of residential isolation for blacks (and to some extent, mainland Puerto Ricans) are distinct and particularly serious.

Charles (2003) reviews the warnings raised by Massey and Denton (1989; 1993; Denton 1994) in this regard. She notes that according to a number of measures of segregation, including both the index of dissimilarity and the isolation index, blacks experience particularly severe isolation from other populations. In their book, *American Apartheid*, Massey and Denton (1993) argued that the social isolation of blacks living in densely settled and geographically isolated urban settings concentrated and exacerbated their poverty and their marginal position in society. In the largest urban areas, blacks and Puerto Ricans faced particularly extreme residential segregation that correlated with high levels of poverty for these minorities. According to the authors, the existing sociological readings of black urban poverty suffered from a "systematic failure to consider the important role that segregation has played in mediating, exacerbating, and ultimately amplifying the harmful social and economic processes" that urban isolation give rise to (Massey and Denton 1993, 7). Massey and Denton are particularly critical of interpretations of entrenched black urban poverty that cite the exodus of the black working and middle classes from the old inner-city neighborhoods without emphasizing the independent effects of intense residential segregation, in and of itself.

Studies of health risks associated with the isolation of minorities document one of the consequences. A study of 309 metropolitan areas in the United States found that higher measures of segregation were associated with greater exposure to certain air pollutants known to increase the risk of cancer (Morello-Frosch and Jesdale 2006); the study supports similar earlier findings (Lopez 2002). Collins and Williams (1999), in a study of the association between black-white segregation and mortality in 107 major U.S. cities, found that "residential segregation predicts higher death rates for African Americans. Apparently, residence in highly segregated areas is associated with a range of pathogenic risk factors that increase susceptibility to illness and death" (516). Interestingly, they also found slightly higher rates of mortality for whites in cities that were highly segregated: Conclusive interpretations of why this should be the case await further research. Minority patients who depend on government Medicaid assistance in highly segregated areas will find it more difficult to find a physician. This is because physicians have a choice in whether or not to accept Medicaid patients, and in areas that are highly segregated and therefore high in the proportion of minority patients, more doctors refuse to accept assisted patients. This is not true for physicians working in areas where there are high proportions of poor white patients. Researchers speculated that the difference may be due to white doctor's personal prejudices, or because doctors believe their white pa-

tients may be unwilling to share the waiting rooms of private medical practices with minorities. The bias did not hold among African American or Latino MDs, but the authors of the study note that the number of medical school graduates from these groups have dropped in recent years (Greene, Blustein, and Weitzman 2006). One clear mortality risk associated with the segregation and isolation of poor minority populations is that associated with violence. Peterson and Krivo (1999) found that racial segregation of urban blacks is associated with the concentration effects of poverty, associated in turn with higher rates of victimization and homicide. The same structured segregation that concentrates and isolates poor blacks within high violence areas of the city insulates affluent white populations living at a distance from these areas.

The impact of racial segregation on inequality of opportunities is particularly clear with regard to public education (Bischoff 2008, 182). While there has been overall progress in desegregating public schools since the 1960s, census data show that in the decade 1990–2000, there was little change in the high levels of segregation that remain. Some of this stasis is bound to result from conservative court rulings that have pushed back against the integration initiatives of the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling of 1954. In 1974 the Supreme Court decided (*Milliken v. Bradley*) that the busing of students between school districts in order to achieve school integration could only be mandated in cases where various districts had deliberately intended to segregate students. In 2007 the court made it more difficult for individual districts to voluntarily assign students to schools on the basis of race for the purpose of achieving racial integration. Commenting in the *Harvard Law Review*, Ryan (2007) questioned whether the 2007 decision would have much of an impact since, for most school districts, desegregation had not been an active priority for the past two decades. The court's decisions make it particularly difficult to remedy the de facto school segregation that had resulted from the pattern of white flight to the suburbs (Bischoff 2008, 207) and the effects of residential racial segregation in general. A nationwide analysis of public elementary enrollments in 2000 revealed that nearly half of white students attended schools that were 90 percent white, and a third were in schools that were 95 percent white. Forty percent of black and Latino elementary school students were attending schools with 90 percent minority enrollment, and a third of black students and one-fourth of Latinos attended schools where 95 percent of students were members of minority groups. In 2000 the average black student had a much lower share of white students in their schools than was the case in 1990 due to the declining proportion of white student enrollment in public schools in general and the increasing proportion of black, Latino, and Asian enrollments. The average Latino and black student attended schools where two-thirds of students were below or near the poverty line (Logan 2002; 2004). Metropolitan areas are typically divided into a number of independent municipalities and school districts: The smaller and more numerous these divisions are, the more economically and racially homogeneous their populations tend to be. It follows that this pattern is associated with greater tendencies for school segregation and greater inequalities in the distribution of resources between districts (Clotfelter 1999; Bischoff 2008).

Since educational segregation stems from residential segregation patterns, the educational bias that penalizes minority students is not likely to be corrected until

residential segregation levels are altered. As noted, the courts in recent decades have made mandating school integration more difficult, even if the will to do so is present locally. Studies that evaluate the effectiveness of educational integration look to past policies that sought to achieve racial balance and equal opportunities among public schools. The evidence is mixed. On the positive side, desegregation was associated with a 2 to 3 percent reduction in high-school dropout rates for black students, with the greatest improvements coming in the largest school districts (Guryan 2004). Borman and colleagues (2004) found a simple positive correlation between racial integration and student achievement on standardized tests in Florida (the percentage of passing grades for racially integrated schools was similar to that of segregated white schools and significantly higher than segregated black schools). The authors caution that as Florida moves away from racial integration goals toward policies that reward successful schools and penalize (withhold resources from) less successful schools, racial disadvantages will deepen. On the other hand, a longitudinal study of minority students who had been bused for the purpose of achieving greater racial balance in enrollments showed that neither their academic performance nor their future earnings were significantly improved (Rivkin 2000). One negative consequence of school desegregation has been that desegregated school districts lost white student enrollment over time, and white families left these districts for others with lower minority enrollments, repeating the pattern of white flight (Reber 2005). Presently there is no indication that the racial integration of public education will be advanced as a government priority.

Understanding the Persistence of Racial Segregation and Minority Disadvantage

Although, as we have noted, more recent measures have shown a decrease in the degree of black-white segregation, the remaining high levels require further exploration of why this separation persists in metropolitan areas. A number of mechanisms have insured that some level of residential separation is maintained. In the past, a well-known formal mechanism that helped institutionalize the separation of black and white residential areas was a practice known as "redlining." It evolved from an effort to identify districts where it was thought to be risky for banks and other lenders to make residential mortgage, home improvement, or business loans. Those areas surrounded by red lines drawn by private lenders on maps of metro areas were excluded from consideration—they were bad lending risks. Among the factors considered in redlining was racial composition, in particular, African American racial composition. While the measure was not intended to reinforce segregation, it had the effect of crystallizing or keeping track of black neighborhoods or communities as separate social and economic entities. It was discriminatory and reflected the general underlying prejudices of the 1950s and 1960s. Additionally, private restrictive covenants were adopted by some homeowners' associations that limited certain uses and the disposition of properties in the area covered by the agreement; a common provision was the prohibition of sale to people of color, in particular to African Americans. In the civil rights era, fair housing and lending legislation was intended to break down housing discrimination and to open up the prospect of residential integration—and the letter of the law and the spirit of the age certainly

contributed to the opening of a wider range of housing to minorities in general and blacks in particular. We see the result in the reduced levels of segregation in successive decennial census measures.

Of course prejudice cannot be legislated away, and prejudiced lenders, realtors, and landlords will find ways to discriminate. "Steering" became a widespread practice whereby realtors and citywide rental agents would steer minority clients away from exclusively white neighborhoods or residential properties where it was understood they would not be welcome. The now illegal practice has been shown to persist through periodic investigations known as *audit studies*. In these studies persons posing as prospective renters or buyers are paired, and they are trained to present identical profiles in terms of biographical background. The only difference is one is white and one is black or Latino. Their experiences at the hands of actual realtors or renters are then compared. Black and Latino home seekers encounter discrimination in that they are shown a narrower range of units and typically are shown properties in areas where there are large numbers of residents with matching racial or ethnic profiles. Given the suspected widespread nature of the informal practice and the relatively few audit studies that it is possible to conduct at any given time, it does not appear that this mechanism of segregation has diminished appreciably (Galster 1992; Yinger 1995; Charles 2003).

At a more microlevel, there are informal strategies carried out by individuals within communities who are seeking to exclude minorities from their area. De Sena (1994) described how local informal networks effectively excluded people of color from Greenpoint in Brooklyn. There was an informal pact among neighbors and property owners, an agreement that no one would rent or sell to minorities. While the rule operated without coercion, it was understood that violators would be confronted by the community. As one put it, "It's, how can I put it, an unwritten law. In other words, you know your family's gonna hear it if you rent to a black. . . . I know what they would go through: that's why I don't do it." In another instance a particular developer who was upgrading old rental properties was warned that his business would suffer if he rented to any person of color. The enforcers were largely the women of the district. Their informal network kept track of relatives, friends, and friends of friends who were looking or renting, and they exchanged this information through casual encounters, church groups, etc. The system of exclusion worked.

Continued racial bias in real estate lending is also widely documented. Minorities have routinely received lower credit ratings, have been less likely to receive favorable mortgage offers, and as sellers received a lower level of services from realtors (Charles 2003, 194). While allegations of systematic abuse were universally denied by lenders after the collapse of the subprime lending market in 2007–2008, there was evidence that minority home buyers, including many who should have qualified for conventional mortgages, were disproportionately targeted by lenders for disadvantageous loans, and subsequently suffered a higher than average degree of default and loss. A comparison of two communities in the Detroit area appears to illustrate a pattern of systematic racial bias. One area was 97 percent white with a median income of $51,000; the other was 97 percent black with a similar median income of $49,000. In the black district, 70 percent of loans carried a high interest rate, while in the white district only 17 percent did. Nationwide, blacks were

2.3 times more likely than whites to get high interest loans, Latinos were twice as likely (Asians were slightly less likely than whites to receive unfavorable rates and terms). The lending industry has defended itself by saying minorities live in areas with poorer credit histories and borrow from particular mortgage companies that offer subprime loans: In fact promoters and telemarketers aggressively promoted this type of lending within minority communities. Critics respond by observing that banks don't provide an alternative by establishing branches in minority communities. Failing to see the systemic nature of the pattern here, the Federal Reserve expressed its understanding that while there might be a correlation between disadvantageous lending practices and race, the pattern had to do with neighborhood credit records and not racial discrimination. Others understand the structural disadvantage faced by minorities as "reverse redlining," where minorities are targeted recipients of loans that are more difficult to repay and therefore face a greater likelihood they will eventually lose their property and their investment (*New York Times* November 4, 2007).

One question remains for understanding the persistence of patterns of segregation: To what extent does it reflect actual preferences of members of the minority? The answer has some complexity. Clark (2009, 334) observes that higher income African Americans have a greater willingness to live in integrated settings and that white unwillingness to live in settings with more that 50 percent minorities "exacerbates" the problem of segregation. However, he also believes that it is significant that blacks' second choice of ideal residential settings is a predominantly own-race neighborhood, and this is true across income and education categories. He argues that since blacks rarely choose as ideal settings neighborhoods that include less than 50 percent black residents, this draws "attention to the fact that residential separation is not just an outcome of White choices . . . The continuing separation of race and ethnicity is not simply attributable to White racism and White hostility" (354).

How important is it for explaining continued high levels of segregation that minorities are more comfortable in neighborhood settings made up of in-group neighbors? In a survey of the attitudes of major ethnic and racial groups in Los Angeles, Charles (2000) found that when Asians, Latinos, and whites were asked about their preferences regarding the composition of a hypothetical neighborhood, blacks were the least-preferred out-group neighbors. "Fully 40% of Asians, nearly one-third of Latinos, and one-fifth of whites create neighborhoods that completely exclude blacks. Latinos were also excluded from a sizeable percentage of white (17%) and Asian (26%) neighborhoods . . . Conversely, blacks—the most segregated group in Los Angeles County and the U.S.—were the least likely to specify all same-race neighborhoods" (401). Her findings indicate, not surprisingly, that those individuals who hold the strongest negative racial stereotypes are most strongly opposed to mixed neighborhoods (395).

In a multicity study that asked respondents about the desirability living in actual communities in the greater Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles metro areas, Krysan (2002) found that whites considered mixed-race (white and African American) areas undesirable, while African Americans rated most communities more acceptable than did whites, including communities where blacks were the numerical majority and those where they were a tiny numerical minority. By asking about "actual communities with actual histories of racial prejudice (or a lack thereof),"

Krysan found that this method allowed her African American respondents to make informed responses to her questions about whether they would be willing to live in those places. While she found that in the general sample blacks rated almost all the communities they were asked about more favorably than whites did, places with hostile reputations for racism (like Dearborn, Michigan, and South Boston, Massachusetts) were rated less favorably. The point made here is that negative responses to specific primarily white residential areas do not support values of in-group preference but instead reflect informed decisions about wanting to avoid hostile racial climates (537). Only 20 percent of black respondents indicated all-black neighborhoods as most attractive (538). Regarding white reluctance to live in mixed communities, Krysan says, "Whites appear to overstate concerns about crime when the community is racially mixed—a perception that may be fueled in part by racial stereotypes" (538).

The population movement that has had the greatest impact on residential segregation in the second half of the twentieth century has been the suburbanization of the white metropolitan population. It produced a pattern in which African American and other minority populations were concentrated in inner cities ringed by largely white, middle-class suburbs. Within the suburbs themselves, the African American population grew from a bare 3 percent at the end of World War I to only 4.2 percent by 1960. After the 1960s civil rights legislation accelerated African American and Latino movement to formerly all-white areas outside of central cities. Some of this movement was to older areas of housing, satellite townships, older inner-ring suburbs, and areas closer to existing ghettoized locations on the urban edge; but because of the "civil rights climate" and the "specter of civil unrest," there was also a general opening of suburban housing to black residence (Stahura 1986, 132–35). The black suburban population increase has been steady, expanding slowly in the 1960s and picking up momentum thereafter. The experiences of members of different minorities in the suburbs tended to vary. Asian Americans became fairly well integrated in predominantly white residential areas (Massey and Denton 1987). The same is true for some Latino groups, but as we have seen metropolitan-wide measures of segregation for Latinos and Asians have increased slightly in recent decades, and suburbs appeared to be following that pattern by 1990 (Logan and Alba 1993). In general, predominantly African American peripheral locations share many features with poorer central city locations. These include more pronounced segregation (compared to other minorities); lower income; poorer quality, older housing; higher taxes; and strained municipal finances (Stearns and Logan 1986; Phelan and Schneider 1996). The movement of blacks to suburbs is often a movement to suburbs that are already home to large numbers of African Americans, to locations from which whites are moving away. The pattern has been described as one of "invasion and succession" in the classical ecological sense. "Suburbs with large black populations, in particular affluent ones, become identified as places presenting a new and expanded set of housing opportunities for blacks and other nonwhites who are locating to suburbia [where] housing options may be restricted by a dual housing market and other forms of discrimination" (Phelan and Schneider 1996, 667).

Historically it was reported that a key criterion that white residents used in deciding if the racial balance in a residential area had reached a hypothetical "tipping point" had to do with some proportion of minority ownership and whether or not

it appeared that whites were continuing to buy and move into the neighborhood. If some white out-movers were not replaced by white in-movers when property changed hands, a general white exodus was soon underway (Lake 1981, 241–42). The behavior pattern was reportedly particularly pronounced where the minority was African American. Such neighborhood transformations were thought to be microcosmic echoes of the great white exodus from central cities in response to growing numbers of African Americans in the 1950s and 1960s, the exodus dubbed "white flight." More recently the neighborhood tipping point hypothesis has been questioned in some studies, as reported by Lucy and Phillips (2000, 180–81). For example, Ottensmann (1995) found that many mixed neighborhoods with substantial African American populations exhibited stable racial patterns from decade to decade, and he thought the tipping point argument no longer applied. Yet, many such mixed-race neighborhoods are located in older, inner-ring suburbs, about which there is today a general concern regarding "suburban decline." The decline referred to has to do with a pattern of stagnant or declining family income levels in these inner-ring suburbs as the population of these areas ages and becomes increasingly diverse. In areas with substantial increases in African American populations overall family income levels have showed a steady decline (Lucy and Phillips 2000, 180). This pattern of suburban decline was particularly evident in Baltimore's older first-tier suburbs during the 1990s. There were increases in poverty and a failure to attract a new younger population, and "patterns of white-flight were evident" (Vicino 2008, 556). While tipping point interpretations may not hold in the case of every residential area, it is probably too early to signal the end of its influence as a factor in the residential preferences of the white majority.

As a general rule, regions with particularly large minority populations have a higher degree of segregation. In such areas, "whites use segregation to preserve their social position in the face of a threatening—that is, large—minority advance" (Logan, Alba, and Leung 1996, 875). In regions where there are large representations of Latinos, whites will be sensitive to Latino residential clustering and will move from suburbs where they are located in number. This was true in the 1990s for affluent suburbs in the Los Angeles area, where whites left when Latinos were perceived to reach some perceived critical mass. However, at the same time whites of more modest means were moving into Latino-multiethnic Los Angeles neighborhoods in search of affordable housing. This was not true with regard to black suburban locations (Phelan and Schneider 1996, 668–69).

So, when we speak of minority suburbanization we indicate a process with uncertain outcomes. Presently, "There is no consensus about whether the suburbanization of minorities lessens their segregation from whites. One can point to the movement of minorities into the suburban ring and conclude that this movement will likely reduce black-white segregation. Or one can observe the emergence of clustered minority neighborhoods in the suburbs and presume that central-city segregation patterns are being duplicated in the suburbs" (Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004, 13). Benefits are particularly unclear, or most doubtful, for black suburbs. Largely black suburbs have, in addition to their generally poorer residents, narrower tax bases, higher property tax rates, and a higher level of commitment to expenditures on social programs (Schneider and Logan 1982, 768–69; Phelan and Schneider 1996). If national patterns hold true for black suburban homeowners, these areas can also

expect to be hit hardest by the vacancies and losses associated with recent mortgage foreclosures. Of course, all of these features are interrelated.

RACE AND URBAN POVERTY: ECOLOGY, CULTURE, AND THE MISMATCH DEBATE

In 1970, Gunnar Myrdal proposed the recognition of a special category of human beings, *the permanent underclass*. He was concerned with a strata of the world population, the urban and rural poor of the Third World, people who had neither the skills nor a chance for formal training that would allow them to become profitably integrated into the world economy. These were superfluous people whom the international economy had permanently left behind.

"Underclass" became a widely used and controversial term as it was applied to certain segments of poor people within the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. It is a potentially radical critique of market-based economies. It strongly implies that the market economy systematically and permanently excludes some segments of society from a reasonable expectation of an adequate share of economic benefits. Contoversy emerged when conservative political interests appropriated the term, using it to refer to those they believed to be locked in a *culture* of poverty. Given these perfectly opposed manners in which the term came to be used—meaning both that the very poor were permanently displaced by remote forces they could not control *and* that they were the cause of their own misery—the continued usefulness of the term *underclass* was in doubt.

Three decades ago, William Wilson (1978) contributed considerable insight to the concept of the underclass with his book, *The Declining Significance of Race*. He argued that the large-scale declining availability of stable and reasonably well-paid work for people with only basic skills and training had produced a threat to the well-being of a broad cross-section of people trying to enter or remain in the working class. Part of his argument was that the restructuring of the economy, especially the loss of industrial work in central cities, was affecting members of all races who were dependent on these opportunities to make a decent life for themselves and their families. Like Myrdal, he was saying that a large segment of the population was becoming permanently excluded from the economy.

However, Wilson's thesis offered a potential tool to conservative political interests. It contained two elements that invited abuse by the opponents of affirmative action policies and social welfare programs. First, the emphasis in the title of the book implied that racism was no longer as serious a problem as it had been in the past. In fact, Wilson did argue that the relative disadvantage faced by blacks at the time was a matter of historical circumstance rather than contemporary racism. Blacks were disproportionately represented in the growing underclass because they were relatively recent arrivals to industrial cities. True, they had been discriminated against in jobs, education, and housing in the past, but in the post–civil rights era, their problems were not a matter of deliberate discrimination based on prejudice but were the result of the structural and color-blind elimination of urban employment prospects due to increased international competition and technological changes in manufacturing. Wilson also emphasized that there had been some black

social mobility in recent decades and that the African American population of the United States was now highly stratified. Hence, the significance of race in determining the distribution of disadvantage had declined. Second, conservative political elements in society found comfort in Wilson's pointed critique of liberalism, especially of liberal social scientists' reputed reluctance to be more critical of the pathology of lower-class black culture in the inner cities. Liberals, he said, were afraid to be critical of the dysfunctional habits of poor blacks because they didn't want to be accused by their colleagues of blaming the victim.

Critics found a number of problems with Wilson's thesis that are still important to emphasize, in part because Wilson is an important figure in urban social science and in part because there is lingering confusion surrounding the work. Critics were quick to comment on the unfortunate implications of Wilson's book, one remarking caustically that the title (*The Declining Significance of Race*) represents "calculated, evocative packaging and promotion—or in marketing lingo, *hype*" (Edwards 1979, 98). Another wrote, "It unwittingly risks adding unsubstantiated support to the dominant ideological myth . . . that racial problems were basically solved during the 1960s" (Pettigrew 1980, 116). It was acknowledged that Wilson had opposed this interpretation of his work, but once the implication had been invited by a leading black social scientist, opponents of assistance to minorities were quick to exploit it.

A more helpful way to make Wilson's distinction between historical and contemporary effects is to differentiate between overt (and covert) racism and institutional racism. Overt racism may be explicit or subtle. The law has made it more difficult to discriminate and to seem to be discriminating—as in redlining black residential districts and excluding them from receiving conventional property loans. Overt racism has to do with the willingness and ability of employers and others to discriminate openly against members of minority groups.

Covert or subtle racism or discrimination involves unfair practices accompanied by an attempt to hide the intent from the victim and any other interested parties. Employers, realtors, and rental agents have devised various practices to circumvent fair housing and employment laws without seeming to do so. If redlining is prohibited, segregation can be reinforced through steering or by such strategies as not publicly advertising vacancies. Minorities may suspect they are not being shown the full range of apartment units or homes available, but they may remain unsure.

Institutional racism (or *institutional discrimination*) is at least as serious a cause of poverty among minorities as are conscious, contemporary expressions of prejudice and discrimination, and understanding this is especially important for understanding minority disadvantage. Institutional racism refers to the pattern where obstacles are built into the political and economic structure of society, and where these disadvantages have become so ingrained that they persist independently of declining levels of prejudice. Regarding the fact that African Americans receive disadvantageous mortgage terms, the banking industry can respond by saying this is not because they are black, but because they are borrowing for properties located in "high risk" neighborhoods. Institutional racism asks about the historical and structural factors that have produced this pattern: Why is it that blacks disproportionately purchase properties in high risk areas? Institutional racism is responsible for the disadvantages experienced by urban minorities today to the extent that those disadvantages are the lingering result of laws and practices that historically limited their full politi-

cal and economic participation. This is where William Wilson's analysis fits most usefully—the part of his argument that states that historically blacks were excluded from full participation in an industrial economy, that this exclusion lasted until that economy began to deindustrialize. Now economic change rather than overt racism reinforces the disproportionate burden of poverty and the attendant challenges faced by poor African Americans.

The Continuing Significance of Race

Wilson (1978; 1987; 1996) is among those who have stressed the role of the neighborhood in perpetuating poverty, especially in poor minority areas of large cities. This is an ecological interpretation because the residential neighborhood is assumed to be causally linked to the perpetuation of poverty. Historically, minority ghettos were once integrated in terms of social class. They included black professionals, middle-class and working-class families, as well as the poor. As we have seen, the integration of residential neighborhoods outside all-black ghettos provided sufficient geographic mobility that those who could afford to do so moved away. This left behind areas that were not only homogeneously black, but homogeneously poor as well. At the same time, the decline in attractive industrial employment opportunities, especially in the inner city, undermined the position of the remaining working class. These structural transitions stripped traditional African American communities of role models, community leaders, and positive cultural influences in general.

As Wilson developed his analysis of inner-city black poverty in *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987) and *When Work Disappears* (1996) he continued to emphasize how the loss of jobs and any realistic prospect for steady employment affected poverty rates. But he also continued to make the case that structural facts have cultural and psychological consequences that take on a life of their own as important causes of poverty.

> Where jobs are scarce, where people rarely if ever have the opportunity to help their friends and neighbors find jobs, and where there is a disruptive or degraded school life purporting to prepare youngsters for eventual participation in the workforce, many people eventually lose their feeling of connectedness to work in the formal economy; they no longer expect work to be a regular, and regulating, force in their lives. (Wilson 1996, 52)

Chicago respondents in three studies that Wilson based *When Work Disappears* on talk about what it's like to live in neighborhoods where very few have a regular job to go to. One seventeen year old said, "Well, basically, I feel that if you are raised in a neighborhood and all you see is negative things, then you are going to be negative because you don't see anything positive . . . Oh, they see thugs you know, they see gangbangers. So, who do they really look, model themselves after? Who is their role model? They have none but the thugs." A young adult said of the youth he knew, "They don't see nobody getting up early in the morning, going to work or going to school all the time. The guys they—they be with don't do that . . . well, that's been presented to you by your neighborhood." Another said, "I watched kids, I saw their fathers ruined, and I see 'em growing up and do the very same thing."

And a thirty-five-year-old unemployed male: "What am I doing now? I'm a cocaine dealer—cause I can't get a decent-ass job. So what other choices do I have? I have to feed my family . . . do I work? I work [at his street trade]. See, don't bring me that bullshit. I been working since I was fifteen years old" (Wilson 1996, 55–58). Here is Wilson's point—that people cut off from the prospect of work develop habits of thought and behavior that in themselves form a barrier against future employment. So when Wilson speaks of joblessness, his emphasis is not on the absence of jobs: "I am referring to the declining involvement in or lack of attachment to the formal labor market" (74). Once in place, cultural habits and psychological conditioning become sufficient barriers to engagement with the formal economy.

Calling Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged* "the most important publication in urban poverty over the past twenty-five years," Small and Newman (2001) assess the subsequent resurgent interest in the influence of family, neighborhood, and culture in shaping poverty, revisiting ideas from 1960s and 1970s poverty arguments. As a result of their survey of a wide range of research employing various causal models based on neighborhood, socialization, middle-class-role-model-deprivation, subcultural influence, cultural conflict, and others, they conclude that much of the research that Wilson's work has helped to inform suffers from methodological problems (vaguely defined neighborhood units) and conceptual underdevelopment. Much of it sounds like Lewis's culture of poverty thesis. "Some cultural theorists argued that, though the original cause of inner-city cultural patterns was the (structural) absence of jobs, this culture was somewhat self-perpetuating, so that people would find it difficult to start working even if conditions did improve" (Small and Newman 2001, 38). As we have seen early in this chapter, Oscar Lewis employed this exact formula in his understanding of the culture of poverty. Included in their critique of the research of neighborhood effects on poverty, Small and Newman note that there are serious omissions in the body of work: It focuses almost exclusively on black neighborhoods, it tends to neglect metro areas in the West and Southwest, and it doesn't take into account the growing numbers and influence of Asian, Latino, and immigrant non-Latino urban populations. While we have focused heavily here on black minority disadvantage, placemark 9.1 features two Mexican American barrios in Southern California. It reveals that poverty may take on different characteristics in different neighborhoods.

Placemark 9.1—Two Faces of Poor Mexican American Communities

Daniel Dohan studied poor Mexican American neighborhoods in San Jose and East Los Angeles. Here we summarize his characterization of the two communities. Dohan finds that low-income Mexican neighborhoods stand somewhere between Boston's North End as it was described in William Foote Whyte's 1943 *Street Corner Society* (described in chapter 4) and the extreme poverty neighborhoods characteristic of some poor black inner-city ghettos today.

Dohan first lived for nearly a year in the Guadalupe barrio of San Jose. Many of the residents were recent immigrants from Mexico, and at least 20 percent were poor. Yet residents rejected the idea that this was home to an underclass.

A long-time resident and researcher asked Dohan: "Look around you here. Is this the 'underclass?' The poverty in San Jose is different. Unemployment is not the problem here. Underemployment is the problem . . . Everyone is off at work. Poverty here is not being out of a job. Poverty here is that jobs are so bad that you cannot get ahead" (6). Poverty in Guadalupe matched the strong work ethic of the indigenous and immigrant populations to the kinds of low wages that were paid at the bottom of Silicon Valley's employment hierarchy. Residents worked long hours for these low wages and cobbled together employment regimens that left little time for anything else, including sufficient sleep.

Dohan spent the following year of fieldwork in East LA, in and around a district called Chavez. There were two street and social environments in East LA: One with small overcrowded private homes and small yards, where the street came alive with activity when residents returned from work in the evening. And then there was the district dominated by public housing, where some element of street life revolved around the drug trade, where street gangs marked their territories, where unemployment was widespread, and more than half the population fell below poverty income standards. While Chavez was different from Guadalupe and other East LA barrios in outward appearance, Dohan thought that the experience of life and poverty there was produced by the same structural elements as other Mexican communities in Southern California. "As it did in Guadalupe, the everyday experience of poverty in Chavez revolved around lousy jobs and residents' limited opportunities for advancement" (8).

In his analysis, Dohan balances elements of global dislocation and local dislocatedness in understanding the position of poor Mexican Americans in the Southwest. The low-wage jobs available to this population are a product of a globalized economy that strategically pegs incomes to stratified labor supplies. In San Jose, global conditions produce harsh economic choices where it makes sense that poor but motivated Mexican immigrants are drawn to work long hours at low pay. In East LA, deindustrialization, produced by that same global economy, means that work has disappeared—the industries that employed earlier generations of Mexican Americans are not there to provide jobs to their children. Dohan says that the macrological analysis that produces an understanding of how decent jobs are withdrawn from metropolitan economies and poverty level jobs are distributed cannot tell us how people adjust to such an environment. On the other hand, neighborhood ethnographies can provide insight into street life, crime, and public housing, but ethnographers find it difficult to link analyses upward to the way global changes shape such environments. He attempts in his work to bridge the two approaches to understanding poor neighborhoods and the forces that create them and focuses on income-generating institutions in the barrio. "The dizzying variety of income-generating activities in the barrios thus boiled down to various combinations of these three things: taking a job, pursuing opportunities in the underground economy, and participating in public aid" (12). (Daniel Dohan, 2003, *The Price of Poverty: Money, Work, and Culture in the Mexican American Barrio*).

Isolation and Structural Unemployment

By far, the majority of the studies of the effects of minority social and economic isolation focus on the question of structural unemployment and its connection to poverty. In its initial form, what has come to be known as "the mismatch theory" states that the increasing distance between jobs located on the metropolitan periphery and minorities located at the economically decaying center produce structural unemployment and higher levels of poverty (Kain 1968).

Many prominent studies (e.g., Ellwood 1986; Jargowsky and Bane 1990; Jargowsky 1996; Jencks and Mayer 1990) have called into question the mismatch hypothesis that higher rates of black employment result from the sheer absence of opportunities in local inner-city areas. There is certainly something going on with regard to the impact of metropolitan economic restructuring and the reduction of certain kinds of jobs for inner-city residents, but evidence indicates that the problem is not simply the lack of *any type* of opportunity. For example, Jargowsky and Bane (1990) pointed out that although Boston lost manufacturing employment at rates similar to those of other northern cities between 1970 and 1985, poverty rates in centrally located ghettos decreased for a time during this period. Similarly, Cohn and Fossett (1996) found that the higher unemployment rates of African Americans in Boston and Houston could not be explained on the basis of distance between residence and jobs in these two dissimilar metro areas. In these cities, "blacks are physically near more jobs than whites are. This finding holds despite analysis being restricted to consider only entry-level, blue collar jobs and allowances being made for group differences in search and commuting capabilities" (557).

This would seem to settle the debate about the impact of deindustrialization once and for all, except for findings that clearly associate black poverty rates and the loss of manufacturing due to restructuring. Galster, Mincy, and Tobin (1997) found that nationwide, between 1980 and 1990, the greatest levels of black poverty were generally associated with census tracts that had lost the greatest number of manufacturing jobs and that "each increment of restructuring was significantly associated with poverty growth" (797).

Jargowsky (1996) systematically reconsidered the evidence regarding the connection of minority poverty rates and ecological patterns of employment opportunity, and he suggested that minority poverty rates in especially impoverished urban areas may be associated with *the kinds of jobs* that are being lost in these areas and the profiles of certain local residents who are most likely to be adversely affected. Building on the finding that industrial decline probably has a disproportionate effect on young residents with less education (Bound and Holzer 1993), Jargowsky (1996, 144) concluded, "Though the exact mechanisms are somewhat murky, structural changes in the economy have worked to disadvantage those with lower levels of education and job skills . . . Because of the poor quality of inner-city schools and the correlation between socioeconomic background and educational attainment, the decline in demand for low-skill labor has had a disproportionate impact on inner-city minorities, particularly young men." He added that finding a job that pays decent wages is particularly difficult. This seems to be the crucial point. Jargowsky and Bane's (1990) finding that the greatest correlation between the loss of manufacturing work and poverty was in the North, where a higher proportion of

the lost manufacturing jobs would have been union jobs, lends indirect support to the idea that it is the loss of higher level opportunities for workers with modest training that may be the crucial factor. Galster and others (1997, 800) made the point more directly:

> Besides affecting the number of jobs, economic restructuring has affected several features of employment. . . . The net effects of these changes have been a decline in high-wage but low-skill manufacturing jobs and a growth in both low- and high-wage service sector jobs. Although high-wage service sector jobs have increased, these generally have skill requirements that low-skilled workers cannot meet.

In considering the mismatch hypothesis it is important to keep in mind our discussion in chapter 7 regarding the spatial changes that cities have undergone. Today's metropolitan areas cover sprawling decentralized regions where growth happens at the edge. Los Angeles presents us with a laboratory for examining the social consequences of this changing urban form, in much the same way that Chicago's size and density provided Robert Park and associates with a much different laboratory early in the twentieth century. Stoll and Raphael (2000) tested the mismatch hypothesis for whites, blacks, and Latinos living in Los Angeles. They found that job searches were indeed anchored by residential location for all three groups. Whites lived in closer proximity to growing suburbs that were generating a job-rich environment. The most highly segregated category were African Americans whose job searches took place in areas with the lowest employment opportunities. Findings for Latinos, who tended to be clustered residentially in deindustrializing areas, were intermediate. The authors concluded that "space-related search costs coupled with racially segregated metropolitan areas imply that, on average, the spatial search pattern of blacks, whites, and Latinos are likely to differ . . . spatial search barriers are an important source of observed racial differences in employment outcomes" (Stoll and Raphael 2000, 220). While the study does not address poverty, per se, it does substantiate the argument that minorities are disadvantaged by a mismatch of residential concentration and job location.

The mechanisms involving economic erosion and rising poverty may be more complex than a simple linear causation where job loss produces poverty areas. For example, a study of 100 neighborhoods in Ohio central cities suggests that there may be a reverse causal relationship between growing poverty and economic decline. The study did not focus on industrial jobs, but on "residentiary businesses"—largely customer-oriented enterprises, such as retail trades. The study found a relationship between rising poverty rates and the decisions by entrepreneurs to leave a particular area. A poverty level of 10 percent of local residents—a very modest poverty rate—was associated with the departure of some retailers and service trades, such as furniture and furnishings stores, realtors, and medical offices. An additional 10 percent increase in poverty levels was associated with the departure of significantly more businesses. At this 20 percent poverty level, the local economy was effectively "ghettoized." The loss of banks, private medical offices, supermarkets, beauty shops, video rental stores, and other businesses is not only inconvenient but also represents a deterioration in the range of employment opportunities (Bingham and Zhang 1997, 787–94). It may be that poverty itself drives out work opportunities.



Relatively few public housing schemes provided a decent and safe environment for the people relegated to them. Many have been razed, and more are scheduled for destruction. © Shepard Sherbell/CORBIS SABA

The Dual-City Hypothesis

Referring to the twentieth century in their book, *Separate Societies*, Goldsmith and Blakely (1992) repeated that bleak (for Americans) but commonplace observation, "The American Century is over." According to these authors, the optimistic view that the future would continue to hold improving conditions for all citizens has been replaced by the realistic expectation that some will be left behind by the nature of economic change. Goldsmith and Blakely believed that the consequences are especially dire for the very poor of inner cities. Cities have acquired a dual-income structure, have become *dual cities*. The upper level is represented by the ascending salaries and perquisites of the managers, lawyers, accountants, and financial consultants who work in the major financial concerns and the global headquarters of major corporations whose towers occupy the costly real estate in the central business districts of the largest cities. The upper tier also includes those who provide professional services for corporations, banks, and their elite executives and their families. The bottom tier of urban workers are the cleaners, servants, delivery workers, and other low-paid service workers, and those with casual or no employment. The larger the city, the greater the disparity between the incomes at the very highest and lowest income levels (Goldsmith and Blakely 1992, 107–8; Garofalo and Fogarty 1979).

Critical of this view, Castells and Mollenkopf (1991) found it necessary to modify substantially the dual-city hypothesis in application to the largest city in the United

States, New York. They stated that the two-strata model is so simplified that it is misleading. On the surface, it is possible to identify the top-most and bottom-most strata of the population in terms of the dual-city model. While the city lost more than half of its manufacturing jobs and experienced an increase in its poverty rolls during the 1980s, it also experienced a boom in real estate values and the construction of office towers. Yet the city consists of many more layers of employment and wealth than can be represented by the two most distant strata. In between, there are the largely clerical labor force, the internally stratified public sector, workforce, the remaining manufacturing jobs, a highly divided service sector including self-employed entrepreneurs, and many other variations. For Castells and Mollenkopf, the image of a dual city may be useful as a political slogan to draw attention to a real problem in the division of wealth and the plight of the excluded and struggling bottom layer, but it is weakened by the fact that it overstates the case. More recently Reichl (2007) in his review of how New Yorkers faired during the boom years of the 1990s found a complex answer in response to whether New York was a dual city. He found that middle-class incomes had lost ground, relative to those in the spectacularly growing high-end Manhattan core. The incomes in poorer districts had improved a little but not enough to make much of a dent in the economic profile of high-poverty neighborhoods. Overall his major finding is that there is an ecological pattern to polarization, especially with regard to the declining fortunes of middle-class neighborhoods outside the urban core of central Manhattan. The findings are not likely to do much to resolve the central issues in the debate about whether the dual city model helps us to understand polarizations based on class and race.

Castells and Mollenkopf conceded that, despite its failure as a literal description, the dual-city model is useful in conceptualizing systematic changes that create increasingly difficult conditions for minority youth seeking work, while the same changes provide the basis for lucrative salaries and benefits for top executives. The dual-city concept may also be useful for distinguishing between the city as a center of concentrated corporate power and individual wealth and the city as a desperate environment for poor people in search of shelter and jobs, and for distinguishing between the city as an arena of privilege for a white executive elite and a place where everyone else outside the upper-most stratum hustles to make ends meet. There is more complexity to urban stratification than implied by the dual-city hypothesis; yet the metaphor has an intuitive appeal and will likely persist.

Urban Households Headed by Women

A major dimension in the profile of urban poverty involves households where women are the sole adult providers, a pattern widely discussed as the "feminization of poverty" in the 1980s. Table 9.3 indicates how the number of families in the United States that were maintained by women grew between 1980 and 1999. The growth in this segment of the population reflects the increased number of divorced and separated women and the number of never-married women who had children (it includes teenagers in charge of their own households). The table reveals that a majority of female household heads were white, the proportion of such households in the Latino population was considerably higher than that in the total population,

Table 9.3. Households Headed by Women with Children under 18 Years Old, 1980–1999

	All Races			*White*			*Black*			*Hispanic*		
	1980	*1990*	*1999*	*1980*	*1990*	*1999*	*1980*	*1990*	*1999*	*1979**	*1980*	*1999*
Number of households headed by women	6,299	7,707	8,736	3,995	4,786	5,500	2,171	2,698	2,892	502	921	1,353
As percent of all household family units** that race/year (%)	10.4	11.6	12.6	7.5	8.4	9.4	34.4	36.1	35.8	16.6	18.5	20.4
Number of female-headed households in poverty	2,703	3,767	3,634	1,433	1,814	1,980	1,217	1,513	1,333	288	536	630
Percent of female-headed households in poverty (%)	42.9	47.1	41.5	35.9	37.9	35.6	56.0	56.1	46.1	57.3	58.2	46.6

Source: Dalaker and Proctor. 2000. Table B.3, pp. B–14 to B–19.
*Figures for Hispanic category from 1980 are not available; data from 1979 are used.
**With children under 18.

Table 9.4. Percent of Children under Age 6 Living in Poverty: Race and Type of Household, 1999

White	14.6
Married couple	9.0
Female householder	44.4
Black	36.6
Married couple	10.0
Female householder	59.0
Hispanic	30.6
Married couple	24.0
Female householder	54.6

Source: Dalaker and Proctor. 2000. Table 2, pp. 3–5.

and the proportion of African American households run by women was highest of all, at nearly three times the national rate.

A disproportionate number of single-parent households headed by women are poor, and this translates into high rates of poverty for children. Table 9.4 shows that children in two-parent families have a better chance of escaping poverty, and this characteristic holds across racial groups. African American children experience the highest rate of single-parenting, and African American and Latino children in single-woman households run the greatest risk of poverty. Table 9.5 indicates that most single mothers work, and most of those hold full-time, year-round employment. Others work part of the year or part time. A substantial number of mothers with young children do not work, and the proportion of nonworking women householders is higher for black and Latino groups. Compared to the national average for married-couple households (top row), every working–nonworking category of

Table 9.5. Comparing Married-Couple- and Female-Headed Households[a]: Work Experience, Race, and Poverty, 1999

	Worked Year-Round Full Time		*Worked, but Not Year-Round, Not Full Time*		*Did Not Work during Year*	
	Number (millions)	*Percent below Poverty*	*Number (millions)*	*Percent below Poverty*	*Number (millions)*	*Percent below Poverty*
Married Couples (Husband's Work Experience)	22.0	3.2%	2.9	17.9%	1.1	35.6%
Female-Headed Households (Householder's Work Experience)						
White	2.8	8.7%	1.7	48.2%	0.8	70.7%
Black	1.4	18.6%	0.9	68.3%	0.5	81.5%
Hispanic	0.6	19.3%	0.4	61.4%	0.3	75.5%

Source: Dalaker and Proctor. 2000. Table 3, pp. 18–21.
[a] Households with children under 18.

women-headed households suffers higher rates of poverty. Also not surprisingly, the highest rates of poverty for young children are in families where the mother does not work, and this pattern is accentuated for minorities.

Although households headed by women make up a distinct numerical minority of the population overall, by the mid-1980s they had come to contain about half of all people in poverty. Employing Michael Harrington's well-known term of reference for the poor, Pearce (1983, 70) wrote that "the 'other America' is a changing neighborhood: Men are moving out; women and children are moving in." Women are burdened by cultural and legal conventions that force them to assume primary responsibility for the raising of children. Only 5 percent of never-married mothers receive any form of financial support from the fathers of their children. The disadvantages that women share go beyond family structure to social structure. In addition to the fact that single women often bear all or most of the cost of raising children, women face well-known structural barriers to full participation in the workforce. If they are able to work out childcare arrangements, they are still confronted with occupational segregation where they disproportionately are limited to low-paying occupations collectively referred to as "pink-collar" work. This form of wage discrimination is especially critical for unskilled or semiskilled working-class occupations, not because wage discrimination doesn't occur at all employment levels, but because at the lower reaches of the pay scale, it more often means the difference between a living wage and poverty for a head-of-household and her dependents. Gender discrimination has proven to be as tenacious a problem as race discrimination. Women continue to earn less than men in comparable positions of skill and responsibility. This is part of the structure that conditions women's place in society. Federal and local job-training programs have helped in changing the situation for some women, for example by moving them into the male-dominated construction trades, but too often they continue to prepare poor women for poorly paid work in clerical, retail, or food service jobs. For working mothers, these kinds of work have the additional liability that hours tend to be inflexible. "Working in retail, fast-food, hospitality, cleaning, office, and healthcare services, mothers described ongoing conflicts between ensuring their children's care and safety and completing the requirements of their often family-unfriendly jobs" (Dodson 2006, 25).

The welfare reform measure of 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, involved an experiment in the capacity of the market to absorb additional workers. For single mothers experiencing mandatory entry into the labor force it has been a no-choice challenge to overcome many of the same structural barriers to working and maintaining a family that have been in place all along, and many of these women face additional personal challenges. The welfare reform measure was designed to move welfare recipients off welfare rolls and into self-support through work by limiting the number of years an individual could be welfare dependent in the course of her lifetime (five years). The measure has hosts of supporters and detractors both inside and outside of government. Those who point to the measure's success emphasize the fact that it cut the number of welfare recipients in half within five years of implementation. They also interpret the strict limitation on welfare payments as having eliminated what they saw as a vicious cycle of welfare dependency (a variation of the culture of poverty view). They celebrated the millions of self-supporting households where working women

provided for their children with the aid of a number of new government programs that provided for food stamps, rent subsidies, childcare funding, and income tax relief. Critics of welfare reform forecast the continuation of poverty due to low wages, inadequate child supervision, and child protection, and questioned whether the jobs that women were supposed to avail themselves to existed in the numbers and locations where they would be required. Writing in the *New York Times* in 2001 (July 13) William Wilson cautioned that, as written into law, welfare reform constituted a huge "social experiment" with uncertain outcomes for affected families.

Well over a decade after welfare limits went into effect supporters and critics of the program still find much to argue about. The economic prosperity of the late 1990s led to a shortage of entry-level service and other low-wage workers at the very time when former welfare recipients hit the labor market. While it is clear that welfare rolls have been drastically reduced it is also clear that people who were poor and living on government payments are now among the working poor; they are people who have jobs but insufficient earnings to raise themselves and their children out of poverty (Haskins and Primus 2000). Working poverty does not represent unaltered circumstances for affected families. Critics point to some evidence that the condition of poverty for some children who remain poor has deepened and that children of mothers forced to find work have been put at risk because the poor do not have the means to make adequate childcare arrangements. A series of open-ended interviews undertaken between 1998 and 2003 with more than 300 low-wage mothers indicated that the most common concern among these women was their children's safety and care (Dodson 2006). With limited choices in the poor residential areas where they lived, about half said that at times the care arrangements that they made involved overcrowded care environments, disturbing incidents, and questionable caregivers. There is a double bind for these working-poor women: They must work adequate hours to support their families, at the same time that pediatricians, school nurses, and teachers watch to see that they make responsible arrangements, especially if their children have special needs. Mothers in general were concerned about whether makeshift care arrangements would lead to the intervention of welfare workers and the loss of their children, which put them in the additionally uneasy position of needing to hide compromised arrangements from authorities. They tended to react by developing a set of working priorities, a "moral economy": They resented what they saw as their employer's antichild "culture of the low-wage labor market"; they put the well-being and needs of their children ahead of the inflexible requirements of the workplace; and for some it is not surprising that this caused them to be fired from the job.

> Most of the respondents had a positive attitude toward having a job and interacting and socializing with other adults, as well as a desire to be earning their own way. But caring for family emerged as the guiding force whenever children are in jeopardy. The strategies they used for survival also functioned as small protests against a wage system that they considered indecent. Viewing their jobs in such a light, ordinary people may begin to regard everyday acting up as legitimate, a righteous response to an immoral economy (Dodson 2006, 28).

The loss of government supports under the welfare reform limits may actually have had a more serious impact in rural rather than in urban areas—areas where

women live far outside the sphere of the popular stereotype of inner-city welfare mothers. Regionally, rural employment opportunities can be more restricted than the limited number of jobs available in inner city sectors. Rural transportation issues—which amount to access to a private automobile—are critical for those who have to travel miles to get to the nearest worksite. Danziger (2000) found that among the serious barriers to employment faced by some rural women were lack of education, little work experience, poor work skills or habits, a personal history of perceived discrimination, lack of access to transportation, a diagnosis of psychiatric disorder, substance dependency, other personal or children's health problems, and the debilitating effects of domestic abuse. The compounded effects of several such obstacles were common (Danziger 2000).

National thinking about poverty in the United States is clouded by the issue of race. One of the cultural or emotional consequences of the concentration of minority poverty in the inner city, a question most often raised regarding the mindset and behavior of poor people themselves, needs to be addressed with regard to its impact on majority middle-class attitudes toward the poor. That is, the visibility of concentrated *minority* poor—the social disorder and deviance attributed to them—causes society to forget that the largest category of poor people are non-Latino whites. In this way, the problem of poverty becomes associated in the popular mind with race. The question goes, If blacks, and most visibly urban blacks, remain seriously disadvantaged, then what are they doing to keep themselves in that condition?

Here the issue of births to unmarried women, and teens in particular, is a central issue, one that translates in the popular mind to welfare eligibility. After several years of downward trends in births to unmarried women, for poorly understood reasons the trend reversed slightly in 2006 and may have resumed a slightly upward trend since then. In 2007 40 percent of all births were to unmarried women and teens. Twenty-eight percent of white births were to unmarried mothers, as were 51 percent of Hispanic and 72 percent of black births. Contributing to the increase in the absolute number (not the rates) of births to single women is an increase in the number of women currently reaching childbearing age (*New York Times* March 19, 2009). But the disproportionate numbers of births to poor women in general and poor urban minorities in particular reinforces negative stereotypes that poor people create their own problems and are therefore unworthy of support. A recent book by Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas, *Promises I Can Keep* (2005), may not dispel the resentment of the affluent against poor unmarried mothers, but it invites an understanding of a world removed from one where continued middle-class status is the default option for young middle-class people.

Among Edin and Kefalas's subjects in the Philadelphia-Camden (New Jersey) area, half of young unmarried mothers had not graduated from high school, a third hadn't worked in the past year: Their median age at the birth of their first child was twenty-one. More than 40 percent of the fathers had been incarcerated, half hadn't finished high school, half were unemployed, and their median annual earnings were below $10,000 (2). The children of unmarried mothers do more poorly in school and have lower high school completion rates, are more likely to become teenaged parents, and will have lower earnings as adults (3). But the authors report that in five years of intensive interviewing they had encountered "astonishingly

little evidence of the much touted rejection of the institution of marriage among the poor." However, these poor young women considered the prospect of their own marriage unrealistic at the moment, "a dream that most still longed for, a luxury that they hoped to indulge in one day when the time was right, but generally not something that they saw happening in the near, or even the foreseeable, future." In their world, the relationship they could count on was with their own child, as "they judged children to be a necessity, an absolutely essential part of a young woman's life, the chief source of identity and meaning" (Edin and Kefalas 2005, 6).

For Edin and Kefalas there exists a gulf of misunderstanding between the middle class and poor single women with babies. "To most middle class observers . . . a poor woman with a child but no husband, diploma, or a job is a victim of her own circumstances or undeniable proof that American society is coming apart at the seams. But in the social world inhabited by poor women, a baby born into such circumstances represents an opportunity to prove one's self-worth" (6). In an uncertain world where there are few opportunities to excel, motherhood offers a kind of microcosm of security, a security of one's own making. But it will be fleeting. As Dodson has shown (above), when these women are advanced only a little in age and their children are growing and need protection, they will be required to leave their children in insecure circumstances, and that will become the source of their greatest insecurity. The affluent members of society may wag knowingly at the situation. Yet the adolescents of every class will engage in willful and risky behavior and will need to survive some years in the subcultures of youth. For those with affluent parents and the luxury of more consistent adult vigilance, questionable choices have less indelible consequences.

Thinking about poverty, the role of nonmarital pregnancy, and the effects of single parenthood has for some time been distorted in the United States by thinking about race. As Wilhelm (1986a, 209) summed it up, the thesis runs "Blacks are in a mess, and while they may have gotten that way because of racial oppression by Whites, nonetheless, today, racial factors no longer matter since it is a specific quality of life among Blacks, family disintegration, that they themselves bring about that explains economic deterioration for at least the past 3 decades." He observed that, according to the deteriorating family thesis, a person enters poverty either because someone has failed to enter marriage or because someone has left a marriage. The facts of the feminization of poverty become posited as a cause of poverty in this way, providing a variation on the well-worn culture of poverty thesis. By focusing on the deficiencies of the family, analysts and policymakers are deflected from confronting directly and critically the difficult issues of racism (Wilhelm 1986b, 140). The argument that the problem is a matter of personal or subcultural maladaptation reflects the implicit assumption that "the free enterprise system [is] an open market, and that failure to enter it or to fully exploit it [is] due to personal inability, not market constraints" (Glasgow 1980, 73).

Revised welfare policy reflects this view of the causes of poverty. Whether the work requirement represents the simple and final solution to the centuries-old question of what is a nation's responsibility to its poor may be tested in a less prosperous time, when there is a surplus of workers rather than a surplus of entry-level, low-skill, low-wage jobs.

THE CORRELATES OF URBAN POVERTY: POWERLESSNESS, CRIME, AND VICTIMIZATION

For those who must endure it, poverty in the city means more than having a lower income and a tougher time finding a job that pays a living wage. It also means that political access and a chance to influence the institutional political processes are restricted. In addition, it means a greater proximity and vulnerability to crime, both in the greater likelihood of becoming a victim and the greater risk of becoming actively engaged in committing crimes.

Powerlessness

The relative power of different groups in society is determined by differences in their access to the important decision-making processes and, assuming a given level of access, their willingness to participate. That is, a group of individuals may be said to be powerful if they have the ability to make policy decisions or are in a position to influence those who make such decisions. How much power do the urban poor have? The answer depends on how much influence they can exert on the decisions that affect the distribution of resources and rewards in their cities. There are two ways to respond to the question: One is to consider the sizable gains that minority groups have made in the control of local urban government. The second is to ask to what extent local government is an effective unit for dealing with the problems of the cities and their poor residents.

Participation in local electoral politics has been on the rise among the minority poor and saw an upsurge in the 2008 presidential election, along with the more effective organization and mobilization of the minority vote. The election of the first black mayor of a large city occurred in 1967 when Carl Stokes became the mayor of Cleveland. In 2000 almost a third of the mayors of the largest U.S. cities were minorities (Kraus and Swanstrom 2001). These political victories are important and represent practical as well as symbolic progress. Yet they also contain an obvious and bitter irony. As minorities gain control of local government, the areas governed no longer contain the resources that allow them to be maintained and operated as viable units. When local urban black leadership looks to wider, largely nonurban upstate, downstate, or federal political bodies for help, the response is often not helpful.

One important dimension of the distribution of political access in urban America is the result of metropolitanization, the fact that cities have sprawled across entire regions. In 1975 Kenneth Newton observed that the fragmentation of the metropolitan political arena had affected the ability of the poor to participate meaningfully in the political process. He pointed out that the 227 existing MSAs by 1967 had 20,703 different units of government. By 1960, there were approximately four times as many government units in the St. Louis MSA as there were nations in the world.

Newton framed his argument in terms of a criticism of *political pluralism*. For decades, pluralist theorists have been locked in a debate with those who held an opposing view called *power elite theory*. The debate was over just how democratic the political process is in the United States. Pluralist theory is anchored in research conducted in the 1950s in New Haven, Connecticut, that focused on the decision-

making process in a number of key issues that were of concern to local government: urban renewal, public education policy, and political nominations. Published research results, most notably those of Robert Dahl (1961), framed the pluralist contention that the decision-making process involved a division of labor among top decision makers and that important policy was not decided by a few powerful political bosses. Instead, decision making was carried out by different actors with particular expertise in each of the three areas of concern. Other important pluralist assumptions supported by Dahl were that various kinds of resources were available to different citizens for influencing officials and that "virtually no one, and certainly no group of more than a few individuals, [was] entirely lacking in some influence resources" (Dahl 1961, 228).

An important feature of pluralist theory is that officials are accessible to public influence and are vulnerable to public disapproval, since they lead only so long as they have the support of voters and taxpayers. Their policymaking must reflect the desires of the electorate, or they will be dismissed by the public.

The opposed thesis, that power is wielded by a relatively small and largely inaccessible elite, was developed most fully by C. Wright Mills (1956) in his work *The Power Elite*; but his interest was in political control exercised at the national rather than the local level. Analyses of metropolitan elites take their lead from Floyd Hunter's (1953) study of Regional City (Atlanta). Other works, such as Robert and Helen Lynd's (1937) Middletown (Muncie, Indiana) study, also reflected that the control of local politics might rest in the hands of a small, powerful group (in the Lynd study it was the "X" family of industrialists who owned or had contributed to every major institution in the city).

Whereas pluralist research tends to focus on the formal decision-making process involving the duly elected and appointed political leadership, the researching of local political elites has employed the "reputational method" of establishing the effective power holders within a community, whether or not these individuals are political officeholders. In the Atlanta study, Hunter submitted a list of names of potential elites to fourteen persons whom he believed were knowledgeable about the local power structure and asked each to select ten people who could be considered prominent and generally accepted leaders in the city. From their responses, he derived a shorter list of forty names of local leaders, interviewed each of these in turn, and again asked for the names of ten others who were thought to be widely acceptable for leadership roles in the community. He found that twelve names emerged repeatedly as an elite core of power holders within the broader forty-name group. Consistent with the elite theory's contention that cities tend to be operated by a handful of powerful individuals who might not be a part of the official city administration, none of the twelve named leaders and only four of the wider group of forty were part of the formal government.

The debate over whether the democratic pluralist description or the power elite description best fits the actual decision-making process of urban areas has continued to generate study and restudy. A large part of the difficulty is thought to stem from the use of the different methods employed by the two sides in establishing who the leaders are. Elitist studies that tend to be based primarily on the reputational method have been criticized because they report only what people believe to be the case, rather than study the actual exercise of power. On the other hand,

pluralists have been criticized for focusing too exclusively on the formal decision-making process of government and ignoring the influence of corporate, financial, and nongovernmental leadership.

Newton's (1975) contribution to this debate was not so much to support the power elite interpretation as to show that if the pluralist assumptions about popular access to the decision-making process had ever held, they did no longer in the metropolitanized, fragmented urban arena. He dismissed the pluralist view that the fragmentation of the urban political arena conferred greater power on individual citizens since it improved the ability of each voice to be heard within these urban fragments. Instead, he pointed out that the division of the city into discrete political units had cut off the poor politically, in addition to isolating them economically. This is because the political divisions within the metropolitan areas—different municipalities each having its own government and tax base—reflected the different economic divisions—rich communities and poor communities. With the poor relegated largely to the inner city and the few isolated enclaves outside of it (declining inner suburbs), the poor and the affluent political and economic arenas are separate and unequal. The situation is antithetical to the pluralist model in which groups with disparate resources and interests compete directly within the same political arena. The economic resources of the metropolis and the economic problems of the metropolis are separated spatially from one another.

To a large extent the political fragmentation of the metropolitan community represents a division between races as well as classes. Minorities have increasingly gained a powerful voice within the formal political process with Latinos and blacks represented at every level of government. African Americans have been particularly successful in attaining elected office in large cities, and this is important for their minority constituents who experience a greater sense of representation in the political process. A survey of 3,000 black respondents in fifty-two cities found that blacks express a higher level of satisfaction with neighborhood services, police services, and local education when represented by blacks in municipal government and on school boards. Attitudes are most positive where respondents could point to tangible benefits in terms of their community service needs. At the same time it appears that cities with high-profile minority representation, especially those with minority mayors, have a harder time delivering due to what has been called the "hollow-prize" problem (Friesema 1969). This is the pattern where minority mayors assume power in cities that are emptying of affluent populations, businesses, and the tax bases that would provide the means for paying for services. In a study of seventy-six U.S. cities, Kraus and Swanstrom (2001) found that while the central city's economic situation had typically declined everywhere, the problem tended to be more acute in minority-governed cities. Not only do these cities have an eroded tax base, but the cost of service provision tends to be higher in cities with comparatively higher minority and poor populations, the kinds of cities that tend to have minority mayors. It was estimated that, putting the direct costs of poverty assistance aside, the cost of nonpoverty service provision (e.g., police and fire) increased $27.75 per capita for every 1 percent increase in poverty rates (Pack 1998). Kraus and Swanstrom (2001) observe two corollaries of the hollow-prize pattern. First, in terms of cause and effect, it is not just the case that the election of minority city officials is statistically associated with white flight and urban economic decline,

there is limited evidence that the election of minorities may lead to an exodus of businesses and a decline in retail trade. Second, Kraus and Swanstrom point to the resultant political ecology of the isolation of minority and white populations into separate political arenas, with affluent and tax-base-rich white suburban townships surrounding minority inner cities. It is the familiar pattern described by Newton (1975) earlier.

On the Limited Powers of Urban Governments

To the extent that urban governments with their limited resources are in a position to work on behalf of their poorest and most powerless citizens, they face constraints, given current economic trends, demanding that a large share of these resources go to support the ventures of large corporations, rather than directly to needed public services. It is useful to consider policymaking as the outcome of political pressures on urban administrations to serve the needs of their various constituents. Feagin (1983) finds the direction of urban development has been determined, at least since the 1940s, by developers, bankers, industrial executives, and their business and political allies who, together, are the chief players in the real-life game of Monopoly. As we have repeatedly heard from a variety of analysts, cities are built and rebuilt for profit, as witnessed by their major physical features: office towers, shopping centers, industrial parks, convention centers, and suburban developments.

Today it may be more difficult than ever for even the most compassionate municipal governments to consider the needs of the poor first, as a major priority. Jones and Bachelor (1986, 202–6) observe, "The reality of mobile capital and stationary cities means that businessmen hold a major bargaining chip in dealing with city officials on economic development issues." In a study of three different instances of city government and automotive industry coordination, they found that "in each case, the community effort [to retain industrial plants] is directed at making water run uphill: attracting capital where it would not normally flow. Bluntly put, businesses do not need to control city governments, because they do not need the city." Their study reviewed the cases of Detroit, Flint, and Pontiac, Michigan, three cities that made major financial concessions to auto manufacturers in order to retain employment in their area. In Detroit, the most celebrated of the cases, the city underwrote the massive expenses of relocating a General Motors plant at the same time that police were being cut from the city payroll. Other cities have been forced into similar difficult choices by the mobile capital of free enterprise. Nothing illustrates the point as well as the mobility of professional sports teams (textbox 9.1).

Textbox 9.1. Big League Sports Extort the Public Purse

Until 1953, except for a few stadiums that had been built by cities attempting to lure the Olympic Games, all professional sports stadiums and arenas had been built with private funds (Siegfried and Zimbalist 2000, 96). In that year, "Using a publicly financed stadium as bait, the otherwise sensible city of Milwaukee enticed the Braves to relocate from Boston . . . and the relationship between communities and sports

franchises has suffered ever since" (Sullivan 1998, 55). Just as major corporations can gain financial concessions from urban government by threatening to leave town, the wealthy owners of professional sports teams can threaten to take their marbles and go elsewhere. Their goal is to get the city to use public funds to build them a new stadium. The stakes are high. Barely a generation ago, the state of the art in sports facility construction was the domed stadium, a technological marvel of its age. Times and sports fans' tastes have changed, and these multimillion dollar venues are considered obsolete. Today, the state of the art is the vastly more expensive outdoor stadium with a retractable roof. New stadiums are designed to maximize revenues from luxury suites, club boxes, concessions, catering, advertising space, parking, and related entertainment-theme activities. The outlay in public funds is considerable. In the 1980s, the average arena cost about $100 million to build. In the 1990s, the cost rose to an average of $200 million (Siegfried and Zimbalist 2000, 97). Among the new baseball stadiums opening in 2008–2009 were those of the D.C. Nationals, the New York Mets, and the New York Yankees. Washington, D.C., invested $611 million in public taxpayer funds to build its new ball field. It was projected that with cost overruns and city-funded infrastructure improvements the new Mets stadium would cost about $900 million and the new Yankee stadium about $1.7 billion in private and public funds (*New York Times* November 5, 2008).

Why do financially strapped cities subsidize professional teams with public funding? There are many more cities than professional teams, and owners can play off one city's offer against another to gain the maximum concession for relocation or staying where they are. The owners of professional franchises are reluctant to expand the number of teams. That would decrease their leverage in bargaining with cities. Urban governments are motivated by the fact that they can enhance or maintain their city's image as a "big league" town by attracting or retaining footloose owners. It is popularly thought that stadiums represent potential tourist revenues, direct employment, spin-off employment, and retail activity near the park or arena, and are a way to keep the downtown (if that is where the facility is located) attractive to metro area residents and visitors who might find no other reason to go there. For reasons both practical and symbolic, owners of professional teams in football, basketball, baseball, and hockey are in a position, similar to that of large industrial employers, to extort major concessions from city governments. In 1998, the Miami Heat of the National Basketball Association declared their home stadium obsolete after only eight years in their custom-built $53 million Miami Arena. They threatened to move to another city if Miami refused to build them a new $165 million arena with public funds. At first the city government capitulated but was later forced by a public protest to withdraw the offer. The Florida Panthers of the National Hockey League, who shared the Miami Arena, quickly got neighboring Broward County to agree to build a new $212 million facility. Former National Football League commissioner Pete Rozelle once commented that the United States had entered an era of "franchise free agency" (Bernstein 1998).

There is actually a good deal of controversy about the economic yield versus the cost of subsidy for new facilities. The evidence regarding team benefits appears clear: "Depending on the sport and the circumstance, a new stadium or arena can add anywhere from $10 to $40 million in revenues to a team's coffers." It also appears that the new stadiums may allow "demographically lesser cities (e.g., Memphis, Charlotte, Jacksonville, and Nashville) . . . to compete with larger cities with older stadiums." This means that the new style stadium potentially increases the number of cities in

the competition to lure the limited number of teams (Zimbalist 1998). It is not as clear that cities that retain or attract a new or migrant team will benefit materially in a major way. Nevertheless, mayors of cities facing urban decline find the prospect of investing in order to tie a major professional sports franchise to a downtown stadium a risk worth taking. "Because some sports and entertainment complexes such as Jacobs Field and Gund Arena in Cleveland are able to attract more than four million visitors to downtown areas that were essentially avoided for years, more and more mayors justify their investments in sports facilities as an effort to enhance the vitality of urban life" (Rosentraub 1997, 180). Unfortunately, there is a lack of evidence that this urban revitalization strategy produces results. Between 1980 and 1995, central cities with downtown sports facilities experienced more rapid population decline and no better retention rates of finance, insurance, real estate, or retail jobs than cities without centrally located sports facilities. "Sports is clearly important to a substantial number of people. This importance, however, does not make it an engine for development" (Rosentraub 1997, 205–6).

Cities building new stadiums face additional outlays for infrastructure and debt service that often double the cost of the project (Zimbalist 1998). This is in the face of evidence that there are limited material benefits to be gained from stadium and arena construction. In most circumstances, sports teams have a small positive economic effect, similar perhaps to the influence of a new department store (Zimbalist 1998). In all, stadiums appear to be an inefficient way of creating jobs. According to a study by the Congressional Research Service, in the 1990s a new $177 million Baltimore football stadium would create 1,394 jobs at a cost of $127,000 each (Bernstein 1998).

The new Yankee Stadium in the Bronx illustrates many of the issues involved in the drama that binds big league sports, city government, and fans in a love-hate relationship. Mayor Michael Bloomberg needed a rationale to explain how it made sense for the city to undertake costs associated with moving the Yankees across 161st Street to their new stadium. The new site eliminated two popular city parks, which the city was obligated to replace at a cost of $177 million. Costs to the city included the construction of road and sewer upgrades, tens of millions to demolish the old Yankee Stadium, and millions more in tax breaks and land-rent subsidies. The mayor's office anticipated the creation of 1,000 jobs: The Yankees organization estimated about twenty new full-time, and 100 or so part-times jobs. The *New York Times* interviewed sports economist Richard Bade who said the city government estimates of public benefits were "pure hyperbole. Why would you expect that this would result in an increase in economic activity in New York when you simply changed the locus of sports play, moving it across the street" (November 5, 2008).

From the fan's (a subset of city taxpayers) point of view, there is not much to be gained from the awkward dance between teams and governments, except that a major league team has come to or stayed in town. "If the goal is to get close to the action, it remains the case that the nature of each sport creates a physical limit to the number of good seats that can be created" (Noll and Zimbalist 1997, 17). The ability of franchise owners to extort public funds from urban governments is an example of how consumers are hurt by oligopoly control of markets. A limited number of wealthy owners and players, and the people who can afford to occupy the limited number of luxury boxes and good seats at the game, benefit disproportionately from the public subsidy of professional sport, while less-well-heeled fans will watch the games on TV on the days they are not blacked out and wonder how long before the "home team" gets a better offer from another city.

The Detroit and General Motors case has received considerable attention. In 1980 GM approached the city government to announce its intention to close its old and technically inefficient Cadillac and Fisher Body plants. If the company moved, the city would lose more than 6,000 jobs and the prospect of $15 million per year in new property taxes. The potential loss held both practical and symbolic significance for the declining industrial city. At GM's request, Detroit's economic development commission rapidly undertook the search for a new site and settled on an area that was known as "Poletown." The site acquired by the city covered more than 460 acres. The city used its eminent domain powers (the right of government to take private property for public use) to take over the property, evict the 3,438 residents, and demolish the 1,176 buildings (including 16 churches, 2 schools, and 1 hospital) that stood on the site. The project involved direct costs to the city of just under $200 million, which it was expected would eventually be recouped in tax revenues if the plan resulted in the retention of General Motors within the city. The company was granted a tax abatement of 50 percent on the new plant, while the city managed to get the company to agree to employ at least 3,000 workers in the more automated production process. The following factors are significant in this case: The expenditures came about as the result of a unilateral decision made by a private industry to abandon its old plants; the company set early deadlines to review the city's progress in locating, acquiring, and preparing an appropriate site, thus giving government little time to consider alternatives; and the city government undertook all of its actions and expenses without any guarantee from the company that it would not, in the end, change its plans (Fasenfest 1986, 109–17).

If, in hard times for the cities, the resources of government can be manipulated in similar fashion by the most powerful economic actors in the urban arena, there would seem to be little that ordinary people can do to assert their will in the struggle for a share of the limited pie. Yet there is a form of power that ordinary people hold, and this is in their numbers. Although the process is more conflictual and does not function as smoothly as the pluralist model of representative democracy would hold, observers have pointed to the potential of urban social movements for bringing policy more in line with the popular will. Whether these movements are conceived of broadly as coalitions of citizens' interest groups (Feagin 1983, 15–16; Castells 1983), or more narrowly in terms of social class (Castells 1985a, 93), they are seen as a potentially effective force for preventing government from neglecting any one group for too long. While Castells expected urban priorities and the patterns of development to regularly express the interests of the dominant class, at the same time they "will also be earmarked by resistance from exploited classes." When the poor remain compliant, the government sees little need to intervene in the interest of the redistribution of resources on their behalf. Such intervention has most often been in response to the perceived capacity of the poor to disrupt the operation of the economic order (Piven and Cloward 1977, 36–37, 354–59).

As we consider cities as arenas of political action we need to keep in mind that they have often been the settings for dramatic expressive demonstrations of mass dissatisfaction. In American cities people, especially the minority poor, have taken to the streets to express their anger and frustration of general political-economic dissatisfaction or to protest what is collectively seen as a specific episode of injustice or police overreaction. This is true of cities everywhere. Cities provide a stage and

dramatic backdrop for political actions ranging from popular collective expressions in marches and riots to calculated acts of terrorism. Cities also serve as arenas that sometimes dramatize the need for political action to respond to the conditions of poor people: The aftermath of a hurricane in New Orleans brought people into the streets in a different way and effectively communicated a message of injustices that needed to be addressed. In that sense the urban arena itself has a powerful voice for expressing outrage.

Crime and Victimization in America's Divided Cities

Beginning with the improving economic conditions from the mid- to late-1990s, the United States has experienced declining crime rates. The 2007 index of serious crimes (table 9.6) compiled by the FBI nevertheless indicated that the level of serious offenses reported to law enforcement indicates that crime remains a serious problem: The highest rates of serious property and violent crime are associated with large urban areas.

The urban poor are disproportionately represented in national crime statistics, both as accused perpetrators and as victims. In general, people in cities are more likely to commit crimes or to be victimized. Table 9.6 reflects the correlation between crime rates (crimes committed per 100,000 inhabitants) and the size of cities. As the population of cities increases, the overall rates of violent and property crimes increase, and the same is generally true for each of the individual categories of crime shown in the table. The one significant exception to the rule are areas with fewer than 10,000 people, which have a higher than expected crime rate. While the reasons for the near-lockstep relationship between crime and city size are poorly

Table 9.6. Crime Rates[a] by City Size, 2007

Violent Crime

City Size	*Total*	*Murder[b]*	*Forcible Rape*	*Robbery*	*Aggravated Assault*
250,000 or more	897	11.4	45	337	478
100,000–249,999	636	8.6	38	227	363
50,000–99,999	468	4.9	32	153	278
25,000–49,999	372	3.5	30	111	232
10,000–24,999	320	2.9	28	80	208
Less than 10,000	330	2.6	29	56	243

Property Crime Larceny

City Size	*Total*	*Burglary*	*Theft*	*Motor Vehicle Theft*
250,000 or more	4,462	949	2,783	730
100,000–249,999	4,354	939	2,868	546
50,000–99,999	3,641	771	2,491	380
25,000–49,999	3,383	672	2,436	277
10,000–24,999	3,182	631	2,334	217
Less than 10,000	4,249	779	3,226	186

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2008. Table 16, pp. 188–89.
[a] Offenses known to the police per 100,000 people.
[b] Includes nonnegligent manslaughter.



Broken windows theory argues that unrepaired vandalized property is an invitation to local lawlessness and more serious crimes. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

understood, there is evidence to deny any simple explanation based on the idea that crime results from a simple frustration-aggression reaction due to conditions of crowding (Freedman 1975). What is clear is that urban crime remains concentrated in a relatively small number of areas within a city, areas characterized by high levels of chronic poverty, unemployment, substandard housing, teenage pregnancy, and drug use. While the economic costs of crime are spread throughout the urban population, its effects are greatest on the poor themselves.

Explanations of why crime rates are higher in the poorer districts within cities once again pit culturalist against structuralist assumptions. James Q. Wilson (Wil-

son and Kelling 1982; Wilson 1983) has been the leading spokesman for the culturalist position, proposing that neighborhood conditions and the attitudes of local residents are key to understanding a greater disposition toward criminal behavior, especially among young people. He has long argued that the economic position of the poor, in and of itself, cannot be used to explain their apparent disproportionate involvement in crime. He pointed to the expansion of programs designed to assist the poor and their children in the 1960s, as well as the general prosperity of that decade, which together "brought greater plenty to more people" than ever before in the history of the United States. At the same time, "crime soared" (4).

Wilson's perspective on the causes of urban crime has been enormously influential. His influence on policies that have been implemented to reduce crime rates has been even more powerful. Known as the "broken windows" effect, his prescription for changing physical environments that are conducive to criminal behavior has been employed in city after city. According to the argument, toleration of minor offenses such as loitering, graffiti, or other disruptive acts invites more serious breaches of norms of public order. The position takes its name from the idea that broken windows that go unrepaired send a message to would-be perpetrators of more serious deviance that the local area is tolerant of misbehavior. The philosophy has fostered the policing tactic known as "zero tolerance," which was most famously employed in New York City under Mayor Rudy Giuliani in the 1990s. The strategy involved the police aggressively monitoring and curtailing any behaviors that violated even minor proscriptions for public behavior. Implementation of the policy correlated with a precipitous drop in crime rates.

Wilson's point of view linking crime to moral rather than material impoverishment was advanced by a number of researchers including Bennett, Dilulio, and Walters (1996). Writing for a popular audience and hoping to sway public opinion and thereby social policy, in much the way Wilson had intended, Bennett (the former drug czar and secretary of education) and his colleagues proposed a get-tough policy toward youthful offenders, whom they predicted would become an increasingly ruthless predatory force if authorities didn't crack down hard, putting more offenders in prison for longer periods of time. This is also in agreement with Wilson's position. Improving material conditions of the poor is not likely to have an effect on crime because many of the poor had become part of a "lower class" that he defined in terms of its uncivil values and habits.

Wilson's "lower class" is a subset of the poor, set off by its welfare dependency, the increasing use of drugs, and the increasing proportion of whom were young and beyond parental control (1983, 16–33). This last feature produced a "critical mass," similar to the way that Fischer (1975; 1984; introduced in chapter 4) had used the concept. Wilson employed the idea to explain how dominant numbers of young people on the street allowed them to set the moral tone for the conduct of public life. Public life, in turn, was marked by a lack of "community," little concern with standards of public behavior and no respect for property. It represents a breakdown of informal social controls that normally enforce lawful and respectable behavior. The assumption is that a set of internal control mechanisms govern the behavior of most people: Most members of a community are unwilling to risk the disapproval of others. Members of the lower class are unconcerned with rules of propriety; consistent with this fact, they fail to assert control over

their offspring, resulting in a generally disordered and threatening public environment.

Wilson's interpretation of the involvement of the poor in crime is strongly reminiscent of the culture of poverty argument, especially Banfield's ([1968] 1974) *Unheavenly City* interpretation. It has produced strong criticism and provoked a continuation of debate, both about the causes of crime and the degree to which the poor are victims of structured inequality versus their own attitudes and habits. Since, in Wilson's view, engaging in criminal behavior is the result of a lack of commitment on the part of criminals to conventional morality and guidelines for behavior, the only policies that make sense are those that convince potential lawbreakers that criminal acts will produce stern, swift, and certain punishment. General social programs designed for improving the economic conditions of the poor, while they may have merit in their own right, are simply not effective tools for reducing criminal behavior. This is because, according to the argument, people steeped in a lower-class system of values are still culturally lower class and can be expected to behave accordingly, even if given training and opportunities.

The controversy over the linkages between poverty, or inequality in general, and criminal behavior will prove difficult to resolve. Part of the problem involves the ideological question of the degree to which higher than average rates of certain types of criminal behavior represent a moral failing or whether they reflect the limited options of the poor or the economically cutoff. Take the example presented by Currie (1985, 144–49) of two Highland Parks in the Midwest. Highland Park, Michigan, is part of the inner city of Detroit. In 1983 it had a population just under 30,000; one family in three was poor; and there were twenty-seven murders, fifty-five reported rapes, and 796 robberies. Highland Park, Illinois, a community of about the same size, is a lakeside suburb just north of Chicago. In 1983, one family in sixty-seven was poor; there were no murders, one reported rape, and seven robberies. Clearly, there is a link between local conditions, the economy, and crime here, but what was it? Many recent studies of crime and economic circumstance have attempted to address the issue.

While debates between culturalists like Wilson (local neighborhood effects are most important in determining the level of crime) and structuralists like Currie (economic trends, unemployment, and poverty levels are most important) are always heated, when the topic is how to explain and deal with criminal behavior they are particularly so. At issue is how to explain the fall in crime rates since the mid-1990s: Are they attributable to the get-tough policies of particular city administrators and police commissioners—which have tended to disproportionately target minority youth? Or was crime reduction simply the result of wider economic and demographic changes that reduced the incentive for crime and the proportion of young people predisposed to engage in it?

Do aggressive no-tolerance police tactics work? Kelling and Sousa (2001) conducted a comparative study of New York City's seventy-five police precincts over the course of the 1990s. They found that precincts that made a higher number of misdemeanor (minor crime) arrests (indicating particularly aggressive no-tolerance policing) experienced the greatest reduction in the rates of violent crime. Similarly, Corman and Mocan (2002), employing a time series research model in NYC, found that aggressive misdemeanor arrests were followed by a subsequent decrease in the rate of the more serious crimes of motor vehicle theft and robbery. However, in a

review of the New York and other research in the *University of Chicago Law Review* Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) raised serious doubt about whether policing strategies explain reductions in crime rates during the 1990s. They pointed out that crime rates came down across the nation during this period independent of law enforcement strategies, and areas that had previously experienced the sharpest *increase* in crime (largely coincident with the rise in the crack-cocaine gang drug wars) were subsequently experiencing the greatest *decrease* in crime rates. Harcourt and Ludwig also drew attention to what amounted to a massive social experiment that was conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in five major cities (Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York) beginning in 1994. Dubbed the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) project, it involved randomly selecting low-income families with children in public or assisted housing and providing them with the opportunity to move to neighborhoods with generally lower levels of disorder (graffiti, broken windows, etc.). Follow-up surveys determined that criminal behavior as measured by arrests showed no reduction in involvement in criminal activity.

In another example of experimentation involving housing as a powerful independent variable, Hagedorn and Rauch (2007) compared changes in homicide rates among cities: In particular, they drew a comparison between the experiences of Chicago and New York City. In both cities police cracked down on drug gangs. In New York the more aggressive policing coincided with a reduction in crime and gang violence. In Chicago similar policies coincided with an increase in gang violence. Two factors help to explain the different results. First, according to Hagedorn and Rauch, NYC gangs were more easily taken off the streets because they were not institutionalized and didn't have roots or organization going back decades in time and so were not deeply rooted in the communities where they operated. In contrast, the Chicago gangs were organizations that had persisted since the 1950s. When their more disciplined leaders were eliminated by police, the "wilder," younger members fought among themselves—the ordered structure had collapsed, and violence flared within as well as between drug crews. A second factor that fueled increasing street violence had to do with differences between New York and Chicago in housing policy. The authors observe that as urban administrations and law enforcement agencies around the world attempt to make the urban environment more secure for affluent classes, the poor are being displaced in urban centers. Hagedorn and Rauch assert that NYC under Mayor Ed Koch saw the need to provide decent housing for the poor and followed vigorous and costly policies of housing provision. Chicago, by contrast, razed massive public housing projects like the Robert Taylor high-rises that housed 27,000 people—without providing former residents with much in the way of replacement units. Thus, 100,000 urban poor were scattered among various crowded neighborhoods. A portion of these displaced residents were young drug dealers and gang members. They forced their way into territories claimed by existing gangs and established dealers. The ensuing violence should have surprised no one; as one young gang member predicted of the invasion, "I'm talkin' about . . . a war, a war that you've never seen before" (Hagedorn and Rauch 2007, 450). These examples demonstrate that the effectiveness of no-tolerance policing alone is questionable and that other structural factors (in this case housing policy) may have an important impact on crime.

The literature that emphasizes the impact of structural factors on the rate of property crime has focused on employment opportunity and job loss. Brenner (1976) found unemployment associated with higher rates of drug use and related the high cost of drug dependency to property crime. He also found unemployment associated with increased alcohol use, and alcohol use was associated with violent crime. Testing Cantor and Land's (1985) straightforward argument that improving economic conditions reduce the motivation for criminal behavior, Arvanites and DeFina (2006) traced general economic and crime trends for the 1990s and linked the society-wide decline in property crime rates to the improving economy. Grant and Martinez (1997) employed a state-by-state approach and found a connection between job loss due to worker displacement and higher crime rates. The authors argued that the elimination of manufacturing jobs due to global economic change produced a sense of abandonment on the part of labor. In that context displaced labor was predisposed to engage in criminal behavior. The impact of lack of employment opportunity on crime rates may be compounded by segregation and race. Grim employment prospects for young black urban males may also have an effect on criminal involvement and crime rates. Inner-city unemployment is more likely to be perceived as permanent by those affected, rendering them more likely to consider illegitimate options (Duster 1987, 306–9). In this connection, a study by Shihadeh and Ousey (1998) found that there is a strong link between homicide rates and employment opportunity. Specifically, their research found that industrial restructuring, especially the elimination of entry-level types of employment, was connected with higher levels of violence among young men. However, this study found that the effects were no different for blacks or whites. Other studies also found that when social and economic conditions are held constant there is no racial variation in the incidence of violent crimes (Lee 2000; Martinez, Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008). In this light it appears that any general perception that minorities are more prone to criminal behavior is due to the fact that minorities are disproportionately affected by high unemployment rates and the lack of local employment opportunities.

Research conducted in black, Latino, and white neighborhoods in Brooklyn revealed that the amount of property crimes they harbored and the length of time that young men remained involved depended largely on the availability of economic opportunities. The black neighborhood, with shrinking numbers of commercial establishments, experienced a higher number of predatory crimes than the other neighborhoods due to the fact that there were few opportunities for targeting commercial properties. The Latino neighborhood contained factories owned and operated by outsiders, which were a favorite target of young burglars. Stolen goods were sold within the neighborhood at discount prices to residents who were ambivalent about the morality of the practice. In neither of these neighborhoods were residents acquiescent with regard to predatory crime that victimized *local* people, and it was highly advisable that young residents pursue any such activities outside their own territory. In the white neighborhood, participation in criminal activity was reportedly lower among young people. Although crime among white youths was economically motivated, it typically ended when young men found legitimate jobs through family and neighborhood networks (McGahey 1986, 253–54). It was this last feature that set apart delinquent activities among the three groups—the

probability of a satisfactory economic future within the legitimate mainstream as one outgrew adolescence.

Somewhat distinct from issue of employment opportunity is the question of the relationship between *inequality* or *poverty* and crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Krivo and Peterson 1996; Messner and Tardiff 1986; Martinez 1996; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Patterson 1991; Heimer 1997). Recall James Q. Wilson's point that it is the culture of the lower class that is at work in promoting common crime. The research that has focused on poverty and crime most often attempts to present a balanced treatment of structural and cultural factors. Most writers point to the geographic mobility of jobs and the middle and working class who have left the inner city and the poor behind (William Julius Wilson's argument reviewed earlier in the chapter). This ecological factor, as we have termed it, is actually a bridge between cultural and structural interpretations of disadvantage. It focuses on the relative isolation of the urban poor and the emergence of a local culture that is destructive to hopes of social mobility. Among the destructive cultural influences associated with crime, the most frequently identified include young single women giving birth, routine family violence, and the adoption of communication and other personal styles that are out of step with mainstream expectations and therefore inhibit upward mobility (Krivo and Peterson 1996; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Heimer 1997).

Shihadeh (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Shihadeh and Ousey 1996) emphasized the ecology of *social isolation* that is associated with high crime rates in the inner city. It is argued that the segregation of poor blacks in neighborhoods that are increasingly homogeneous in terms of class as well as race results in a concentration of social disadvantage. Not only are lower-income minority neighborhoods cut off from an adequate supply of entry-level jobs and the information networks that might help people find work, but also the people who live there are surrounded by dysfunctional ghetto adaptations that represent countercultural habits, which place a behavioral barrier between them and employment. What the authors had in mind includes "the cool and aggressive pose of young men, where clothing, hairstyles, facial expressions and gait are all used to shore up an identity of physical toughness," where childbearing is the means to recognition and prestige for unmarried girls, where violence is seen as an acceptable method of resolving grievances. In these neighborhoods, where there is a failure of neighbors to exert control over the behavior of others, the stigma of social and economic failure is removed—even the stigma of having served time in prison is neutralized (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996, 1331–32).

While those who make the argument say it is not a culture of poverty interpretation (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996), they point out that ghetto street culture stands convention on its head, that it adopts a set of styles and a logic that are perfectly opposed to the way people who are going to get ahead in the world behave and think. Their findings, based on a comparison of the numbers of major crimes and the degree of segregation in large cities (alternatively, the degree of middle-class suburbanization), bear out at least the physical or spatial aspect of the isolation argument. That is, cities with higher levels of black isolation have higher levels of black murder and robbery (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996), and cities with higher levels of black suburbanization also have higher black inner-city crime rates (Shihadeh and Ousey 1996). Krivo and Peterson (1996) also articulated the relationship between social class and crime in terms of cultural and behavioral qualities, but they

argued that the concentration of poverty in not simply poor but *extremely disadvantaged* neighborhoods is the key link to crime, not necessarily racial isolation. Their research, comparing crime and poverty in different neighborhoods in Columbus, Ohio, showed that while gross rates of violence were nearly three times as high in black neighborhoods, the difference between black and white neighborhoods was drastically reduced when the economic status of residents was controlled. They suggested that the small remaining differences might be explained by the greater concentration of public housing in black neighborhoods and by the larger and more isolated character of extremely disadvantaged black districts.

To summarize, there is clearly a link between both unemployment and poverty, on the one hand, and violence and street crime, on the other. The degree to which this relationship is directly determined by social status or economic exclusion and the degree to which criminal behavior is mediated by cultural values and habits remains open to question. To show that there is a statistical link between poverty and crime, and then to posit the importance of the moral breakdown of poor neighborhoods as a key to understanding that linkage, may obscure as much as it appears to explain. While it would be foolish to dispute the notion that poor neighborhoods carry within them cultural influences that encourage criminal options, this is not the same as saying that we have discovered within the subcultural attributes of poverty the root causes of criminal behavior. We must still explain what has given rise to and isolated these cultural pockets that impact the behavior of a greater proportion of some racial groups than others in a society where minorities are confronted by serious structured inequalities.

Today, part of the structural reality of crime is that there is an informal economy operating throughout the world, some of it operating outside the law, much of it within the boundaries of large cities, where it flourishes in poor neighborhoods, shanty towns, and ethnic minority neighborhoods—because these are the places where conditions restrict opportunities for legal employment and entrepreneurship. The illegal sectors of informal economy include drug traffic, prostitution and other illegal services, extortion, and the full range of the usual street crimes. The strategy of attacking or correcting the subcultures that we encounter in these places, thereby attempting to get at the root causes of crime, is questionable. It is the same as the strategy of building more prisons, which will accommodate a disproportionate number of the poor and other marginalized peoples of any society in which crime is a problem. The link between poverty or economic dislocation and crime has been established. To then pursue interpretations that cause us to consider cultural attributes of the poor and the otherwise disconnected may be a distraction from the main issue. Some would say that such a conclusion involves a value judgment. The conclusion and the criticism are a reflection of the ideological nature of the debate over the causes of crime.

A number of points should be made in closing our discussion of crime. First, with regard to crime and race, our discussion shifts too easily from a discussion of one to a discussion of the other. This reflects two real features of criminal issues in the United States. The vast majority of African Americans and other minorities feel the same way about crime as do other members of society, and although the bulk of criminal episodes are intraracial, the prevailing mindset has historically identified crime, especially violent crime, as interracial, with black or other minority perpetrators and white victims. Also, blacks and Latinos are disproportionately represented among prison

populations. Nevertheless, dwelling on the connection between race and crime as we have done here associates, however inadvertently, minorities with negative images. Also, regardless of whether cultural or structural factors are emphasized in discussions of problems associated with minorities, one may come away with an image of a victimized people in desperate circumstances: Either they victimize themselves through dysfunctional subcultures or are helpless in the face of historical or global forces that push them aside. Both images are inaccurate. There is now an emphasis in African American scholarship that stresses the integrity of the culture of working-class African Americans and the strength reflected in the efforts of families and individuals to make a life for themselves under the adverse conditions that have prevailed historically and still prevail today (Goings and Mohl 1996). A discussion of the problems still faced by this minority should take nothing away from this positive emphasis.

To focus on the illegitimate behaviors of the disadvantaged causes us to miss two other critical features of crime in the United States. Critics have argued that an overemphasis on the role of the poor in most thinking about crime ignores the more serious kinds of criminality and greed in high places that can result in higher economic costs and more suffering society-wide than what the poor can manage to do to each other and to the rest of society. Since our interest here is urban sociology, however, government and corporate crimes are too tangential to warrant exploration. Wall Street may have an urban address, but there is little that systematically links white collar crime to the urban environment—the subject matter of urban sociology.

A further consequence of focusing on the criminal behavior of the minority poor is to miss the fact that the majority of the victims of inner-city crime are also minorities. This is the intraracial feature of crime and victimization. Minority poor have the highest victimization rates for property and violent crimes. Among a sample of African American men and women aged sixty-five or older in Atlantic City, New Jersey, 51 percent knew someone who had been victimized within the previous twelve-month period, and 27 percent had themselves been victimized. Not surprisingly, 83 percent of the men and 70 percent of the women (men had somewhat higher victimization rates) were classified as having a "high fear of crime" (Joseph 1997). While the rest of society continues to worry about the dangers that city streets full of poor young minority males pose for them, there appears to be less of a sense of urgency that the greatest danger these young people pose is to each other. Black men are roughly six times as likely to be killed as white men. How concerned or aware was wider society between 2000 and 2007 when crime rates in general were falling across the country, but black teenage homicide rates increased by 34 percent for boys between the ages of fourteen and seventeen? Whether or not an individual becomes engaged in violence on the inner-city block or in the public housing project is not entirely a matter of personal choice. Here, the day-to-day strategy involves avoiding trouble when possible and confronting it when necessary. Williams and Kornblum's (1985, 74) young subjects told them that it was better to face a fight and lose than to run away. Those who appeared afraid to fight faced intimidation and extortion; in effect, access to public space was denied to them. In such an environment, where there is no opportunity to appeal to the formal forces of law and order, there is an appealing logic to the adage "strength in numbers." The first-person accounts of Sanyika Shakur (1993), Nathan McCall (1994), and others of gang life, criminal involvement, and the brutality of the streets are chilling.

The families of these young gang members were not at all in total disarray, but the streets of the segregated society in which they lived were a compelling influence in their lives. Children in their preteen years are recruited into a world where children expect to encounter street skirmishes where people their age will kill and be killed, where young men are likely to do some prison time once they outgrow the juvenile detention system.

Placemark 9.2—In the Line of Battle

One of the troubling things about a war far away is that, after the initial shock of the first news of casualties, we become numbed by the continuing reports of dead and wounded. This emotional callusing over reportedly happens for combatants and for civilians caught in the line of battle, but it is different. People directly subject to it are forever changed by the experience of warfare. Samuel Greengard and Charlene Marmer Solomon (1995) spoke to young people in some of the violent neighborhoods of Los Angeles. For the most part, their essay allows those whose lives had been touched by violence to speak for themselves. Here are some of their words.

A fourteen-year-old boy reported that he was watching a little league baseball game with his parents. "All of a sudden, we started hearing these loud noises, like firecrackers, and we all started running because it sounded like they were getting closer. It was two rival gangs shooting at each other. I was really scared. I wanted to stay as close to my family as I could. I saw my mom start running with my sister, and then my dad grabbed us and we all started running. . . . Now, whenever I see on the news or in the paper there are all these incidents where innocent people get killed . . . I see my family running."

An eighteen-year-old, eleventh-grade student counts herself lucky because no one in her family has died or been injured as a result of street violence. She can't say the same of friends. Some time after her first brush with violence, when a girlfriend standing beside her was wounded in a drive-by shooting, she was at a party when an argument broke out between rival gangs. "The guns came out . . . I ran out of the house . . . A bunch of us were on the ground . . . I heard a lot of shots, and then a guy I know yells, 'They hit me! They hit me! I don't want to die!' Then I hear an ambulance. But before the ambulance could leave, I heard him say one last time, 'I'm dying, I'm dying.' And then he died. He was 21—he had a little daughter." Psychologists say that young people exposed to this kind of violence are permanently transformed; they never get over it. One who has worked with young people and families of victims says the result is that "there is a feeling of helplessness and powerlessness that goes along with being a victim of a crime. There's usually a general preoccupation with the event—and that makes it difficult to focus on other things. For kids, there's a profound feeling of vulnerability. They believe nobody can protect them. And when kids are victimized in a significant way, they are no longer able to trust; they see the world as a menacing place. No amount of reassurance can make them feel safe again."

Wider society expresses confusion and distaste regarding the largely intraracial warfare between young men that takes place in the inner city. Wider society insists that order be restored by the police. In the neighborhoods where armed teenagers police their own streets, trespassers, other armed teenagers, may be shot on sight. An adversarial stalemate has crystallized between desperate young men and society. Some scholars argue that some proportion of minority incarceration rates is due to prejudicial arrest and sentencing procedures. While room for debate remains, evidence suggests that courts and especially pretrial decisions are biased against Latino and black defendants (Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch 1987, 181–86). Even the way crimes are classified and the length of sentences for particular crimes can have implications for the unequal treatment of minorities. Minnesota was among the states that imposed stiffer penalties for possession and sale of crack cocaine in contrast to cocaine powder. The law classified possession of three or more grams of crack cocaine as a third-degree felony punishable by up to twenty years of imprisonment; possession of up to ten grams of cocaine powder was a fifth-degree felony punishable by a maximum of five years in prison. Ninety-seven percent of persons arrested for crack were black, while 80 percent arrested for possession of powder were white (Alexander and Gyamerah 1997). The fact that the state moved subsequently to eliminate the inequity only underlines the fact that the legal system has at times been biased against minority citizens. At the federal level Congress was still in the process of considering the elimination of similarly unfair cocaine penalties in early 2009.

Poor people in the inner city have a different relationship with the official organs of state than do most other Americans. Public hospitals are crowded; emergency rooms are places where an individual can wait for hours to be treated for serious illness or injuries by an overworked staff; and the wait for an ambulance is more life threatening than in other urban districts. Few poor people have medical insurance. Police are slow to respond to emergency calls; they are perceived as unsympathetic and ineffectual, as antagonistic and dangerous. This leads to a proscription against complying with police requests for information when they are investigating a crime: Among young people, a *snitch* is not an honorable status in a poor neighborhood, even when members of the local community are victimized.

At a time when there is general concern about security and safety in the public schools, inner-city students are particularly concerned about protection from their fellow students. In the United States, it was estimated in the 1990s that perhaps 100,000 students carried a gun to school each day. A survey of inner-city high schools in four states found 35 percent of males and 11 percent of female students readily admitted that they carried a gun (they weren't specifically asked if they regularly took their gun to school). Over 11 percent of male students and 1.5 percent of female urban high school students in Seattle said they owned a gun, and a third of these reported having shot at someone at least once. Those inner-city students who regularly carry weapons are more likely to be involved in illegal activities, but a significant number reported they carried a weapon only to defend themselves (Page and Hammermeister 1997). In recognition of the hazards of attending school, 35 percent of the largest U.S. school districts employed metal detectors by the late 1990s. An article in *American School & University* recommended in the interest of safety classroom telephones with quick-dial 911 features be installed (consistent

with the recommendation of the U.S. Department of Education and the National School Safety Center), that teachers and other school officers be equipped with wireless phones, and that surveillance cameras be set up inside and outside the schools to monitor activity continuously—in addition to the installation of metal detectors (Day 1999, 54–55). Such an environment may be perceived by inner-city youth as a reminder of the general hazards of their existence and do little to foster a feeling that they are secure for the time being from confrontation with victimizers or rivals. At any rate, they are likely to know from experience that security measures designed for their protection do not extend beyond the immediate school environment. Part of the structural reality in which poor people live involves the nature of, or lack of, institutional support from various layers and agencies of government. When a segment of the population is neglected or allocated substandard support, this is not a reflection of the cultural values of the neglected poor or minority population itself but of the cultural values of the wider society in which they live.

It is easy to get public officials and academics to agree that changes in the international economy and domestic restructuring have presented cities with major problems and that poverty is one of the consequences of these changes. Yet when discussion turns to the question of what policies would be practical to pursue to alleviate urban poverty, the focus reverts to the problem of culture and what poor people can do to help themselves. This is not surprising because if some version of the culture of poverty is the cause of poverty, then remedies take the form of educating or reforming the poor. From a liberal perspective, head-start and job-training programs are an effective way to change attitudes and habits. From a conservative perspective, nothing will work, short of forcing people to go to work and putting bad actors in prison; beyond this, policy measures should remain minimal. A radical perspective remains focused on the structural roots of the problem, the international economy, and domestic restructuring. It sees in the hostile environment of segregated inner cities the attitudes and behaviors of isolated people, especially young people, who in the absence of institutional guidelines make up the rules of their world as they go as they attempt to negotiate an environment that is dangerous and offers few positive options. This focus has so far taxed the will and imagination of America with regard to what effective policies might be employed to alleviate poverty and its correlates, much less eradicate them.

In chapter 10, we will consider the kinds of policies that the United States has pursued with regard to its cities and contrast these with the nature of policies carried out in other countries. A key criterion that will be employed to evaluate the various strategies will be that of social justice: the question of which segment of a nation's population is best served by its urban policies. Most particularly, we will be interested in the impact of policy on the urban poor.

10

Urban Policy

In this chapter, we deal with urban policy. Archeological evidence clearly shows that deliberate efforts by public authorities to manage and control the urban environment date from the time of the earliest known cities. Since these early times, the complexity of the task of controlling urban growth and change has increased along with changes in technology and the greater size of cities. Urban policymakers and planners confront the objective of maintaining an orderly environment under conditions of constant change while balancing the often conflicting goals of economic development, social justice, and environmental protection (Campbell and Fainstein 1996, 7). Because of the diversity of interests that exist in cities, any decision made by urban planners will be seen as best serving the interests of some while ignoring or minimizing the needs of others. We begin our discussion with the recognition that urban policymaking is controversial in terms of how much is desirable as well as what kind.

THE NATURE OF URBAN POLICY

The chief characteristic of policymaking is that it is an attempt to impose a government-initiated *command* structure on an environment that would otherwise be produced by a multitude of private decisions. It represents the authority of government to say no to certain kinds of individual choices in the name of protecting the rights and welfare of other citizens. In the case of urban policy, this might involve, for example, restricting private interests from establishing businesses or building certain types of structures incompatible with existing property uses (e.g., privately owned residences) in a particular area. In most of the cases that we can imagine, such restrictions would seem to serve the interests of all concerned and impose minimum costs on any party. However, we can also anticipate that policies that restrict the location of certain kinds of industry to areas distant from residential areas, and concentrate them in particular zones where competition for sites bids up the

price of land for development, will lead to complaints about government interference with private enterprise.

The tension between government command authority and private interests is immediately evident. In the name of creating order, how far should a system go in restricting private initiative and individual freedoms? The answer to the question always comes as a matter of degree, since all societies impose restrictions on what their citizens may do. This is because there is a general understanding that one individual's choice may contravene another's welfare and rights. It should be apparent that the need for such controls is likely to be felt most keenly in densely built environments that contain large numbers of people and extremes of wealth and deprivation. That is, the urban arena itself intensifies the perception of the need for the imposition of public controls.

The task of overseeing the making and remaking of cities falls jointly to government officials and professionally trained planners. The former provide authority for controlling the urban environment through legislation, while the latter provide through their professional training particular schemes for promoting orderly change. The questions that sociologists and others ask of these agents are, first, whether their plans are sufficiently far reaching to make a real difference, and second, which segments of the population are best served by their policies.

Different political and economic systems around the world vary widely in the degree to which urban policy is an important, comprehensively treated priority. Having said this, at this juncture in the evolving history of urban planning, we may make a broad generalization. If we picture a continuum of urban policies ranging from the most restrictive government-imposed control structure at one extreme to the most hands-off policy of market-determined urban change at the other, we can place classic socialist nations like the old Soviet Union toward the command end, mid-twentieth-century European states toward the middle, and the United States toward the minimal-interference end of the continuum. Next, if we were to animate this arrangement—set the cases arranged along the continuum in motion—we would perceive an interesting, convergent movement. Over the course of the last fifty years, the cases toward the more strictly controlled command end of the continuum and those in the middle would slide along the continuum toward the United States. In the past twenty years, this convergence toward a less restrictive management policy has accelerated. The convergence of thinking is, in large part, generated by the model of globalization that insists that government pursue policies that promote rather than restrict the activity of business. This broad generalization tells us that while it is possible to imagine a more fully controlled urban environment, and while some governments have in the past initiated substantial undertakings to direct change, today's cities are shaped largely by market demands and by governments attempting to accommodate to those demands. This does not mean that governments have abandoned all attempts to control the direction of urban change. However, governments have generally scaled back their efforts to impose controls on the direction and shape of urban change and, where possible, attempted to harness market forces to achieve policy goals at the same time as they redefine policy goals to make them consistent with the interests of private enterprise. This trend in thinking is as true in the People's Republic of China as it is in the United States. What the scaling back of

urban-planning goals means, in less abstract terms, will become clearer in the course of this chapter.

EARLY PLANS: THE GRAND SCALE AND THE HUMANE ORDER

In the United States, the urban-planning tradition is rooted in efforts to create order out of the disorderly and congested environments created by rapid population growth and industrial expansion. In the older northern cities that had been growing since colonial times this meant struggling with makeovers. For the new cities of the westward expansion, it meant attempting to avoid disorder by imposing orderly growth from the outset in uniform city blocks where numbered avenues and streets intersected at right angles. In older industrial cities there were practical problems of water and air pollution, of health-threatening inadequacies of outmoded sewage systems and crowded and decaying housing, of clogged transportation arteries. By early in the twentieth century, although there were some leading social theorists (the Social Darwinists) who insisted that any government meddling would be sure to do more harm than good, the conditions of older industrial cities made it abundantly clear that here the general welfare could not be left to private choices. The earliest urban-planning activities undertaken by public authorities were to expand thoroughfares, provide for public transportation, upgrade sewers and water supplies, and oversee the provision of gas and electricity (Sutcliffe 1981, 5).

While municipal authorities were engaged in the practical and pressing day-to-day problems of keeping the city running, others were inspired by the shortcomings of the urban environment to dream lofty dreams of the perfectibility of the urban form. These were an important few who saw in the conditions of the city both the inequities of the machine age and the potential for creating a more Utopian mode of living. Urban designers like Ebenezer Howard, Le Corbusier, and Frank Lloyd Wright thought that any plans to remold the human environment would be useless if the "benevolent humanism that motivated them" resulted in schemes that would merely cover up, rather than alter, the basic inequities they perceived to be a part of their society (Fishman 1977, 5). While the ideas put forward by the Utopian visionaries attracted a large audience, the practical impact of their schemes remained limited. Their visions deserve our attention as hypotheses of what might be if one person were given power of command to implement that person's idea of the ideal urban society. Democratic societies, by their nature, resist such an arrangement.

Ebenezer Howard's vision of the more perfect human habitat provides a good example of just how ambitious the early planners could be in pursuit of their revolutionary social goals of improving life for all members of society. All physical details of the new society would have to be anticipated and laid out in a way such that every person would have convenient access to all the services and amenities that society had to offer. Howard was attracted by the potential advancements that great cities like London offered but repelled by the extremes of wealth and want they produced. A totally planned and managed environment could provide livelihood and satisfy the other needs of all citizens. A large part of the trouble, he believed, was that town and country had until then been considered the only two possible

forms of settlement. In his book *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, he proposed to combine the most favorable features of these two more limited forms. He envisioned a setting that combined "all the advantages of the most energetic and active town life with all the beauty and delight of the country" (Howard [1902] 1965, 42–46).

The kernel of his idea—the desirability of maintaining open, green spaces within newly planned towns—found limited implementation in the British towns of Letchworth (founded in 1903) and Welwyn (1920). In the United States in the 1930s, his work also inspired a few experimental "greenbelt cities," largely residential housing tracts that we would perceive as typically "suburban." But aside from the idea that people would benefit from more green space, his Utopian social vision was destined to remain no more than an idea. No authority existed in free societies to impose such a total plan on citizens.

The ideas of the French planner, Le Corbusier, suffered the same fate. They drew attention, even from government officials, and the architect-planner was given commissions to carry out limited implementations of the physical aspects of his visions, but his socialist goals went beyond the limited authority of a democratic state. Where Howard was committed to decentralizing the city, Le Corbusier believed that the concentration of population in large skyscrapered cities was the key to efficiency and improved living standards for all. Today, his drawings strike us as unremarkable representations of contemporary, high-rise urban living. But we must remember that he was working on his ideas in the early part of the twentieth century and that he had more in mind than apartment house architecture. For Le Corbusier, the urban problem was that workers, unhappy with their material conditions (recall the French sociologist Émile Durkheim's concern with worker "anomie" in chapter 3), were particularly frustrated with the condition of their housing. Their limited shelter was all too clearly a holdover from an older technological era. Better housing for the whole population played a central part in Le Corbusier's thinking about a new and more equitable social order. But his plans went far beyond housing to the very restructuring of society. The city of the future would necessitate a hierarchical administrative structure that would see to all phases of social and economic life, including the cooking and laundering that was formerly performed within each household. With their staffs of gourmet chefs, housekeeping services, and laundries, Le Corbusier's massive apartment blocks resembled, by his own admission, the ocean liners of his era (Fishman 1977, 192–98).

An important feature of Le Corbusier's ideas was that they were designed to free people from the drudgery of everyday chores. The implications for freeing especially women from household maintenance are significant. And this was no scheme for the laboring class to more fully serve the needs of the rich: All households would receive the benefits of the proposed services. But in practical terms, Le Corbusier believed his plan would necessitate a strict hierarchy of command authority for its implementation since, he believed, the sweeping changes he proposed would have to be imposed from above. The implementation of such changes meant that planners needed both the authority for the acquisition of property and state or privately provided economic resources for their acquisition. When Le Corbusier turned from the drawing board and lecture hall to seek government help in the execution of his plans, he found that the key reality confronting the planner

was that the urban landscape was divided into thousands of privately held parcels of property. His quest for the ideal city became a search for government structures that would give him the power of implementation. He was not successful (Fishman 1977, 205–12).

Much can be learned from contemplating the elaborate visions of Howard and Le Corbusier. Their work has been described as naive utopianism, on the one hand, and inhumanly formalized and rigid, on the other. Referring to such magnificent schemes generically as "Big Plans," Kolson (2001, 5) comments, "Everyone knows that [such plans] are not easily effected. For one thing, the Big Plans that people generate compete with one another, which means that the execution of any particular one may require a measure of force or fraud." By this he means that they require universal compliance on the part of citizens, which may be brought about by grand deception of citizens who must give up certain freedoms of choice. The idealism of the grand scheme is largely a feature of the past. In the present, elaborate idealizations of coordinated beehived cityscapes are the stuff of science fiction rather than the planning profession. Yet there are individuals who continue to think on a grand scale and in terms of the total plan that will produce a controlled and more efficient human environment. One, Paolo Soleri, worked on a small scale and without the support of government. Soleri's vision took him to central Arizona where he, a small staff, and a shifting band of students and elder volunteers created Arcosanti, an environment of steel and concrete that is neither an urban landscape nor altogether not an urban space. It is more a campus, growing slowly and organically as a totally planned environment, where those who longed for a more enlightened vision of urban possibility could work and exchange ideas and have a sense that they were participating in a rich alternative. The work was funded only by donations, the proceeds from seminars, and the sale of the Cosanti Foundation trademark pottery and bronze-cast bells. Arcosanti is a demonstration project, an experiment in the efficient use of space through unified design. Its projected total population at maturity, between 6,000 and 7,000 people, is not the answer to environmental problems posed by the contemporary megacity.

As much as by Soleri's philosophy, the citizens of Arcosanti are driven by the idea of exploring an alternative to what they see as a wasteful use of space unfolding in the United States and particularly in the desert Southwest. The deserts and the mountains of Arizona and other southwestern states, with their delicate arid ecologies, are being consumed with unprecedented efficiency by suburban housing developers. Arcosanti may appear in its small scale not to be an effective answer to market-driven sprawl, but for its many annual visitors, it manages to raise the question of alternative futures, serves as a classroom where people are encouraged to think about the collective impact of our lifestyle, and acts as a reminder that currently we proceed without any vision but the powerful one of individual choice expressed in terms of home ownership.

Today, the approach taken by official organs of government planning have an agenda quite distinct from that of urban visionaries, past and present. Whereas visionary planners may have erred in assuming that too much was possible through the revision of the urban environment, more recent planning efforts may be characterized as piecemeal and inconsistent.

THE RECORD OF URBAN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

In the rapidly growing cities of nineteenth-century America, bristling with entrepreneurial ambition, there was a sense that growth needed to be controlled and directed as well as encouraged. At the very least, there were practical concerns related to the efficient flow of business—the placement and width of public thoroughfares, the provision of adequate water supplies, sewage conduits and treatment plants, and so on. And beyond such basic practical concerns there was also a sense that people would benefit from open and green areas, something to counteract the "visual squalor without parallel in the industrializing world" that uncontrolled building and public signboard advertising had created in the cities of the United States (Sutcliffe 1981, 92–97). Of the two types of concerns, the practical variety received the most attention from government. As Max Weber had told us in his essay on the nature of cities, the city is a marketplace, first and foremost. While urban planning in the United States has always had an aesthetic architectural element, ensuring the smooth operation of commerce has always been a dominant principle. When a substantial portion of San Francisco was destroyed by earthquake and fire in 1906, there was already an officially commissioned plan in hand for renovating the city by reproportioning the size of city blocks and broadening streets. The devastation of the city offered a perfect opportunity to put the plan into effect, but it was scrapped in favor of rebuilding structures where they had stood, in order to get on with business as quickly as possible (Sutcliffe 1981, 88, 102–15).

The visionary version of urban design did have its moment in North America in the City Beautiful movement. The vision was embodied in the White City, a theme park–like celebration of the journeys of Columbus at the 1893 Columbian Exposition and Fair in Chicago. It was a kind of demonstration project featuring temporary white-painted plaster buildings designed and constructed by a team led by Daniel Burnham and Frederick Law Olmsted that was intended to reflect the possibilities of the urban form. The City Beautiful movement was dedicated to the idea that the unsightliness and disorder of the typical urban streetscape of the time stifled urban life. If these scenes could be replaced by architecturally sculpted ones, then the inspiration of life in beautiful cities could be realized. Daniel Burnham warned, "Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men's blood" (Kolson 2001, 56). But the big plans of the City Beautiful movement were thwarted by practical considerations, and while the movement's ideas were implemented in a piecemeal fashion in some cities, holistic visionary planners and their plans soon faded from the urban landscape.

It is not surprising that the practicality of any effort to tamper with existing patterns of land use tends to be judged by its promise to stabilize property values and enhance the efficiency of the city as a business arena. The approach is consistent with the view that circumstances that benefit business benefit all citizens, that within the market system the prosperity of private enterprise is a shared good. The position is reflected in the words of architects, including the same Daniel Burnham, proposing a planning philosophy for the city of Chicago little more than a decade after the closing of the Columbian Exposition: "How are we living? Are we in reality prosperous? Is the city a convenient place for business? Is it a good labor market in the sense that labor is sufficiently comfortable to be efficient and content?"

(Burnham and Bennett 1909, 32–33). The reality of the matter was that planners had to sell their ideas to public administrators. They did this by emphasizing the need to protect capital with minimal interference, with plans that emphasized "partial reform through efficiency techniques that transformed obsolete land uses into more productive values" (Boyer 1983, 70). Plans that found the greatest acceptance were those that were pro capital, simple, and limited in their scope. Ideas that were redistributive smacked of socialism and faced the greatest resistance. Two widely accepted planning strategies illustrate the point: zoning and housing policy.

The most popular and widespread government-imposed restriction of the twentieth century was zoning. Zoning divides the spatial area of a city into districts where certain types of building and land uses are permitted and others are banned. By 1913, for example, cities in some states in the upper Midwest had banned commercial and manufacturing businesses from certain designated residential areas. The strategy was designed to protect property values for homeowners. New York City in 1916 implemented a more detailed zoning ordinance in response to demands by owners of department stores in fashionable Fifth Avenue locations who were concerned about the encroachment of noisy manufacturing establishments. For the homeowner as well as the large investor in real estate, the practical benefits of zoning were evident, and the measure was rapidly and widely adopted by city governments. Zoning represents the approach that protects investment with minimal interference. It remains symbolic of urban planning in its most limited form.

While the protection of private property provides an example of readily acceptable market goals, the question of government responsibility for ensuring an adequate housing supply is just the kind of social welfare goal that has historically drawn criticism and resistance from entrepreneurs and other taxpayers in the United States. As noted in chapter 7, the Hoover administration resisted demands for a federal housing policy during the depths of the Great Depression, in what proved to be the futile hope that developers and builders would discover a profitable way to provide housing for people with low incomes. Pressure remained on the government to intervene directly in upgrading housing. Pointing to examples from Europe where many governments had for decades supplemented the private housing market with government-provided housing, critics argued that the failure to enact similar policies amounted to government negligence of families with modest incomes. The aging and overcrowded housing stock in U.S. cities made housing conditions a national embarrassment both during the Depression and in the post–World War II years. Ultimately, the country publicly and legally committed itself to the provision of "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of low income" in the Housing Act of 1937. Congress reaffirmed its commitment in the Housing Act of 1949, declaring "that the general welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage." The government has never come close to meeting its obligation. In the following section, we review the major components of government housing programs that actually represent over time a retreat from the kind of commitment to the provision of housing contained in the housing acts that remain the law of the land. Whereas zoning laws represented minimal interference with market freedom and stabilized investment environments, government housing programs involve a sustained commitment of public

funds and creative energies to the massive task of creating millions of wholesome dwellings for the least advantaged cross-section of society. While the difference in the success of the two programs may have been predictable, the degree to which the United States has failed to establish an effective housing policy is an example of the very limited and inconsistent nature of urban planning.

Housing Programs in the United States

Historically, the two most ambitious programs related to the provision of housing in the United States were the urban-renewal and the public-housing programs. While urban renewal was not a housing program per se, it had a significant impact on the existing urban-housing supply both through demolition of the existing stock and the planned provision of replacement units. The public housing program represents a limited foray by government into the direct provision of housing for the poor.

Urban Renewal

This program provided federal support for the revitalization of decaying districts of inner cities, and was most actively pursued from the early 1950s through the 1970s. Within the renewal site—which would include several city blocks—old buildings, including housing units, were torn down to make way for new structures that integrated businesses and residential units. Each project involved a partnership between federal and local government and private enterprise.

Locally, the renewal process was set in motion by the official designation by local government of "blighted areas" to be subject to "slum clearance." Planning, administration, property acquisition, clearance of existing structures, and site improvement were public costs shared by the federal government (which provided two-thirds of the expenditures for each project) and local government. Improved sites were sold to private developers, with taxpayers absorbing the difference between government expenditures and the resale price.

The partnership between government and industry was, in fact, more extensive. Local renewal projects had to be proposed as a package to the federal government, which provided the bulk of the initial funding for the project. The federal agency evaluated each proposed project in terms of its potential for returning a profit on investment—that is, the commercial viability of the completed plan. The selection of particular sites by local governments was heavily influenced from the outset by developers, lending institutions, and other interested partners for whom the enterprise was an investment gamble, heavily subsidized by government though they were. Since federal requirements specified that local governments and investors would have to make a case for the *economic* viability of a particular package, it is not surprising that the worst, most desperate slums were not necessarily selected for clearance under urban-renewal plans due to their poor strategic location and their lack of promise for redevelopment as commercial sites.

Urban renewal soon became one of the most controversial government-sponsored urban programs. In addition to often neglecting the worst tracts of inner-city hous-

ing, government could condemn and raze decent residential buildings adjacent to a selected site in order to consolidate "buildable packages" or blocks of land (Meltzer 1984, 59–61). The 1949 Housing Act that authorized the demolition of run-down housing also specified that rebuilt areas be primarily residential in character. However, there was no real mechanism that insured that the number of destroyed housing units would be rebuilt or that low-rent units would be replaced by similarly priced housing. Criticism mounted that urban renewal amounted to removal of the poor and minorities from the inner cities.

Public Housing

For anyone growing up in the cities of the 1950s, reference to "the projects" could mean only one thing: the government-built housing projects that were home to the poorest and most troubled elements of the population. Projects varied a little in their reputation, but generally there was a stigma attached to the address. To outsiders, the projects meant trouble. The 1950s was the decade when government housing projects were being built, when they were brand new. City by city the conditions and reputation of the projects would get much worse over time.

Over the course of two decades, the government supplemented the private-housing supply with apartment blocks, where units were allocated on the basis of need on an equitable first-come, first-served basis, and where rents were low and assessed on a sliding scale according to the family's ability to pay. One other potentially positive feature of the program was that it was carried out on a massive scale, and a given project typically provided space for hundreds or thousands of needy family units. Yet, all the potential merits of the plan hid liabilities that soon became evident.

The stigma that quickly became attached to living in the projects meant that most families who gravitated to them had no alternative. The effect was to homogenize the residents, insuring that the tenant population would be more or less comprised of those in the lowest-income categories. While the projects were intended to be racially integrated and while many initially were, the conditions of life in the projects and the visibility of minority families in large numbers had the usual effect on white residents: It drove them elsewhere, and most projects became vertical ghettos for black and Latino residents. With regard to fairness in eligibility and rents adjusted to income level, the efforts of government agents to make sure that families qualified for residence, and that income was honestly reported, led to intrusive surveillance policies. Housing authorities arrogated sweeping powers of investigation into family finances (requiring regular, detailed documentation of income from renters) and family living arrangements (restricting who might be allowed to sleep in the apartment, an especially difficult provision for complex families and those who were involved in less institutionalized forms of cohabitation). Housing authority agents had the power to spot check and carry on investigations of tenants' domestic circumstances at will. This changed the meaning of "home" for those whose low incomes did not entitle them to privacy.

The greatest criticism of the city projects was focused on what initially may have appeared to be their most commendable feature: their prodigious size. Given the severity of the urban housing shortage in the United States, the housing strategy

required a dramatic effort if it was going to result in a conspicuous reduction in the number of families with an acute need for shelter. Therefore, individual projects were very often conceived on a grand scale. The Pruitt-Igoe project in St. Louis, which accepted its first tenants in 1954, consisted of thirty-three eleven-story buildings. A total of 2,700 units were built on this centrally located fifty-seven-acre site.

Whatever the size of a particular project, urban land costs demanded that the most efficient use be made of the space that federal dollars would buy. The emphasis, therefore, was on high-rise apartment blocks. Although many of the building designs for the high-rise housing projects won prizes for the architectural innovations they offered, the high-rise public apartment building became a notorious symbol of the failure of the housing program in the United States.

Some of the failure might be attributed to what were thought to be the necessary spending limits: What types of cosmetic features could be justified in buildings designed to house poor people? The elimination of community gathering areas within buildings or of protective grates around structural hazards could mean the difference between a livable and safe environment for families, especially children, and an environment fraught with dangers, including places where gangs of young people could prey on children, the elderly, and each other. The serious problem posed by typical federal housing projects in the inner cities was becoming evident even as new buildings continued to be constructed. Critics pointed to crime, accidents, and the dehumanizing and isolating features associated with this housing strategy.

The Pruitt-Igoe project in St. Louis stood as the most prominent illustration of the unworkability and short life of the mass housing policy for the poor. Although it may have attracted more than its share of notoriety, due to its short life span and the dramatic and well-publicized manner of its destruction, and although it provides merely one extreme example among many, Pruitt-Igoe is an irresistible symbol of the failure of high-rise public housing. The problems of the safety and security of residents, stemming from structural hazards and crime, emerged almost simultaneously with the opening of the project in 1954. By 1958 occupancy rates had begun to decline. Various infusions of public funds, special programs, concentrated social services, and sociological studies failed to remedy the deterioration, crime rate, and despair of tenants who fled the unlivable space. Vacancy rates climbed steadily, from 18 percent in 1961 to 65 percent in 1970. Demolition began in 1972 with the dynamiting of three central buildings and was completed in 1976, two years after the last residents had moved out and just twenty-two years after the first had moved in. Critics blamed the failure on the massive scale and high-rise design, the inadequacy and reductions in routine kinds of funding for the maintenance and operation of the project, and society's failure to address the more fundamental problem of the poverty of tenants (Montgomery 1985, 230–41). All these reasons, and especially the last, would appear to be plausible explanations for the dramatic failure of this attempt to provide shelter for those of modest means.

The task that remains is to explain how a number of older government-sponsored housing projects have continued to provide livable family environments, decade after decade. The answer seems to lie in what the older (and in some cases newer) projects do *not* have in contrast to the high-rise projects. For example, the sites they

occupy are less densely populated on a persons-per-acre basis, and the number of families in any given project is smaller. Many of the developments built on a less-ambitious scale are small enough to be tucked away, to become part of existing neighborhoods, rather than to dominate or eradicate the social fabric of these areas. The urban townhouse, duplex, or apartment building of three or four stories allows parents to watch their children at play outside, and residents are mutually recognizable and more attuned to the presence and behavior of strangers. In addition, the space outside is more inviting, facilitating contact among neighbors.

The Renewed Search for Market Solutions to the Housing Problem

By 1970, government was moving away from the direct provision of housing in favor of paying rent subsidies, enabling low-income households to compete for space in the private housing market. The public-housing program was judged ineffective, and a 1973 report by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) flatly stated that the direct effort of government to provide housing had failed: The report endorsed a direct subsidy program for renters. Government did not simply abandon public-housing projects overnight. By 2007, 1.2 million households still occupied government-supplied housing units, while the number receiving rent subsidies was 1.95 million. In city after city, however, the projects were coming down, while Congress year by year made adjustments in funding for the direct subsidy housing voucher program.

Under the subsidy program, renters operate as relatively independent shoppers seeking housing in the privately owned rental market. Under what is known as the Section 8 program, the federal government provides rent vouchers or rental certificates to households that qualify for the program. To qualify, a family's income cannot exceed 50 percent of the prevailing median income in their county or metropolitan area (HUD establishes and periodically adjusts the income criteria for each area). Each family accepted into the program is responsible for finding a suitable rental unit; suitability is established by formal criteria and by an inspection conducted by a local housing authority acting on HUD's behalf. The family is usually responsible for contributing 30 percent of its adjusted income to the monthly rental, with the balance paid directly to the landlord by the federal agency.

While this program adjusts the income of poor families in a manner that allows them to compete for housing on the open market, it does not adjust the supply of available housing. HUD's budget for rent subsidy is not unlimited, and when all funds budgeted for a local area are allocated, applicants are put on a waiting list. When the wait for housing for families on the list becomes unreasonably long—and sometimes families who qualify wait for years to become actively enrolled—housing authorities close the list. On the supply side, landlords are not obligated to participate in the program and, once in the program, can withdraw from it. Some tire of meeting government standards and repeated inspections; others grow impatient with the perennial debates in Congress over the level of funding that the program will receive. Landlords were tempted to drop families on assistance in favor of more affluent renters in the booming urban economies of the late 1990s that increased the open-market costs of housing rentals more rapidly than the rate

of inflation. According to HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo's spring 2000 *State of the Cities* report, 5.4 million families not receiving housing assistance (12.5 million people) were living in substandard housing and/or paying more than 50 percent of their income in rent.

The record of housing policy in the United States is not a record of progress; it is not a record of finding increasingly effective policies built on past experiences. It is a record of experimentation, of reluctant action inconsistent with the lofty ideals of the 1937 and 1949 housing acts that declared safe and healthy housing a necessity and right for all citizens. As is the case with U.S. urban policy in general, lawmakers appear dedicated to market solutions over commitments to direct intervention to solve what many consider a housing crisis for people with low and moderate incomes. The reluctance of lawmakers to consider adequate shelter a direct responsibility of government is clearly reflected in their withdrawal from the provision of public housing. It is evident in their decision to subsidize instead the private-housing market through rent subsidies, thereby incorporating an element of private enterprise and government partnership into social policy. The acceptability of policy measures that boost market activity is reflected also in the most successful U.S. housing program: the provision of mortgage guarantees and income tax credits that have supported widespread home ownership in middle-class suburbs. Government guarantees have the effect of lowering mortgage interest rates, while the large share of homeowners' monthly payments that go to interest and taxes are fully tax deductible. In effect, this is a generous housing subsidy for the middle class and affluent. The strong symbolic appeal of home ownership, which lies at the heart of the American Dream, has not gone untested as a strategy for providing shelter for individuals and families of modest means.

Urban Homesteading and Project HOPE

Urban homesteading and *Project HOPE* are two government programs that were designed to provide nonaffluent inner-city populations with a chance to own their own homes. Urban homesteading was first unveiled in the 1960s and refined in the 1970s to bring together housing needs, reduce certain government liabilities, and reaffirm popularly acknowledged American values in one package. Poor people needed housing, and government held a large number of abandoned and dilapidated housing units. By applying a label that conjured up a pioneering imagery, the plan involved transferring ownership and responsibility for improvement of units from government to families for a nominal fee. Purchasers, who were eligible for special improvement loans and mortgage rates, agreed to reside in the property for a given period of time and improve it. They were then free to continue to reside in or sell the improved and marketable housing. It was reasoned that families motivated by this type of opportunity would provide stabilizing influences and good role models in the neighborhoods they occupied (Hughes and Bleakly 1975, 3–4; Varady 1986, 47–49).

In 1992 HUD initiated what was to be a short-lived plan to sell public-housing units to tenants and other poor families, in effect condominiumizing some of the remaining still-standing public-housing projects. Given the uplifting label of

Project HOPE I (Home-ownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere), HUD Secretary Jack Kemp declared that it would "bring the power of private property ownership to thousands of low-income families across America. President Bush and I believe every American family should have the chance to realize the American Dream and upward mobility." By the time he left office, Kemp claimed that 55,000 families had become homeowners under the plan (HUD News Releases, August 22 and October 2, 1992). Today, the program has evolved into Project HOPE VI, which is a much more far-reaching experiment in the development of planned communities featuring economically integrated housing. Because it represents the latest thinking in urban redevelopment strategy that has to do with more than housing we return to Project HOPE VI after consideration of its historically antecedent forerunners.

There is considerable controversy as to how well these programs met either the needs of property holders or government. It was difficult for families of modest means to meet the upgrading standards under the urban-homesteading plan. Project HOPE had at least the potential virtue of preserving some number of public housing units, many of which would otherwise have been abandoned and razed. Taken together, the programs, which were aimed at selling off the least desirable units in the national urban-housing stock to the poor, cannot be seen as having a major impact on the needs of the 5.4 million families that were still underhoused in the late 1990s. The reliance on market forces to provide adequate housing for everyone in the economically divided cities of the United States has produced the inevitable: urban landscapes where the haves and have-nots compete for secure shelter, where the affluent wrest upgradeable units from the less affluent, where the battleground for livelihood and shelter drives many concerned property owners into fortified residential retreats, and where downward pressures on the remaining urban housing supply push millions into substandard housing or onto the streets. In the divided cities of the United States, *gentrification* and *gated communities* are produced by individuals and families attempting to create order in the absence of effective policy, and homelessness is the predictable outcome of a housing supply no longer augmented by government efforts and the admission by government that it has failed to meet the needs of the millions who live at the margins between shelter and the street.

Beyond Housing: Limited Strategies to Promote Economic Revitalization

There have been some notable efforts undertaken by the federal government to develop strategies to promote economic revitalization in the inner cities. A model cities program sought to integrate rehabilitative efforts directed at inner-city areas. The New Towns strategy, which hearkened back to the work of Ebenezer Howard, was intended to create enacted (totally planned and built from scratch) urban environments with limited populations and coordinated services and institutions. Enterprise zones and empowerment zones were attempts to jump start economic growth in depressed inner-city areas by providing incentives to induce private businesses to relocate there.

Model Cities

The Model Cities program (mid-1960s to 1974) was designed to concentrate existing federal government stimulus programs—in the form of education, training, jobs programs, economic rehabilitation funds, and housing supports—in a few cities. The concentrated benefits were expected to provide demonstration projects that would bring about meaningful change, showing other cities what was possible through coordinated effort. An additional feature of the plan was the incorporation of local community leadership in the planning process. As a result, the plan for a given community would generate grassroots support among local citizens. Although Model Cities seemed to include all the necessary elements for success, the program contained fatal flaws that emerged in the implementation stage. Whereas the Model Cities plan had been proposed for only a few cities, the legislation that was passed to authorize it increased the number of locations to more than 100. This meant that the funding allocated to the program would be spread too thin, defeating the impact of the program in any given location. Coordination between different federal government agencies responsible for administering the plan failed to materialize, and there was conflict between administrators and grassroots representatives. In 1972, there was a change in philosophy at the national level as Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" administration gave way to Richard Nixon's efforts to disengage government from direct intervention into the problems of urban minorities and the poor. The Model Cities program was terminated, never really having gotten under way (McFarland 1978, 84–88).

New Towns

An alternative strategy to that of rebuilding old urban districts was to start over and build new urban environments somewhere else. Such an approach would largely avoid dealing with the tangled problems of the existing ownership rights of established property holders, of what to do with local poor and minority residents while the redevelopment took place, and of what resistance might develop among locals (because, in effect, there were no locals) in response to the implementation of the master plan. The beauty of such an approach has appealed to planners since Howard's time. Three federally sponsored "greenbelt" towns were constructed in the early 1930s: Greenbelt, Maryland; Greenhills, Ohio; and Greendale, Wisconsin. These early New Towns contained little or no provision for industrial or commercial developments and remained garden suburbs—in the end housing slightly more than 2,100 families among them (Scott 1969, 338–39).

The subsequent revival of the New Town philosophy in the United States has been dominated by towns that were conceived and built as for-profit enterprises with government subsidy. In the 1960s, Lyndon Johnson suggested that self-contained New Towns become part of the general strategy for ameliorating the problems of the inner city, and between 1968 and 1970, Congress passed legislation granting benefits and guarantees to New Town developers. Usually cited as among the most successful private venture New Towns are Radburn, New Jersey; Reston, Virginia; and Columbia, Maryland. Each of these may be judged a success, if success is mea-

sured by whether these are pleasant places in which to live for middle-class families. Radburn, a suburb of New York City, was not from its inception as an enacted community anything like a self-contained settlement or socially integrated town comprised of different social classes. Reston and Columbia were more ambitious efforts at designing complete and class-integrated communities—at the planning stage. But because they represented substantial market ventures for their financial backers, which included major oil companies, developers eventually found it necessary to drop such plans as side-by-side housing for different social classes—too risky a concept given the need to attract affluent families.

New Towns have had a very limited impact on the lives of the average city resident and were too slow to provide a return to corporate investors compared to other ventures. This planning strategy was never intended to address the problem of providing livelihood and a place to live for the city's neediest underhoused and underemployed residents. The problems of cities in the United States have been linked rather convincingly to the inability of the market to create either adequate housing or employment for the inner-city poor: It would have been surprising if these deficiencies could be remedied simply by allowing private enterprise to choose new sites for urban development.

Enterprise and Empowerment Zones

In recent decades, some version of the enterprise zone concept has played a major role in the approach to urban poverty in the United States. The goal has been to match the un- and underemployed urban workforce with newly created jobs by enticing employers into the central city, presenting them with incentives for locating there and for hiring the local unemployed. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank dedicated, in its own words, to the "principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual liberty," has taken credit for importing the idea from the United Kingdom where it was first employed. Conservatives who endorsed the idea argued that this approach to economic revitalization would harness the natural potential of private enterprise to do what bureaucratic command structures were unable to do—to generate sustained economic recovery in blighted areas.

Details vary among different states and cities that have adopted the plan, but they are all modeled to some degree on the first U.S. enterprise zone established in Connecticut. There, qualifying employers in the designated areas were granted a 50 percent reduction in state corporate income tax payments for the first ten years, a five-year 80 percent reduction in local property taxes, a grant of $1,000 for each new job created, grants for job training, and special low-interest loans (Hardison 1981, 10–20). By 1992, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia had enterprise zones: They were located in depressed rural as well as urban areas, and the number of zones varied widely across states. At that time, New York State had 19, while Arkansas had 458, essentially making the entire state an enterprise zone. The success of the zones in creating new jobs is difficult to assess. For example, in central Los Angeles the designation of a zone coincided with an increase in small businesses, but because very few of the new businesses took advantage of the support offered by the plan, most of the new business activity cannot be attributed to the program. The

record is clearer in the Los Angeles community of Watts: The creation of a zone there had little impact, as there was very little increase in the number of businesses (Riposa 1996). However, the federal government position, as expressed through HUD, was that by 1992 enterprise zones had saved or created hundreds of thousands of jobs where those jobs were most needed (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992, 1, 83).

The Clinton administration embraced the enterprise zone approach to urban economic recovery, changing the title of the program and the targeted districts to "empowerment zones" in 1993. The new program required that localities compete for funding by proposing comprehensive plans that addressed not only the creation of jobs but also the coordination of social services and education programs. The community proposals that were successful would receive $100 million in social service grants, along with a range of tax reduction incentives. In addition, a system of advisory and specialist resources networked from the cabinet level down to community citizen councils was set up to assist and monitor the achievement of goals that had originated within the community itself. Within a short time, more than 500 communities applied. Only six received the full support available under the program. About seventy others received some funding (Riposa 1996).

Harlem was one of the winners in the federal funding lottery, receiving $100 million and the full package of tax incentives, to which the state of New York added another $200 million in aid. An article in *Black Enterprise*, however, qualified the benefits of the plan. The new Harlem renaissance would bring a dozen large retail businesses to the area, including Walt Disney, Rite Aid, Pathmark, and the Gap, as well as a Magic Johnson movie theater and a massive retail-entertainment complex, to be located near the Apollo Theater. Community leaders and small business owners were concerned because a disproportionate share of the benefits of the program would go to the new employers, and they worried about the impact on small existing operations that were just getting by (Smith 1997).

In a society committed to allowing private enterprise to provide the leading edge of change, the enterprise zone and empowerment zone programs appear to be a natural outcome in the evolution of social policy; the older enterprise zone approach, especially, minimizes the role of government command or enacted elements and maximizes the role of the market. It provides government payments and subsidies to businesses to draw them into the economic vacuum of the inner cities. In return, business provides work for the unemployed and poor. Critics raised questions about the kinds of jobs, working conditions, and rate of pay received by those employed under the enterprise zone plan. Coldly considered, the inner-city poor in a wealthy nation can be seen as providing a kind of low-income domestic asset within the framework of the global economy. The old enterprise zone schemes of the 1980s made sense within this framework. By combining government subsidies with the lower wages that prevailed in poor districts, the enterprise zone labor force was made more competitive with its overseas counterparts in poor nations. The point was not lost on critics of the plan. They charge that employers received government subsidies to create sweatshop environments allowing poor U.S. laborers to become competitive globally through the creation of Third World conditions at home. The criticism is one-sided, but it provides a useful reminder regarding potential worst-

case outcomes of profit-driven social policies. In order for the Clinton empowerment zone plan to avoid similar criticisms, it was important that the educational and service components of the program remain central and highly visible features. Any tendency for the self-sustaining element of the program, the profit-incentive element, to run ahead of social and community-building provisions would need to be avoided. As we have seen, this has in the past proven difficult in the tradition of urban planning in the United States. Elements of planning programs and entire planning philosophies can dissolve with changes in administration. Early in the George W. Bush administration, HUD announced a rededication of the empowerment zone program. Seventeen billion dollars in tax credits and employment incentives were made available to employers who set up shop in designated economically distressed areas. Benefits to employers included $3,000 for every newly hired employee who lived in the zone, $2,400 for each employee hired from "groups with traditionally high unemployment rates," $3,500 in the first year of employment for each newly hired long-term welfare recipient (and an additional $5,000 in that employee's second year), and a package of various tax reductions and cash assistance provisions to help with start-up expenses. The only supports for community development costs mentioned in a HUD news release were a system of interest-free loans (not direct federal grants) for local school renovation and tax credits for landlords to renovate rental housing located in the zone (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development January 15, 2002).

Project HOPE VI and the New Urbanism: An Uneasy Alliance

The current chapter in urban policy in the United States incorporates something of a radical departure with the piecemeal and inconsistent policies of the past and a carryover of a particularly serious failing of past policy—the provision of an adequate supply of shelter for the poor. The remarkable departure with the past involves the melding of a progressive philosophy espoused by an organized group of academics, architects, and planners, on the one hand, and government sponsorship of the destruction and makeover of inner-city land parcels formerly devoted to public housing for poor people, on the other. The movement reintroduces an element long absent in U.S. urban planning circles, the element of a broad vision for improving the quality of urban life. The movement is identified as the New Urbanism. The government policy considered here is a much evolved Project HOPE VI (in contrast to the limited goals of Project HOPE I discussed earlier). There is a built-in tension between the enlightened mission of the movement and the consequences of the reuse of urban land once devoted to housing for the poor: We will come to that. First, what is the New Urbanism?

New Urbanism

The New Urbanism embraces a set of goals for urban living and the urban experience that is much broader than support for reclaiming public-housing land. It is a movement devoted to remaking urban space so that it is more sociable, inclusive of all people, and is more compatible with present and future energy consumption

considerations. It seeks to reclaim the energizing dimensions of the urban environment in a humane and positive manner. It is the antithesis of metropolitanization that has produced the typical and familiar cityscape. Two of the founding proponents of the New Urbanism school, Duany and Plater-Zyberk identify the problem as they see it.

> The congested, fragmented, unsatisfying suburban sprawl and the disintegrating urban centers of today are not merely products of laissez faire, nor are they the inevitable result of mindless greed. They are thoroughly planned to be as they are: the direct result of zoning and subdivision ordinances zealously administered by planning departments.
>
> If the results are dismaying this is because the model of the city being projected is dismal. These ordinances dictate three criteria for urbanism: the free and rapid flow of traffic, parking in quantity, and the rigorous separation of building use. The result of these criteria are that automobile traffic and its landscape have become the central, unavoidable experience of the public realm (Duany and Plater-Zyberk 2008, 64).

Duany and Plater-Zyberk, and other New Urbanists, believe it is not too late to remake important parts of the urban environment into more socially cohesive communities (Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck 2000, 183–214). The formula advanced is essentially architectural, seeks to promote an integrated urban environment that undoes many of the social inequities that we have described in this text. Specifically, the New Urbanism advocates the development of urban space with the following features:

- the development of neighborhoods that mix shops, offices, services, privately owned homes and rental properties that range from low rent to the apartments and townhouses of the affluent, thereby fostering a diversity of population in close proximity
- architectural strategies that foster interaction, such as homes with front porches built close to sidewalks on tree-lined streets, attractively designed buildings with lots of variety, the orientation of the complex toward a central place—shops or a public green
- projects laid out to encourage pedestrian traffic, mimicking the old walking or cellular cities, where all routine destinations are within a five- or ten-minute walk, with many crisscrossing roads, lanes, and alleys to facilitate access on foot, rollerblade, or bicycle
- a minimization of the use of fossil fuels, eco-friendly buildings and construction methods, the preservation of green pockets despite an emphasis on building in greater density to limit the physical footprint of these developments

In all, the New Urbanism is a philosophy that values the promise of urban living applied to the creation of spaces that capture that quality of experience.

Beyond promoting the construction of local communities that employ the design strategy, the New Urbanism is a social movement (built around the kernel of formal membership of the Congress for the New Urbanism http://www.cnu.org/intro_to_new_urbanism) that advocates for green technologies, energy-efficient means of transportation (especially high-speed rail for interurban travel), and optimally sustainable urban environments. The movement has brought together

scholars and technologists in a number of international conferences, most notably at Harvard in 1999 and Stockholm in 2004. Its goals for cities are consistent with advocates for more humanely and creatively planned urban environments that can inspire human participation and potential from Jane Jacobs (1961) and William H. Whyte (1988) to Charles Landry (2006). The New Urbanism has put vision back into the planning process, with overall proposed city plans at times reminiscent of the polynucleated features of Ebenezer Howard's garden city (Calthorpe 2008, 67). Preliminary indications early in 2009 were that the movement's priorities had an affinity with the thinking of some members of the Obama administration, including director of HUD Shaun Donovan (Steuteville 2009). The support of the New Urbanists for HUD's Project HOPE VI makes sense, but for the moment leaves the nation with an enormous practical housing problem.

Project HOPE VI

This set of government programs seek to end some of the worst leftover problems of U.S. public housing, the massive projects erected decades ago. Poorly conceived and inadequately funded since their construction, many units in the projects slipped into disrepair, whole buildings were declared uninhabitable, abandoned, and eventually demolished. In 2008 less than a million households lived in HUD-owned and managed low-income public housing (U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development 2008, 5). Begun in 1993, Project HOPE VI is a program that converts old public-housing sites, often covering very large tracts of centrally located land parcels, into mixed-use, mixed-income areas. The goal of the conversions is "restoring an urban fabric to blighted superblocks of public housing" (*New Urban News* February 2002). The new sites do away with the isolated nature of the projects as islands of poverty and disorder by building low-rise, economically integrated neighborhoods on smaller blocks with streets that are continuous with the grids of the surrounding areas. And since privately owned properties—homes and businesses—are part of the new system of land use, the area loses the stigma attached to the old "projects." In such New Urbanist areas the social problems that attach to the isolation of the urban poor are ameliorated. The strategy took some of its inspiration from the work of William Julius Wilson (Zhang and Weissmann 2006, 46): recall that Wilson put much of the blame for inner-city crime and joblessness on the concentration of the poor.

A large number of conversions have been built on reclaimed public-housing sites in major cities around the country, including Atlanta, Chicago, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland (Oregon), St. Louis, and Washington, D.C. By 2004 HUD had made HOPE VI grants to 166 cities (Popkin et al. 2004). The Project HOPE VI sites seem to generate satisfaction among residents, the general public, developers and architectural firms, and city governments. The strategy is based on sound planning principles. Yet one serious flaw remains.

A Project HOPE VI site in Chicago absorbed part of the former public housing Robert Taylor Homes land. The plan called for building 197 private homes to be sold at market rates, 400 market-rate rental apartments, and 297 public-housing apartments: These would take space formerly occupied by 1,103 public housing apartments. In St. Louis a former 639 unit public-housing site was planned to accommodate 300 private homes, 284 affordable and market-rate apartments, and

231 public housing replacement units (*New Urban News* February 2002). In a 2004 assessment report, the nonpartisan Urban Institute noted that an overall assessment of the costs and benefits of Project HOPE VI is difficult because of the lack of uniformity across projects in different cities. It observed that, on the one hand, "hundreds of profoundly distressed developments" had been demolished, replaced with high-quality mixed housing, and some may have led to improvements of surrounding neighborhoods. On the other hand, "there is substantial evidence that the original residents of HOPE VI projects have not always benefited from redevelopment" and that "some of the original residents of these developments may live in equally or even more precarious circumstances today" (Popkin et al. 2004). Because of its ambitious scope, Chicago's plan to convert massive high-rise public housing into mixed-income sites has received a great deal of attention. In a citywide program, the mixed plan for demolition, renovation, and replacement would result in a net loss of 13,000 public housing units in the mid- to late-1990s. The Chicago Housing Authority's own estimate was that over 140,000 extremely low-income families were "severely impacted by the short supply of affordable housing" in the city. But the Authority also considered that it had no alternative but to demolish the failed buildings and move to a mixed-housing model of development. Some evicted families received Section 8 vouchers, some did not. Ninety days after notification, 32 percent of families surveyed had not found replacement housing (Smith 2006a).

Like all policy, urban social programs are a product of the political economy of the moment. The Republican Congressional election victories of 1994 gave notice that, in the area of federally sponsored public housing, "things had to change" (Zhang and Weismann 2006, 55). In 1995 the federal housing program (including fledgling Project HOPE VI) were looking at the prospects of deep cuts in funding, with deeper cuts to come in 1996: Indications were that Congress was interested in "reorganizing HUD out of existence" (49). HUD was confronted by the problem of how to get HOPE VI to depend less on federal funding. President Bill Clinton and HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros faced the challenge of strategizing "an orderly and prudent transition to prepare agencies and residents for a shift to a market environment," as Cisneros put it in testimony before a House committee (50). In 1995 program supporters were put on notice by HUD: "With the prospect that in a few years [local public housing authorities] will have to rely solely on rental income for their operating revenue, it is even more urgent that they convert their most distressed properties into attractive communities that households with and without rental assistance will want to live in." The calculus involved in deciding whether or not to proceed with a HOPE VI type plan for a given project was straightforward: Would the renovation of properties under consideration command rents sufficient to be self-sustaining? Or would it be more realistic to simply demolish the existing buildings and dispose of the site (Zhang and Weissmann 2006, 55, 67)? As had been the case with earlier urban planning programs, the question remained, Could the project be made to pay for itself?

The New Urbanism as a set of principles for developing urban space, especially residential space, is sound and forward looking, and presents a blueprint international in its applicability. It does not address the problem of how to supply adequate shelter to the urban poor—it was never intended to. The model, as it has

been employed in the United States as a solution to the condition of a collapsing public housing stock, is clearly not the answer to how to fix the inadequate supply of housing for the poor. Obviously, simply demolishing projects that have become unlivable is not going to help. Smith (2006b, 279) concludes with reference to Project HOPE VI and similar plans, "Public housing transformation relies on new urbanism to reconfigure physical sites into mixed communities . . . the only certain outcome is that the number of public housing units for the very poor will be reduced. In this sense, then, public housing reform is really no different from urban renewal begun in the 1950s: it will do little to benefit the very poor, and a lot to benefit the middle-class and private developers." For their part, the New Urbanists have recognized the potential shortcomings involved in the misapplication of what are essentially mixed housing design strategies. The movement is currently at a stage where questions are raised about the degree of social diversity produced by planned mixed housing, and where social justice issues about applying the strategy to Project HOPE VI type programs are raised (Grant 2008; Kohn 2004, 127–29; Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 2005; Talen 2008). Meanwhile, the failure to find a solution to the problem of housing the poor results in a continued battle for living space in cities where the most vulnerable find themselves without shelter of any form.

The Continuing Battle for Shelter in America

Beyond the efforts of government, private interests continue to fight over residential space and thereby transform the urban landscape. The outcomes of this battle illuminate the nature of social class in the United States. The common observation, by both social scientists and public officials, that the economic expansion that carried the United States into the new century was widening the gulf between the urban affluent and the urban poor is brought into sharp focus in the competition for residential space. People who reside in U.S. cities don't need to be told that they are expensive places in which to live. Using the criteria of federal guidelines and the real estate industry, housing should represent no more than 30 percent of a household's adjusted income. Using that simple formula, a $2,100 rental requires an annual adjusted income of $75,000; many household units in New York and San Francisco easily qualify. Many do not. Of the latter, many are able to find housing at less than the prevailing rental rate, but this will mean living in neighborhoods and in buildings that compromise health and safety. In good economic times the rise in housing costs often exceeds the general rate of inflation in major cities. In the kind of economic downturn that the United States experienced at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, jobs were lost and wages were reduced. In either case, pressures increase for the poor and families of modest means.

Williams and Smith (1986) offered a useful framework for understanding the rising costs of living in major cities: *Manhattanization* is the consequence of the globalizing economy as it impacts major or global cities like New York. These are the cities that represent the nerve centers of the global economy, home to the corporate headquarters of the most powerful enterprises. The incomes and perquisites of rising executives set the ceilings on rent and land values. The values reflected in the real estate section of the *New York Times* are not so much set by local conditions as

they are by the wealth that flows to global cities through the international economy. As that economy reaches beyond these—London, New York, Tokyo—prices in the next tier of cities—Dublin, Madrid, San Francisco—are adjusted to reflect the degree to which the emerging international capacity to pay has reached them. According to Williams and Smith, if corporate headquarters or other important corporate administrative offices play an important role in the local employment structure, the population of that city can expect to feel a commensurate increase in the costs associated with living there. Costs will rise as local professionals and businesses that service elite tastes set their fees to reflect the depth of the corporate purse accustomed to paying for the best around the world. Some will benefit from the Manhattanization of the local market for goods and services, and others will experience it as the hardship of costs rising beyond their limited means.

Gentrification

Dating from the mid-1960s, at least, many inner cities have undergone a transformation most commonly referred to as *gentrification*—a term that denotes the return of the middle classes or "gentry" in force into central city residential neighborhoods. The process typically involves the purchase and conversion of entire buildings by owner-occupants in areas that may have been run down for decades or generations. Especially popular are townhouses that may be converted from multi- to single-family use in areas where there are a number of similarly attractive potential conversions, perhaps a particularly favored period style (Schill and Nathan 1983, 30). Older areas of cities transformed by the New Urbanism may also qualify as being gentrified to the extent that affluent in-movers replace poorer former tenants of demolished or upgraded properties. Gentrification refers to any area that is undergoing a change in population from predominantly lower- to higher-income residents. Any development of high-income residential property in generally poorer areas of cities that *does not directly replace* poor or moderate income housing, as in the conversion of former factory lofts and the reclamation of "brownfield" (vacant former industrial or commercial lots) land parcels, constitutes a gray area where analysts are not in agreement about whether these qualify as gentrification (Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008, 139–44). It appears that the eventual outcome of such cases for the indigenous renter population should decide the issue: "As in traditional notions of gentrification, capital is reinvested in disinvested central-city locations, even if the product is a new-built development. Like in classic gentrification, the people attracted to these developments are the urban-seeking middle classes. And the end result is the same, too—displacement of lower income people by an in-coming middle class—even if the process of displacement is perhaps less overt (Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008, 140, citing the work of Davidson and Lees 2005). Gentrified areas are also marked by the conversion in local businesses as well, as commercial enterprises come to reflect the upscale tastes and incomes of the new residents. Poorer citizens have no place there.

In cities where there were alternative accommodations for people of modest means, this trend might be welcomed purely as the spontaneous revitalization of economically depressed inner-city areas. But in a nation where the term *housing crisis* is used to describe the prevalent condition of cities, gentrification has obvious

implications for controversy: As the affluent take over housing, what happens to the less affluent who formerly lived there? One set of estimates for New York City in the mid-1980s put the number of households displaced by gentrification between 10,000 and 40,000. In 1979, HUD issued a *Displacement Report* that minimized the impact of displacement due to gentrification, but Legates and Hartman (1981; 1986) said that their own estimate of 2.5 million people displaced each year in the United States by gentrification was conservative. They argued that substantial numbers end up moving into accommodations that represent deterioration in standards and/or where rents are higher (Legates and Hartman 1986, 194–97).

One related issue involves the question of just how spontaneous a process gentrification is. Early on in the process, it is clear that local trends have typically been produced by numerous independent individual choices by adventurous types wanting to carve out an attractive private space in the city. These were decisions by young professionals to opt for the excitement of urban as opposed to dull suburban living, a decision reinforced perhaps by bargain urban real estate in contrast to the escalating costs of suburban alternatives. Certainly, many early urban gentrifiers were motivated by such considerations. But critics point out that once a "trend" had been identified in such an area, realtors and property speculators quickly saw the opportunity to capitalize on the expected boost in real estate values, and they sold the idea of gentrification to a wider spectrum of prospective buyers. Areas were identified as gentrifying or on the verge of gentrification by realtors and city administrations anxious to promote and accelerate the movement. Where first-wave gentrifiers tend to be willing risk takers, latecomers to the movement were more averse to investment risks, more interested in preserving property values, and concerned with neighborhood economic homogeneity. Housing costs of gentrified areas spiral upward over time and attract increasingly affluent newcomers who bid up prices of already renovated properties. Lees (2003) relates the "biography" of a particular brownstone property in Brooklyn Heights. It was purchased by a young professional couple, completely converted to a single family dwelling and later sold to a more affluent Wall Street broker who wrote them a check for the full purchase price (in the neighborhood of $1.2 million) and then had the property completely redone to more elegant standards (she moved away less than six months later).

Because of its potential for making the tight housing supply for people of modest means even tighter, gentrification has remained a controversial issue. Central to the controversy is the question of the impact of gentrification on the displacement of the poor from properties they formerly occupied. Some argue that a more important source of the residential displacement of the poor is the practice of abandonment of derelict buildings by slumlords who have extracted all they can from their long-neglected properties. Definitively assessing the net benefits and costs of the impact of gentrification across the United States would be difficult, to say the least. Peoples' perceptions of the impact vary from city to city and neighborhood and depend to a large extent on respondent demographics. In Portland, Oregon, for example, a survey of two gentrifying neighborhoods found that people generally were optimistic about the change: But African American residents *who were long-term renters* were less likely to have a positive view of the change (Sullivan 2007). There is an important distinction here—blacks in general held a positive view. Boyd (2008) offers an

important reminder in this regard. Many gentrifiers are black. She argues that black gentrifiers engage in a deliberate *defensive* strategy. In the Chicago neighborhoods she studied, black elites adopted "community building and economic revitalization strategies designed to protect their neighborhoods from control by white residents, city elites, and developers" (Boyd 2008, 752).

In a study of gentrifying neighborhoods in Atlanta where newcomers were generally white and long-term residents black, Martin (2007) relates how long-term residents organized in various ways to resist "political displacement," the threat that the in-movers would take over more than their places of residence but would also take over their ability to speak for their neighborhoods. They were concerned about losing their power to raise such issues as getting the city's help in maintaining a supply of affordable housing (Martin 2007). A detailed case study of a gentrifying area of Philadelphia by Anderson (1990) reveals a different dimension of resistance. The gentrifying area eats inexorably into adjacent poor black neighborhoods already hard hit by the loss of industry. The border area where upward mobility met economic decline was characterized by resentment, lack of understanding, exploitation, hostility, and fear. The city government was clearly on the side of the upwardly mobile district and was interested in upgrading the area. The young men from the poor neighborhoods took their power in the form of public swagger and intimidation. Gentrification in this area of Philadelphia was a formula for hostile confrontation as well as change. The battle for shelter and security for poor and affluent people in the city provides a focus for class conflict. Increasing numbers of those who can afford it retreat into fortified residential enclaves.

Gated Communities

The battle between the classes for space and security has produced a particular type of strategic retreat for many of those who can afford to live there: the gated community. The atmosphere of uncertainty and threat is sufficient to have produced private residential garrisons that prevent all but authorized service-worker nonresidents from routinely entering or passing through. The pattern is repeated in many affluent as well as poor countries around the world.

Gated communities are a type of residential association. There were 50,000 of these in the United States in 1950: by 1992 there were 150,000. Four and a half million Americans lived in gated communities in 2005, an increase of 13.7 percent since 2001, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. In the Sunbelt, most new residential construction takes this form (Associated Press, May 25, 2007). As the term suggests, *gated communities* erect gates across access roads; they also limit points of entry; build perimeter walls and fences; and employ private security guards, surveillance cameras, and infrared motion detectors. In the mid-1990s, the St. Andrews complex in Boca Raton, Florida, was spending $1 million a year on helicopter and canine patrols. At that point, perhaps 45 percent of homeowners' associations nationwide displayed some evidence of this type of security organization (Kennedy 1995).

According to Blakely and Snyder (1997b) gated communities may take one of three forms, but in practice these are found in various combinations. Lifestyle communities are built around leisure themes, often golf courses, and use by non-

residents and their guests are restricted or prohibited. Prestige communities set apart the expensive exclusive homes of their residents. Security zone communities are expressly built to secure the safety of residents and their property from outside intruders. They are perhaps the form most characteristic of the gated community. Some gated communities have as few as 100 or less modest condominiums with a gate and twenty-four-hour guard, others cover thousands of acres.

Realtors report that erecting gates and limiting access has become popular enough to raise property values, although leading researchers say there is little evidence to indicate that gated communities contribute either to an increase in neighborliness or, surprisingly, to much of a reduction in crime rates. Gates and fences are likely to prevent entry by motorists or casual potential trespassers but are probably not a deterrent to serious criminals (Blakely and Snyder 1997a, 1997b).

Critics target a broad range of negative features. The gated and walled community approach to security has been referred to as segregationist, isolationist, anticommunity, and medieval. In the latter sense, builders and developers are feudal lords offering protection from the perceived hordes outside (McKenzie 1994). By the end of the 1990s, there was sufficient criticism of the gated community that some municipalities and policymakers had begun to impose restrictions on builders. Still, gated communities remained in demand in those metropolitan regions where security was a concern, and builders were happy to respond to home buyers willing and able to underwrite the added expense (Baron 1998). What buyers may not realize is that, in addition to the initial extra cost and expense of constant surveillance, they may be responsible for general maintenance of aging and deteriorating common infrastructure in these private developments over time (Low 2003).

The gated community may be read as a sign of the generalized anxiety that attends inequality and entrenched divisions by class and race within society. They are a symptom not only of the failure of urban policy to create order but also of the failure of the market to maintain a reasonable distribution of economic opportunity. These systematic failures are most visible within cities because that is where poor populations are concentrated. Under such circumstances, we may expect the most timid or controlling elements of the dominant population to attempt to wall themselves off from the poor. It is an expression of their perception of social reality, of the instability of the social order. It reflects a disparity of life chances that produces an odd juxtaposition of images.

Gated communities have become widespread across the globe wherever there are personal safety or security concerns. There were more than a 1,000 in England by 2004 (Atkinson and Blandy 2007, x–ix) and they are popular among the affluent in Latin America. In India they provide a different kind of security: Hamilton Court in the Indian boomtown Gurgaon is a twenty-five-story high-security residence where occupants have a continuous water and electricity supply in a city where the municipal provision of these services fails for several hours each day. The complex also supplies a private school, and the shanty town across the road provides an ample supply of maids and chauffeurs (Sengupta 2008). On the outskirts of Johannesburg, South Africa, in the post-apartheid era, there is the gated community of Fourways Gardens, a community that might just as well describe a protected suburban enclave in the metropolitan United States. Armed guards patrol an area surrounded by eight-foot-high walls topped with electrified fences. Inside, there are recreational

facilities, including a golf club and restaurant so that residents need venture out only for business. The white residents of this fortified community are attempting to cope with their fear of crime in the uncertain atmosphere in which the state has declared equality of opportunity but has not been able to deliver (*Economist* December 2, 1995).

In a suburb of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, deep in the U.S. South, is a gated community called the Country Club of Louisiana, where houses cost between $300,000 and $3 million. There is a golf and tennis complex, intended architecturally to re-create the style of a Louisiana plantation. In 1999, Percy Miller caused a stir well covered by the national press when he and four associates moved into the steel-gated community. Miller, proprietor of the top-grossing rap label No Limit Records, had earned $56.5 million in the previous year alone. This made Master P, as he is known in the business, the tenth-highest paid entertainer in any medium at the time. The other four new residents were C-Murder, Silkk the Shocker, Mystikal, and Snoop Dogg (Snoop later moved to another gated community in California). At that point, all had made their fortunes in hit recordings that celebrated gunfights, misogyny, and the drug trade. They didn't feel welcomed by their neighborhood association, but it is not surprising that they were there. These were people who had made substantial fortunes, who had much to lose, and who understood that there was a struggle going on between the wealthy and the poor in U.S. cities. Without effective urban policy, one has to engage in self-protection, one has to defend oneself.

Losers in the Battle for Space: The Homeless

History may not repeat itself, but the basic political and economic arrangements of society often cause us to question how much we learn from the past. Sweeney (1993, 15) reminds us that in the latter part of the 1800s, given the meager levels of public assistance available at the time, "every poor family and some middle class families, too, found themselves one personal or economic crisis away from destitution." Destitution would certainly include homelessness. A hundred years ago, the response to the growing problem of homelessness was to pass various tramp laws that criminalized homelessness but did nothing to relieve the condition or its causes. There are troubling parallels between this time and that.

It is difficult to say just how many homeless people there are in the United States. The homeless may be all too visible as individuals, but for purposes of enumeration, they are an invisible population. So, we are left with estimates and extrapolations from limited data, even after the last two censuses that made an effort to count them: The nature of the problem would be the same in 2010. At the heart of the enumeration issue is the operational definition of the homeless population. One method of enumeration includes only those who were homeless on a given night, yielding a *point in time count*; the other includes everyone who was without shelter at some time during a given year, the *period prevalence count*. It is often reasoned that point in time measures understate the seriousness of the problem of homelessness. This method might well miss the woman who lives in a cheap hotel until her social security check runs out in the third week of each month and then spends the rest of each month in shelters or on the street (Peroff 1987, 35–39).



The homeless are often immediately identifiable on the street: Their status and condition are announced by the presence of all of their meager possessions. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

According to the combined efforts of the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and the Urban Institute in 1996, on a particular night in October, 444,000 people (representing 346,000 households) were homeless. The best estimate for a particular February night that same year was 842,000 (637,000 households). When the researchers calculated the number of people who were homeless at some point during 1996, the projections were that between 2.3 million people (based on October estimates) and 3.5 million (based on February estimates) experienced some period of homelessness during 1996 (National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty 2007). Any party or agency interested in minimizing the scope of homelessness typically chooses to speak in terms of point in time counts, while advocates of expanding services for the homeless employ the annual period prevalence count. Also, point in time estimates tend to underrepresent families and individuals who find themselves temporarily homeless due to such systemic factors as job loss, being unable to find housing they can afford for some period, or people temporarily homeless as a result of domestic violence. These temporarily homeless people may be living in their cars or in campsites or staying in overcrowded doubled-up housing with relatives or friends—they remain invisible to spot checkers. The measure tends to catch a disproportionate number of those using shelters or other services, and these tend to be the long-term homeless. The method thereby overstates the proportion of the homeless who have chronic drug or alcohol problems and the proportion that are mentally ill (National Coalition for the Homeless 2008). Once again there are policy implications for profiling the characteristics of homeless persons in this way.

Whatever the absolute number of homeless people in America, there are indications that the homeless population is growing and changing. There was an apparent contradiction in the growing national prosperity and growing numbers of homelessness in the 1990s. It can be explained by the fact that while national prosperity held steady, rents continued to rise, and more low-income households were squeezed out of the scarce supply of affordable units at the lower end of the private housing market: recall that the number of public housing units were contracting due to the changes in housing policy. Since 2000, the structural conditions that amounted to a mismatch between the number of modest-income housing units and the number of families of limited means persisted. The mayors of every city and HUD agreed on the major cause of homelessness: The crisis was fostered by the undersupply of affordable urban housing. As we have seen, the nation has not devised an effective plan for addressing the problem. In 1995, a U.S. Conference of Mayors Task Force on homelessness reported that requests for emergency shelter were increasing and that more of these requests were coming from families with children. One-fourth of the families requesting aid were turned down due to a lack of government resources (Worsnop 1996). In 1999, the Conference of Mayors reported that requests for food and shelter were growing at increasing rates, and half of the cities studied in that year's report had turned away more than half of the requests for aid because they did not have the resources to provide assistance (Ward 2000a). As cities managed to gradually increase the number of shelter beds and services available, the number of homeless kept pace (National Coalition for the Homeless 2008), a reflection of the iceberg nature of the phenomenon: All we recognize of the body of homelessness is

the proportion above the surface. Some proportion remains invisible. At the 2007 U.S. Conference of Mayors it was estimated by mayors of fifteen of twenty-three cities surveyed that increasing problems of homelessness would persist through 2008. In fact, as the recession tightened its grip on the world economy in 2008 and 2009, local news media were reporting an upsurge in homelessness due to job losses in city after city. Some of the cities badly affected included Denver, New York, Chicago, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Portland (Oregon), and San Francisco. Mostly anecdotal accounts indicated families with children, who were finding themselves homeless for the first time, were disproportionately represented. As one local shelter worker said, these new people "didn't know how to be homeless," where to look for help, what services might be available to them.

Family units have long comprised some proportion of the homeless population but, in the 1990s they were estimated to be the fastest-growing category. Many of the families included both parents, but single-parent families headed by women were overrepresented, with one study indicating that 81 percent of homeless families were single-parent units headed by women (Nunez and Fox 1999). The backgrounds of homeless women often include domestic violence, coupled with economic desperation. A study of 450 homeless women in a New England city revealed that 60 percent had been physically assaulted or sexually molested by age twelve and a majority had suffered violent attacks by husbands or boyfriends. All told, 90 percent were victims of some form of abuse (Bassuk 1997). At times domestic violence is the immediate precipitating cause of a homeless episode. Also, adolescents on their own and homeless are often running from abusive or otherwise insupportable family situations.

The economic condition of poor and working-class women puts them at risk for homelessness when their domestic arrangements or employment is disrupted. Barbara Ehrenreich (2001), in her popular book *Nickel and Dimed*, presents a participatory account of just how difficult it is to get by and to maintain a permanent address in the low-wage "pink-collar" sector of employment occupied by women. Living arrangements for her colleagues (and herself) were often a matter of compromise, a tentative situation that could be ruptured by the loss of a week's pay. Women in male-provider-dependent domestic roles (unemployed wife or domestic partner) are equally liable to homelessness when they lose a partner's support (Golden 1992). The image of homeless women as elderly "bag ladies" is misguided: In one study, the average homeless woman was twenty-eight-years-old (Sullivan and Damrosch 1987); in another study of homeless mothers, twenty-four was the average age (Gerson 2006).

Gerson (2006) studied twenty-four homeless women with children who sought refuge from the streets in homeless shelters in New York City. The women told of many different paths that led them eventually to their shelter, but there were common themes that many shared. Many had lived in poverty as children and adults and had experienced domestic abuse. Some had received mental health treatment and had spent time in other publicly provided care facilities. Several told about having been victimized while living on the streets. The situation that precipitated their choice to enter the shelter was often that they had exhausted the goodwill of family and friends. They were concerned about repeated or chronic illness suffered by their

children or themselves, feared that their children would be taken away by the department of human services, and all had finally had to admit to themselves that there was no other choice. This admission in itself was degrading: The women had a clear sense of how they were viewed as failures by the rest of society, and it was a painful blow to their self-esteem. They resented how they were regarded by other people and harbored the conviction that many of those who labeled them as failures were one step away from homelessness themselves. As one put it, "People think we are stupid. They actually think that we came outta the bottom of the gutter and crawled here to look for a place to stay. We're homeless. We'll take anything. This place is run like a prison for profit" (142–43). A somewhat different life history is presented by another homeless woman. Michelle Kennedy was a middle-class housewife and mother of three who, after a marital breakup, found herself sleeping in her car with her kids.

> This is the story of how we were homeless while I simultaneously tried to hide it from my family, my friends, and the rest of the world. By day, I walked the streets of Stone Harbor, Maine, as the completely normal mother of three children, looking in shop windows and going to the library and the Laundromat. By night, however, I was driving around town, looking for a place to park and sleep, bathing at the truck stop, and boiling ramen noodle dinners on public grills.
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> . . . In time, I pulled us out of homelessness and returned us to a more normal lifestyle, but the hot days of that summer will never leave me. Neither will what I learned from them (Kennedy 2005, 3).

What she learned, looking back after several years and regaining her middle-class status, was the precariousness of living in a society where the default option to steady work and steady income is life on the street.

> There is something about being at the bottom—at the bottom of the bottom—that never quite leaves you . . . you become acutely aware of that one paycheck, which separates you from the car apartment. And I will never get over it . . . I will never forget the feeling of being so absolutely alone, with three babies totally dependent on every move I made. (206–7)

Children and adolescents are another important segment of the homeless population. Preteen-aged children are often enumerated as family members, but adolescents are often living on their own, and their numbers are especially difficult to establish because they often drift, stay with friends, habituate places overlooked by enumerators, and are not accepted as clients by some agencies that serve the homeless. Estimates of the number of homeless adolescents range from the hundreds of thousands to 3 million. They include runaways, escapees from juvenile facilities, and those who are reported as lost or missing by their families. On the street, they are particularly vulnerable and often victimized. One-fourth of young people living on the street reported engaging in "survival sex," the exchange of sex for money, food, or shelter (Greene, Ennett, and Ringwalt 1999). The effects of homelessness are compounded by the developmental stages at which young people confront the uncertainties and stigma of their situation. Homeless students who are enrolled in schools typically change schools frequently and have poor attendance records. They stay away to hide their situation, to avoid the stigma attached to it. Their long-term academic potential declines, and they have problems of social and psychological

adjustment, especially difficulties in forming relationships based on mutual trust (Reganick 1997; Vissing and Diament 1997).

Despite general agreement that the inadequate housing supply is the major cause of homelessness, discussions continue about the individual characteristics of members of the homeless that distinguish them from the general population. Chief among these are mental disorder and substance abuse. During the 1970s, the population of state psychiatric institutions nationwide was significantly reduced as part of a plan to treat patients in a more humane and hospitable community environment. Newly developed medications at that time could stabilize behavior and mood swings in more of the profoundly affected individuals, and it was believed that these people could function as outpatients in open environments with the proper degree of supervision from community-based clinics. The first aspect (the release of formerly confined patients) was embraced enthusiastically by public administrators interested in saving money, but the second (establishing and staffing an adequate number of community-based clinics) cost money, and so implementation was delayed or neglected altogether. Many proposed clinics never materialized, and "few localities have managed to supply an adequate array of services for the most seriously disabled" (Breakey 2004, 383). Former patients, without adequate supervision, wandered the streets, neglected or bartered their medications, and because of their behavior and at times their appearance, became a highly visible part of the homeless population. They helped inform the popular public image of the homeless, along with street-dwelling abusers of crack, meth, heroin, alcohol, and other substances. The skid-row alcoholic, inhabiting the margins of shelter between the flophouse and the street, has long been an indigenous fixture in the imagery of urban America. Many of the homeless are indistinguishable from the rest of the poor we encounter in the city, so it is the behavior of those who fit the stereotypes that stands out. This along with point in time counts of the regular and long-term users of shelters results in a distorted profile of homelessness. The profound problems of the long-term or permanent homeless are visible not only to the casual observer but also are overrepresented in studies of the currently homeless. Many more people than those on the street or in shelters at the time of a given study have been homeless recently. Others, to their shock and dismay, will find themselves unable to shelter themselves independently in the future. The homeless will always include a number of people whose problems will never allow them to independently leave the street, and this will reinforce and distort the popular understanding of the causes of homelessness as idiosyncratic (Phelan and Link 1999). This is a point worth pondering.

Textbox 10.1. Homeless Women

When Elliot Liebow, author of the widely known study *Tally's Corner* (1967; see reference in chapter 4), learned he was dying of cancer, he quit his government job and went to work as a volunteer in homeless shelters near Washington, D.C. His habits as an anthropologist inevitably led to note-taking behavior as he worked with homeless women. He compiled these notes into a sensitive and insightful book, *Tell Them Who I Am: The Lives of Homeless Women* (1993), before his death. He was able to convey admirably the women's own perspective, to represent their own voices.

Liebow did not find it useful to distinguish among his subjects in terms of mental illness versus mental health, or in terms of drug use or dependency. Sharing many hours with them, he found mental stability a situationally relative circumstance, which might show signs of deterioration toward the end of the month when monthly government support payments ran out. He was impressed with the resilience of the women. He commented, “One wonders why more homeless people do not kill themselves. How do they manage to slog through day after day, with no end in sight? How, in a world of unremitting grimness, do they manage to laugh, love, enjoy friends, even dance and play the fool?” (25).

Life in public shelters is difficult and fatigue is a constant condition. At night there is the constant noise of snoring, weeping, women crying out in bad dreams, and the insomnia that comes with the gnawing question, “How did I end up here?” There is boredom: The shelters turn their residents out onto the streets by day. They walk the streets; they look for someone to talk to. But as one woman put it, the long day is a reminder that you’re not needed anywhere, that it doesn’t matter what you do because no one cares. Because homeless people are not totally without possessions, there is the problem of where to keep things, especially clothes, priceless mementos of a more stable past, religious items, and important documents. Most carried them around with them, but others rented storage lockers in which they kept a surprisingly large number of personal and household items, stored for a time when things might be better and they would leave the shelters and the street. Health care is a challenge. Commonly prescribed remedies like keeping off your feet, bed rest, or using a vaporizer were out of reach and might well mean simple ailments would become more complicated and serious. Finding a job is made more difficult by the lack of a permanent address and the behavioral and diagnostic stereotypes associated with homelessness.

Liebow’s work reminds us that homelessness is not necessarily a permanent condition. Many of his subjects were able to leave the shelter and the street, sometimes obtaining well-paid work, advancing themselves through training, reestablishing normal relationships with relatives, and diminishing their disordered behavioral tendencies or the unconventional thought patterns that had attended their experiences as homeless persons. But the accounts of life after the homeless shelter often include the kinds of crises that give the impression that some of the women are one crisis away from returning to the street. In that way, their present condition parallels that of many women who have not yet experienced homelessness.

It is easy to understand how mental illness and addiction become appealing standard bearers in explanations of why there is homelessness in times of plenty. Yet, while city mayors and others concerned with the analysis of homelessness pay appropriate attention to the personal problems that bring individuals onto the streets, there is an unusual degree of consensus regarding the primary cause. Government officials do not hesitate to refer to it as the housing crisis. But since the mid-1990s, city governments have been engaged in efforts to reduce the visibility of homeless people in retail and middle-class residential areas. The nationwide trend drew the critical attention of the popular press as a featured article in *Time* reported thirty-five municipalities, from Tampa, Florida, to Tucson, Arizona, were “enacting or enforcing punitive anti-vagrancy ordinances, banning everything from loitering on median strips to getting food handouts in public parks” (December

20, 1999, 69). Rudolph Giuliani, New York's mayor at the time, threatened to ban able-bodied homeless adults who did not find employment from receiving city-provided shelter. Chicago "privatized" the sidewalk in front of businesses, making loitering a trespass offense. Police in San Francisco arrested nuns serving hot meals in a downtown public area for not having a permit. Mitchell (2003) links a growing intolerance of the homeless presence to Wilson and Kelling's (1982) "broken windows" philosophy of the prevention of serious crime—the idea that tolerance of minor transgressions like loitering or lying down in public creates an atmosphere of disorder that invites more serious criminal acts (the position is discussed and evaluated in chapter 9).

The tramp laws of a century ago made the public condition of destitution illegal by severely restricting a poor person's ability to exist in public. Today, there are renewed efforts along these lines in the passage of local ordinances that articulate in greater detail that it is unlawful to stand, lie down, sleep, or relieve oneself in public spaces—in the name of removing nuisances that inconvenience other members of society and interfere with businesses. Increasingly, the homeless poor are without safe havens in shared public space (Mitchell 2003). Meanwhile, urban government leaders announce that the cause of the growing problem of homelessness is rooted in systemic features of the economy and the inadequate supply of housing, conditions that are beyond the capacity of homeless individuals or families to resolve: At present, there is no movement toward a solution, and the number of homeless continues to grow.

The U.S. Failure to Develop a Comprehensive Urban Policy

The development of an effective, overall urban policy is no mean achievement, and no nation has developed a completely effective and enduring national plan to deal with the problems of its cities. Still, the record of the United States stands out as particularly piecemeal, uncoordinated, and inconsistent. The reason for this is that individual metropolitan regions are divided into multiple self-governing units and that urban policy at the national level shifts with each change of government administration.

The United States lacks the government structures and political traditions to effectively contain and shape patterns of urban expansion. From the earliest days of population and economic growth, jealously independent towns and cities have defied the attempts of regional planning commissions and state legislatures to impose a regional coordination of efforts in such areas as fresh water supply and water pollution control; containment of urban and suburban sprawl, transportation, parks, and the coordination and economical provision of public services; and a system for regionally sharing the provision of services to the homeless. Government and businesses in small towns have harbored suspicions about being overpowered and exploited if they entered into cooperative schemes with larger and more powerful urban centers. Today, effective planning requires that the territorial unit addressed by planners comprise at least the metropolitan community or region. However, enormous metropolises like Los Angeles or New York have thus far presented insurmountable difficulties in the development of territorially comprehensive plans because the areas involved are divided among so many independent governments.

Even in metropolitan areas of modest size, it is not unusual to find a dozen independent townships. Outlying populations of all metro regions are realistically concerned that areawide cooperation would involve an increase in taxes and represent an increased strain on local services.

Since the 1970s, there has been a renewed hostility toward "big government," fueled by political rhetoric that charges that large-scale programs of government assistance do not work. In this view, any policy is suspect if it is not based on individual initiative and the utilization of market mechanisms to achieve socially desirable goals. This policy emphasis does not resolve the long-standing debate over the responsibility of the state for the welfare of the poor versus the responsibility of all adults for their own welfare and that of their children. It does not resolve the debate between the structuralists, who argue that the conditions of poverty and homelessness are produced by remote forces, and the culture of poverty theorists, who argue that the causes are in the habits of the poor themselves. Instead of fully engaging both sides of the argument, the position taken by government policymakers presently favors the individual responsibility and bad-habits interpretation. It will take some time, given the prevailing wisdom, to understand that prosperity can have negative consequences for millions in the rising costs that attend it and to recognize that ambitious, consistent social policy has never really characterized the approach to addressing urban problems in the United States.

URBAN POLICY OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

A selected review of urban policy outside the United States reveals two useful insights. First, in recent history, many nations have engaged in comprehensive urban planning, originating at the national level and directed at achieving major social and economic goals. Second, policy around the world has come to resemble that of the United States in recent years, characterized by what is considered to be a pragmatic reluctance to interfere with market forces and a much more limited set of objectives. Generally speaking, the authority for regulating land use and other urban policy has increasingly been shifted from the state to local government (Haussermann and Haila 2005, 55–56). Still, local plans may be held in check. In Europe, any locally sponsored initiatives depend on funding approval and program development from the region's largest governance structure, The European Union and its Regional Policy Commission.

Urban Policy in Western Europe

At one time, in the mid-twentieth century, it was somewhat easier to characterize the goals of European urban and regional planning. Urban policymakers in Western Europe shared certain problems in common. Urban growth tended to be concentrated in a particular city or urban region; construction and street patterns were holdovers from the period of nineteenth-century industrialization, or even from the preindustrial period; and, after World War II, there was an acute housing shortage in many countries. Planners were concerned with bringing traffic flow patterns under control, the social equity issue of providing housing for the growing working class,

and redistributing urban and industrial growth to regions where they were lacking—another social equity concern involving access to employment opportunities for all citizens. By midcentury, many countries had a nationwide urban plan in place.

It is useful to consider three cases where the primary planning goal was to redistribute urban and economic growth: England, France, and the Netherlands. In England, population growth and economic concentration in and around London was a persistent concern, associated with unmet housing demand, traffic congestion, and unbalanced regional development. In France, growth had been concentrated in the north-central region, around Paris, a primate city (the concept discussed in chapter 6) that, like London, historically had been a magnet for industrial, commercial, and population growth. In the Netherlands, the magnet for growth was comprised of a ring of cities surrounding a rich agricultural region in the South. Taken together, the cities, which include Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, Haarlem, Leiden, Delft, Dordrecht, and Hilversum, make up the "ring city," the Randstad. Here there was no primate city, but rather a primate urban region composed of several large- and medium-sized cities. In this case, the problem was how to contain additional Randstad growth while preventing urban sprawl from consuming the rich interior farmlands. As was the case in England and France, there was also the goal of redirecting population and economic growth—in this case toward the underpopulated and economically inert northern reaches of the country.

The strategy for limiting and redirecting growth varied in each of the three cases. In England, an act of Parliament in 1938 confined the development of the city of London and its immediate environs within a coordinated master plan. The act decreed that the outward growth of London be halted where it was. A greenbelt—a ring of undeveloped open country and farmland—was permanently set aside to remain free of commercial or residential development additional to that already present. Further growth in the region would be confined to eight satellite towns located outside the ring and designed to be self-contained residential, commercial, and industrial units that would not promote commuting to work in London.

In France, the greenbelt strategy for controlling the growth of Paris was rejected in favor of a plan that would allow growth outward from the existing margins of the city only in narrow, strictly controlled ribbons or fingers stretching east and west along existing transportation corridors. The plan, administered by a regional planning authority, featured the development of autonomous new towns along the narrow corridors. The advantage over the London greenbelt strategy was that the corridor plan would provide a self-limiting check on regional development by moving new development further and further away from the center. The idea was that prospective new residents and businesses, with no choice but to locate in the increasingly distant peripheral corridors, would find it more attractive to locate in a different city where they could be closer to the center.

The Dutch strategy for saving the green heart at the center of the Randstad complex also involved a narrow-corridor strategy. A regional planning authority took control of development and took advantage of a division of labor that existed among various Randstad cities. Plans focused on engineering an effective public transportation system that whisked travelers among cities that specialized in various levels of government, finance, commerce, and industry. Residential development was tightly restricted to narrow zones within the urbanized ring.

The plans backed up by parliamentary authority and administered by regional planning bodies enjoyed varying levels of success in battling against market elements bent on developing preserved land. Perhaps the Dutch and French plans were more effective in the medium term, permitting but channeling growth along designated development corridors. The ambitious London plan was successful in blocking greenbelt growth, and the satellite cities attracted population and industries, their shopping districts proving attractive over time, and they achieved some degree of class integration. However, there was little provision for controlling growth in the areas between the new towns, and these areas became the sites of residential and other mixed growth as the new towns themselves were ringed by a maze of speculatively built development. This was soon to become known as "commuter country," and many residents traveled daily from far beyond the greenbelt to their jobs in London (Hall 1984, 39–43).

Just as the master plans were taking effect in these countries, the definition of the major urban problem—too much concentrated growth—was reversed. From the mid-1960s onward, inner-city decline became an increasing concern in Europe, especially in terms of the loss of industrial jobs. The central cities were losing population. Between 1966 and 1976, the London area within the greenbelt lost half a million industrial jobs; by the mid-1980s, Paris lost 300,000 jobs and 500,000 residents; within the Randstad, the leading city—Amsterdam—declined in population between 1965 and 1982 by 155,000, leaving just 700,000 residents (Hall 1984, 25, 36–37; van Weesep 1988, 100). The reasons for decline everywhere were the same: technological and regional restructuring, with old industrial jobs disappearing into more efficient manufacturing techniques and reappearing, transformed, in less congested and costly suburban locales. The trend appears similar to what was happening in major U.S. metro regions at the same time: While urban cores lost population, the populations of metro regions were unchanged or even growing (Martinotti 2005, 92–101). Urban and regional policies have become more accommodating to market trends, less restrictive. By the second half of the 1990s, urban core populations in Western Europe had for the most part stabilized and were growing modestly (more rapidly in Ireland and the Iberian Peninsula). While populations in metropolitan regions continue to decentralize to suburban locations, major cities still hold more than their share of jobs. In the past few decades European economies have undergone the same transition as did the United States from industry to service work (European Commission Directorate General 2007).

The European Union is today a single marketplace, which has broadened the geography of decision making for executives determining where manufacturing, transshipment points, and executive offices will be located. The governing body of the European Union sets regulations and authorizes and financially supports local policies through a regional planning authority that sees to it that member states comply with environmental and other regionwide regulatory statutes. The European Parliament has authorized a series of programs to support sustainable urban development. These programs have been directed at protection and restoration of the environment, urban development, regeneration of poor and declining inner-city districts, social integration (European states have rapidly increasing immigrant populations from within and outside of the Union), promoting renewable sources

of energy, improving public transportation within and between cities, cooperation among cities in different states, and assisting with spatial development strategies. While the funding, authorization, and oversight of local programs is centralized in European Commission headquarters, individual programs are locally administered with monitoring and guidance from the Commission (EUROPA April 24, 2009). Certainly, the territorial scope of the regional planning authority is extensive, coterminous with the collective territory defined by the member states of the EU. But in practice, Europe has long moved away from the grand plan. Planning projects are locally conceived and tailored to needs defined by local elites. Martinotti (2005, 91) observes that while regulatory authority in Europe remains a "far more binding" force than in the United States, the marketplace exerts an increasingly powerful energy over the direction of change. According to Martinotti, the governing elite of all major cities are "enthralled" with the idea of competitively marketing their city. Within the EU "the unabashed commodification of cities as sellable objects has become a matter of course only in recent years." In Europe as elsewhere, the most powerful voice in the formulation of urban policy is that of the global marketplace.

Centrally Planned Economies

It is useful to consider briefly the kinds of policy associated with centrally planned or socialist economies. Despite the political and economic revolutions that have dismantled the USSR and drawn the single other large-scale example of socialism, the People's Republic of China, squarely into the global marketplace, the planning experiments of the recent past remain useful illustrations of the frustrations of socialist command policy to resist international market forces.

Under the principles of socialism, the spatial distribution of opportunities and cultural amenities must be considered part of the general pattern of the distribution of economic and social benefits. In line with the principle of eliminating inequalities, attention must be paid to the location of housing, services, education, employment, shopping, and green space for recreation. Cities need to be built in such a way that all will be provided for equally—at least to a reasonable degree. Since social class, as measured by differences in income and other benefits, remained a persistent feature of old socialist societies, it was the job of the planner to reduce those inequalities by seeing first and foremost to the needs of the less highly remunerated. That is, the planner's job is to reduce inequalities consistent with the goals of socialism.

Under the Soviet system, the goals were to limit the growth of cities (centers of privilege in comparison to rural and small-town life) through the use of greenbelts and totally planned satellite towns; to promote growth in a limited number of specially targeted less populated regions, thereby bringing urban amenities to those areas (small towns that were not part of the program were encouraged to wither and die out); to see to the coordination of urban housing, economic development, and the distribution of services according to an overall urban plan; and to make a massive effort to provide housing, thereby addressing the dire and persistent housing shortage. The plans were repeatedly frustrated by what may be recognized as market factors associated with popular preferences and demand.

Plans to limit the growth of large cities in the western part of the Soviet Union were obstructed by internal migrations that defied vigorous measures for controlling domestic population movements. The population grew beyond the greenbelts of the major cities as migrants employed devious schemes of relocation (Morton 1984, 5). As a result, growth in the eastern regions lagged far behind and inequalities persisted among the western Soviet cities. Eventually, the fact that industrial development continued to be heavier in western cities was rationalized by a change in ideology that proclaimed development anywhere benefited all citizens (Badcock 1984, 314–15). Efforts to engineer all aspects of city development proved difficult due to a lack of coordination among the various government bureaucracies that administered housing, industrial development, education, and so forth. Different components of new growth often lagged far behind one another. For example, the construction of housing and shopping facilities might come long after the higher-priority construction of new plants beyond the edge of existing urban development, so that workers and their families faced hardships of commuting and had considerable difficulty in buying daily necessities. Finally, the goal of providing all workers with adequate housing was subverted by the equivalent of Western gentrification, as the social elite made effective claims to new state-provided housing on the basis that their more vital professions made it important that they be located closer to offices or plants where they worked (Szelenyi 1977, 1983). Long before the end of the Soviet system, market forces were at work, undermining socialist principles.

In the post-Soviet period, as centrally planned systems quickly faded, former socialist countries including Russia were influenced by the same global processes that were influencing urban changes in the rest of the world. Whereas they were formerly national centers oriented to limited national economies, these cities now seek full integration into the EU marketplace: Unfortunately, many would-be competitors lack the infrastructures to compete. Only the national primate cities Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw, and within Russia, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and possibly Kiev, have the necessary communications infrastructure, research and development facilities, stable political and judicial systems, and human capital (trained and qualified personnel) to be qualified competitors on the international European stage. The introduction of the force of the marketplace, private property, and the competition among businesses for building in central urban locations is something new in cities where a less dense occupation of land use had been determined by a central plan. In fact, St. Petersburg and some Eastern European cities in former socialist nations that had been allowed to deviate from the strict Soviet model before the demise of the Soviet Union have in major ways completed the transition from centrally planned to fully integrated membership in the world market system (Axenov, Brade, and Bondarchuk 2006).

In the People's Republic of China, the market is also having an enormous impact on the shape of urbanization. The Chinese government has attempted to reinvent socialist policy to fit a system where change is driven by the energy of international capitalism and where the growth of the economy fuels the growth of cities in a nation that by 2008 had between 1.3 billion and 1.4 billion people. From 2003 to 2007, China's economy grew at a remarkable rate, between 8 and 12 percent a year. China has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to facilitating an economic revolution, if not a political one.

During the revolutionary era, Mao Zedong took a dim view of the contribution of cities and the urban population to the Chinese Revolution. He believed that the consumer cities of capitalism and imperialism absorbed and squandered the productivity of Chinese peasant labor, so tight controls were placed on the growth of the urban population in the 1950s. Between 1966 and 1976, millions of Chinese were involuntarily relocated from city to country, and large numbers of the administrative and educated classes were exiled to rural areas for alleged offenses of privilege. By the end of the Mao era, there were 20 million fewer urban Chinese than there were in 1960 (Kirkby 1989). Subsequently, many of these displaced persons filtered back into the large cities as undocumented or unauthorized migrants (legal residence in China is by official designation: those who are not authorized to live in an area in which they reside may be denied permanent employment status and state services). By 1979 China was relaxing its internal migration controls, and the urban population began to mushroom (Laquian 2005, 11–12).

During the 1980s China undertook a series of economic reforms in what amounted to an open-door policy for international capital investment in the country. This was a full-fledged effort to gain a secure foothold in the expanding world market and to take advantage of the potential China had for becoming a powerful actor in the global economy. Urban migration accelerated although urban populations remained divided between authorized residents and unauthorized labor migrants. By the end of the twentieth century, investment and rapid urban growth had created a different China from the one Mao had departed. At the same time, the end of the enforced commune system in rural areas revealed a surplus of rural labor at levels of 30 or 40 percent, contributing to a large floating migrant labor population in search of work (Xie and Costa 1991, 321). Many in the surplus rural labor force joined the urbanward flow to the expanding coastal cities where they worked as temporary laborers (Wang and Hu 1999). China's immense potential for urban growth had begun to be realized.

In a blending of policy that attempts to integrate the advantages of international investment with redistributionist socialist doctrine, policy at present is to encourage growth in several designated cities along the coast while encouraging investment in the less inherently attractive (to foreign investors) interior and poorer regions. Development in the interior and western regions remains markedly lower than along the coast, and poverty rates are significantly higher, but China has had some modest success in addressing regional and rural-urban disparities in wealth (Tang 1999). In 2008–2009 China and its citizens were experiencing the consequences of a significant dip in the volume of the international demand for Chinese manufactured exports, but the country remained poised to resume its substantial influence in the world economy in postrecession times. Chinese cities reflect all the features of twenty-first-century boom towns writ large. Its major coastal cities have massive new architectural wonders, including clusters of towering skyscrapers that reach breathtaking heights and massive entertainment and sports venues. Beijing managed to display appropriate world-class standards in its stadium and associated facilities for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Yet Beijing reflected the same problems of China's other major congested cities, with traffic that crawls along at a few miles per hour, high levels of health-threatening air pollution, underhoused workers, and drifting labor migrants.

Beginning in the 1980s, local government was given increasing authority over local planning matters and retained a larger share of local revenues. Local policy initiatives are varied in character but feature a particular emphasis on urban redevelopment in older congested residential and market districts. These undertakings involve a coalition of local authority interested in promoting economic growth, foreign capital (real estate investment represents a third of the value of foreign capital investments), and state-owned enterprise management. There has been a particular emphasis on redevelopment projects in urban cores that replace old land uses with mixed use projects, including new modern housing and commercial property development (Thornley and Newman 2005, 228–29). These projects are changing the look and feel of Chinese cities, especially the old residential and market areas that provide the underlying fabric of social life.

Meyer (2008), along with many of the inhabitants of the dismantled older traditional neighborhoods, laments the passing of these communities in his book, *The Last Days of Old Beijing* (2008). He describes the process where market incentives propelled the Chinese version of state-sanctioned urban renewal. The old neighborhoods, or *hutongs*, made up the residential center of Beijing and are centered around the old Imperial City of the Old City district. The area comprised about 25 square miles, typically a mix of one-story homes and shopping streets with narrow lanes. People were attached to their small section of the sprawling area. In the 1980s as China's economy was transforming to a market base, real estate, including housing, became a commodity: The state still held ownership of property, but it granted long-term lease to private interests. In 1990 the state announced a plan to redevelop a large segment of the Old City. Parcels of government land were put on the market, and purchasers could redevelop the land with an eye to improving their investment. Local governments received revenue from the sale, and by the late 1990s property-use sales amounted to a fifth of the revenue collected by the government of Beijing. Occupants of the old hutongs were evicted and typically had nine days or so to find new accommodations or be forcibly removed by authorities. Typically there was little resistance but much resentment and mourning over the loss of community. The plan was later modified and evicted families and individuals would receive cash compensation to assist in their relocation. Meyer reports that the amount was insufficient to provide for comparable replacement property in the local area. The expectation was that evicted residents would reshelter themselves in the poorly constructed high-rises peripherally located some miles from their old residence. According to one of Meyer's sources, 572,000 residents were forcibly relocated between 1998 and 2001.

The scale of the dimensions of China's urbanization process and government efforts to get it under control are dizzying. Just one of China's Special Economic Zone (designed to attract international capital and trade) cities grew in population from around 30,000 just before the liberalization of economic policy in the late 1970s to an estimated 12 million by 2008. China's largest city, Shanghai, was estimated to have about 19 million people in 2009. The estimate of the size of China's total urban population in 2005 was 572 million: Projections were that it would reach an urban population of 1 billion by 2030 (McKinsey Global Institute 2008). How can a nation prepare for such growth? In 2005 China engaged a British engineering consultant to lay out plans for six clusters of eight cities each to be located in

western China. There would be a total of forty-eight new cities involved in the plan, each to contain between 5 million and 6 million people (roughly the size of London's present population) (*Building Magazine* December 2, 2005). While the scope of such a plan appears outrageously ambitious, the program would *only* house between 240 million and 290 million people or between 24 percent and 29 percent of the projected billion urban dwellers in 2030. The concept is consistent with the long-term socialist goals of the old days when policy included the development of China's neglected western region. However the strategy has more to do with relieving the anticipated urban population growth that would have difficult-to-imagine consequences in places like Shanghai and other existing eastern cities.

The experience of China post–turn of the century underlines the character worldwide of efforts to control urban change. The policy priority that runs far ahead of all others is how to optimize a place for one's city in the world-market economy, to avoid being overlooked or left out. According to this wisdom, policymakers must accept market-driven urban growth as a given. This new order holds out the prospect of revolutionary changes in the configuration and the hegemonic order of the cities of the world. It appears that bankers, mobile capital, and private firms of architects will have as much or more than government policymakers to say about the nature of cities and the direction of change in the foreseeable future. Policymakers, for their part, are absorbed by the task of selling their city to international investors as the place to do business, at least until other urban promoters in other cities lure them away. Meanwhile the question of how to ease the burdens of change for those shoved aside and those of limited means struggling to find a safe and secure place remains secondary or neglected. Many are finding the new world order, without vigorous urban social policies that soften the impact of the shifting global market, a hard town to live in.

11

Urban Sociology: An Evolving Perspective on the World

It is clear from the preceding chapters that urban sociology addresses a broad subject matter. The theme that unifies the various areas of interest into a cohesive subdiscipline within sociology is that all we have spoken of here is related in some systematic manner to a particular kind of social space, the urban arena. The proper subject matter of an urban sociology incorporates the social phenomena created or changed by cities. Urban effects may include the nature of experience (a feeling of powerlessness or freedom, an aversion to strangers, a social life enriched by diversity and exposure to multiple subcultures, or a tolerance for different kinds of people), influences on behavior (becoming part of a social movement or engaging in a form of deviance), the emergence of different forms of social organization (new political parties or subcultures), or shifts in the focus and objectives of social policy (to balance living conditions between rural and urban areas or to lower the visibility of the numbers of homeless people who gather in urban districts). Urban sociology is the study of social phenomena that are *of* the city. Other things that happen *in* the city, just as they happen elsewhere, do not interest us in the same systematic way.

Urban sociology assumed its character at a time when cities were growing rapidly. Urban space excited the imagination and challenged the ways that social life had existed up to that time. Urban sociology was a creature of a particular time and space, Europe and North America in the late nineteenth and very early twentieth century. Its ideas evolved over the course of the twentieth century as cities evolved and changed. Urban sociology's place in the twenty-first century, even as some cities grow to proportions unimagined in earlier times and the global population has become predominantly urban, is not quite clear. In this chapter we explore the challenges facing our field of study. We begin with a backward glance at the evolved nature of the field.

A LOOK BACK AT TWO PATTERNS OF ANALYSIS IN URBAN SOCIOLOGY

The field of urban sociology has arrived at an important juncture. In order to gauge its forward progress, it is useful to recognize the fact that it contains two very different sets of interests and approaches. We have explored the argument that the urban environment operates as an important sociological variable—that is, the urban environment affects the way people feel as well as what they do. Yet an important question persists with regard to this urban variable: Does the urban environment operate as an *independent* variable, as a basic causal factor, or is it merely a *secondary* variable? To what extent are cities, at their root, the *effect* of some prior cause—the spatial manifestation of the political and economic organization of a society, or more appropriately, the dynamic *global* political and economic order? When we look at the effects of the urban environment (size, density, and heterogeneity, as they were identified by Wirth), are we identifying *ultimate* causes? Or are the aggregations of people and productive forces that make up the cities merely the way the international marketplace organizes itself into dense nodes of activity in order to facilitate business? These are no incidental questions if we are to establish the place of urban sociology among the various macrological approaches to analyzing human organization and behavior.

There are no comfortable labels for identifying the two very broad and distinct approaches embodied within urban sociology. The labels that seem to do the least violence to the respective orientations are *culturalist* versus *structuralist*. Table 11.1 attempts to isolate the differences between the two approaches. It contrasts their

Table 11.1. Distinguishing Features of the Culturalist and Structuralist Approaches

	Culturalist Approach	*Structuralist Approach*
Characteristics of the urban area	Size and density give rise to distinctive modes of thinking, interaction, and organization	Cities represent a concentration of political and economic forces and relations that extend around the globe
Ideology	The urban form is progressive and reflects modernity, advanced organization, and technology	The urban form is the locus of wealth and privilege and the product of accumulated capital
Forces that shape the environment	The emphasis is on ecology and community, local environmental features.	The emphasis is on political economy, an extraterritorial focus
Development and underdevelopment	In modernization theory the city creates momentum for development through the spread of modern attitudes, technology, and forms of organization	Political economy argues that cities are parasitic in the Third World and maintains that there is an international imbalance in development
Stratification	The culture of poverty thesis prevails.	A structured inequality rooted in changes in the world economic system and regional patterns of growth and decline prevail.

underlying assumptions and their emphases in some basic areas of concern that we dealt with in earlier chapters. The categorical presentation is intended to denote observable tendencies among certain lines of thought.

The culturalist approach is rooted in the tradition of Tönnies, Durkheim, and Wirth and is based on what may be called the *ecological premise* (Flanagan 2009), the idea that the urban environment generates a distinct cultural form. This may be manifest as social aversion, as in Wirth's classic essay (1938), or in the form of cohesiveness and subcultural richness, as in Fischer's (1975; 1982) work. Thus, the city, as a social environment, is capable of creating novel ways of feeling and acting.

The fact that culturalists also talk about structural variables, such as size and density (Wirth) or critical mass (Fischer), need not be confusing. Culturalists begin with the idea that differences in social organization, such as the size of a given population, will generate differences in the nature of the participants' experience and the manner in which individuals interact. This was the basis of Simmel's observation on how cities affected "mental life" and the insight of Park as he linked urban ecology and behavior. However, the culturalist's interest is focused on the outcome that is produced by structural characteristics of the urban environment itself. Size and density produce "urbanism," which is the subcultural expression of the experience of life in the urban spaces of a wider society. This is what sets the subject matter of urban sociology apart for culturalists. The urban arena itself creates the sociological variables in which urban sociologists are interested; that is, urbanism, a distinctive way of life.

By the 1960s urban sociology, dominated by the culturalist orientation, was facing something of a crisis. A chorus of criticism raised the complaint that urban sociologists had as yet failed to adequately identify their subject matter. As cities sprawled into metropolitan regions, and the electronic media of "urban" communication and entertainment spread into every village and hamlet, the question became, What is it that urban sociologists study? They had failed to identify the theoretical object of their discipline (Harvey 1973). The culminating theoretical achievement of classical urbanism, Wirth's essay, was in disrepute as an "antiurban" tract. Yet it was the best that the culturalist tradition had managed to produce in terms of a comprehensive theoretical statement. Fischer's (1975) more positive view of the results of population size and density was still a decade away.

By the end of the 1960s, there was a growing body of work in urban political economy. Its focus was mainly on the problem of underdevelopment, and it found the most compelling explanation of the cause of underdevelopment in the structural relationship between rich and poor economies, historically and in the present time. Political economists posited the existence of a global network of economic relationships and opened an important tangential linkage between the study of the international economy and urban sociology. Cities represented intensive nodes of power and economic manipulation, instruments through which the underdevelopment of poor nations was bound to the development of rich nations (Frank 1967). In rich countries, the urban environment could be properly understood as the physical arena in which world corporations threw their weight around, dictating the rise and fall of local economic fortunes; it was where their executives lived and played, inflating the cost of living and affecting the housing supply for the less affluent of

the region. Observations of these phenomena gave rise to the dual-city hypothesis and debates: Could it be that the affluent and powerful lived in one city and those of limited means lived in quite a different one?

In the view of political economists, traditional urban sociology was inadequate because its focus was on what cities did, the sociological consequences of the urban arena itself (Castells [1972] 1977). From the perspective of political economy, it is appropriate to study the urban arena but only as an intensified spatial manifestation of wider processes, spaces where the circulation of capital was facilitated. The major fault of the culturalists is that they tend to see the city as a self-contained arena of action; thus, they begin and end their studies in the middle of the full range of operational factors.

The approach of political economists or critical structuralists carries its own set of liabilities. At the heart of much of the work in political economy is a radical critique of the capitalist world system. It is radical in the sense that it questions the fundamental legitimacy, the equity, of the way the international marketplace distributes advantage and disadvantage: The poor countries of the world are held hostage by wealthy nations; the poor and the working class of wealthy nations are the expendable victims of economic change. In nations that subscribe to the ideology that capitalism (free enterprise) is a benevolent force, fitting hand-in-glove with democracy, the arguments of political economists are heresy in polite circles. Yet, nothing has moved the political economy perspective to the fore so much as the general popular awareness of globalization and the questions it poses for the future. The discussion that raises questions about the exploitable conditions of Third World workers also highlights the systematic linkage between workers in different parts of the world. As the competition among geographically mobile corporations to drive down production costs continues to shift field after field of employment away from affluent populations, questions are raised about the future of work and the interests of workers versus the interests of their employers. The conflict between the interests of global capital or worldwide banking operations, on the one hand, and the remainder of society, on the other, enters the common parlance in the terms of Wall Street versus Main Street. At base these can be seen as questions about class interests—and in the tradition of Western discourse these echo the most disturbing debates of the past two centuries. In effect, the tightening structure of economic globalization, including the industrial and banking crisis that began in 2008, has moved the questions raised by political economists and the radical critique of market-driven change into the arena of everyday public discussion.

In the cities of today both the culturalist and structuralist approaches remain highly relevant. The figures of classical urban sociology who were writing early in the twentieth century would find little in the atmospheres of today's central cities to make them want to change the terms of their analyses. We can speculate about what their reactions might be to the residential transience of boomburbs and the bourgeoning of edge cities—whether they would find more similarity or contrast with the anonymity or alienation they found in the cities of their time. And there is little in the current era to deter the critical political economist from finding in today's metroplexes more fuel for their emphasis on the idea that metropolitan space is first and foremost an extension of the international economy. Its opulence put it there as an artifact of speculative systems of capital investment, where a crisis

in the global economy would locate its first fragile victims in the form of foreclosures, bank failures, construction and other industrial collapses, and the inability of formerly well-off citizens to pay their rent—*anywhere* in the world. This is the paramount reality of urban space, from that perspective.

So at this point in the development of the field of urban sociology it is possible to see the continued potential of both kinds of urban sociology, the inward-looking ecological premise of culturalists and the relevance of the assumptions of critical structuralists who take as their unit of analysis the global economy.

SUMMING UP THE PRESENT STATE OF URBAN SOCIOLOGY

At the present time it is possible to sum up, to appreciate and evaluate what the two orientations in urban sociology have taught us about the urban environment. We can see that both perspectives are indispensable, that either alone is inadequate for telling the whole story of the sociology of the city. Also, this period in time presents an interesting juncture for the urban sociologist: The ascendancy of the global perspective on change insists on a revised perspective for viewing the city. The revised perspective suggests that urban sociology will play a different role in the hierarchy of specialist sociologies in the twenty-first century, a role different from the one it held at the beginning of the twentieth century when the sheer dimension of urbanization drew the attention of the leading theoreticians in the field. The new emphasis on global economic unification dwarfs even the largest urban arenas and tells us that what happens everywhere is ultimately conditioned by worldwide events now more than ever before.

As global connectivity becomes a more insistent consideration, it intervenes increasingly in a sociology consisting of local culturalist and broader structuralist understandings. The articulations of the global political and economic entity insist on the externalization of analyses of what is observed on the city street—on any street. It is still a long road from observing the way political and economic forces operate on a global scale to explaining why an elderly woman fearful of the streets locks herself into her un-air-conditioned Chicago apartment during a life-threatening heat wave, or knowing why a young man migrates to Nairobi from his rural homeplace despite the fact that he knows of the soaring urban unemployment rates. However, it adds to our understanding to trace the behavior of the elderly woman and the young man to trends in the international economic system that manifest themselves in Chicago as underhousing and unemployment statistics and in Kenya as a desperately lean balance between rural and urban economic opportunities. It could be argued that there are more immediate legitimate sociologies that might be done in either case that would yield worthwhile insights into the experiences and feelings of these two distant individuals. Political economy is a remote theoretical tool, with little to offer in the way of innovative methodological devices to employ in the immediate empirical investigation of the details of these two lives. On the other hand, a traditional study of these people that focused on the local cultural factors that produced their behaviors but failed to develop an understanding of the link between the conditions of their lives and the global economic order would be incomplete. In any serious study, it is vital to link the immediate and more remote spheres of analysis.

Placemark 11.1—New Orleans: Understanding the Causes and Consequence of Hurricane Katrina

What happened to New Orleans? One is tempted to respond that Hurricane Katrina happened to the city. But that response jumps in at the end of the story, not at the beginning of a long tale of unnatural disaster. At the time the storm came ashore just east of the city, August 29, 2005, New Orleans was not in any position to cope with a near-hit by a category 4 hurricane. That had been made clear in a *Scientific American* article written by Mark Fischetti four years earlier (2001). Titled "Drowning New Orleans," the article summarized the unpreparedness of the city to withstand such a blow. "New Orleans is a disaster waiting to happen," Fischetti wrote. Much of it was below sea level (and, like Mexico City, sinking due to subsidence) and it was surrounded by water (Lake Pontchartrain, the Mississippi River, and the Gulf of Mexico), protected by a series of aging levees and a low-lying delta. The delta, which offers a buffer of marshland against storms coming in off the Gulf, was crumbling and washing away (disappearing) at the rate of twenty-five to thirty square *miles* per year due to human activity and natural processes. It was understood that in the event of a major weather emergency, large-scale evacuation of New Orleans on short notice would be impossible due to the existence of only a few, low-lying escape routes from the city. Fischetti noted that 10,000 body



While it is true that Hurricane Katrina profoundly affected the lives of all the citizens of New Orleans, it immediately became apparent that its impact was heaviest on poor people of color. Photograph by James Nielsen/AFP/Getty Images

bags had been stockpiled by 2001, and scientists at Louisiana State University were estimating that more than 100,000 people might die in a perfect storm. The day before Katrina hit, the mayor issued an evacuation order. When other residents fled, 130,000 people were left behind.

A tropical storm poses the threat of natural disaster that threatens life and property. But there are also what may be called "socially created vulnerabilities" involving systematic features of the societal environment that put some segments of society at greater risk in the event of disaster (Cutter 2006). As Peter Dreier (2006, 529) put it, "Katrina was not an equal opportunity disaster." He refers back to Eric Klinenberg's (2002) book that performed a "social autopsy" on the Chicago heat wave that primarily killed poor and elderly persons to make the point that, in the case of Katrina, the people hardest hit were poor and black. The results of the hurricane had been a long time in preparation. New Orleans was the twelfth poorest city in the United States with a 32.2 percent poverty rate. While most southern cities had been gaining population since the 1960s, New Orleans, more like a northern rustbelt city, had been losing (primarily middle class) population, along with jobs (down more than 50,000 between 1980 and 2000) and major companies. It was one of the nation's most segregated cities (the 2000 dissimilarity index was 69) and ranked third among U.S. cities in the concentration of poverty. So at the time natural disaster struck, social disaster was firmly in place, so that it was no surprise when a posthurricane investigation found that poor and black residents were disproportionately impacted (Logan et al. 2006). At the time the mayor warned everyone to leave the city, many inhabitants did not have the means to do so (black and poor residents had much lower automobile ownership rates), nor did they have friends or family living elsewhere to call upon for help; they certainly didn't have the means to book a room in a hotel in some distant town. They were socially vulnerable. "Socially created vulnerabilities are largely ignored in the hazards and disaster literature because they are so hard to measure and quantify. Social vulnerability is partly a product of social inequalities—those social factors and forces that create the susceptibility of various groups to harm, and in turn affect their ability to respond, and bounce back (resilience) after the disaster . . . What is a major challenge for other cities became a virtual impossibility for New Orleans. Those that could muster the resources evacuated the city. With no welfare check (the hurricane struck near the end of the month), little food, and no help from city, state, or federal officials, the poor were forced to ride out the storm in their homes or move to shelters of last resort" (Cutter 2006).

The news media and its viewers and readers were shocked by the consequences of the storm. Commentators often remarked on the Third World quality of what they were witnessing, and the quality of journalism suffered in the days immediately following. The chaos of the situation involving so many poor minority victims suffering in the absence of effective support from government was soon confused with anarchy, and the media reported on wild gangs committing murder, rape, and all forms of abuse, with thugs firing at

would-be rescuers. Some abuses did occur (New Orleans had a robust crime rate before the hurricane, and the ranks of police were thinned severely once the levees broke), but at a fraction of the rates imagined. Some shots were apparently fired to signal rescuers by people who were passed several times by boat or helicopter—no reports of firing at officials were later verified (Wise 2005). The reports of crowds giving in to looting instincts in the days after the city flooded and in the days before any relief in the form of water or food was distributed amounted largely to people scavenging locked stores for food and water—technically, looting.

There were some verified reports of serious armed aggression. These had to do with sheriff's men and police firing over the heads of people on foot, including children and elderly, who tried to escape flood waters by crossing the Greater New Orleans Bridge into neighboring Jefferson Parish where they had been told by authorities buses were waiting to evacuate them (Kaufman 2006). Subsequently, Jefferson Parish officials and residents said they had been alarmed by the reports of anarchy and violence in New Orleans and reaffirmed the decision to prevent evacuation.

The story of Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans is about the global economy, the decline of some U.S. cities, inequality, and race. If we fail to attend to the broader structural context in which local events are grounded, we risk misinterpreting fundamentally what we are looking at. A disaster, natural or otherwise, striking any large U.S. city would reveal that the large numbers of people who are the most vulnerable are poor blacks and other disadvantaged minorities. As Elijah Anderson observed, "In New Orleans, racial competition for resources did show its ugly face. Whites cleared out, while the people sleeping in the Superdome, the corpses rotting on the street and floating in the water, and the people camped out along evacuation routes were black."

Today urban sociology holds promise as an orienting mechanism among the social sciences as the branch of sociology concerned with the organization of space. This very issue presents urban sociology with an identity crisis. What is *the* unit of space that an urban sociology studies? As urban political economists redefine the scope of their spatial analysis to include the entire globe, are they still pursuing an *urban* sociology? They are as interested in the articulation of the world system in rural areas as in urban areas. Essentially, there are no more urban or rural sociologies, as the recognition of the economic linkages among all regions has erased the rationale for the conventional division of labor. What has been urban sociology up until now becomes the sociology of spatial relations. Its subject matter is the local manifestation of global trends.

The traditional culturalist orientation of urban sociology remains productive as a sociology of locality within the global perspective on spatial relations offered by structural sociology or political economy. The superordination and subordination of the structuralist and culturalist perspectives within a single paradigm merely recognizes which is the narrower (culturalist) and which is the broader (structuralist)

geography. Logically, the structuralist orientation is broad enough to offer a framework within which culturalist observations may be evaluated, while the reverse does not appear to be as forthcoming.

The study of cities-localities affords us an understanding of the practical impact of global change. As Sassen (1996, 630) put it, the traditional spatial focus of urban sociology remains useful because "a focus on cities and communities allows for a more concrete analysis of globalization, and in that regard we can think of cities and communities as strategic sites for an examination of global processes and major politicoeconomic processes." The study of cities helps in understanding globalization as well as the reverse. Sassen employs the example of the sharp stock market reversal of 1987, which saw widespread attention devoted to the plight of high-income Wall Street professionals, but the consequent impact of the crisis in the unemployment of Dominican office cleaners living in northern Manhattan was just as real in that community. The market boom in the mid- to late-1990s saw the creation of a new line of taxis in Manhattan servicing only the financial district, and the consequent peripheralization of "gypsy" cabs to low-income neighborhoods. In this light, it is reasonable and appropriate to ask how any local change may be traced back to its nonlocal origins. The worldwide economic crisis that began in 2008–2009 would once again turn the world's cities into laboratories (Park's term for the Chicago streets of his time) in which ethnographers are sure to discover local experiments in survival in response to global economic disaster.

Sassen speculates that there is a connection between expressive criminal tendencies, such as vandalism, skinhead angst, and the anger of rap, on the one hand, and the "sharpened inequality being witnessed in the process of economic globalization," on the other. Her point is that there is a new starkness to inequality that is the product of the global age, a new arrogance of corporate power, and an immediacy in the communication of the message that urban space is the province and property of remote forces. In reaction, the relatively powerless can be expected to use the streets and public spaces to make their claims for recognition and entitlement, to claim "their rights to the city." While the close juxtaposition of affluence and want has a history as old as cities themselves, there is a new clarity in the extremes. "The distance, as seen and lived, between the urban glamour zone and the urban war zone has become enormous. The extreme transparency and high public visibility of this difference is likely to contribute to further brutalization of the conflict" (Sassen 1996, 635). An appreciation of the connection between global processes and local outcomes provides a job description for the urban sociologist.

SPACES, PLACES, AND A CONTINUED PLACE FOR URBAN SOCIOLOGY

The dean of North American urban sociologists, Robert Park, was a newspaperman who changed careers when he came to believe that sociology would write the "big story" of the city. Park was inspired by the awesome dimensions of the rich and rapidly changing cities of his time, and by Chicago in particular. He believed that these social laboratories provided a glimpse into an unfolding and uncertain future.

But as the twentieth century advanced, the capacity of the maturing urban form to inspire awe faded. People got used to living in them, to having them around. In the twenty-first century, the "big story" of social change cannot be contained within a city of any size. Instead, what fascinates us—the window through which we attempt to glimpse the future—is the global reach of the international economy and the parallel dimensions of communication technology. The notion that physical spaces such as cities enclose social organization or social action, that they somehow establish perimeters within which people's lives are organized, is fundamentally challenged, harks back to the way things were in an earlier age.

> We are passing through a revolution that is unhitching the social processes of urbanization from the locationally fixed city and region. Reflecting the current explosion in science and technology . . . increasing ease of transportation and communication is dissolving the spatial barriers to social intercourse and Americans are forming social communities comprised of spatially dispersed members. A new kind of urban society is emerging that is increasingly independent of the city. (Webber 1968, 1091)

It is worth revisiting these observations from Melvin M. Webber, first introduced in chapter 1. Again, what makes the set of observations remarkable is that he made them in 1968, long before the introduction of personal computers, cell phones, the World Wide Web, e-mail, or Facebook. Consder how much more powerful they are today. He also remarks in his essay about outmoded terminology and frames of reference that are holdovers from an earlier urban age: His continued use of the term "urbanization" to refer to the development of the aspatial communities that he describes sets up an interesting tension as he speaks of urbanization "independent of the city." In the following we explore the extent to which communication and transportation and other "revolutions" have taken us beyond the spatial confines of the age of cities. We consider cybercities, transnationalism, and terrorism to determine the extent to which society in the present age is postcity, unhitched from spatial constraints, and what the implications are for the future of our discipline, urban sociology.

Cybercities: Imagining the Obliteration of the City

By the mid-1990s Melvin Webber had a lot of company regarding his prediction that technology had reduced the friction imposed by physical distance: It was possible to imagine that instant communication meant that people, industry, research facilities, and so forth, could be located anywhere with respect to each other, and this was rendering cities obsolete. With the advent of the Internet and instantaneous information communication technologies (ICTs) worldwide, speculators proposed that cities were holdovers from an older industrial age when central location for purposes of access to services, suppliers, and transportation arteries were a necessity. There were a number of important works that forecast the gradual demise of the urban form: most often cited are Peters and Gilder (1995), Negroponte (1995), and Naisbitt (1995). In the following decade, however, there was a chorus of criticism of the idea that the rapid development and proliferation of ICT had marked the end of urbanism and reduced the need for both human clustering and physical

movement. Presently, it is clear that ICT has impacted cities and the urban form, but in complex and unexpected ways.

In his introduction to the collection of essays that make up *The Cybercities Reader* (2004a), editor Stephen Graham provides an extensive review of critical reactions to the late twentieth-century argument that "the spread of the speed-of-light, digital exchanges and the explosion of digital domains, would, necessarily, imply some catastrophic collapse for cities" (4). Graham's opinion of such futuristic prescriptions is clear in the various terms (some of them borrowed) he uses to describe the perspective: excited, romantic, utopian, theological, cyberlibertarian, antiurban. The predictive argument of a cause-and-effect coincidence of the rise of digital technology and the shrinkage of cities was defeated by world events even as it was being proposed. He points to the unprecedented growth of cities and metropolitan regions in the digital age. This in fact may not be as apparent a contradiction as it may appear. While there is a clear and closely associated parallel growth between ICT and certain technology boom cities, Bangalore, India, to take one obvious example, today's patterns of urban growth vary considerably from place to place. In Europe and the United States, urban growth means sprawl, with outlying areas growing in a decentralizing manner not inconsistent with the influence of advances in ICT. In some of the Third World cities that are growing rapidly today very few people in the burgeoning slums and squatments are living on the metropolitan periphery because they can telecommute to their central city jobs from there. For most of the impoverished inhabitants of these urban peripheries the communications revolution is irrelevant. It appears that the interrelationship between ICT and human settlement patterns is an empirical question: The answer lies somewhere in the future. Meanwhile there have been some interesting works, some empirical, that give us a little insight to how communications technology may be affecting the kinds of spaces we live in.

Sassen (2001; [2000] 2004) has noted that while it would appear to make sense that major financial institutions like investment banks, given the development of electronic exchanges and the digitization of financial transfers, might well choose to decentralize their offices to less expensive locations, but they continue to cluster in three major cities—London, New York, and Tokyo. The reason has to do with the continued importance of the concentration of talent, of locating in creative milieus with regard to technological innovation, and the availability of all sorts of necessary specialized financial services, including legal supports and economic financing. With reference to the footloose information revolution, she distinguishes between two kinds of information: *Quantitative data* can be delivered anywhere. But being on the cutting edge of the *interpretation and evaluation of that data* means that you need to be a participant in the physical space where those conversations are taking place, which is not the same as getting the news online of what's already been said. So while some lower level clerical, sales, and data-processing operations can be dispersed to anywhere on the globe that makes economic sense, "financial centers provide the social connectivity that allows a firm or market to maximize the benefits of its technological connectivity" (Sassen [2000] 2004, 197).

Some patterns regarding central and peripheral location and relocation of elements of the ICT industry itself reflect the same "old" patterns that we have observed

regarding metropolitanization and urban deindustrialization in the United States. Gross (2004) reviewed the results of the efforts of New York City to subsidize some of the costs of setting up shop for high-tech manufacturing, communications and technical service firms, and software developers and providers, in seven locations in the five boroughs of the city. The plan to help convert some old and underutilized industrial space worked pretty well in the TriBeCa district of lower Manhattan. The number of tech firms located in Manhattan grew from 2,600 at the beginning of the program in 1997 to 4,000 just two years later in 1999. One area of clustered businesses in lower Manhattan came to be known as Silicon Alley. Elsewhere, results were not so successful: Many of the companies taking city grants were small businesses or start-ups, and some of the former simply transferred from one part of city to one of the sponsored growth zones. Also, larger high-tech industrial operations, especially hardware manufacturers, continued to favor suburban locations, while services tended to scatter throughout central city and suburban locales. This pattern of distribution of industries and businesses was well under way before the sudden rise of the importance of electronic technologies.

Some of the most innovative thought on cities and the cyber revolution comes from Manuel Castells, who originally became well-known in urban studies for introducing a Marxist criticism of the traditional non-Marxist study of urbanism. He has proposed that communication and other technologies have restructured society by doing away with boundaries between sovereign nation-states. There is a new global unity in the patterns by which bodies of information are developed, valued, controlled, and exchanged. This dimension of globalization may be "understood as the technological, organizational, and institutional capacity of the core component of a given system (e.g., the economy) to work as a unit in real or chosen time on a planetary scale . . . At the root of the new society, in all its diversity, is a new social structure, the network society" (Castells 2000, 694–95). While such a conceptualization may appear to reinforce arguments about the eradication of the relevance of physical space, Castells says this is not the case. But place, in particular the city, must be reconceptualized accordingly. Here he offers the idea of the "global city," which is a quite different kind of space than what we have considered in our discussion of the city up to this point. "The global city, in the strict analytical sense, is not any particular city. And empirically it extends to places located in many cities around the world, some extra-large, others large, and still others not so large. The global city is made up of territories that in different cities ensure the management of the global economy and global information networks. Thus a few blocks in Manhattan are part of the global city, but most of New York, in fact most of Manhattan, is very local, not global" (Castells 2000, 697). He sees the concept offering a "new frontier," and thereby, implicitly, new life, "for one of the oldest sociologies, urban sociology" in the present and future.

Castells sees the body of his work, which he summarized for *The Cybercities Reader* in 2004, as pointing the way toward a new theory of urbanism. Briefly, there are three components to be considered with reference to the urban dimension of societies:

- Function: urban spaces are conduits for the global economic and communication flows, but at the same time are places that frame the local orientations of inhabitants.

- Meaning: cities are sites occupied by individualism ("individuation"), or self-interest, and "communalism," which here refers to shared identity: the two processes coexist within individuals and within society in an uncomfortable and unsettled tension.
- Forms: sites once again of growing tensions because cities simultaneously operate as *spaces of flows* (multicontent communication or transmission nodes) and *spaces of places* (the local orientations of individuals and activities).

Castells acknowledges that there is some overlap among these identifying principles of urban spaces. The last of the three appears to be most central to his effort to build a comprehensive urban theory. It is the dual character of cities as spaces of flows and spaces of places that gives them their place in a network society and provides the necessary insight to begin to develop methodologies for the study of cities. To what extent is *this* space in *this particular city* part of the global city? To what extent is *that segment* of a particular city the dimension that provides its inhabitants with local orientation and meaning? What is the nature of the tension between the two and how is that changing at this moment? In Castells' words, "The contradictory and/or complementary relationships between the new metropolitan centrality, the practice of public space, and new communication patterns emerging from virtual communities, could lay the foundation for a new theory of urbanism—the theory of cyborg cities or hybrid cities made up of flows and places" (Castells 2004, 87). We will have to leave Castells there. He has given us something to think about in identifying one path that urban sociology may consider following in the future. It is interesting that he originally became known in urban sociology for his criticism of existing efforts to theorize urbanism ([1972] 1977), but it is true that his proposed paradigm goes far beyond Louis Wirth and other ecologists, and beyond cities themselves, for that matter. Finally, he does assign urban sociology an important role to play in framing an understanding of life in a globalized world and, thereby, a rationale for urban sociology's continued existence in the cyberage.

Textbox 11.1. Bangalore, India: A Third World–Real World Manifestation of the Information and Communication Technology Age

People in the West are no longer surprised when they call computer support or other customer service numbers to find themselves connected to someone located far away with a South Asian accent and an occupationally anglicized contraction of their given name—Ken, Ron, Jan, Jen. It has become a routine part of the global experience that service workers responding to routine calls for goods or services may be located anywhere. It also became an all too well-recognized part of the global landscape that since the mid-1990s all aspects of the ICT industry have relocated to areas of the world where highly trained labor was a relative bargain, whether it lived in little towns in West Cork in Ireland or in burgeoning Third World cities like Bangalore in Central India. Bangalore reflects the blinding speed of change in the interface of the cyberworld and the physical world. It grew from a population of under 1.7 million in 1971 to just under 4 million in 2000 to (perhaps) 8 million in 2008. By the late 1980s it had 3,000 electronics industries, large and small, and by the end of the twentieth century it was

contributing economically nearly 40 percent of the value of India's high-technology output. It was home to an inordinate proportion of the country's skilled technicians and engineers, and some of its companies were growing at the staggering rate of more than 50 percent per year, with hundreds of acres of labs and light industry parks occupied by the likes of IBM, Sanyo, Motorola, and Texas Instruments. "Increasingly, the presence of a sizeable modern industrial sector has brought prosperity to the city and has given its central parts a cosmopolitan look. Measured in terms of expensive restaurants and pubs, boutiques, shopping plazas, and other signs of available purchasing power in the context of western behavior patterns, a middle class is strikingly present in the central parts of the city and in other expensive areas beyond the center" (Madon [1998] 2004, 310–11). While this makes it appear that the utopian vision of cyberspace is capable of lifting a majority of people in a Third World city past the crushing physical realities of the twentieth-century, postcolonial era, that is, unfortunately, not the case. The prosperity of those sectors of the population who are able to enjoy the benefits of being plugged into the ICT revolution only accentuates the degree of inequality that separates them from the majority of the city's inhabitants, many of whom suffer extreme poverty. In 1998 a salary that would have appeared an unbelievable bargain to international employers, beginning at just under $400 per month, was four times the *annual* family income in rural Karnataka State that surrounds Bangalore. The predictable resultant mass migration to the city from the countryside has produced a situation where throngs each day seek occasional work as informal laborers. Meanwhile, inflation caused by the higher corporate salaries of technical and professional employees includes rising land values that have driven members of the local non-high-tech-employed middle class as well as poor residents to the periphery, adding to the burden of those who must daily seek temporary work in the city. City officials, engaged by the image of their modern metropolis, are increasingly hostile toward poor slum dwellers and squatters (Madon [1998] 2004, 311–20).

It is an inescapable fact that the revolution in information and communication technology is the source of extraordinary change in everyday life. But taking Bangalore as one defining example, it is clear that cyberspace has not replaced the on-the-ground political and economic realities of the physical world. Electronic innovations don't make cities obsolete. Bangalore's population has doubled in the past five years because of the electronic revolution. Communication doesn't obviate the need for physical movement—with the number of vehicles on Bangalore's roadways growing by 50 percent per year, causing massive traffic snarls. Instant communication hasn't resolved acute problems of inequality or poverty, which are a part of the real world where people struggle against much more affluent and powerful agents to shelter themselves. Bangalore's physical reality reportedly includes bad roads, serious pollution, power shortages (except to high-tech plants and gated communities that have their own generators), growing garbage collection and disposal problems, dying lakes, and reckless construction (*The Telegraph* (Kolkata) September 11, 2005). We might be talking about conditions in a nineteenth-century European city growing during the Industrial Revolution. A product of the electronic age, the reality that is Bangalore has escaped the fantastical imaginary twenty-first-century cyberspace utopianism. Perhaps this is a good testing ground for Castells' hypothesis for cities simultaneously attached to spaces of flows and spaces of places. Some of Bangalore is a component of the networked global city: Some of it has remained at home in India, growing out of but tied firmly to the past, a local artifact rooted in the political economy of earlier centuries, and this one.

The cities and metropolitan regions of the world are shifting shapes, but they remain real places that draw, hold, and exchange among them growing populations. ICT systems are one of the elements that cities contain and are contained within. Electronic technologies make up part of the urban landscape that we have become accustomed to. Devices for storing and exchanging information are not only freeing, but they also curtail freedom. Some time ago they migrated from the desktop and now help to monitor, sort, and control the movements of people in public, in the form of cameras and other constant surveillance devices that capture and store images and make sure people (especially the poor) are in place and behaving themselves (Graham 2004b). The public fear of terror attacks and common crimes produces an increase in the numbers and kinds of sensing devices and expands their distribution. Yet the market has not found a way to distribute access to productive personal electronic media to all. From the inception of the ICT revolution there was a recognition of the looming digital divide that meant that change was introducing a new and powerful dimension for structuring inequality. The digital divide adds to the magnitude of the differences in life chances between the populations of rich and poor nations, and stands between the potentials for individual advancement of the affluent and the poor within nations. Lack of access to computers and other information technologies is not simply a matter of inconvenience. "There is no simple way to measure the impact of the current inequitable distribution of information technologies, but it clearly is becoming an increasingly important contributor to inequality in America" (Benton Foundation [2000] 2004, 307). Cyberspace is a real dimension of human existence, but not everyone can live in it, nor has it overcome the realities of life in the physical world.

Cities persist in that world and show few signs of going away. In 1996 Melvin Webber looked back across three decades to his earlier essays "proclaiming the demise of the traditional city." He reflected that all of his earlier observations about the space-destroying communications and transportation revolution remained in effect, and that even London, Paris, and Tokyo were increasingly coming to resemble sprawling Los Angeles, growing at their edges. But he also remarked on what he called "The Persisting Power of Propinquity," the tendency for businesses and people to "agglomerate," for cities to grow. Part of the economic and social affinity for population concentration, he thought, was that people liked the city, had social and emotional attachments to their particular city as well as to each other (were what we referred to as the cityphile in chapter 1). "Many New Yorkers contend that they'll never leave Manhattan with its crowds and visible vitality, no matter what the glories of the suburbs." Another piece of persistent propinquity was the fact that "the cost of overcoming space has not yet reached zero" for the movement of people or goods (Webber 1996). At the time of his death, ten years later in 2006, cities were growing as never before. The time for the even dispersal of the world's population without regard to urban centers had not arrived. Webber would probably add "yet."

Transnationalism and the Globalization of Home for the New Uprooted

Transnationalism refers to a pattern where international migrants become enmeshed in a "plethora of connections spanning home and host societies" (Waldinger

and Fitzgerald 2004, 1177), maintaining ties with their society of origin even when established in their point of destination. This in-between existence is supported by the ease and velocity of today's modes of transportation and global communication. Those who study transnationalism believe that technology has made international migration different from emigration and immigration in the past: Ease of movement makes settling into a new society much more tentative, both with respect to the open opportunity to return home (circular migration), or the decision to move on to a third, fourth, and so on, society. The impetus for movement is often provided by the global economy that quickly shifts relative opportunities for employment or business from point to point around the world. Transnationalism has been called a grassroots dimension of globalization, or globalization from below.

Transnationalism interests urban sociologists because it refocuses our attention once more to the global arena, where people cross permeable national borders in an unprecedented volume worldwide. In chapter 5 we made the case that, historically, the city provided an important arena where immigrants from many countries developed a sense of belonging, an ethnicity or common sense of peoplehood based on their shared identity with people who had emigrated from the same land. It has been argued that today, international migrants' sense of who they are and where they belong is much more tentative, more provisional, as the option to return to their place of origin, or to move on to yet other nations, remains an open opportunity, even as migrants and their children adapt to the conditions of their current resettlement. Sukhetu Mehta's family experience (chapter 2, *Maximum City* [2005]) in living among the cities of Europe, the United States, and his native Mumbai is a good example of the kind of movement and network dispersion we are describing.

To a greater degree than ever before, the world of air travel and global communication offers many of its citizens an open question: Where does it make sense for me to make my life, given my skills, chances for economic mobility, and my social and economic capital? For populations of the Southern Hemisphere and other poorer regions of the world there is the further question of how to deal with prejudice and the difficulty of entry, if their target of relocation is among the richer states of the world. But, for people with the means, there is always the question of "Where?" or "Where next?"

Where do the people who do move live, in their hearts, in their plans for eventual settlement? What sort of community-in-limbo do they occupy, along with similarly situated others? Among all of the international migrants, these are the subset of the not-permanently settled, or permanently unsettled, these are the transnationals. They are thought to make up a greater proportion of "emigrants" and "immigrants" than in earlier times. Schmidtke (2001, 4) sums up the situation for transnationals in Europe:

> The ability of some immigrant communities in Europe to maintain a connection to their society and political community of origin is new . . . New transportation and communication technologies, a more permissive legal framework, and an internationalized economy with more cross national modes of production provide new opportunities for immigrants to move from one country to another and to live and work in a multitude of national contexts. Due to the decreasing significance of geography in determining the social space of these groups, they can partially emancipate themselves from citizenship regimes defined by national boundaries.

Is it indeed the case that current economic, political, and technological factors, when compared to past conditions, have produced a new set of experiences worthy of the new transnationalism designation? The point has proven to be controversial.

The disagreement is over the extent to which some body of today's international migration is really sufficiently different from that of the past to deserve special designation. Critics (Morawska 2001; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) claim that the field of transnational studies that has grown so rapidly has "dehistoricized" its subject matter. They argue that the "discovery" of connectivity between societies that has resulted from the current volume of international migration initially failed to appreciate the similarities between present patterns and earlier periods of widespread emigration-immigration. Morawska (2001) writes that while no two historical periods are ever precisely the same, transnational scholarship has failed to acknowledge essential social and political similarities between past and present. Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) add that transnational scholars posit a false dichotomy between past and present. They say that there is an overemphasis on the differences between present and past states: It is a mistake to imagine that stronger international borders prevented emigrants from maintaining home ties or circulating among various states as they do today. And critics are not satisfied with the delayed acknowledgment by those researchers operating within the transnational paradigm that patterns of international migration today do indeed share some characteristics with past patterns; Waldinger and Fitzgerald ask, "So what's new?"

While there is ample room for scholars to argue over the degrees of similarity between the past and present waves of immigrants, it would also appear reasonable to recognize some of the important differences that do exist. It has always been the case that many international immigrants have strained to maintain connections with home. But it would be difficult to overstate the contrast in connectivity between a time when contact was via surface mail that took weeks or months to travel between sender and recipient, and the present era of cell phones and cheap international calling cards, or between the era of rail and sea travel and air travel. And while the permeability of international boundaries vary from region to region, the possibilities for cross-border travel and enterprise are indeed facilitated between many places today in comparison with even the recent past. Europe, in particular, through the European Union accords, has made travel, trade, and employment a matter of choice among the citizens of member states. While immigration, guest labor, and return migration have long been features of international migration, the fluidity and connectivity of the current era would appear to argue that internationalism today deserves recognition as being a qualitatively different experience. It is probably wise to add that changes have been emerging gradually over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, so we should not be surprised to find that variations in the interconnectivity of global social networks among past and present eras are a matter of degree.

Alejandro Portes, a leading figure in the study of transnationalism, concluded (2003) the following with regard to what has been learned from the study of the phenomenon. Transnationalism represents a novel perspective if not a set of structures and experiences strictly limited to the current era. Responding to the question of whether or not there is "anything new," he suggests that we acknowledge evidence regarding the interconnection between sending and receiving societies in the

past, but we should also recognize that the transnational perspective represents a worthwhile advance in knowledge by emphasizing global interconnectivity as a key feature of international movement in the present. Portes enumerates certain characteristics and qualifications that have been developed by transnationalism studies. Transnationalism is most appropriately understood as a grassroots phenomenon based on the initiatives of common people to establish and maintain cross-border ties in their own interest. The body of study should be kept analytically separate from the study of large transnational political or other bureaucracies. We should keep in mind that, as in the past, not all cross-border migrants are transnationals: Those that allow their home ties to atrophy, or actively seek to cut them, are simply immigrants, rather than people attempting to live between or among states. Emigrant transnationalism can have a significant aggregate economic impact, particularly in the form of remittances, investments, and businesses formed in the sending community or society. The extent to which transnationalism develops depends to some extent on conditions in both the sending and the receiving societies. Those migrants escaping from a violent and disordered environment may want to cut their ties; those who encounter a hostile reception in host societies are likely to form protective residential enclaves and maintain local and extended ethnic-national ties (Portes 2003, 874–80). Here, in Portes' review of some of the dimensions of transnationalism studies, he demonstrates that the field has developed some well-established parameters. However, his remarks have not convinced critics such as Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) that the body of transnational studies has developed evidence of sufficiently novel patterns to be worthy of a separate designation.

For our purposes in this text, if we will accept transnationalism as an emergent phenomenon that can only become an increasingly important dimension of social organization, what are the implications for urban sociology? The study of transnationalism appears to give urban sociologists a key role in studying the phenomenon (Smith and Eade 2008). Smith (2001) employed the term "transnational urbanism" to stress the central role played by cities as the social spaces that ground transnational networks. These are the arenas that reveal the effects of transnational social, political, and economic ties on place and vice versa. Three studies in Smith and Eade's (2008) collection of case studies that link the study of transnationalism to certain cities are particularly useful in articulating the manner in which cities anchor these migrant systems.

Sinatti (2008) argues that it is important not to overstate the ability of migrants to break free of locality as they appear to move freely between the places in which they temporarily locate their lives. International migrants are still strongly connected to the cities they pass through, even if they are only stopping-off points. She refers to these sites as "translocalities." Whereas destination cities provided most international migrants with the arena in which they worked out a new ethnic or adapted identity, today's transnationals experience the urban stops along their journeys as meaningful sources of belonging. Sinatti studied Senegalese migrants to (and often through) an industrial city in northern Italy, Zingonia. In the process of emigration from Senegal, the capital city, Dakar, became an important collection and stepping off point in the migrants' journey from rural homeplaces—but not as a place left behind. Building a house in Dakar for Senegalese working in Italy was symbolic of success, of having made it. This marks a significant change in West African migra-

tion that is indicative of the recent internationalization of migrant imagination and identity. In a previous generation, building a house in the *internal village of origin* for migrants en route to Dakar and other major West African urban destinations had been the public signal of a successful work career (Gugler and Flanagan [1978] 2009). Even the concept of "destination" has changed in the era of transnational migrant experience. Zingonia, Italy, provides work and residence for many Senegalese migrants; however, "It is not so much the presence of resident Senegalese that makes this town a translocalilty, but rather the capacity it has developed to attract a constant flow of people who spend more or less extended periods of time here for a variety of reasons" (Sinatti 2008, 70). Many move on to other locations in Italy.

Garbin's (2008) study of international migration, linking a local district in northern Bangladesh and cities in Britain, focuses on the manner in which transnational networks impact both sending and receiving communities. In the sourcing area there has developed over the decades a sharp distinction between families with and without a history of migration, as the families with migrants have provided infrastructural benefits and prosperity for the whole of the community, as well as for themselves. These families have gained a superior moral standing and authority within the home district. At the European end, members of these families of high standing that have institutionalized homeland improvement activities assume a leadership role in sponsoring and organizing meetings and cultural or religious gatherings in British cities where they live. In this way they support the local maintenance of ethnically reconstructed Bangladeshi values and traditions for subsequent generations of people who may never travel to the homeplace. The Bangladeshi diaspora, suspended between place of origin and migrant destination, constitutes a cultural, political, and economic "locus" of flows. Life in this network is uniquely transnational, anchored at either end by a hybrid culture that is not native to either society.

A study of Chinese entrepreneurs in Central European cities indicates that some are increasingly transnational, commuting among several receiving countries with increasing regularity. Milutinovic (2008) reports the underlying motivation for relocation for members of this "upward stratum" of Chinese business families is to expand economic opportunity by establishing themselves in new trading markets. Cities of Hungary and Serbia had become hubs of Chinese operations by the mid-1990s, and these operations linked big cities there with economic trade zones in China. The value of Milutinovic's analysis is that she points to a manner in which these business agents accelerate the spread of globalizing trade networks. These international middle-level merchants possess a kind of nimbleness, whereby they are able to identify and are willing to relocate to opening markets that promise an adequate return on risk, opportunities that make the new markets competitive with already established but crowded entrepreneurial spaces elsewhere in Europe. This nimble quality gives these international trading networks an inherently transnational quality, ready to pounce on new opportunities wherever there is a hint of promise. The brains behind such operations also are transnational in their orientation to the globe, with grassroots communication networks located in a number of regions simultaneously. Milutinovic (2008, 93) says that changes in global capitalism should be expected to generate changes in human movement and habitation patterns: "Nowadays, the flow of people, goods and ideas are shaped by new modes

of flexible production and accumulation of capital. Consequently, migration and migrant entrepreneurship should be also examined in relation to these modes of production and the transformation of capitalism from mass industrial production toward the flexible accumulation of capital."

Each of these studies points to an important dimension of transnationalism. Sinatti documents the continued importance of place for migrants in the translocalities that dot their passage and anchor meaning. Both Garbin and Milutinovic indicate the prominence of economic factors in motivating transnational movement. Garbin's study of Bangladeshis in Britain also hints at some of the ways global migrants can be agents of change and stability for both sending and receiving localities. Milutinovic makes the valuable observation that, in the light of the globalization of markets, it should come as no surprise that people will find ways to respond by reframing their lives, social resources, and their place of residence accordingly. What all these studies have in common is that they demonstrate that the impact of global processes still is best observed and understood at the local level, in the case of transnationalism, with reference to specific migrant streams and particular cities. The scope of global social phenomena may test our imagination, but as researchers we know where we must go to study it. We go to the city, realizing that what we are looking at is a dynamic anchoring point of far-reaching processes.

International Terrorism and the City

An area of analysis that demands the attention of contemporary urban social science is the manner in which various dimensions of armed conflict and violence connect to cities. Cities are magnets for varieties of violent expression that go beyond the consistent correlation between violent crime and city size. Urban centers have no monopoly on violence but tend to be arenas in which violence is played out on a large scale—or in calculated efforts to attract the attention of a wider audience. Cities showcase episodes of violence that range from mass killings by individuals expressing idiosyncratic frustrations, to popular protests quelled by police or other armed force, through sectarian warfare, to terrorism. Whatever the underlying motive, a relatively small amount of violence played out on the urban stage yields far more press coverage than a more vicious bloodletting in a rural area. Alienated assassins who want to take revenge on society or the world know they can make no stronger statement than by carrying out their vengeance on a crowded commuter train or in familiar and accessible public building. If the violence in question is a strategically planned act of terror, choosing an urban arena ensures the most effective coverage and transmission of the message. If we understand that a primary objective of terrorism is communication (Schmid and de Graaf 1982), we immediately see the city as the natural habitat of political violence.

This means that the work of urban sociology in the twenty-first century must extend to the study of cities as strategic targets in global conflict, "the choice *par excellence* of those seeking to commit terrorist acts," a fact usefully seen in the light of a long history of conflict and warfare where cities and their inhabitants have presented adversaries with an irresistible vulnerability (Graham 2004c, 53). In addition to the attack on the United States in September 2001, which targeted Manhattan and Washington, D.C., other recent major politically motivated at-

tacks have been carried out in Bali (Indonesia), Casablanca (Morocco), Tel Aviv, Moscow, Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), Istanbul, Madrid, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), London, Mumbai, Lahore-New Delhi (passenger train en route), and several other major cities in India (not included in the list are cities in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, or Sri Lanka where urban bombing causing thousands of civilian casualties has been a major strategic component in ongoing warfare). In the last four decades more than 12,000 terror attacks have occurred in cities causing over 73,000 casualties. Roughly three in every four acts of politically motivated violence occur in cities. "Urban terrorism has brought the equivalent of a major war to cities around the world. Its most conspicuous quality is that civilians are both the intended and actual victims" (Savitch 2008, 3). And while it is appropriate to recognize and distinguish between state terrorism and terrorism committed by outside groups, our limited discussion will focus on the latter, the agents of which are committed to magnifying the demonstration effect of their acts for a global audience.

Cities provide a natural environment for terrorist acts for a number of reasons. Savitch (2008, 9) sums up the appeal with reference to what he sees as three analytically distinct forms of terrorism:

- Catalytic terrorism seeks the widespread transmission of attacks that are shocking and distressing: ideally it involves the destruction of irreplaceable national symbols.
- Mega terrorism seeks to cause the largest number of casualties and the greatest degree of physical destruction: advances in the destructiveness of explosive devices have enhanced the capacity of terrorists to make these statements over time.
- Smart terror is aimed at the destruction of key infrastructural systems or financial institutions that are most delicately integrated, vital, and vulnerable in large cities.

A listing of some of the factors that contribute to the attraction of cities as terrorist targets might include:

- Rich targets—in terms both of monetary value and potential for loss of life.
- Soft targets—difficult to protect
- Familiar and symbolically important targets—buildings that are well-known—either through personal experience (cities are important tourist attractions as well as homes to large populations) or through repeated public imaging. The psychological pain caused by the transformation of familiar urban symbols and spaces from a recreational, governmental, or everyday-business locus to a site of terror and human tragedy affects a far wider population than those directly connected to the violence.
- Anonymity of the variety described by Wirth or Simmel—it is relatively easy for terrorists to hide, to go unnoticed among heterogeneous urban populations.
- Power statement—the message of urban terrorists is that we can strike anywhere, even in the heart of your largest population centers, and your government is powerless to protect its citizens: a primary goal of terrorism is to communicate

we are here, we are strong, we are clever, and we must be reckoned with (Schmid and de Graaf 1982). The effectiveness of any terrorist event may be evaluated in these terms.
- Lingering effects of major urban terror strikes—government efforts to control further incidents include limitations placed on citizens regarding free movement and restricted access to particular types of spaces. There is a slowing of flows of movement of people and material (both of which especially affect dense urban spaces)—and perhaps a curtailment of information (restrictions on news media reporting). Restrictive measures entail both material and civic costs.

There is irony in the fact that today's cities, especially world cities like New York and London, have the power to orchestrate and profit from the global economy, and yet that very fact makes them most vulnerable to terror attacks. The destruction of the World Trade Center in Manhattan underlines the painfully vulnerable targetability of spaces that are at the same time functionally vital and exquisitely symbolic. The difficulty of defending urban space from would-be attackers is underlined in a warning from a former FBI deputy director discussing the building of a memorial on the site of the World Trade center. He wrote that the proposed memorial presented an elevated level of "target attractiveness" based on its symbolic importance and capacity to draw large public gatherings (Sorkin 2008, 215). This caution is emblematic of the way life, in particular urban life, has been changed, restrategized, not only in the United States but also around the world. Periodic attacks in other cities since 2001 offer reminders that the threat of attack is ongoing and that no place, especially no urban space, is excluded. We have come to the realization that the open questions regarding terror attack are *where* not *if*, *what* evolved instrument or strategy will be used, *how* effective will it be as measured by loss of life. Also, *who* will be its targets and *who* will be its agents? A year after the September 2001 attacks on the United States that destroyed and damaged edifices symbolic of economic and military might, bombers attacked an expatriate nightclub and beer garden in Bali, a site frequented by Westerners. In the attacks on the United States, the sites selected were symbolic. In Bali the objective shifted to causing maximum death and injury. A first bomb scattered survivors into the street, a second delayed detonation caught the survivors of the first bomb there (Holt-Damant 2008). The fact that the world has become all too familiar with this tactic from its employment in Iraqi cities and other war zones tells us how much the world and its cities have changed. In the new urban world, street smarts include the knowledge that if a bomb goes off, you don't rush in to help the victims, lest you become one in a second blast.

"Urban terrorism draws on low-intensity warfare in order to destabilize cities by upsetting their routines and undoing their productive capacity. Boiled down, where cities seek to make [ordered, routine] space, urban terrorism seeks to despoil it; where cities seek to facilitate movement, urban terrorism seeks to paralyze it" (Savitch 2008, 95). It is the aftermath of attack that often transforms urban space as much as the memory of attacks themselves. Sometimes the change is starkly symbolized. In Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Israel, Baghdad, and elsewhere, walls have been built to separate would-be attackers and target communities. In an odd symbolic manner they hark back to the walls that surrounded ancient and

medieval towns and cities to protect them from external enemies (Savitch 2008, 123–24).

There are parallel boundaries that separate the world's wealthy economies and standards of living from poorer regions, a "political equator," at times walled, that divides the United States and Mexico, the strait of Gibraltar lying between Europe and Africa, the frontier territories of Middle East conflicts, and the patrolled straits and borders that protect China's growing economic promise from poorer territories in the region. Mirroring the gated communities that protect the urban affluent in many countries from their poorer neighbors, the wall and its equivalent boundaries are symbolic of a particular type of future.

> The dramatic images emerging from the political equator are intensified by the current political climate in which terrorism and its opposite, fear, set the stage for the current confrontations over immigration policy and the regulation of borders worldwide. The result is an urbanism born of surveillance and exclusion, casting these geographies of conflict as anticipatory scenarios of the twenty-first century global metropolis, where the city will increasingly become the battleground between control and transgression. (Cruz 2008, 111–13)

The point here is that the sphere of urban conflict has been broadened and the division and source of anxiety have also been broadened on a number of fronts. The result is that today's cities have been transformed not only by physical walls but also by other less visible protective barriers and watchtowers as well. As Marcuse (2004, 263) put it, "Not terrorism, but what has been done under the mantel of counter-terrorism, has had a significant effect on cities since the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001."

As never before, city spaces have become wary and watchful spaces. Marcuse continues: "The prognosis of the impact of the war on terrorism is not good, for those interested in urban life and democracy. Both are threatened by actions in the market, and government responses are likely to aggravate problems. The war on terrorism is leading to a continued downgrading of the quality of life in U.S. cities, visible changes in urban form, the loss of public use of public space, restrictions on free movement within and to cities, particularly for members of darker skinned groups" (Marcuse 2004, 264).

Now that terrorism's toolbox has been opened, it cannot be closed again. In a chapter titled "The Poor Man's Airforce: A Brief History of the Car Bomb," Mike Davis (2008) traces the history of this device, which has an affinity with urban targets, back to the anarchist detonation of a horse-drawn wagon on Wall Street in Manhattan in 1920. As the title of Davis's essay implies, the car or truck bomb is a cheap, easy to manufacture, and precisely targetable device for delivering massive destruction equivalent to "several 1,000 pound bombs to the doorstep of a prime target" (353). Since its inception it has been made more powerful and deployed by groups around the world (including state intelligence agencies) as an instrument of terror. The future is sure to bring yet larger and more technologically sophisticated devices and greater destruction to cities, but the car and truck bomb is a stealth device accessible to the masses, with widely distributed instructions for manufacture. In the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 the leader of the attackers said



Cities such as London, New York (pictured here), and Tokyo remain the central organizing poles of global society in the twenty-first century. © 2008 Jupiterimages Corporation

the ingredients for the bomb cost about $3,600, plus the daily rental cost of the Ryder van that was used to deliver the device (Davis 2008, 354).

THE CITY AT THE CENTER OF THE WORLD

We have questioned at various points in this text the future role of urban sociology in an increasingly globalized world. Cyber technologies reputedly obliterated space and the need for cities, yet the urban share of the world population has continued to grow. Recent generations of the uprooted and transnationally mobile were thought to have achieved a kind of social weightlessness that allowed them to float free of particular geographic coordinates: In fact, they have been shown to be thoroughly anchored, materially and emotionally, to particular urban spaces. Worldwide political conflict has come to include terrifyingly spectacular attacks on civilian targets and populations, drawing our attention once more to cities as the optimal arenas of destruction. After more than a century of urban sociology the city appears to remain a centripetal force in the organization of the globe. Robert Park, the newspaper man who thought that the city contained the "big story" of a changing society a century ago, might feel that the importance of the city is compromised today by the remote forces of the globe that organize and reorganize society. But he might not. As we have shown here with respect to the aspatializing forces of electronic innovation, of transnationalism linking space to space, and terrorism carrying on its mission worldwide, it is impossible to escape the pull of cities for focusing and concentrating the meaning and experience of social life. Park might well be inclined to argue

that today urban space remains the great laboratory of the human social experiment of living together and apart in the world, and as students of the city we may well be inclined to advance that argument on his behalf. The city and growing urban populations still appear to offer a vital arena for understanding a globalized world. The world is much larger than it was when the first cities formed more than 5,000 years ago, and it is smaller. The city is still the center. We can't say that this will remain so on indefinitely into the future but, for now, it is so.

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About the Author

William G. Flanagan grew up in Stamford, Connecticut, half an hour on a good traffic day from Manhattan, in the industrial South End of one of the factory cities of the megalopolis that stretches from Boston to Washington, D.C. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Connecticut. He lived and taught in Ireland at the National University in Cork for two years before assuming his present position on the Sociology Faculty of Coe College. He has taught a wide range of classes in sociology, specializing in urban sociology, social conflict, and social change. He is author of *Contemporary Urban Sociology* and coauthor of *Urbanization and Social Change in West Africa* (with Josef Gugler). A monograph, "Ireland Now: Tales of Change from the Global Island," was published in 2007. He wrote the "Urban Sociology" entry in the Sage Encyclopedia of Urban Studies (2009). He lives in Iowa City, Iowa.